Banerjee, Prasenjit, Iversen, Vegard, Mitra, Sandip and Sen, Kunal (2024) Politicians, institutional incentives and citizen welfare: evidence from a lab-in-the-field experiment in India. Oxford Economic Papers. ISSN 0030-7653 (Print), 1464-3812 (Online) (doi:10.1093/oep/gpae028)

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Abstract

We examine how politicians and non-politicians in rural India respond to behavioural incentives. Using a modified dictator game, we vary treatments (and incentives) across the nature of interactions, the visibility of actions, and an upfront promise. Under anonymity, politicians and non-politicians behave selfishly: both become significantly more generous when interactions are personalized. However, while non-politicians respond to greater visibility more strongly than politicians, an upfront promise induces more pronounced politician responses. Whereas promise-breaking appears to be more costly for politicians, visibility, via social image concerns, appears to matter more for non-politicians. This mix of similarity and heterogeneity in response suggests that evidence about the behaviour of real-world politicians is more important for effective policy design than acknowledged so far.

Item Type:	Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:	asymmetric information, politician behaviour, social preferences, promises, dictator game, India
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HM Sociology
Faculty / School / Research Centre / Research Group:	Faculty of Engineering & Science Faculty of Engineering & Science > Natural Resources Institute Faculty of Engineering & Science > Natural Resources Institute > Centre for Society, Environment and Development (CSED) Faculty of Engineering & Science > Natural Resources Institute > Centre for Society, Environment and Development (CSED) > Gender & Social Difference
Last Modified:	20 Aug 2024 09:39
URI:	http://gala.gre.ac.uk/id/eprint/47563

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