

1 **Business network strategies and performance of**
2 **specialized, advanced, differentiated, and innovative**
3 **(SADI) Chinese companies**

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7 **Abstract**

8 Hidden champions are highly successful companies operating in niche markets, playing a key role in global supply
9 chains. Recently, the Chinese government has launched a national strategy for selecting and supporting their own
10 hidden champions, also called specialized, advanced, differentiated, and innovative (SADI) companies.
11 Nonetheless, it is still unclear if these companies are different from non-Chinese hidden champions and whether
12 their business strategies lead to different performance results. In this study, we investigate how SADI's business
13 networking strategy relates to their performance, using data from Orbis M&A and the list of hidden champions
14 published by the Chinese Ministry of Industry and Information Technology. By mapping the business network,
15 our results show that SADI companies that establish joint ventures with companies from the same industry
16 experience a positive increase in their performance metrics, however unique to the Chinese context Chinese SADI
17 companies do not benefit fully from formal international collaborations.

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20 **Keywords**

21 China; Hidden champions; Business network; Joint ventures; Social Network Analysis.

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36 Introduction

37 Hidden champions are small and medium enterprises (SMEs) which are considered market leaders in specific
38 industries. They usually show a high level of self-reliance, high growth potential and unrivalled competitiveness,
39 and these qualities facilitate them to survive in global markets (Kim, 2016). They are globally in the top positions
40 in their niche, thanks to their hyper-specialisation, focus on innovation, and strong emphasis on
41 internationalisation (Audretsch et al., 2018; Schenkenhofer, 2022; Simon, 1990). Traditionally, many hidden
42 champions are family-owned (e.g. Johann et al., 2022) and according to Simon (2022, p. 13), who first introduced
43 this concept, they should have the following characteristics:

- 44 • they must be among the top three in the world in their market, or number one on their continent;
- 45 • their revenue must be less than €5 billion;
- 46 • they must have a low level of awareness among the general public.

47 Despite their small size, hidden champions usually achieve global market leadership by pursuing a focused niche
48 market strategy, increasing their presence in new markets, and boosting competitiveness (Simon, 1990). This
49 requires high knowledge intensity and a level of specialisation and differentiation which results in high barriers
50 to entry, meaning there are no more than two to three competing companies within the same market. This is why
51 world market leadership is often attained in the hidden champions (Schenkenhofer, 2022): it is the pursuit of the
52 niche strategy which is the key characteristic that distinguishes hidden champions from other SMEs.

53 Hidden champions are fundamental for large manufacturing economies, and in the last decades the business
54 literature has explored in depth what is driving their success (Schenkenhofer, 2022; Simon, 1990). However, while
55 most of the studies has concentrated on European countries, only in recent years we have seen an increase in
56 research on Asian hidden champions (Lalić & Purg, 2021; Lee & Chung, 2018), driven by the rapid increase in
57 the number of champions observed since the beginning of the century, especially in China (Greeven et al., 2019).
58 Interestingly, the Chinese government has recently launched (in 2016) a national strategy for supporting
59 specialized, advanced, differentiated, and innovative (SADI) companies (专精特新), which are ‘niche leaders
60 with the characteristics of hidden champions’ (Lei et al., 2025, p. 2). This strategy identifies and provides special
61 support to these companies, aimed at creating a favourable business environment by offering financial support
62 and tax incentives, investing in research and development (R&D) to enhance their competitiveness, and contribute
63 to economic growth. Overall, SADI companies share the following aspects with their non-Chinese counterparts:
64 a narrow focus on their niche market, a high technical specialisation, and the objective of having a high market
65 share (Lei et al., 2025). On the other hand, they also differ in their cost leadership strategy and adaptation to
66 rapidly changing institutional environments (Lei & Wu, 2022). Moreover, SADI companies are encouraged to
67 develop synergies with domestic and international partners, to strengthen their financial performance and the
68 supply chain security of the country (Hänle et al., 2022; Zhu et al., 2023). The creation of business networks
69 enables companies to address market challenges and satisfying customers’ needs (Wu & Lei, 2021). Nevertheless,
70 these business networks are not randomly created, but they follow a precise company strategy. Previous studies
71 have investigated the importance of collaboration within value chains and international collaborations for non-
72 Chinese hidden champions (Lee & Chung, 2018; Petraite & Dlugoborskyte, 2017; Simon, 2022), finding that
73 these companies do not search for collaborations aimed towards the diversification of their products (Voudouris
74 et al., 2000) nor they want to concentrate on formal partnerships only (Din et al., 2013). However, it is unclear if
75 this applies to SADI companies as well and if the search for specific domestic and international collaborations is
76 impacting their performance.

77 Although SADI companies share several characteristics with hidden champions in developed economies, their
78 strategic behaviour is shaped by a very different institutional and capability context. As relatively latecomer firms
79 operating within a policy-driven industrial environment (Hänle et al., 2022; Lei & Wu, 2022), they often lack the
80 long-term, path-dependent accumulation of technological capabilities that characterises German hidden
81 champions (Audretsch et al., 2018; Simon, 1990). As a result, business networks play a broader and more strategic
82 role for SADI companies: they function not only as relational assets, but also as mechanisms for accessing
83 complementary knowledge, upgrading internal capabilities, and expanding market reach (Wu & Lei, 2021; Zhu
84 et al., 2023). This suggests that the network strategies adopted by SADI companies are qualitatively different from
85 those of hidden champions in advanced economies and therefore require more focused theoretical examination.

86 Therefore, this paper aims to address the following research question: how SADI networking strategies support
87 their performance? Our empirical analysis is based on the use of secondary data collected from Orbis M&A and
88 the Chinese Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, and it focuses on the business networks of SADI
89 companies involved in domestic and international joint ventures. Our data covers the 2017-2023 period, which
90 accounts for a two-years pre-policy period (2017-2018) and the entire policy period (2019-2022) plus a one year
91 after-policy period (2023, for assessing the performance of those companies identified as SADI in the last period);
92 the analysis draws upon the application of network statistics and panel econometric models to assess the impact
93 of business network strategies on SADI performance. From a theoretical point of view, we contribute to the social
94 network and business network literature by investigating how networking strategies of a relatively new type of
95 companies (SADI), conceptually developed around the idea of hidden champions, can influence their
96 performance.

