

The contents, organisation, and functions of living historical memory in Egypt and Morocco

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The contents and structure of shared collective historical memories among Egyptians and Moroccans were explored by examining their aggregate perceptions of the three most important historical events in living memory. Egyptian living historical memory (LHM) was preoccupied with recent political instability and military history. Moroccan LHM was broader in the domains and events incorporated. Research on institutionalised collective memory and critical consciousness has suggested contradictory relationships between LHM and system justification, national identification, and political engagement. We argue that these sociopolitical functions of LHM are not mutually exclusive but contingent on national context. Latent class analysis of participants' historical memories showed that both countries split into two groups of people, with one more preoccupied by the foundational history of the nation and the other emphasising modern events. Moroccans in the foundational history group showed higher system justification whereas Egyptians in the foundational history group showed higher identification with their communities. Egyptians whose memories were more historical overall also identified more strongly with their nation. LHM was not related to political engagement in either nation. The social and political implications of these results are discussed.

Keywords: collective memory, Egypt, Morocco, identity, political engagement, system justification.

A nation's collective memory plays a variety of roles in its public discourse and political culture. Psychology has recently begun exploring specifically what functions collective aggregates of informal, communicated individual historical memories (i.e., living historical memory [LHM]) perform in human societies (Liu et al., in press). This follows in the tradition of research on the social representations of history (Hilton & Liu, 2017), and how these impact on various aspects of a country's culture, including its politics and intergroup relations (Liu et al., 2009; Liu & Paez, 2019; Pennebaker, Paez, & Rimé, 1997).

Prior research has suggested that national authorities deploy historical memories to establish and maintain their legitimacy (Olick, Vinitzky-Seroussi, & Levy, 2011) as well as to attempt to erase memories when they threaten their control (Nora, 1989). Tailoring the past to enable state control over the present has been theorised to work via several mechanisms, including (a) creating or propagating group identity and social cohesion; (b) creating or legitimising authorities and institutions; and

(c) enculturating loyalty and conformity to state-endorsed ways of being, including reducing possibilities for social change (Anderson, 2006; Bouchat & Rime, 2018; Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983; Kohl & Fawcett, 1995; Nora, 1989).

However, other research has shown that especially "living" historical memory can resist state control, and frequently diverges in content and effect from institutional canonical narratives and their intended impacts (Billig, 1995; Nora, 1989; Portelli, 2003; Winter, 2006). Historical consciousness can make salient any contradictions in the dominant ideology of the state, and allow different points of view that better fit the historical facts challenge or replace dominant legitimising myths (Kus, Liu, & Ward, 2013; Pratto, Stewart, & Bou Zeineddine, 2013). Additionally, historical consciousness can provide examples of social change, which in turn can promote social action (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). LHM can be a source of the knowledge, collective memory, and critical awareness at the core of the process of overcoming oppression (Adams, Salter, Kurtiş, Naemi, & Estrada-Villalta, 2018; Prilleltensky & Gonick, 1996). From the perspective of critical consciousness theory, a long-term historical perspective reveals cause-and-effect relationships between long-term social processes and the status quo. Therefore, LHM should increase critical reflection and political efficacy, and lead to greater political engagement (PE) (see Watts, Diemer, & Voight, 2011).

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Identity can be seen as both shaping and being shaped by intragroup interactive processes (Postmes, Haslam, & Swaab, 2005). System justification (SJ) is understood as a function of interactions between individual drives, relational processes, and contextual characteristics (Jost, Ledgerwood, & Hardin, 2008; Vargas-Salfate, Paez, Liu, Pratto, & Gil de Zúñiga, 2018), and political (in)action depends on interactive social processes (van Bezouw et al., 2019). Thus, LHM, insofar as it is a mechanism of shared reality-making and a product of social interaction, should theoretically influence these variables (see also Liu et al., in press).

However, (institutional) collective memory and critical consciousness perspectives have divergent predictions of the relationships between the contents and organisation of LHM and national identification, SJ, and PE. National contextual factors may moderate these relationships so that they vary across countries (Liu et al., in press)—the two seemingly opposing theoretical perspectives may both be valid, contingent on the presence of other factors (see Prilleltensky & Gonick, 1996).

In the present study, we explore how LHM influences collective identification, political system legitimisation, and PE in two North African Arab countries: Egypt and Morocco. In the following sections, we argue that differences in their historical narratives may differentiate both the ways that their populations' LHM is organised and how it functions in relation to collective identities, system legitimacy, and PE.

Egypt as a Case Study

Egypt has seen years of political instability, with several episodes of massive popular mobilisation against the government and repressive governmental responses. This instability started and ended in military-linked authoritarian government, with a brief interregnum of democratic Islamist rule that also produced widespread discontent. Throughout this period, the historical national narrative propagated by the authorities (through the media, school curricula, and other modes of communication) has emphasised obedience to authorities, glorification of the military, and nationalistic sentiments, and has hardly changed since the country's independence more than 50 years ago (Abdou, 2017; van de Bildt, 2015; Diab, 2019; Sasnal, 2014). It is the military that is the hero and moral exemplar in the romantic national narrative that essentialises the nation (Carretero, 2011). Indeed, even the narrative of the 2011 "Arab Spring" revolution was co-opted to portray it as an effect of military paternal benevolence than of popular pressure against the military-dominated rule of Mubarak; in this story, the overthrow of President Morsi was simply a continuation of the 2011 revolution (Sasnal, 2014; van de Bildt,

2015). van de Bildt (2015) described the current narrative pillars in Egyptian propaganda as demonisation of the Muslim Brotherhood, continuing the war on terror, continuity of the 2011 revolution in President Sisi's regime, and the historic unity of the army and the people. Abdou (2017) argued that while the wearying effect of continued instability and insecurity combined with such political propaganda played a role in the current acceptance of the Egyptian regime, it is the regime's manipulations of the consistent, familiar, deeply rooted national narrative that defused political opposition.

