Skip navigation

Inequality aversion and prosocial punishment: evidence from a one-shot public goods game

Inequality aversion and prosocial punishment: evidence from a one-shot public goods game

Andersson, Per F., Testori, Martina ORCID logoORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7292-7129 and Lo Iacono, Sergio (2025) Inequality aversion and prosocial punishment: evidence from a one-shot public goods game. PLoS ONE. ISSN 1932-6203 (In Press)

[thumbnail of Author's Accepted Manuscript]
Preview
PDF (Author's Accepted Manuscript)
51707 TESTORI_Inequality_Aversion_and_Prosocial_Punishment_Evidence_From_a_One-shot_Public_Goods_Game_(AAM)_2025.pdf - Accepted Version
Available under License Creative Commons Attribution.

Download (223kB) | Preview

Abstract

The willingness to engage in costly punishment of free riders (prosocial punishment) is crucial to foster group cooperation and understand public goods provision. While prosocial punishment is common across societies, its motivations remain unclear. Scholars have suggested that people resist inequitable outcomes and willingly bear costs to sanction free riders, seeking a fairer distribution of payoffs. This study tests a key implication of such fairness-driven arguments: if inequality aversion drives prosocial
punishment, individuals should punish less when redistribution occurs, as equality concerns would be already satisfied. We conducted a pre-registered 2x2 between-subjects lab experiment (N=320), where participants completed a Social Value Orientation (SVO) task and played a one-shot Public Goods Game (PGG) with a Punishment Stage. We manipulated endowment inequality and the presence of redistributive taxation. Pre-registered analyses show that (1) inequality aversion does not predict prosocial punishment; (2) punishment levels do not significantly differ across treatments. However, exploratory results suggest that under high inequality, redistribution reduces the intensity of punishment towards richer individuals. This could indicate that inequality aversion triggers prosocial punishment only at acute inequality levels.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: inequality, taxation, public goods game, pre-registered
Subjects: H Social Sciences > H Social Sciences (General)
H Social Sciences > HN Social history and conditions. Social problems. Social reform
H Social Sciences > HV Social pathology. Social and public welfare
Faculty / School / Research Centre / Research Group: Greenwich Business School
Greenwich Business School > Networks and Urban Systems Centre (NUSC)
Last Modified: 24 Nov 2025 16:41
URI: https://gala.gre.ac.uk/id/eprint/51707

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item

Downloads

Downloads per month over past year

View more statistics