97 The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. The next section discusses our main theoretical framework
98 and the literature on hidden champions in general and SADI in particular. The Methodology section describes our
99 data collection process and the modelling. Results are presented in the fourth section, while their discussion is
100 included in the fifth section. Finally, the last section concludes, highlighting strengths and limitations of our work.

101 **Literature review**

102 **Unique characteristics of hidden champions and SADI companies**

103 Research on hidden champions have been pioneered by Hermann Simon on German manufacturing companies,
104 they can be seen as top-performing anomalies in a business ecosystem, and are characterised by: ambitious
105 leadership, focused strategy, innovation, close customer relations, and internationalization (Simon, 2009). Critical
106 to maintaining their competitiveness and market leadership, innovation is at the forefront of these companies: it
107 was found that vertical integration is critical for hidden champions to protect their quality standard, retain their
108 knowledge, and to maintain their contracts (Audretsch et al., 2018). They frequently operate in B2B markets and
109 are usually seen in various forms of engineering for which technology is key to their success. They keep the core
110 aspects of their business relatively unchanged; instead, technology improvements are viewed to satisfy customer
111 needs, to forge stronger customer relationships and increase loyalty - and therefore greater interdependency to
112 their customers (Kožo & Braček Lalić, 2021). Simultaneously, continuous interactions with the customers allow
113 intensively contribution to the innovation process, which is beneficial as it allows hidden champions to offer
114 tailored products for specific uses (Baloh, 2013). On average, around 6% of hidden champions' revenues are spent
115 on R&D, which is approximately twice as much as standard companies; additionally, hidden champions submit
116 patents significantly more than other companies (Simon, 2009).

117 Most of these characteristics can be found in SADI companies as well; however, there are also several aspects
118 which mark a difference between Chinese companies and their non-Chinese counterparts. As highlighted in the
119 Introduction, in 2016 the Chinese Ministry of Industry and Information Technology introduced a policy initiative
120 called "Implementation Plan of Special Action for Cultivating and Promoting Manufacturing Champion
121 Enterprises", as a follow-up of the "Made in China 2025" master plan (Lei et al., 2022). This initiative was
122 specifically designed to promote high-tech Chinese manufacturing companies, with the objective to financially
123 support them. Moreover, in 2021 Beijing issued a guideline¹ announcing that by 2025 the country will develop
124 10,000 SADI companies specialized in niche sectors and will aim to have 1,000 companies considered champions
125 in a single industry, focusing on core industrial components, materials, processes and cutting-edge technology.
126 The Chinese government invested CNY 10 billion to support SADI companies, providing preferential support in
127 terms of subsidies, tax breaks and grants to help boost China's global technological position, with Xi Jinping
128 expressing hopes that these champions will 'play a more importance role in stabilising supply chains and
129 promoting economic and social development'². This is a rather important difference between non-Chinese hidden
130 champions and SADI companies: while the former have never been labelled as 'champions' by their governments,
131 SADI companies are included in an official list and their presence in such list is not permanent - they must be able
132 to retain their accreditation every three years.

¹ See here: <https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202107/1227877.shtml>

² See here: <https://www.scmp.com/tech/policy/article/3191908/china-has-named-nearly-9000-little-giants-push-preference-home-grown>

133 Upon examining additional policies released by the Chinese government, China's position towards SADI
134 companies can be summarised as follows³: first, SADI companies are encouraged to invest in scientific and
135 technological innovation, enhance research and development capabilities, and promote technological innovation
136 and industrial upgrading - especially in areas such as artificial intelligence, big data, the Internet of Things, and
137 biotechnology. Second, SADI companies can benefit of simplified bureaucratic procedures such as the registration
138 and approval processes for enterprises and the provision of entrepreneurship training and consulting services.
139 Third, the government will work on strengthening the financial support system for SADI companies, by providing
140 additional line of credits and venture capital funds, thus reducing the financing difficulties faced by these
141 companies and promoting their rapid development. Finally, the government will encourage SADI companies to
142 actively participate in international cooperation and expanding in overseas markets; in this regard, these
143 companies will receive more support in terms of market access facilitation and intellectual property protection.
144 Considered all together, these government supported initiatives make Chinese SADI companies inherently
145 different from non-Chinese hidden champions. However, while the Chinese government's objectives and policy
146 tools are clear, little is known about the impact of these tools on SADI companies' performance - and in particular
147 the role played by local and international collaborations and business networks.

148 **Business networks and performance**

149 Simon (2022) has shown that all hidden champions develop business networks as part of their own strategy;
150 moreover, Lehmann et al. (2025) have found that these champions benefit from spillovers effects and spatial
151 cluster proximity, i.e. business relationships are particularly important for the development of these companies.
152 Using network theory as theoretical lens can help researchers to better understand a company's strategy in light
153 of the presence of other stakeholders - i.e. considering the presence of inter-organisational relationships (Grandori
154 & Soda, 1995; Ter Wal & Boschma, 2009). Business networks can support a stronger integration with upstream
155 and downstream suppliers, enabling companies to strengthen their supply chain and becoming more competitive
156 at global level. At the same time, Simon (2022) pointed out that, different from other SMEs, hidden champions
157 are strongly vertically integrated; this is supported by Lee and Chung (2018) and Greeven et al. (2019), who found
158 that these companies tend to avoid excessive formal dependency on others. Moreover, hidden champions have a
159 strong tendency towards operating independently and not creating large networks (Din et al., 2013): they carefully
160 select their partners based on their specialisation and capacity of providing support for innovation and
161 technological advancement (Din et al., 2013; Petraite & Dlugoborskyte, 2017). In developed economies, therefore,
162 business networks of hidden champions tend to be relatively narrow and deep, reinforcing existing value chains
163 and allowing firms to protect proprietary knowledge while maintaining high quality standards (Audretsch et al.,
164 2018; Simon, 2009). Collaboration is often oriented toward upstream and downstream partners in the same or
165 closely related industries, and many relationships remain informal or customer-centred rather than formalised
166 through equity ties (Din et al., 2013; Schenkenhofer, 2022). According to network theory, this selection process
167 may be influenced by two opposite phenomena: homophily and heterophily. In the case of homophily, companies
168 choose similar partners; in the case of heterophily, companies choose partners that possess different characteristics
169 (McPherson et al., 2001).

