Song, Guoxiang (2021) Large US bank takeovers in 2008: performance and implications. Journal of Capital Markets Studies, 6 (1). pp. 33-47. ISSN 2514-4774 (Online) (doi:10.1108/JCMS-06-2021-0021)

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Abstract

Purpose
Because systemically important banks' takeovers in the US were expected to contain the 2008 global financial crisis (GFC) but were found to have imposed large cost on shareholders, this paper examines the effectiveness of these acquisitions during the GFC and investigates what went wrong with the market for corporate control of large banks.

Design/methodology/approach
This paper presents a model of the disciplinary takeover based on the efficient market hypothesis which provides appropriate measures for it to examine the financial performance of acquiring banks after takeover.

Findings
The results indicate that the takeover market for large banks was ineffective in two aspects: the market did not distinguish strong banks from weak banks before the crisis and acquirers performed worse after takeover. Such ineffectiveness reflects the fundamental deficiencies of large bank takeovers arising from some key distinguishing characteristics of large banks.

Research limitations/implications
The sample size of systemically important banks' takeovers is small so large-sample standard statistical inferences cannot be used.

Practical implications
The deficiencies of large bank takeovers need to be rectified in order to aid in resolving future crises.

Originality/value
This paper provides rare and detailed insight based on case studies of large US bank takeovers during the GFC.

Item Type:	Article
Additional Information:	Publisher: Emerald Publishing Limited Copyright © 2021, Guoxiang Song. 'This AAM is provided for your own personal use only. It may not be used for resale, reprinting, systematic distribution, emailing, or for any other commercial purpose without the permission of the publisher’
Uncontrolled Keywords:	corporate control; disciplinary takeover; systemically important banks; global financial crisis; information asymmetry; pro-cyclicality
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HG Finance
Faculty / School / Research Centre / Research Group:	Faculty of Business Faculty of Business > Department of Accounting & Finance Greenwich Business School > Political Economy, Governance, Finance and Accountability (PEGFA)
Last Modified:	02 Dec 2024 16:08
URI:	http://gala.gre.ac.uk/id/eprint/34294

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