Sosnovskikh, Sergey and Cronin, Bruce ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3776-8924 (2025) Public procurement in Russia: state patronage, corruption, and tax evasion. Europe-Asia Studies. ISSN 0966-8136 (Print), 1465-3427 (Online) (In Press)

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Abstract

This study examines public procurement in Russia’s construction sector, highlighting its deep entrenchment in corruption and state patronage. Based on 50 interviews with 27 business and state officials, we find that authorities enable corruption and tax evasion for self-enrichment and power consolidation. Contrary to claims that digitalisation curbs corruption in public procurement, we argue that state patronage sustains a cycle of illegal practices. A weak judiciary reinforces corruption, increasing state intervention, eroding public trust, and lowering tax compliance. As a result, corruption remains socially accepted, making meaningful reform unlikely.

Item Type:	Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:	tax evasion, corruption, Russia, state patronage, public procurement, state-business relations
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > H Social Sciences (General) H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions H Social Sciences > HJ Public Finance
Faculty / School / Research Centre / Research Group:	Greenwich Business School > Networks and Urban Systems Centre (NUSC) Greenwich Business School > Networks and Urban Systems Centre (NUSC) > Centre for Business Network Analysis (CBNA) Greenwich Business School > School of Business, Operations and Strategy Greenwich Business School
Last Modified:	19 Mar 2025 16:45
URI:	http://gala.gre.ac.uk/id/eprint/50083

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