170 However, what has been found for non-Chinese hidden champions might be different in the Chinese context.
171 Because of their capacity to massively invest in R&D, and the opportunities offered by the aforementioned policy
172 tools, SADI companies may be more pro-active in establishing formal partnerships with other companies to
173 achieve a better performance. Moreover, these companies - which operate in high-tech and advanced
174 manufacturing sectors such as electronics, information technology, robotics, and biotechnology (Ding et al., 2023)
175 - are likely to establish formal partnerships in different industrial sector, and therefore following an heterophily-
176 based approach, because of their niche expertise. According to Lei and Wu (2022), the Chinese context is
177 characterised by a situation of continuous but unbalanced growth, and managers of SADI companies are better
178 prepared to respond to external challenges in mature and concentrated industries. Hence, strengthening their
179 position in their sector via the creation of new opportunities in other sectors, which can enable the exchange of

³ According to the 'Opinions on Strengthening the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights', 'Opinions on Supporting the Strengthening, Improvement, and Growth of Small, Medium, and Micro Enterprises' and 'Several Opinions on Promoting the Innovation and Development of Small and Micro Enterprises' published by the General Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China in 2015, 2016 and 2018, 'Guiding Opinions on Promoting High-Quality Development of the Manufacturing Industry' published in 2018 by the State Council of the People's Republic of China.

180 knowledge for innovation (Chen et al., 2022), can be a strategy for improving their financial performance. Greeven
181 et al. (2019) pointed out that most of SADI companies are wary of formal partnerships, and they rather prefer to
182 internalize R&D activities and production processes as much as possible: but they are also strongly committed to
183 'develop an indigenous R&D capability for creating a sustainable competitive advantage' (Greeven et al., 2019,
184 p. 63). This may lead them to rely on networking with companies and stakeholders possessing a different expertise
185 to strengthen their performance, as observed by Shao et al. (2025) and in contrast with non-Chinese hidden
186 champions. For SADI companies, business networks therefore serve a broader role than for traditional hidden
187 champions. Beyond supporting supply chain integration or market access, formal relationships such as joint
188 ventures can be understood as mechanisms for capability building: they enable firms to tap into complementary
189 technologies, managerial know-how, and market knowledge that may be underdeveloped internally due to their
190 latecomer status and rapid growth (Chen et al., 2022; Wu & Lei, 2021). In other words, networks are not only
191 relational assets but also learning platforms through which SADI companies can experiment with new domains,
192 upgrade their innovation capabilities, and reduce the risks associated with entering unfamiliar industries or
193 markets. This stands in contrast to many European hidden champions, whose networks primarily leverage already
194 accumulated capabilities rather than substituting for them. Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis:

195 H1: Establishing formal business networks with companies in different industrial sector has a positive effect on
196 the performance of SADI companies.

197 The establishment of business networks is also strictly related to the internationalisation strategy of a company.
198 Business network studies have highlighted the importance of establishing global connections for improving key
199 performance indicators of innovativeness, productivity, and market positioning (Cannizzaro, 2020; Cuypers et al.,
200 2020): even the original authors of the Uppsala model (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977) have recently published a study
201 for discussing the 'process of internationalization as one of co-evolution with network members' (Vahlne &
202 Johanson, 2020, p. 5). In the case of hidden champions, there is an existing understanding that the
203 internationalisation strategy of these companies has in the past followed a low commitment (Simon, 2009).
204 Overall, hidden champions are considered an anomaly as they are very export focused yet have a large presence
205 in international markets; these companies prefer adopting an export driven strategy but avoiding the use of
206 intermediaries such as agents, thus relying less on what, in network theory, are called brokers (Cuypers et al.,
207 2020). It is acknowledged that when hidden champions internationalise, they prefer to do this alone particularly
208 with regards to establishing an overseas manufacturing, sales and service presence (Simon, 2009; Venohr &
209 Meyer, 2007; Witt, 2010; Witt & Carr, 2013). Audretsch et al. (2018) argued that the reason for the witnessed
210 internationalisation strategies of hidden champions is that they prefer a strong vertical integration strategy which
211 is a requirement to protect themselves from knowledge theft as well as to maintain high their standard of quality
212 of product and service offered. Following a property rights' point of view, it is expected that vertical integration
213 is essential to potentially reducing the number of contracts lost to the market. This explains why a large number
214 of direct export and wholly owned subsidiaries are witnessed in the internationalisation strategies of hidden
215 champions (Witt, 2010). Since the origins and the success behind these companies are typically technology-based
216 assets, hidden champions prefer direct export and their mode of international market entry as it permits them to
217 retain a high degree of control given that they rely heavily on their own assets. Critically, having complete control
218 allows them to protect their technological assets, for this reason, hidden champions will characteristically need to
219 secure unequivocal property rights.

