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Task constraints distinguish perspective inferences from perspective use during discourse interpretation in a false belief task

Task constraints distinguish perspective inferences from perspective use during discourse interpretation in a false belief task

Ferguson, Heather J., Apperly, Ian, Ahmad, Jumana ORCID: 0000-0001-5271-0731, Binderman, Markus and Cane, James (2015) Task constraints distinguish perspective inferences from perspective use during discourse interpretation in a false belief task. Cognition, 139. pp. 50-70. ISSN 0010-0277 (doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2015.02.010)

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Abstract

Interpreting other peoples’ actions relies on an understanding of their current mental states (e.g. beliefs, desires and intentions). In this paper, we distinguish between listeners’ ability to infer others’ perspectives and their explicit use of this knowledge to predict subsequent actions. In a visual-world study, two groups of participants (passive observers vs. active participants) watched short videos, depicting transfer events, where one character (‘Jane’) either held a true or false belief about an object’s location. We tracked participants’ eye-movements around the final visual scene, time-locked to related auditory descriptions (e.g. “Jane will look for the chocolates in the container on the left.”). Results showed that active participants had already inferred the character’s belief in the 1 second preview period prior to auditory onset, before it was possible to use this information to predict an outcome. Moreover, they used this inference to correctly anticipate reference to the object’s initial location on false belief trials at the earliest possible point (i.e. from “Jane” onwards). In contrast, passive observers only showed evidence of a belief inference from the onset of “Jane”, and did not show reliable use of this inference to predict Jane’s behaviour on false belief trials until much later, when the location (“left/right”) was auditorily available. These results show that active engagement in a task activates earlier inferences about others’ perspectives, and drives immediate use of this information to anticipate others’ actions, compared to passive observers, who are susceptible to influences from egocentric or reality biases. Finally, we review evidence that using other peoples’ perspectives to predict their behaviour is more cognitively effortful than simply using one’s own.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: Theory of mind, false belief, eye-tracking, perspective use, cognitive effort
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BF Psychology
Faculty / Department / Research Group: Faculty of Education & Health
Faculty of Education & Health > Department of Psychology, Social Work & Counselling
Last Modified: 11 Jul 2019 11:36
Selected for GREAT 2016: None
Selected for GREAT 2017: None
Selected for GREAT 2018: None
Selected for GREAT 2019: None
URI: http://gala.gre.ac.uk/id/eprint/24687

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