Given these arguments, and the consistency of the nationalist narrative across generational time spans, we expected historicity in LHM (individual memories of nationally shared experiences defined by historical rather than ahistorical event landmarks) and more historical organisations of collective memories to be tied to decreased PE as well as greater collective identification and SJ. We also anticipated that the contents of Egyptians' LHMs would be constrained by the bounds of the history publicly sanctioned by the state. Therefore, we expected that the Muslim Brotherhood, Islamism, or the Morsi regime would not be prominent in their expressed memories but that institutionally sanctioned and glorified military events would be (e.g., the overthrow of the monarchy-British colonial rule, the Six-Day War, the liberation of Sinai, the overthrow of Mubarak and Morsi; see Sasnal, 2014).

Morocco as a Contrasting Case Study

In contrast to Egypt, Morocco has been relatively stable, weathering the Arab Spring protests without fundamental volatility. The king and associated institutions were able to defuse initial protests in 2011 through constitutional reform and a variety of political manoeuvres and messages, including fragmenting the opposition and co-opting elements of it, consolidating power, redirecting blame (to the "technocratic" cabinet and bureaucracy of the government), using the Syrian civil war as a warning of the dangers of instability, and implementing various relatively covert repressive moves (Aouragh, 2017; Cavatorta, 2016; Hill, 2019). But the relative stability of the monarchy in Morocco is also due to its adaptability, and the legitimacy accorded to it by many Moroccans for historical and religious reasons, and its capacity to leverage this flexibility and legitimacy through subtle and overt control over public and private sectors (Aouragh, 2017; Cavatorta, 2016).

Unlike the case of Egypt, where there is a clear glorifying master narrative propagandised for generations, and where instability and inconsistencies with that narrative are glossed over, distorted, or simply banned from discussion, collective memory in Morocco seems to be

held in homeostatic tension between acknowledgement and repression. It aims not to glorify or exculpate the nation or authority but to preserve social cohesion and systemic continuity and legitimacy, and to depoliticise the memories of civil grievances and divisions, at least in the general public (e.g., the approach to the Years of Lead and the Equity and Reconciliation Committee, Menin, 2017; the positioning of Amazigh people in Moroccan history education, Karrouche, 2017). The romantic master narrative then is that the monarchy is the guardian of unity and stability, a continuation of the struggles for decolonisation and progress. Inadequate progress, and politicised and controversial events and repression, are temporary aberrations, or attributed to specific agents or institutions rather than the system (e.g., bureaucrats; Cavatorta, 2016).

Thus, we expected that historicity in the collective memories of Moroccans, and configurations of LHM that emphasise more foundational historical memories, would be related to increased collective identification and SJ. However, we also anticipated a possibility that foundational historical memories may be less related to national identity in Morocco than in Egypt, where the nationalist-glorifying narrative is more dominant. Moreover, we anticipated that foundational historical memories would be more associated with SJ in Morocco than in Egypt, due to the greater political systemic instability and the inflexibility of the institutionally sanctioned nationalist military glorification narrative in Egypt (discussed earlier, e.g., Sasnal, 2014). This role of history in legitimising the system suggested a further link to decreased PE, although perhaps to a lesser extent than in Egypt, given the role that historical consciousness has been shown to play in Moroccan activism (Aouragh, 2017; Menin, 2017).

Given the relatively flexible constraints on the historical events that are institutionally accepted within historical narratives here, we could not predict precisely the types of events that would form the contents of the LHM of Moroccans. However, Karrouche's (2017) analysis of Moroccan historiography over time, examining contemporary Moroccan history textbooks, has suggested that we should not see great emphasis on ethnic or other intra-Moroccan group divisions or identities, with ethnic and linguistic "otherness" overlaid with Arab-Islamic unity and common origin narratives. Additionally, we should see both protest and political movements as well as foundational and monarchist memories well-represented (Cavatorta, 2016; Menin, 2017).

Overall, then, we present the first quantitative study of the LHM of Moroccans and Egyptians, and analyse the contents and organisation of these memories, examining their relationship to collective identity, SJ, and PE. There are reasons to expect these memories to be related

to higher collective identification, and to be system justifying and depoliticising, albeit to different extents in the two nations. We expect that consciousness of the nationalist, unstable, and overtly repressive Egyptian system's historical narrative will foster national identification and political disengagement more so than SJ, whereas we expect the monarchist, stable, and subtly repressive Moroccan system to foster the reverse pattern.

Method

Administration and Translation

The surveys described here were part of an international study on a variety of social and political issues (Liu et al., in press). These surveys were administered online in Morocco and Egypt from December 6, 2018 to January 24, 2019. The authors translated the survey to Arabic using the committee method (Brislin, 1980).

Participants

The participants in the study were recruited by the international polling company Nielsen from the curated Harris Panel. Sampling was stratified by age, gender, and income. The local panel provider invited participants through their online portal or via e-mail. In total, 614 Egyptian and 526 Moroccans responded to the questionnaire. To ensure data quality, about 10% of cases were deleted because they showed signs of straight-lining and/or responding too quickly for attentive and meaningful responding (for detailed exclusion criteria, see Liu et al., in press). The final samples included 562 Egyptians and 495 Moroccans (for descriptive statistics and case deletions for each country, see Table 1).

Measures

LHM. We used an open-ended item to examine LHMs that are salient in each country's population. The item was as follows: "Please name 3 historic events that have occurred during the lifetime of people you know

Table 1
Descriptive Statistics

Country	N, Total	N, After Deletion	Age		%Female
			M	SD	
Egypt	614	562	29.4	8.6	44.3
Morocco	526	495	31.2	9.6	45.7

Note. Age and gender descriptives are based on *N* after deletion.