220 When considering SADI companies, scholars have highlighted similarities and differences with European and
221 American hidden champions, in terms of internationalisation strategies. A different approach towards international
222 networks has been recently observed in Asian companies (in particular, Koreans and Chinese) by Samson and Lee
223 (2021) and Hänle et al. (2022b). In their paper, the latter showed that when these companies create new formal
224 business relationships, they tend to associate with top-level partners, because this gives them legitimacy to operate
225 in new markets. At the same time, they also want to be better embedded in global value chains (Galizzi et al.,
226 2025), but sometimes this is not always feasible because of the lack of access to financing and the unpredictable
227 institutional environment - which make internationalisation less appealing from an economic and financial point
228 of view. Business network theory and social network theory have slightly different views on how to measure
229 embeddedness in international business (Galizzi et al., 2025): as for the former, embeddedness can be measured
230 at dyadic level, looking at the quality of business relationships; in social network theory, embeddedness is usually

231 measured as tie strength and considering the company's position in the network. Hence, according to the social
232 network theory, alliance networks based on strong relationships may indicate the presence of a high level of
233 embeddedness. Other authors (Hänle et al., 2022a) pointed out that recent literature on Chinese SMEs and SADI
234 companies has shown how their internationalisation is driven by formal business networks. While non-Chinese
235 hidden champions' performance may be influenced by their strong vertical integration, SADI companies may
236 have an interest in strengthening international networks because of tangible and non-tangible benefits. Therefore,
237 we argue that:

238 H2: Establishing formal business networks with companies in different countries has a positive effect on the
239 performance of SADI companies.

240 **Methodology**

241 **Empirical context and data**

242 Empirical studies on hidden champions have concentrated on different countries: for instance, Germany
243 (Audretsch et al., 2018; Mear & Werner, 2021; Rietmann, 2023), Greece (Voudouris et al., 2000), Japan (Namba,
244 2014), South Korea (Kim, 2016; Lee & Chung, 2018), and Türkiye (Yosun & Çetindamar, 2013). In recent years,
245 a growing interest on China has emerged (Lei & Wu, 2022; Lei et al., 2022; Zhu et al., 2023), because of the
246 increase of SADI companies (Simon, 2022) both in numerical terms and financial performance.

247 For mapping business networks, we use joint ventures data (referring to the 2017-2023 period) about Chinese
248 companies collected from Orbis M&A. As pointed out by Opper (2023), inter-organisational networks such as
249 joint ventures enable companies to access specialised knowledge and new distribution channels, thus making them
250 more competitive. In the long run, companies may be able to generate synergies and therefore achieving economic
251 and financial benefits. These formal relationships were chosen for mapping business networks because of the
252 following reasons. First, in the international business and management literature, they are considered
253 representative of a company's networking strategy (e.g. Chae et al., 2022; De Man & Duysters, 2005; Xia et al.,
254 2018): they show what formal relationships have been established, the resources involved in establishing and
255 maintaining such relationships, and their impact on the company's performance. Second, joint ventures are key
256 for understanding companies' investment decisions and their likelihood to entering into new markets. Finally, joint
257 ventures have been used in previous business studies to investigate companies' strategic behaviour in domestic
258 and international markets (Carnovale et al., 2016; Shi et al., 2014; Yenyurt & Carnovale, 2017). The focus on
259 deals made by SADI companies relates to our choice of adopting a (national) case study approach. We aim to
260 investigate the network dynamics characterising these companies, and we considered both domestic and
261 international deals in order to test our hypotheses. A similar approach was taken by Shi et al. (2014) in their
262 research on alliance networks for attracting foreign partners: they focused on strategic relationships at national
263 level in China, to understand if network centrality has an impact on international partnerships.

264 The original dataset from Orbis M&A consisted of 1,128 deals involving 1,907 entities⁴. We merged this dataset
265 with the last updated list of SADI companies published by the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology
266 in 2022; this list can be found in the Zero One Think Tank platform, an executive secretary unit of the Digital
267 Economy Research Group of the China Science and Technology System Reform Research Association. There are
268 9,279 companies included in this list, of which 248 from the first wave of companies recognized by the Chinese
269 government⁵, 1,744 from the second, 2,930 from the third, and 4,357 from the fourth. Around 20% of these 9,279
270 companies are located in just two provinces (Zhejiang and Guangdong), and in general the majority of them can
271 be found in the eastern coastal area of the country. For the merging process, we used a combination of two different
272 keys: the Bureau van Dijk identification number, which is available in all the Bureau van Dijk's databases, and
273 the tax identification number. Since we want to test the impact of internationalisation and industry diversification
274 on performance, our analysis concentrates on the companies from the first and second wave which established
275 joint ventures. With those companies included in the third and fourth wave, we do not have enough data to test
276 our hypotheses, because the last available observation year for financial data in Orbis is 2022. The merging process
277 resulted in the identification of 100 companies, 14 from the first wave and 86 from the second wave, which

⁴ Note: in ORBIS M&A, a potential entity is called "Individuals", which includes unnamed acquirors or targets. We treated this entity as a single one, but we are aware that it may include multiple actors. Therefore, 1,907 entities are a conservative estimate.

⁵ The Chinese government launched the first wave in 2019; the list has been periodically updated with more hidden champions in 2020 (second wave), 2021 (third wave), and 2022 (fourth wave).

278 established joint ventures during the 2017-2023 period. Our final database is a balanced panel including these 100
279 companies and covering the post-policy period 2019-2022.

280 **Variables and method**

281 Our dependent variable is financial performance, which is measured by using three main indicators: revenues,
282 EBITDA, and profit margin in US dollars. We decided to concentrate on three different measures of performance
283 because different networking strategies may have different impacts on performance, depending on what
284 performance aspects are considered (Chen et al., 2025; Ferriani & MacMillan, 2017; Lau et al., 2020). Moreover,
285 this helps in assessing the robustness of our results. These variables were collected from Orbis; in line with other
286 studies focusing on hidden champions, we also collected data on R&D expenditures, number of employees, and
287 company's age to be used as controls in our model (Johann et al., 2022; Lei & Wu, 2022; Rammer & Spielkamp,
288 2019).

289 For our independent variables, we used the following information: the company's name and tax identification
290 number included in the list of SADI companies created by the Chinese government; the business activity of the
291 company, expressed by its 1-digit NACE classification; and the geographical location of the SADI company which
292 established a joint venture and its partners, distinguishing between Chinese and non-Chinese partners.

