With whom to ally? Alliance strategy for EV battery supplier considering echelon utilization and disassembly recycling
Fang, Zhangzhen, Guo, Yuhan, Lou, Gaoxiang, Lai, Zhixuan, Ma, Haicheng and Zhou, Li ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7132-5935
(2026)
With whom to ally? Alliance strategy for EV battery supplier considering echelon utilization and disassembly recycling.
Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, 208:104656.
ISSN 1366-5545 (Print), 1878-5794 (Online)
(doi:10.1016/j.tre.2025.104656)
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PDF (Author's Accepted Manuscript)
52257 ZHOU_With_Whom_To_Ally_Alliance _Strategy_For_EV_Battery_Supplier_(AAM)_2026.pdf - Accepted Version Restricted to Repository staff only until 12 January 2027. Available under License Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial No Derivatives. Download (3MB) | Request a copy |
Abstract
The rapid expansion of the electric vehicle (EV) industry has heightened the need for sustainable and efficient closed-loop supply chains (CLSC) that can simultaneously improve economic returns and mitigate environmental impacts. To address this challenge, this study develops a game-theoretic model from the perspective of the power battery supplier and examines four inter-firm alliance modes: Non-alliance (N), supplier-manufacturer alliance (SM), supplier-recycler alliance (SR), and comprehensive alliance (SMR). The results reveal that (1) in the forward supply chain, suppliers under the SM and SMR modes consistently achieve higher battery capacity and EV sales. In the reverse supply chain, suppliers in alliance modes (SM, SR, SMR) are able to pay lower recycling prices while securing higher recycling quantities. (2) When recycling competition is weak, alliance with the manufacturer improves economic performance, whereas that with the recycler enhances environmental outcomes; however, the two benefits cannot be achieved simultaneously. By contrast, under intense recycling competition, forming a comprehensive alliance allows suppliers to improve both environmental and economic performance. (3) When extending the analysis to include suppliers’ investment in echelon utilization technology innovation, increased recycling competition intensity leads to a decline in the supplier’s echelon utilization performance, thereby amplifying the advantage of the comprehensive alliance.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | EV battery, echelon utilisation, business strategy |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > H Social Sciences (General) H Social Sciences > HF Commerce T Technology > T Technology (General) |
| Faculty / School / Research Centre / Research Group: | Greenwich Business School Greenwich Business School > Networks and Urban Systems Centre (NUSC) Greenwich Business School > Networks and Urban Systems Centre (NUSC) > Connected Cities Research Group (CCRG) Greenwich Business School > School of Business, Operations and Strategy |
| Last Modified: | 12 Jan 2026 15:18 |
| URI: | https://gala.gre.ac.uk/id/eprint/52275 |
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