(or have known) that have had the *greatest impact on your country.*” Each of the three events listed by participants was coded, with codes for globally recognised historical events (e.g., World War II) and figures (e.g., Gandhi) as well as for country-specific events and figures (e.g., 2011 overthrow of Mubarak; King Mohammed VI). We generated codes only for the most commonly named historical events and figures; items mentioned by fewer than five participants were not coded. Two raters independently coded a randomly selected subset of 60 of participants’ responses for each of the Egyptian and Moroccan raw data, and showed strong reliability across coders (98.3% of the events for Morocco, 95% for Egypt). These codes were then further grouped in broader domain categories to facilitate statistical analyses and visualisation of the data, obtaining 10 code groups for the Egyptian data and 9 code groups for the Moroccan data (see Tables 2 & 3 for the list of events/figures retained and codes used for each country). Two coders independently classified the original codes into these code groups, with no disagreements.

Historical memory index (historicity). In addition to coding for the content of the historical events named by participants for the LHM item, we also coded for whether the three events they listed were all historical, partially historical, or nonhistorical (1 = *nonhistorical*, 2 = *partial*, 3 = *full historical*). Historical events were those that were dateable events or periods of time, or historical figures (i.e., people alive or dead of special historical significance). Participants also listed other types of events that were coded as nonhistorical, being general or collective events that cannot be dated or were regularly recurring (e.g., elections without reference to a year or other signifiers), or personal events (e.g., my birthday). Two raters independently coded a randomly selected subset of 60 participants’ responses in both the Egyptian and Moroccan data, with no disagreements.

Identification. We measured identification with local communities and nationality using a single item for each: “I identify with my local community” and “I identify with my nationality.” Responses ranged from 1 (*disagree completely*) to 7 (*agree completely*). Such a single-item measure has been shown to be sufficiently reliable, valid, and useful (Postmes, Haslam, & Jans, 2013).

SJ. Examining SJ, we used a four-item version of the System Justification Scale (SJS; Kay & Jost, 2003) that has been shown to be globally reliable (Vargas-Salfate et al., 2018). An example item is “In general, I find society to be fair.” Responses ranged from 1 (*disagree completely*) to 7 (*agree completely*). The SJS was highly

Table 2
Event Coding for Egyptian Living Historical Memory Items

Codes	Code Group Label	Events/Figures
1	Loss of Sinai	1967 Six-Day War
2	Liberation of Sinai	1973 October/Yom Kippur/Liberation of Sinai War
3	Independence	Return of Sinai lands (Taba 1989) Decolonisation in general Signing or drafting a Constitution (2011 constitutional referendum) 1919 Overthrow of British colonialism (independence) 1952 Military coup against monarchy/ King Farouk (ending British protectorate)
4	Revolution	2011 overthrow of Mubarak Arab Spring Revolution in general
5	Anti-Islamist events	2013 coup against Morsi/Muslim Brotherhood 1981 assassination of President Sadat by Islamists 2013 Protests against Morsi
6	Morsi regime	2012 elections placing Muslim Brotherhood in power President Morsi
7	Sisi regime	2014 and 2018 elections electing General Sisi President Sisi
8	Economic troubles	Economic Crisis, Financial Crisis of 2008 Economic Recession following crisis of 2008 2013 Egyptian pound floated against the dollar and devalued Commodity subsidies lifted
9	Economic advances and technology	Suez Canal construction (and extension) Aswan High Dam construction Construction of pyramids Nationalisation under Abdel Nasser Internet (invention, usage of Internet) Smartphones
10	Natural disasters	1992 Cairo earthquake Floods Other natural disasters

reliable in both the Egyptian, $\alpha = .89$, intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) = .67, and Moroccan, $\alpha = .85$, ICC = .58, samples. We assessed measurement invariance of the SJS using van de Schoot, Lugtig, and Hox’s (2012) procedure. The scale showed scalar noninvariance due to differences in the intercept of one item: “In

Table 3
Event Coding for Morocco Living Historical Memory Items

Codes	Code Group Label	Events/Figures
1	Terrorism	Terrorism/terrorists/terror bombings in general May 16th bombing 2018 murder of tourists 2011 Marrakesh bombing
2	Colonisation	Colonial era (French, Portuguese, and/or Spanish occupations)
3	Independence	Independence (Morocco from France and Spain) Decolonisation in general Green March (protest against Spanish control of Sahara) Revolution of the King and the People—revolution against France Defeat of the Portuguese at the Battle of the Three Kings
4	Territorial conflicts	Sand War (Morocco vs. Algeria) Western Sahara secession conflict (Polisario)/Moroccan control over all Saharan territories
5	Political movements/dissent	Protest movements in general Feb 20 Movement Rif Movement/War Boycotts movement (boycotting local companies corrupting government) Women's suffrage Arab Spring (as a whole) Years of Lead
6	Government	Joining/rejoining the African Union Elections in general 2011 elections 2016 elections Educational reform (Arabization, Amazigh language, curricular change)
7	Economy and technology	Inflation, currency devaluation (Morocco gradually devaluing currency to remove peg from euro and float it, beginning January 2018) Rising costs Lack of employment opportunity Switching to permanent summer time Emigration Internet (invention, usage of Internet) High-speed train/Trains à Grande Vitesse (TGV)/Boraq Rocketry program (satellites/missiles) Solar energy plants
8	Natural disasters	Earthquakes—Agadir Earthquake 1960 Train accident (Bouknadel derailment October 2018) Other natural disasters
9	Kings	King Mohammed V King Hassan II King Mohammed VI

general (my country's) political system operates as it should." The measure showed full invariance once this item was removed. Analyses with the full scale (reported later) and the invariant measure showed no substantive differences in the results (see invariance test results and latent class analysis [LCA] results using the alternative measures in Appendix S1).