293 Our independent variables are created by using Social Network Analysis (SNA). In the literature, scholars have
294 widely employed SNA for studying business networks and their impact on companies' behaviour and performance
295 (e.g. Barros et al., 2022; Bartalevich, 2021; Chae et al., 2022; Dueñas et al., 2017; Waßenhoven et al., 2021; Yang
296 et al., 2011), using network statistics to understand how companies's networking strategy are developed and what
297 organisational dynamics occur when companies develop business collaborations (Mirc, 2015). The first
298 independent variable (*ego_nace*) is a network statistic used for defining the homophily level for each SADI
299 company in relation to their partners - when considering the industrial sector. This is an ego-network statistic:
300 ego-networks are special networks made by a focal actor (the ego) and those alters with whom the ego is directly
301 connected (Prell, 2012). In our business network mapping joint ventures, SADI companies are our egos, and their
302 alters are those companies with whom they established a joint venture. The variable *ego_nace* is a measure of
303 ego's homophily with their alters based on the 1-digit NACE classification, which is one of the attributes of the
304 companies in the network. The score for this variable ranges from 0 to 1, and it is estimated by dividing the number
305 of connections between the ego and an alter belonging to the same industrial sector by the ego's total number of
306 connections: the higher the score, the higher the level of homophily shown by the ego. This means that SADI
307 companies with a score close to 1 tend to create connections with other companies belonging to the same industry,
308 while those with a score close to 0 tend to connect with companies from different industries. The second
309 independent variable (*ego_country*) was created following the same approach, but instead of using the 1-digit
310 NACE classification as company-level attribute, we used the geographical location of the company: in this case,
311 SADI companies with a score close to 1 are those who created connections with other Chinese companies, while
312 those with a score close to 0 established formal relationships with companies in other countries. All network
313 statistics were estimated using UCINET 6 (Borgatti et al., 2002). Moreover, following an approach similar to Lei
314 and Wu (2022), we decided to include degree of marketisation and ownership structure as moderating effects in
315 the model, since they may moderate the impact of networking on companies' performance. With regard to degree
316 of marketisation (*marketisation*), all SADI companies are recognised by the Chinese government as innovative
317 and highly performative companies. However, the business environment in which they operate may differ from
318 province to province (Xie, 2017), because of the presence of special economic zones or other local factors (Wang,
319 2013). Therefore, the institutional environment can be relevant in determining partner selection (Shi et al., 2012),
320 thus impacting the performance of a company. As in Lei and Wu (2022), we relied on the marketisation index
321 developed by the National Economic Research Institute of China: each company's score is determined by the
322 score assigned to the province where its legal headquarters are located. With regard to ownership structure, the
323 business network literature has widely investigated the impact of ownership networks on performance
324 (Novoselova, 2022; Rowley, 1997), but not in the context of European and American hidden champions, probably
325 because of their dimension. Nevertheless, Chinese SADI companies are larger and marked by the presence of
326 multiple shareholders which can be found across multiple companies. This implies that sharing one or more
327 shareholders may be a relevant factor when deciding with whom establishing a joint venture, i.e. if partnering
328 with a company operating in the same industrial sector or partnering with a foreign company. In this study, we
329 have created a variable called *shared_shareholders* which can assume three values: 1 if shareholders have shares

330 in only one company, 2 if there is at least one shareholder with shares in two or three companies, or 4 if there is
331 at least one shareholder with shares in more than three companies.

332 Since we have a panel dataset with yearly data from 2019 to 2022, where our variables of interest (*ego_nace* and
333 *ego_country*) are time-invariant⁶, we estimated the following dynamic panel data model using the two-stage
334 estimation procedure developed by Kripfganz and Schwarz (2019):

$$y_{it} = x'_{it}\beta + f_i\gamma + u_i + e_{it} \quad (1)$$

335

336 where $i = 1, 2, \dots, N$ and $t = 1, 2, \dots, N$ represent companies and time, respectively, y_{it} represents our dependent
337 variable, x_{it} is a vector of company specific time-varying variables, and f_i is vector of observed company specific
338 time-invariant variables. As dependent variables, we are using *log_revenues* (the logarithm of revenues), *ebitda*,
339 and *profit_margin*; among the time-varying variables, we use the logarithm of expenditures in research and
340 development in US dollars (*log_r&d*), the logarithm of the number of employees (*log_size*), and the logarithm of
341 company's age (*log_age*); as time-invariant variables, we include *ego_nace* and *ego_country*, and the above
342 moderating variables (*marketisation* and *shared_shareholders*) with the interaction terms.

343 The procedure developed by Kripfganz and Schwarz (2019) is a two steps procedure where the first stage is used
344 for estimating a regression with the time-varying regressors only, and then in the second stage the first-stage
345 residuals are regressed on the time-invariant regressors. We run the estimation in STATA 17 using the "xtseqreg"
346 command; the lag length of the dependent variable(s) was imposed to be two periods, and we selected the number
347 of instruments used in the analysis based on the performance of the Hansen's test.

348 Results

349 Figure 1 shows the SADI companies' business network, whose density is almost null. In SNA, network density is
350 measured as the ratio between the number of actual relationships and the number of potential relationships (Prell,
351 2012): a score close to zero indicates the presence of a very sparse network. Usually, joint ventures do not involve
352 many companies, apart from some exceptional cases. Most of the joint ventures visible in Figure 1 were made
353 between just two companies, and this is the reason of the low network density score. Table 1 shows the results of
354 the correlation analysis: *ego_nace* is slightly positively correlated with *revenues* and *ebitda*, while *ego_country*'s
355 stronger correlation is with *shared_shareholders*. Descriptive statistics are included in Table 2: overall, SADI
356 companies are relatively young (around 20 years) and larger than European hidden champions, with an average
357 workforce of around 747 employees per company. Most of the SADI companies in our database have established
358 joint ventures with other Chinese companies (*ego_country* average score equal to 0.75), while their homophily
359 level, i.e. *ego_nace*, is not particularly high (0.28 on average), i.e. they tend to establish joint ventures with
360 companies from different industrial sectors.

