Khalifa, Mohamed ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0003-2589-9921 (2026) Shareholder coordination and waste management. Business Strategy and the Environment (BSE). pp. 1-16. ISSN 0964-4733 (Print), 1099-0836 (Online) (doi:10.1002/bse.71065)

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Abstract

This study examines how shareholder coordination relates to corporate waste management. Drawing on 1059 firm-year observations from S&P 500 firms between 2010 and 2022, we show that higher levels of coordination among shareholders correspond to reduced waste generation. This effect is more pronounced in firms whose coordinated shareholders are more common. Moreover, we find that this negative coordination–waste link is stronger in firms with a higher CEO pay gap, lower board co-option, and lower analyst coverage. Furthermore, we propose that shareholder coordination reduces waste generation through three mechanisms: agency costs, information asymmetry, and financial constraints. Our main results remain robust after a variety of endogeneity tests.

Item Type:	Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:	environmental performance, geographic proximity, institutional investor heterogeneity, shareholder coordination, waste management
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > H Social Sciences (General) H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor > HD28 Management. Industrial Management
Faculty / School / Research Centre / Research Group:	Greenwich Business School Greenwich Business School > School of Accounting, Finance and Economics
Last Modified:	04 Jun 2026 15:45
URI:	https://gala.gre.ac.uk/id/eprint/53655

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