PE. We examined PE using six items concerning self-reported political behaviour from an established scale

(Keeter, Zukin, Andolina, & Jenkins, 2002). Responses ranged from 1 (*never*) to 4 (*frequently*). The scale was reliable in both Morocco, $\alpha = .88$, ICC = .54, and Egypt, $\alpha = .84$, ICC = .47. We assessed measurement invariance in the same way as with the SJS. The scale was noninvariant. Analyses were run with the full scale (reported later) and with a single item: "In the past 12 months, how often have you taken part in a protest, march or demonstration?" There were no substantive differences in the results with either approach (see Appendix S1).

Demographics. We examined political orientation using the item “On political issues, where would you place yourself on a scale of 0–10, where 0 = *Strong conservative* (right-leaning) and 10 = *Strong liberal* (left-leaning)?” We examined subjective socioeconomic status (SES) using the item “On a scale of 1–10, with 10 being people who are most well off in society, and 1 being people that are least well off, where would you describe your position?” In addition, we asked how large a part religion plays in participants’ lives on a scale from 1 (*no part*) to 4 (*extremely important part*). We also assessed education (with responses from 1 = *elementary school* to 6 = *graduate school or higher*), gender, and age.

Analysis Plan

First, bivariate correlations were calculated to examine relationships between historicity, SJ, identification with nation and community, and PE. Partial correlations were then conducted to estimate these correlations controlling for age, gender, SES, religiosity, education, and political orientation. Missing values accounted for <0.5% of the data in any of our variables in both Egyptian and Moroccan data sets, so we used listwise deletion in all analyses.

To understand whether there were discrete categories of people in the samples who had distinctive combinations of event-type nominations across their first, second, and third nominations, we conducted separate LCA for each country using Mplus 7 (Muthén & Muthén, 2012). We approached the analyses for the two countries in the same way. First, we examined the classification of the events, examining a range of models from one to seven latent classes. We then selected the best fitting model based on the sample-size-adjusted Bayesian information criterion (BIC) and the adjusted likelihood ratio test (aLRT). We then examined the event code distributions for each class in each country, and labelled each class according to its unique event nomination profile. This clarified the organisation of memory representations in each of the two countries and allowed us to describe the sample proportions characterised by each class of memories as well as to compare this organisation and distribution across the two countries.

Finally, analyses were conducted with auxiliary variables (Asparouhov & Muthén, 2014) to investigate whether the latent classes differentiated the means of the three potential distal outcomes (i.e., how LHM was organised impacted mean identification, SJ, and PE). These auxiliary variable analyses included demographic variables (age, gender, SES, religiosity, education, and political orientation) as covariates in estimating class mean differences in the distal outcomes, using the Lanza method in Mplus 7 (Asparouhov & Muthén, 2014; Lanza, Tan, &

Bray, 2013). This allowed us to examine the differences in mean SJ, PE, and identification with nation and community between different memory classes and to compare the relationship between memory organisation and these sociopolitical variables across the two countries.

Results

Descriptive Data

The Egyptian sample was 54% male, varied in age between 16 and 64 years ($M = 29.7$, $SD = 8.5$), was relatively well-educated ($M = 4.6$, $SD = 0.9$), fairly religious ($M = 3.0$, $SD = 0.9$), generally middle class ($M = 5.7$, $SD = 1.8$), relatively centrist in political ideology ($M = 5.4$, $SD = 2.3$), identified with their communities ($M = 4.8$, $SD = 1.5$) and their nationality ($M = 5.3$, $SD = 1.5$), did not justify their political system to a great extent ($M = 2.8$, $SD = 1.3$), and were only occasionally politically engaged ($M = 1.7$, $SD = 0.58$). On average, the Moroccan sample did not differ to a great extent on any of these variables. The Moroccan sample was 51.4% male, varied in age between 18 and 62 years ($M = 31.5$, $SD = 9.7$), was relatively well-educated ($M = 4.5$, $SD = 1.0$), fairly religious ($M = 3.1$, $SD = 0.91$), generally middle class ($M = 5.2$, $SD = 1.8$), relatively centrist in political ideology ($M = 5.5$, $SD = 2.5$), identified with their communities ($M = 5.0$, $SD = 1.6$) and their nationality ($M = 5.4$, $SD = 1.6$), did not justify their political system to a great extent ($M = 2.4$, $SD = 1.2$), and were only occasionally politically engaged ($M = 1.6$, $SD = 0.51$).

Just over half of Egyptians (55.3%) and Moroccans (51.8%) listed three events or figures that could be interpreted as historically having the greatest impacts on their countries. Just under one fourth gave some historical and some nonhistorical responses (Egypt 21%, Morocco 24.4%). A similar proportion (Egypt 23.6%, Morocco 23.4%) listed no historical events or figures, and instead listed personal events or general collective events, or failed to answer.

Content of LHM in Egypt and Morocco

We examined contents of the events selected by those participants who chose any historical events or figures as having the greatest impacts on their country (see Tables 4 & 5). The historical events considered most important by Egyptians were largely political or military in nature, and included the overthrow of President Mubarak (2011), the liberation of Sinai (1973–1989), and the ending of the British protectorate (1952). The most nominated single event was the 2011 revolution (35.8%). Egyptians considered economic events (both

crises and accomplishments), the current political regime of President Sisi, and events associated with opposition to Islamists, including the assassination of President Sadat (1981), and protests against President Morsi (2013), as also being impactful, but secondary to the first tier of events.

Events considered most important by Moroccans, on the other hand, included the latest era of colonisation (1912–1956), and decolonisation and liberation events such as national independence from France and Spain (1956). Compared to Egyptians, there was less consensus among Moroccans regarding the most important events, with the most predominant memory being the Green March against Spanish occupation of the Western Sahara in 1975 (17.4%). Moroccans also nominated economic and technological crises and accomplishments, political movements, natural disasters, and their kings as significant historical events or figures, secondary to independence and decolonisation.