361 [Figure 1 here]

362 [Table 1 here]

363 [Table 2 here]

364 The results of the analysis are presented in Table 3-5, where each table includes a different dependent variable
365 (*log_revenue*, *ebitda*, and *profit_margin*). We estimated three different models per table: one testing for the impact
366 of *ego_nace* and *ego_country* only; one incorporating *shared_shareholders* and its interaction terms with *ego_nace*
367 and *ego_country*; and one incorporating *marketisation* and its interaction terms with *ego_nace* and *ego_country*.
368 The Hansen's J-test confirms the validity of our modelling and its instruments in all cases.

369 [Table 3 here]

370 [Table 4 here]

⁶ This is our own imposition because we 'collapsed' all the data points about joint ventures (occurring during the 2017-2023 period) into a cross-section, therefore assuming that *ego_nace* and *ego_country* are constant over time. This is because we wanted to map ego-networks with enough information to be used for the analysis. However, we can reasonably assume that joint ventures do not happen frequently, because it takes years to finalise one, and therefore we can say that in our period of analysis these variables were time-invariant.

371

[Table 5 here]

372 When considering the first and second lagged value for the three dependent variables, their coefficients are always
373 negative, but they are statistically significant only for *ebitda* and *profit_margin*. Among the other time-varying
374 control variables, the coefficients for *log_r&d* and *log_size* are always positive, while for *log_age* is always
375 negative; however, their statistical significance changes across models.

376 By looking at the time-invariant regressors, the impact of *ego_nace* and *ego_country* does not change when
377 considering revenues and ebitda as performance metrics, but it does change in the case of profit margins and when
378 *shared_shareholders* intervenes as moderator. The variable *ego_nace* is always positive and statistically
379 significant, except for its impact on profit margins. This means that when SADI companies establish joint ventures
380 with other companies from the same industrial sector, this has a positive impact on their performance. However,
381 this effect does not hold when considering *marketisation* and *shared_shareholders* as moderators in the model:
382 industrial homophily seems to have a negative impact on revenues and ebitda, but in none of the models presented
383 in Table 3-4 the coefficient is statistically significant. This contradicts H1, and it offers new insights on the
384 strategic approach taken by Chinese SADI companies. On the other hand, the results for *ego_country* are mixed.
385 In all the models this variable alone shows a negative coefficient, which indicates that SADI companies creating
386 joint ventures with other Chinese companies see a negative effect on their performance; however, there is no
387 statistical significance observed. Nevertheless, in Table 3 the interaction effect between *ego_country* and
388 *shared_shareholders* is negative and statistically significant: this means that the presence of a large number of
389 shared shareholders reinforce the negative impact on revenues for those SADI companies who establish joint
390 ventures with other Chinese companies. This is aligned with our second hypothesis; however, it is the only case
391 where we observe a statistically significant value. Finally, *marketisation* does not seem to play a role in moderating
392 the impact of networking on performance. Its impact on *log_revenues* and *profit_margin* is identical and
393 completely opposite to *ebitda*; however, this variable, and its interaction effects, is never statistically significant.

394 Discussion

395 Starting out as late-comers, Chinese SADI companies challenge long-standing assumptions in business network
396 theory, particularly those derived from research on non-Chinese hidden champions. Prior work on German and
397 other European hidden champions portrays them as deep specialists that rely on strong vertical integration, tight
398 intra-industry ties and export- or FDI-based internationalisation while deliberately limiting formal alliances
399 (Audretsch et al., 2018; Din et al., 2013; Petraite & Dlugoborskyte, 2017; Simon, 2009; Witt & Carr, 2013). These
400 firms typically build networks that reinforce their position within a narrowly defined value chain and prioritise
401 long-term customer relationships over complex inter-organisational networks (Schenkenhofer, 2022; Venohr and
402 Meyer, 2007). By contrast, Chinese SADI companies emerge as state-recognised niche leaders in an institutional
403 setting characterised by strong industrial policy support, uneven regional marketisation and more complex
404 ownership structures (China Industry and Information Technology, 2023; Lei & Wu, 2022). Our evidence shows
405 that these contextual differences go beyond policy labels: they translate into distinctive network strategies and
406 performance patterns that differ in systematic ways from the ‘classic’ hidden champions in developed economies.
407 Rather than being larger replicas of European champions, SADI companies display network strategies that reflect
408 a mixture of inward- and outward-looking approaches, and these strategies influence their performance in ways
409 that the existing studies have not yet explored. Network theory generally assume that firms benefit from inter-
410 organizational connections to access resources, being innovative, and therefore achieving successful results on
411 national and international markets (Audretsch & Guenther, 2023): our findings offer a more nuanced
412 interpretation, showing that these assumptions do not hold uniformly in the Chinese SADI context and that new
413 mechanisms are at play.

414 Similarly with established hidden champion in Western countries, SADI companies establish formal business
415 networks with companies operating in similar industries. Previous studies on hidden champions demonstrated that
416 they prefer to strengthen their supply chain positions by integrating with upstream and downstream players, thus
417 implementing a low product diversification strategy (Baloh, 2013; Schenkenhofer, 2022). SADI companies
418 benefit of a similar homophilous approach, searching for connections with other players that can guarantee some
419 advantages from a technical point of view. However, our results are not confirmed when considering endogenous
420 and exogenous factors (i.e. ownership structure and degree of marketisation) that may interfere with companies’
421 networking strategies, and, more importantly, when looking at profit margins as performance metric. Differently
422 from revenues and ebitda, profit margins can be considered a measure of efficiency: collaborating with similar

423 companies may be beneficial for immediate returns, but efficiency is sensible to the presence of costs which can
424 be reduced by partnering with diverse companies.

425 Our findings also show that SADI companies are not fully benefiting of international formal collaborations: local
426 and international dynamics may help to understand this unexpected result. A first explanation for this is China's
427 significant regional disparities. Coastal provinces such as Guangdong, Zhejiang, and Jiangsu have experienced
428 rapid economic growth due to their proximity to international trade routes and early exposure to foreign
429 investments; as a result, they have developed vibrant manufacturing and export-oriented industries, and
430 consequently a significant portion of SADI companies is located in these provinces. While this situation could
431 have favoured these companies in the creation of international contacts, it is likely that others may have benefited
432 more of such international openness. As illustrated by Tang et al. (2024), a system aligning SADI companies with
433 the characteristics of their local business environments is still missing; however, this is necessary for supporting
434 a fast transition toward specialisation and innovation, and the acquisition of competences and resources that makes
435 SADI companies equipped for exploring international business networks. Moreover, while we agree with
436 Audretsch et al. (2018) and Witt and Carr (2013) that hidden champions generally avoid formal agreements with
437 other companies to protect their independence and technical expertise, we expected a different behaviour from
438 SADI companies. This is because the Chinese government, via its policy, specifically aims to strengthen these
439 companies' position in global value chains.

