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The unsustainable political economy of investor–state dispute settlement mechanisms

The unsustainable political economy of investor–state dispute settlement mechanisms

Weghmann, Vera and Hall, David (2021) The unsustainable political economy of investor–state dispute settlement mechanisms. International Review of Administrative Science. ISSN 0020-8523 (Print), 1461-7226 (Online) (In Press) (doi:https://doi.org/10.1177/00208523211007898)

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Abstract

Investor–state dispute settlement mechanisms were intended to protect companies from the Global North against expropriation by Global South countries. Since 2000, investor–state dispute settlement mechanisms have increasingly been used against Northern countries to obtain compensation for and constrain policy decisions around nationalisation and remunicipalisation, as well as around the environmental or social regulation of service provision that threatens commercial interests. Social movements and governments alike resisted investor–state dispute settlement mechanisms, and despite the power wielded by multinational companies, the global trend is now to exclude investor–state dispute settlement mechanisms from new investment treaties. The purpose of this article is to provide a political-economy analysis of the processes of supporting and contesting the role of investor–state dispute settlement mechanisms in international treaties, processes that include activity at national, sub-national and international levels. The ensuing conflicts are analysed in terms of post-colonial contradictions over sovereignty under globalisation, continued contestation over the role of the public sector and climate change policies.

Item Type: Article
Additional Information: © The Author(s) 2021. This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) which permits any use, reproduction and distribution of the work without further permission provided the original work is attributed as specified on the SAGE and Open Access pages (https://us.sagepub.com/en-us/nam/open-access-at-sage).
Uncontrolled Keywords: bilateral investment treaties, compensation, Energy Charter Treaty, environmental regulations, globalisation, investor–state dispute settlement mechanism, municipalisation, nationalisation, populism
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Faculty / Department / Research Group: Faculty of Business
Faculty of Business > Centre for Work and Employment Research (CREW)
Faculty of Business > Centre for Work and Employment Research (CREW) > Public Services International Research Unit (PSIRU)
Faculty of Business > Department of Human Resources & Organisational Behaviour
Last Modified: 18 May 2021 21:02
Selected for GREAT 2016: None
Selected for GREAT 2017: None
Selected for GREAT 2018: None
Selected for GREAT 2019: None
Selected for REF2021: None
URI: http://gala.gre.ac.uk/id/eprint/32717

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