In general, Moroccans' significant historic memories extended further back in time, were less exclusively concerned with contemporary politics, more concerned with events relating to domestic economy and bureaucratic governance, and were more tightly tied to the individual identities of their leaders (Moroccan kings), as compared to Egyptians.

Historicity, Identity, and System Legitimacy in Egypt and Morocco

To examine whether remembering historical events in general was associated with increased or decreased SJ,

Table 4
Frequencies of Events Listed by Egyptian Participants as Having the Greatest Impact on Their Country

Event	Most Important Event	Second Most Important Event	Third Most Important Event
Revolution	201 (51.7%)	105 (30.6%)	56 (19.6%)
Liberation of Sinai	77 (19.8%)	45 (13.1%)	29 (10.1%)
Independence	47 (12.1%)	19 (5.5%)	27 (9.4%)
Natural disasters	19 (4.9%)	12 (3.5%)	1 (0.3%)
Anti-Islamist events	12 (3.1%)	97 (28.3%)	79 (27.6%)
Economic advances and technology	12 (3.1%)	23 (6.7%)	21 (7.3%)
Loss of Sinai	11 (2.8%)	11 (3.2%)	8 (2.8%)
Economic troubles	7 (1.8%)	12 (3.5%)	28 (9.8%)
Sisi regime	2 (0.5%)	8 (2.3%)	27 (9.4%)
Morsi regime	1 (0.3%)	11 (3.2%)	10 (3.5%)
Valid <i>N</i>	389 (69.2%)	343 (61.0%)	286 (50.9%)

Note. Percentages are based on the valid *N* for each event.

Table 5
Frequencies of Events Listed by Moroccan Participants as Having the Greatest Impact on Their Country

Event	Most Important Event	Second Most Important Event	Third Most Important Event
Independence	159 (49.4%)	122 (45.9%)	70 (30.3%)
Colonisation	51 (15.8%)	16 (6%)	11 (4.8%)
Economy and technology	27 (8.4%)	32 (12%)	42 (18.2%)
Political movements	22 (6.8%)	13 (4.9%)	24 (10.4%)
Terrorism	21 (6.5%)	19 (7.1%)	12 (5.2%)
Kings	18 (5.6%)	25 (9.4%)	21 (7.3%)
Government	10 (3.1%)	17 (6.4%)	22 (9.5%)
Natural disasters	9 (2.8%)	15 (5.6%)	29 (12.6%)
Territorial conflicts	5 (1.6%)	7 (2.6%)	11 (4.8%)
Valid <i>N</i> (% of total <i>N</i>)	322 (65.1%)	266 (53.7%)	231 (46.7%)

Note. Percentages are based on the valid *N* for each event.

identification, or PE, we conducted bivariate and partial correlations between these variables and our historicity measure. Historicity of participants' nominations in general was associated with national identification, $r(561) = .10$, $p = .01$ and age, $r(561) = .11$, $p = .01$ in Egypt, but was not associated with any variable in Morocco, $ps > .10$. In both countries, historicity was not related to education, gender, political orientation, religiosity, or SES, whether participants justified their political systems, or to the extent to which they were politically engaged, $ps > .10$. Partial correlations showed that in Egypt, but not Morocco, people who nominated historical events as the most significant events for their countries identified more strongly with their nationality, $r(555) = .10$, $p = .02$, as well as with their local communities, $r(555) = .11$, $p = .01$, after controlling for age, gender, SES, religiosity, education, and political orientation. This implies that historical memory in general was associated with the dynamics of collective identification in Egypt, as expected. However, contrary to expectations, this was not the case in Morocco, and general historicity in memory had no association with either SJ or PE in either country.

Organisation of LHM in Egypt and Morocco

Next, to examine and compare how historical memories were organised within each country, we conducted LCA of the three event nominations' contents and salience to the participant. LCA thus grouped participants both by which three events they listed and by which of these

events participants listed first, second, or third in their estimation of the importance of these events to their country (see Tables 7 & 8).

Egypt. Beginning with the Egyptian data, we found that the most parsimonious model with an optimal BIC was obtained when two classes had been specified (valid $n = 414$). Fit indices for the different solutions were as follows: single-class solution BIC = 3,672.08, two-class solution BIC = 3,488.24 (preferred), three-class solution BIC = 3,460.73, four-class solution BIC = 3,501.197, five-class solution BIC = 3,540.22, six-class solution BIC = 3,581.108, and seven-class solution BIC = 3,625.948. The aLRTs also supported the two-class model, indicating that the three-class model did not perform significantly better than the two-class model, aLRT = 106.816, $p = .99$, and that the two-class model performed significantly better than a single-class model, aLRT = 262.17, $p < .001$. Classification quality for the two-class model was good, with entropy at 0.80 (An entropy level over 0.6 provides good class separation; see Asparouhov & Muthén, 2014). Furthermore, the average probabilities that a given participant belonging to a given class would be correctly categorised were over .90 (see Table 6), confirming the reliability of the latent class model.

We labelled the two classes as *contemporary history* and *foundational history* because the main difference between the classes was in whether contemporary events such as the 2011 revolution or foundational history events such as independence were listed as primary events by participants (see Table 7). The foundational history class was also characterised by recollections of natural disasters and historical economic advances whereas the contemporary history class was also concerned with recent economic troubles. The classes were almost equally represented in the Egyptian population, with 50.4% in the contemporary history class and 49.6% in the foundational history class. This indicates that despite major recent instability and historical events, half of all Egyptians' historical memories were preoccupied by events further in

the past, and that the contemporary class was not differentiated across potential political cleavages such as Islamist–secular or liberal–conservative.