440 Our findings contribute to capability-based views of hidden champions by showing that business networks
441 perform a broader strategic function for Chinese SADI companies than for their counterparts in advanced
442 economies. Classical hidden champions rely heavily on deeply internalised, firm-specific capabilities developed
443 over long periods, such as proprietary technologies, accumulated export experience, and tightly integrated value-
444 chain processes (Simon, 2009; Venohr & Meyer, 2007). For these firms, business networks primarily reinforce
445 existing strengths rather than compensate for internal weaknesses. By contrast, SADI companies operate as
446 latecomer niche leaders that face capability gaps in areas such as internationalisation, governance systems,
447 technological depth and managerial professionalisation. Our empirical findings show that cross-industry domestic
448 alliances and selective joint ventures play a significant role in enabling these firms to acquire complementary
449 knowledge, learn new technological routines and scale up more rapidly than their internal resources alone would
450 allow. In this sense, business networks serve not only as relational assets but as capability-building mechanisms,
451 allowing SADI firms to overcome structural latecomer disadvantages and accelerate upgrading. This provides a
452 theoretical extension to the hidden champion literature by highlighting how emerging-market hidden-champion-
453 type firms rely on inter-organisational networks as substitutes for internalised capabilities. While traditional
454 hidden champions succeed through accumulated specialisation and internal depth, SADI firms succeed through
455 network-enabled capability accumulation within a policy-driven, institutionally heterogeneous environment. This
456 distinction advances understanding of how hidden-champion trajectories differ between developed and emerging
457 economies.

458 Our work provides two main contributions to the business network literature. A first theoretical contribution
459 concerns the role of industrial homophily. Establishing business relationships by exploiting vertical integration is
460 considered a standard approach by Western hidden champions, because this reinforces value chains and ensure
461 alignment of technical competences; however, this can be an issue for hidden champions because they may
462 become 'skeptical about open innovation and innovation collaboration' (Lampe et al., 2025, p. 508). In our
463 models, *ego_nace* is positive and statistically significant when considering only networking regressors for
464 revenues and ebitda, which indicates that homophilous ties can be beneficial. However, in the case of profit
465 margins, industrial homophily does not yield performance benefits at all. These results suggest that performance
466 is tied to the ability to access knowledge from similar partners, but in order to become more efficient Chinese
467 SADI companies would probably need to shift from classical value-chain strategies toward diversified value-
468 network strategies. The theoretical implication is that business network strategy models built around homophily
469 must be adapted for innovation-intensive firms in emerging economies.

470 A second theoretical contribution concerns country-level embeddedness. Across all models, *ego_country* always
471 shows a negative coefficient; although not statistically significant, it indicates that domestic-only partnerships do
472 not systematically enhance performance. More importantly, the interaction between *ego_country* and
473 *shared_shareholders* has a negative and statistically significant impact on revenues. This suggests that domestic
474 ties become detrimental when the firms involved share multiple shareholders, raising the possibility that

475 overlapping ownership generates governance frictions or conflicting strategic agendas. In contexts where
476 ownership structures are common, the value of domestic network ties may be contingent on how concentrated or
477 overlapping the companies' shareholder bases are.

478 **Policy implications**

479 The networking behaviour of SADI companies carries several implications for policymakers. The Chinese
480 institutional environment, strengthened by national programmes such as "Made in China 2025," has supported
481 rapid technological advancement, enabling SADI companies to pursue diversified and cross-industry network
482 strategies. However, our results show that international joint ventures do not yet contribute meaningfully to
483 performance, despite policy objectives encouraging international collaboration.

484 SADI companies are growing rapidly because of their strong focus on innovation (Lu et al., 2025); however, this
485 seems to be decoupled from internationalisation, differently from the traditional approach adopted by Western
486 hidden champions (Witt et al., 2024). Thus, given their market strength and domestic state support, the natural
487 progression for SADI companies will be to focus on cross-border relationships and understanding how these can
488 become beneficial from an economic and financial point of view, therefore driving the internationalisation of
489 Chinese companies. For this reason, we argue that cross-border targets can best prepare themselves for this process
490 by carrying out thorough screening and vetting of proposals put forward by Chinese companies. This can also
491 include the development of national policies focused on the safeguarding of SADI companies in strategic
492 industries, which would therefore secure the country from external acquisitions. Policymakers aiming to promote
493 the globalisation of SADI companies may therefore need to complement industrial upgrading programmes with
494 an explicit framework for supporting international network formation, including capacity-building for
495 international negotiation and risk-mitigation mechanisms for cross-border collaborations.

496 Since our findings indicate that SADI companies use formal partnerships to compensate for gaps in technological
497 and managerial capabilities, policy interventions should not focus solely on R&D subsidies or tax incentives.
498 Instead, policy programmes may need to enhance firms' absorptive capacity through training schemes, cross-
499 sector innovation platforms, and international collaboration support mechanisms to ensure that network-based
500 learning can be translated into performance improvements.

501 In this sense, our results also suggest that there is potential for intervening on the global supply chain with policy
502 initiatives. Simon (2022) suggested that hidden champions may have underestimated the impact of global
503 disruptive events such as the Covid-19 pandemic; governments should therefore concentrate on supporting
504 companies to become more resilient, which can be achieved by investing in areas of technological innovation to
505 offset risks associated with being overleveraged on a single supplier. According to the business network theory
506 (Sharma et al., 2022), inter-organizational relationships can help overcoming these risks: thus, because of their
507 official recognition by the Chinese government, SADI companies can be in a better position, compared to non-
508 Chinese hidden champions, to benefit of policy incentives for strengthening and diversifying supply chain
509 networks. These incentives can be coordinated with other business partners. Encouraging joint technological
510 platforms and cross-sector innovation schemes, and therefore going beyond intra-sectoral collaborations, may
511 help SADI companies consolidate their global footprint while maintaining the agility that characterises their
512 strategic behaviour.

