Ugur, Mehmet ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3891-3641 and Trushin, Eshref (2021) Information asymmetry, risk aversion and R&D subsidies: Effect-size heterogeneity and policy conundrums. In: Royal Economic Society (RES) 2021 Annual Conference, 12-14 April 2021, Virtual. (Submitted)

Preview

PDF (Conference Presentation) 32224 UGUR_Information_Asymmetry_and_Risk_Aversion_2021.pdf - Presentation Download (1MB) | Preview

Abstract

Drawing on the theory of contracts and Schumpeterian models of innovation, we argue that direct public support for business R&D may deliver sub-optimal outcomes if firms are risk-averse and have private information about their R&D productivity. Using observable proxies for risk aversion and R&D productivity, we report that the average treatment effect (ATT) in the sample of sample of 43,650 British firms is positive but highly heterogenous. The ATTs tend to be: (a) insignificant or negligible when the perceived risk of R&D investment is high due to crisis episodes or because of investment in basic research; (b) insignificant among larger and older firms and firms closer to the R&D frontier; and (c) positive and larger than the average among small and young firms and firms further away from the R&D frontier. Our findings point out to conundrums in the use of R&D subsidies as an innovation policy tool: The case for R&D subsidies is stronger during economic downturns, when the investment is in basic R&D and when firms have a higher probability of innovation success; but the subsidy is less likely to increase business R&D under these conditions.

Item Type:	Conference or Conference Paper (Paper)
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Treatment effect, R&D subsidy, innovation, additionality, entropy balancing, contract theory, Schumpeterian models
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Faculty / School / Research Centre / Research Group:	Faculty of Business Faculty of Business > Department of International Business & Economics Faculty of Business > Institute of Political Economy, Governance, Finance and Accountability (IPEGFA) Faculty of Business > Institute of Political Economy, Governance, Finance and Accountability (IPEGFA) > Greenwich Political Economy Research Centre (GPERC) Greenwich Business School > Political Economy, Governance, Finance and Accountability (PEGFA)
Last Modified:	02 Dec 2024 16:09
URI:	http://gala.gre.ac.uk/id/eprint/32224

Actions (login required)

View Item

Downloads