We then conducted an auxiliary variable analysis so we could examine whether specific LHM classes, rather than general historicity, were related to our distal outcomes. Specifically, the analysis examined age, gender, SES, religiosity, education, and political orientation as covariates of the latent classes, and whether these classes impacted mean levels of SJ, national identification, community identification, and PE. Results showed that age differed across the two classes, $\chi^2(1) = 10.83$, $p = .001$, with the contemporary history class being younger ($M = 28.3$, $SD = 0.55$) than the foundational history class ($M = 31.0$, $SD = 0.61$). They confirmed that the foundational history class consisted of participants who had higher historicity, $\chi^2(1) = 39.8$, $p < .001$. Correspondingly, they also showed that identification with community was significantly higher, $\chi^2(1) = 4.34$, $p = .04$, in the foundational history class ($M = 4.91$, $SD = 0.10$) than in the contemporary history class ($M = 4.59$, $SD = 0.11$). However, unlike general historicity, there was no relationship between class membership and national identification—indeed, all other demographic covariates (gender, SES, religiosity, education, political orientation), and distal outcomes (national identification, SJ, and PE) were unrelated to class membership, $ps > .10$. In sum, the class of Egyptians whose memories were more preoccupied with events in the further past accounted for about half the population, was older, and identified more strongly with their communities.

Morocco. As with the Egyptian data, we found that for Moroccans (valid $n = 366$), the most parsimonious model with an optimal BIC was obtained when two classes were specified. Fit indices for the different solutions were as follows: single-class solution BIC = 2,977.74, two-class solution BIC = 2,900.00 (preferred), three-class solution BIC = 2,915.59, four-class solution BIC = 2,943.01, five-class solution BIC = 2,985.38, six-class solution BIC = 3,034.37, and seven-class solution BIC = 3,078.95. The aLRTs also supported the two-class model, indicating that the three-class model did not perform significantly better than the two-class model, aLRT = 52.30, $p = 1.00$, and that the two-class model performed significantly better than a single-class model, aLRT = 144.93, $p < .001$. Classification quality for the two-class model was good, with entropy at 0.72. Furthermore, the probabilities (averaged across participants) that a given participant belonging to a given class would be correctly categorised (see Table 8) were over .90, confirming the reliability of the latent class model.

We again labelled the two classes as *contemporary history* and *foundational history* because the main

Table 6
Latent Class Probabilities (Egypt) for Most Likely Classification by Latent Class Membership (Row) and Latent Class (Column)

	1	2
1. Contemporary history	.906	.094
2. Foundational history	.017	.983

Note. Values on the diagonal (in bold) are the average probability that a person in the corresponding latent class was correctly categorised as belonging to that class.

Table 7
Frequencies and Probability Weights of Events for Each Egyptian Latent Class

Event Category	Contemporary History Class			Foundational History Class		
	Primary Event	Secondary Event	Tertiary Event	Primary Event	Secondary Event	Tertiary Event
Loss of Sinai	0	0	4	11 (.05**)	11 (.06**)	4 (.03*)
Liberation of Sinai	0	14 (.06*)	20 (.18**)	77 (.38**)	31 (.19**)	9 (.05**)
Independence	0	13 (.08*)	13 (.11**)	47 (.23**)	6 (.04*)	14 (.09**)
Revolution	187 (.95**)	1	2	14 (.13**)	104 (.54**)	54 (.31**)
Anti-Islamist events	3	90 (.57**)	26 (.20**)	9 (.05*)	7 (.05*)	53 (.33**)
Morsi regime	1	11 (.07**)	2	0	0	8 (.05**)
Sisi regime	2	8 (.05**)	25 (.22**)	0	0	2
Economic troubles	6	11 (.07**)	21 (.19**)	1	1	7 (.04*)
Economic advances and technology	0	9 (.04*)	6 (.06*)	12 (.06**)	14 (.09**)	15 (.09**)
Natural disasters	0	6 (.04*)	0	19 (.09**)	6 (.03*)	1

Note. Primary, secondary, and tertiary events denote those events that participants listed first/most important, second, or third, respectively. Results show the classes are distinct not just in their event content but in the prioritisation of the events (e.g., participants in the foundational class were most likely to prioritise independence as the most important historical event whereas those in the contemporary class were less likely to do so). Results are shown in probability scale in parentheses for significant probabilities.

* $p < .05$.

** $p < .01$.

difference between the classes was again in whether contemporary events such as the floating of the currency (in 2018) were listed as significant events by participants or whether foundational issues were more exclusively emphasised (see Table 9). The contemporary history class was also characterised by recollections of economic and technological events, recent terrorism incidents, governance (other than the monarchy), and political protest events. On the other hand, the foundational history class was also characterised by recollections of the monarchy and natural disasters. The contemporary history class represented precisely one third of Moroccans whereas the foundational history class accounted for the other two thirds. This indicated that there was a relatively strong emphasis in Moroccans' historical memories on the further past, substantially more so than in Egypt.

Auxiliary variable analyses were set up in the same way as in the Egyptian data, and showed that education

Table 8
Latent Class Probabilities (Morocco) for Most Likely Classification by Latent Class Membership (Row) and Latent Class (Column)

	1	2
1. Contemporary instability	.902	.098
2. Foundational history	.075	.925

Note. Values on the diagonal (in bold) are the average probability that a person in the corresponding latent class was correctly categorised as belonging to that class.

differed across the two classes, $\chi^2(1) = 7.94$, $p = .005$, with the contemporary history class being more educated ($M = 4.72$, $SD = 0.09$) than the foundational history class ($M = 4.40$, $SD = 0.07$). They confirmed that the foundational history class consisted of participants who had higher historicity, $\chi^2(1) = 14.07$, $p < .001$. Interestingly, unlike general historicity, class membership was also characterised by differing means of SJ, $\chi^2(1) = 8.43$, $p = .004$, such that Moroccans whose historical memories were more preoccupied with foundational history justified the system to a greater extent ($M = 2.55$, $SD = 0.08$) than the contemporary history class ($M = 2.17$, $SD = 0.11$). There was no relationship between class membership and other demographic variables (age, gender, SES, religiosity, or political orientation) or distal outcomes (identification with community or nation, or PE), $ps > .10$. This indicated that although general historicity in Moroccans' LHM was not associated with system legitimisation, foundational history memory organisation in Morocco was, and it was more common among the relatively less educated majority of the population.