513 **Managerial implications**

514 From a managerial perspective, our results highlight the need of strengthening internal capabilities to fully
515 leverage the benefits of diversified international networks. Indeed, while government support can be instrumental
516 in accelerating the growth of SADI companies, there are still visible limitations in the pursuit of international
517 partnerships. Managers should therefore focus on enhancing their firms' technological capabilities and innovation
518 cultures so that they are better positioned to absorb knowledge acquired through cross-country collaborations.
519 Such internal strengthening is essential for achieving long-term competitiveness and drive sustainable growth in
520 the long run (Shen, 2014; Yu et al., 2022).

521 The results also emphasize a potential weakness related to managerial expertise. Many SADI companies are led
522 by managers with strong technical backgrounds (Lu, 2022): this is a strength when collaborating with similar
523 technologically advanced partners, but potentially a limitation when building international partnerships that
524 require strategic competencies beyond technical knowledge. Successful network strategies may therefore depend

525 on the development of leadership training programmes and a broader professionalisation of managerial roles (Lu
526 & Gao, 2022). Identifying and nurturing individuals who combine technical expertise with other non-technical
527 skills could be central to sustaining growth and ensuring that SADI companies can effectively navigate diverse
528 and globalised business networks.

529 In addition, given the dual function of business networks as both relational and capability-enhancing mechanisms,
530 managers should adopt a more strategic approach to partner selection. The positive performance effects of cross-
531 industry collaborations indicate that partnering with technologically or organisationally complementary firms can
532 support capability development. Prior studies suggest that many SADI companies are relatively young and still
533 maturing in their managerial and organisational systems (Lei & Wu, 2022; Lei et al., 2025; Zhu et al., 2023).
534 Domestic partnerships therefore provide a practical channel for acquiring external knowledge, improving
535 production processes, and strengthening innovation capabilities. Managers may need to evaluate potential partners
536 not only for technological fit but also for their potential to enhance organisational learning. The findings also show
537 that international joint ventures do not yet translate into performance gains. This aligns with evidence that many
538 SADI firms possess limited international experience and managerial readiness (Lu, 2022; Lu & Gao, 2022). To
539 benefit from international collaborations, companies may need to invest in leadership development, international
540 strategy capabilities, and more formalised internal decision-making structures.

541 **Conclusions**

542 This paper explores the impact of networking on Chinese SADI companies' performance. SADI companies share
543 some similarities with non-Chinese hidden champions, but at the same time they differ in several respects. In this
544 vein, it is still unclear if SADI companies really differ from their European and American counterparts when it
545 comes to their networking strategy. We found that the peculiar networking strategy of these companies is leading
546 to mixed results. According to the most recent literature on both hidden champions and SADI companies, we were
547 expecting a positive impact of business network diversification on performance, but this has not been
548 demonstrated to be true. Finding partners from different industries, and potentially acquiring new knowledge for
549 being more innovative, can help SADI companies to improve their performance. At the same time, if a better
550 vertical integration positively influences revenues and earnings, SADI companies may be encouraged to follow
551 this strategic path to achieve short-term benefits. On the other hand, internationalisation does not have a relevant
552 impact on SADI companies' performance. While the first finding is making these companies more similar to
553 'traditional' hidden champions - which are not usually searching for business partners in different sectors - the
554 latter is confirming what other studies say about hidden champions: when it comes to internationalisation, their
555 main focus is on customer relationships, not formal business relationships (Schenkenhofer, 2022; Venohr &
556 Meyer, 2007). In this case, SADI companies show unique qualities that are distinct only to the China context,
557 and, unlike hidden champions seen in developed economies. Beyond these empirical findings, our results show
558 that SADI companies follow a different network logic. As latecomer niche leaders, their domestic cross-industry
559 partnerships function not only as relational assets but also as mechanisms for capability building. This indicates
560 that business networks in the Chinese context play a dual role: supporting market access while accelerating
561 organisational learning, which distinguishes SADI companies from traditional hidden champions.

562 Despite the above conclusions, our results still suffer from some limitations. First, the analysis primarily focuses
563 on formal relationships (i.e. joint ventures) established by SADI companies, without considering informal
564 relationships as well. Indeed, we are aware that these companies do not just rely on formal relationships, but also
565 on the informal ones, and in some cases the latter are even more important than the former (Din et al., 2013). We
566 encourage future research to map and analyse these networks of informal relationships: for example, the exchange
567 of knowledge and communication, since they are highly important for internationalisation and innovation. In this
568 respect, we agree with Zhu et al. (2023) that Chinese institutions should support a stronger cooperation between
569 universities, research centres, and companies. Further research may be dedicated to investigating the relationships
570 between these players. Second, our analysis is based on a limited dataset. The Chinese government has recently
571 launched the national strategy for supporting niche champions (单项冠军) and specialized, advanced,
572 differentiated, and innovative companies (专精特新); the first and second wave of companies officially
573 recognized as SADI companies refer to 2019 and 2020, and therefore we do not have enough data on the recently
574 added companies in the third (2021) and fourth (2022) wave to assess their performance, assuming that the policy
575 has influenced their strategy. We encourage future studies to expand our work through a policy lens by using the
576 most recent official list of SADI companies, and updated economic and financial data from these companies to

577 support exploration on the impact of the “Made in China 2025” policy and the strategy implemented by the
578 Chinese Ministry of Industry and Information Technology resulting in potential economic and financial growth,
579 innovation and internationalisation of SADI companies.

580

581 **Conflict of interest statement**

582 On behalf of all authors, the corresponding author states that there is no conflict of interest.

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584

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