Lim, Ik Soo ORCID: 0000-0002-9499-8515 and Capraro, Valerio (2021) A synergy of institutional incentives and networked structures in evolutionary game dynamics of multi-agent systems. IEEE Transactions on Circuits and Systems II: Express Briefs, 69 (6). pp. 2777-2781. ISSN 1549-7747 (Print), 1558-3791 (Online) (doi:https://doi.org/10.1109/TCSII.2021.3133711)

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Abstract

Understanding the emergence of prosocial behaviours (e.g., cooperation and trust) among self-interested agents is an important problem in many disciplines. Network structure and institutional incentives (e.g., punishing antisocial agents) are known to promote prosocial behaviours, when acting in isolation, one mechanism being present at a time. Here we study the interplay between these two mechanisms to see whether they are independent, interfering or synergetic. Using evolutionary game theory, we show that punishing antisocial agents and a regular networked structure not only promote prosocial behaviours among agents playing the trust game, but they also interplay with each other, leading to interference or synergy, depending on the game parameters. Synergy emerges on a wider range of parameters than interference does. In this domain, the combination of incentives and networked structure improves the efficiency of incentives, yielding prosocial behaviours at a lower cost than the incentive does alone. This has a significant implication in the promotion of prosocial behaviours in multi-agent systems.

Item Type:	Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:	game theory; multi-agent system; evolutionary dynamics; trust game; synergy
Subjects:	Q Science > QA Mathematics > QA75 Electronic computers. Computer science T Technology > T Technology (General)
Faculty / School / Research Centre / Research Group:	Faculty of Engineering & Science Faculty of Engineering & Science > School of Computing & Mathematical Sciences (CMS)
Last Modified:	07 Jun 2022 16:02
URI:	http://gala.gre.ac.uk/id/eprint/34575

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