Overall, we found two distinct classes of historical narratives in both countries, with one class more preoccupied with the country's foundational history whereas the other class emphasised its modern history. The foundational history class in Egypt represented half the population, was older, showed higher community identification, and included memories of events associated with growth and progress. In Morocco, the

Table 9
Frequencies and Probability Weights of Events for Each Moroccan Latent Class

Event Category	Contemporary History Class			Foundational History Class		
	Primary Event	Secondary Event	Tertiary Event	Primary Event	Secondary Event	Tertiary Event
Terrorism	16 (.14**)	12 (.13*)	3	5	7	9 (.05*)
Colonisation	3	5	5 (.07*)	48 (.22**)	11 (.06*)	6 (.04*)
Independence	14 (.20**)	0	3	145 (.64**)	122 (.68**)	67 (.42**)
Territorial conflicts	5 (.05*)	0	1	0	7 (.04*)	10 (.06**)
Political movements	16 (.13**)	13 (.15**)	9 (.14**)	6 (.04*)	0	15 (.09**)
Government	10 (.09**)	17 (.20**)	14 (.18**)	0	0	8
Economy and technology	25 (.23**)	30 (.33**)	35 (.45**)	2	2	7 (.06*)
Natural disasters	8 (.07**)	5	1	1	10 (.05*)	9 (.05*)
Kings	1	2	0	13 (.06**)	23 (.12**)	29 (.19**)

Note. Primary, secondary, and tertiary events denote those events that participants listed first/most important, second, or third, respectively. Results show the classes are distinct not just in their event content but in the prioritisation of the events (e.g., participants in the foundational class were most likely to prioritise independence as the most important historical event whereas those in the contemporary class were less likely to do so). Results are shown in probability scale in parentheses for significant probabilities.

* $p < .05$.

** $p < .01$.

foundational history class was instead a majority composed of relatively less educated, more system-justifying citizens who emphasised the Moroccan monarchs. In addition, we found that historicity in collective memory generally related to greater community and national identification among Egyptians whereas for Moroccans, historical memories as a whole were more frequently romanticised and conservative in content, emphasising foundational myths, but were unrelated to identification or SJ. In both countries, PE was unrelated to historicity or to the organisation of LHM.

Discussion

Generations of military-glorifying nationalist propaganda and nationalist-Islamist polarisation as well as recent historical instability in Egypt may be responsible for the low salience of much of the memory of the foundational history of this country, particularly of its historical ties to pan-Arab identity and the Arab region. The content of Egyptian memories that we observed strongly reflects the content of history education in Egypt, focused almost exclusively on events beginning at independence, starting with the 1952 revolution, then moving quickly over to the 1973 October War and the 2011 revolution (Sasnal, 2014).

As expected, events related to Islamists and to the Morsi regime were infrequently mentioned, except in reference to Morsi's removal, despite Islamists and President Morsi winning the first democratic elections held in generations and the first held after the 2011 revolution that was so prominent in Egyptians' memories. It is possible that this may be due to participants

perceiving this period as a short-lived failure, and therefore not significant to the history of the country, or to the extreme suppression of Islamists and their ideology and accomplishments that have been government policy both before the 2011 revolution and after the 2013 coup (see also Abdou, 2017). Conformist self-censorship is another possibility (Guimelli & Lo Monaco, 2016), as expressing memories of Islamist accomplishments or thoughts could threaten the postcoup standards of Egyptian society. The significance of this result in these data is thus ambiguous, and deserves further study.

We also found largely what we expected in the contents of Morocco's LHM. The contents were broader in domain and time span than those in Egypt, going back to the Battle of the Three Kings (1578), with much a more even balance between economic, social, and political events. There were no listed events that focused on minority ethnic or religious identities, per se (e.g., Amazigh, Jewish communities). Such issues were incorporated as elements of broader memories of protest movements and educational and other civic reforms. Both contemporary (e.g., recent protest/political movements) and foundational (e.g., monarchist, independence) memories were well-represented in the contemporary history group, suggesting that historical memories in Morocco were recruited by both system-justifying romantic narratives and social change and progress narratives.

Note the absence of global or precolonial events in the recollections of people in both countries. While the absence of precolonial historical memories makes sense given that the instructions for the listing of memories

specifies events occurring in the recent past (no farther back than two or three generations), participants seem to be addressing importance as well as recency. Certainly, some listed events go back further than the lifespan of participants' lived experiences or that of their grandparents'. Nonetheless, it seems that participants feel that these events have enough impact and importance for their contemporary lives that they deserve mention. Yet, many precolonial and global events that should fall in this category were not mentioned. A previous study that examined social representations of world history in African countries (without our measurement confound) has found similar marked recency effects, but also greater attention to Western and global historical events than we found here (Cabecinhas et al., 2011). Future studies should examine whether the recency effect and lack of global representations we find here are indeed measurement artifacts or are related to (a) the scarcity of such events in the history curricula and media environment of Egypt and Morocco, (b) the larger salience/urgency of the contemporary domestic issues facing these populations, or (c) a popular lack of awareness of the connection between such events and these countries' histories and current development.

