Skip navigation

Norms, advice networks and economic governance: The case of conflicts among shareholders at the Commercial Court of Paris

Norms, advice networks and economic governance: The case of conflicts among shareholders at the Commercial Court of Paris

Tubaro, Paola, Lazega, Emmanuel and Mounier, Lise (2010) Norms, advice networks and economic governance: The case of conflicts among shareholders at the Commercial Court of Paris. In: Economic Governance Institutions, Economic Outcomes and the Crisis: An International Conference, 4 June 2010, University of Greenwich. (Unpublished)

[img] PDF
Tubaro_Lazega_Mounier.pdf - Presentation
Restricted to Repository staff only

Download (257kB)

Abstract

Businesses are usually very keen to participate in the governance of their markets (Lazega and Mounier, 2002, 2003). At the inter-organizational level, at least two different sociological traditions deal with the issue of governance of markets, stressing either formal and often exogenous aspects, or informal and endogenous ones. For the first tradition, a socio-legal one, exogenous governance (see for example Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992; Hawkins, 1984; Hawkins and Thomas, 1984; Shapiro, 1984; Weait, 1993; Weaver, 1977) is provided by government agencies backed up by courts. These studies focus, for example, on the decision by government agencies to prosecute deviant companies. Such decisions are not straightforward and they often come out of tradeoffs between official inspectors and company managers. This is especially the case when they face risks such as large-scale losses and layoffs, and sometimes bankruptcy, should the law be strictly enforced. The second tradition focuses on inter-firm arrangements promoting self-governance benefits for firms in their transactions and more informal conflict resolution mechanisms. Because litigation is costly, firms sometimes prefer unofficial dispute resolution whenever possible, especially when they have long term continuing relationships (see for example Macaulay, 1963, 1986; Raub and Weesie, 1993, 1996, 2000; Rooks et al., 2000; Buskens et al., 2003). Here the focus is on pressures to conform by one organization on the other. Pressures are based on resource dependencies and reputation. Thus, these two traditions focus on different kinds of actors intervening in governance, the State and companies themselves –the latter sometimes through industry representatives.

Item Type: Conference or Conference Paper (Paper)
Additional Information: [1] A revised version of this paper appears in the book Does Economic Governance Matter?: Governance Institutions and Outcomes edited by Mehemet Ugur - see http://gala.gre.ac.uk/7121/
Uncontrolled Keywords: economic governance, social networks, business networks, organisational behaviour, norms, stochastic actor-based modeling
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions
Faculty / Department / Research Group: Faculty of Business > Department of International Business & Economics
Related URLs:
Last Modified: 14 Oct 2016 09:09
Selected for GREAT 2016: None
Selected for GREAT 2017: None
Selected for GREAT 2018: None
Selected for GREAT 2019: None
URI: http://gala.gre.ac.uk/id/eprint/3623

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item

Downloads

Downloads per month over past year

View more statistics