Su, Larry (2010) An empirical investigation of managerial compensation in publicly listed corporations in China. In: Proceedings - 2010 2nd IEEE International Conference on Information and Financial Engineering, ICIFE 2010. IEEE Computer Society, Piscataway, NJ, USA, pp. 926-930. ISBN 9781424469277 (print), 9781424469260 (online) (doi:10.1109/ICIFE.2010.5609505)

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Abstract

Using an unbalanced panel which consists of a total of 43626 executives in 1362 publicly listed corporations (PLCs) in China during 1999 and 2007, this paper empirically examines several theories of managerial compensation. The paper finds that pay increases as executives move up the corporate hierarchy into higher ranks. In addition, pay gap is the largest between the first and second tier executives. Moreover, pay dispersion is positively related to the number of tournament participants, the level of noise in the business environment and firm performance. The empirical results are consistent with the tournament theory and against equity, relative deprivation and sabotage theories.

Item Type:	Conference Proceedings
Title of Proceedings:	Proceedings - 2010 2nd IEEE International Conference on Information and Financial Engineering, ICIFE 2010
Additional Information:	This paper forms part of the published proceedings from the 2nd IEEE International Conference on Information and Financial Engineering (ICIFE), held 17-19 September 2010, Chongqing, China.
Uncontrolled Keywords:	China, firm performance, human resources, managerial compensation, tournament theory
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor
Faculty / School / Research Centre / Research Group:	Faculty of Business > Department of International Business & Economics
Related URLs:	Publisher Organisation
Last Modified:	14 Oct 2016 09:10
URI:	http://gala.gre.ac.uk/id/eprint/4110

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