The contemporary history class was larger in Egypt than in Morocco. Given the much greater instability experienced by Egypt compared to Morocco in the past decade (Cavatorta, 2016), this is understandable. In more fragile, unstable, or less developed countries, it makes sense that acute and blatant grievances and injustices are prioritised in people's systemic societal evaluations and attributions of historical importance. It is also possible that people in such countries would base their critical orientations toward their political systems less on historical memory tied to national foundational narratives and legitimising myths than on critical analysis of the contemporary roots of current acute problems (e.g., corruption).

Thus, we also expected historical memories to be associated with national identification and SJ in both countries, albeit a stronger relationship with SJ in Morocco and a stronger relationship with collective identification in Egypt. What we found was more extreme. Although historicity was associated with national and community identification in Egypt, and the foundational history class there showed higher community identification, there was no relationship with SJ. It seems that while the nationalist military narrative may be successful in enculturating social identity, the systemic instability and overt repressiveness of governance in Egypt may be blocking this narrative from being an effective legitimising myth (for broader perspectives on this issue, see Liu et al., in press). As Sasnal (2014) noted, the Egyptian glorifying nationalist narrative is unsustainable because

it is increasingly self-contradictory, leaves large gaps in time unexamined, and cannot explain the changes that the country has gone through or the events that people have observed for themselves. If the state's intention in continuing to propagate this narrative is to legitimise its political system, our results suggest that such an approach will fail.

In Morocco, on the other hand, historicity was generally unrelated to either identification or SJ, though people whose memories specifically emphasised the foundational history of the country did tend to legitimise their political system and the monarchy more than did those who also attended to more recent events. This makes sense in the much more stable political system in Morocco. The Moroccan "unity in stability and reform" narrative is not only flexible but also is wielded by the monarchy in tandem with subtle repression and coercion in such a way that the latter reinforces that narrative rather than undermines it (Cavatorta, 2016). Accordingly, this narrative functions to legitimise the system. However, it appears Moroccans may derive their national identification from other sources. These sources of identity may be other beliefs propagated by the king and state, such as beliefs in common fate, visions and aspirations for the state and the future (e.g., as a moderate modern Muslim country), or religious or civic beliefs idiosyncratic to Morocco (Cavatorta, 2016), or that national and communal identities themselves vary in meanings and associations more widely in Morocco than in Egypt. Future studies should examine these possibilities.

In both countries, we see that historical memory or salience was not necessarily associated with greater SJ or national identification, contrary to predictions made by some collective memory theories (Olick et al., 2011). Neither was LHM of any class associated with greater PE, as would be predicted by proponents of critical consciousness theory and others (Watts et al., 2011). Neither group of theoretical frameworks seems to fully explain these contexts.

It is possible that the effects of LHM in Morocco and Egypt do not translate to changes in PE because there are so many other measures taken by these states to demobilise and suppress political activism, and thus variations in LHM content and organisation have a negligible effect in these contexts. It is also possible that the PE measure was too broad, relying on items more appropriate for measuring normative political behaviour in the West (e.g., signing online petitions, protest participation) to see the link between historical memory and the kinds of covert and noninstitutionally sanctioned activism that may be more feasible in these countries. Also note that political ideology, SES, and religiosity had no impact on our outcomes or their relationships with LHM. Follow-

up studies should examine political behaviour and its covariates in these countries more closely, using better measures, and note their associations with LHM.

The current study is limited in that it involves a two-country comparison rather than a full cross-cultural analysis. It is cross-sectional, leaving unknown how LHM changed in content, organisation, and function over the periods of instability that these nations have seen. It is possible that the results observed here are a snapshot (albeit an informative one) of the period of consolidated counterrevolutionary suppression in these countries during which these data were collected, and that very different patterns would have been observed in 2011 or 2013. Moreover, the study relies on correlational data, so attributions of directionality or causality are not possible (e.g., whether the foundational history organisation of LHM in Morocco leads to greater SJ, or if being more legitimising of the system leads to greater salience and perceptions of significance of the country's foundational history).

This study is also limited by its measures and sampling. We examine identification as a unidimensional construct, where some research has suggested that it may not be (Leach et al., 2008). We did not have data assessing constructs related to identities that might be equally important, such as collective narcissism (de Zavala, Cichocka, Eidelson, & Jayawickreme, 2009) or ingroup glorification (Roccas, Klar, & Liviatan, 2006). In addition, as discussed earlier, the PE measure is probably not adequate for these contexts. Our samples, although nationally representative of the populations on the basis of our stratification criteria, might not be representative in terms of other criteria that would be relevant for this study, such as ethnicity, language, and location (urban/rural, provincial distribution, etc.). This is particularly relevant for Morocco, where Amazigh and other ethnic and linguistic minorities may be underrepresented in a survey conducted online, in Arabic. The relative dearth of interethnic and minority-relevant collective memories in our data set may be due less to the success of the state in subsuming such memories within unifying Arab and Islamic and nationalist historical interpretations, and more to underrepresentation in sampling.

Future research should address these limitations and further extend this work. One avenue to explore would be examining polemical narratives within as well as across these nations, with greater attention to the ethno-linguistic, regional, and religious diversity of these nations, knowing that the same historical events may be interpreted differently and have opposing sociopolitical functions for different communities within countries (see also Kus et al., 2013). Moreover, having observed a clear class of citizens in both countries focused on independence and anticolonial foundational history, it may

be of interest to examine how such an organisation of collective memories relates to such citizens' attitudes toward former colonising countries and populations today.

The results presented here do not fit neatly into any current theoretical framework, partially supporting opposing views regarding the role of historical memory in constructing identity and legitimising the state. But this study does provide a basis for future research that could have major implications for how we understand collective memory and the role of history in political propaganda, nation formation, and political protest. It has also opened a window into the functions of collective remembering in a part of the world (North Africa) where this subject has been little explored.

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Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Data Availability Statement

Data that support the findings of this study are available from the corresponding author upon reasonable request.

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