Of Ideological Obsessions

By The Editors

Abstract

In this article, we argue that there is only a thin line between an obsession to ideology and doctrine formation with its attendant and sometimes inevitable totalitarianism. Because of the sometimes blurred boundaries, particularly between theory and ideology, we suggest that it is easy to unconsciously slip into the realm of ideology even though we assume that we are only playing around with theory or indeed holding a rational position. We argue further that a fastidious adherence to the former can sometimes result in a rigid binary opposition between the self or familiar, which is often eulogised, and the alien which is often castigated. Drawing on critical discussions on various educational issues including literacy practices, issues around language, ideology and discrimination, recent policy developments and issues emerging from significant periods in history, we relate this issue to knowledge enquiry and policy making and conclude that we must utilise theory in its situated and contextualised form in order to reap its full benefit in our knowledge enquiry and policy making endeavours.

Keywords: ideology, Brexit, Reflections, theory

Setting the context: Reflections

In writing this article, the beginning for us is a process of reflection. One feature of reflection is a process of thinking about what we do. Schon (1983), one of the major contributors to the discourse on reflection in education highlights the dichotomy between reflection in and on action. For us, the argument we present in this paper was kick-started by a process reflection on action. Central to this process is the question; what is it that we do as intellectuals and academics? Finding an answer to this question becomes even more pressing in the context of the contemporary global issues: a sizable part of the world that is economically impoverished, social discontent leading to mass murder of innocent citizens and in Britain, the now-dreaded word, BREXIT etc. In the middle of all of this, we think that we as academics are precariously perched. That perch is created through our constant engagement with theory as an instrument for proffering solutions to these problems. That, in our view, is what most of us as academics do. All our other engagements are secondary and incidental. It is our engagement with theory that leads to our academic worldview, our input into policy and governance and in extreme cases, the totality of our social interactions. This paper, therefore, is not a conventional academic paper. We have no copious data to convince you of the validity of our claims. What we aim to present, however, is the product of our reflections, first and foremost, as academics. Ultimately, our hope is that our argument will resonate and get you thinking about your own role in these contexts.

Three specific incidents came to mind in the course of our reflection and led to our conclusions in respect of the all-pervading impact of theory on us as academics. The first incident relates to a personal experience of one of us, who had submitted an article for publication. The article itself was a product of a collaborative empirical research on feedback and trainee literacy teachers. As usual, the response came several
months later: the article was accepted for publication subject to minor amendments. Naturally, that was something to celebrate. But, what was the amendment? A request for ‘a more rigorous engagement with theory in the discussion of data’.

The second incident involved a role one of us had as a panellist on a PhD viva voce which ended in an almost intractable conflict. The real issue, it seemed, was on the superiority of using one theory as against another. Indeed, it became a gladiatorial contest between the two external examiners and as expected, when two elephants fight, the grass gets hurt. The poor candidate paid the price for the examiners’ disagreement over theory. It was indeed the reason why a panel of expert was set up. Both examiners were unwilling to yield ground on the issue of supremacy of theories, and the poor candidate was driven to distraction. So, what is the price that we variously have to pay for such adherence to theory?

The third incident emerged from a monthly seminar series of a university in the UK. The focus of the series is on theoretical influences on the work of academics. One of the most interesting of this series to date was the presentation by one colleague on Foucault shortly after the now infamous UK riots of 2011 summer. This colleague, after eulogising the virtues of Foucault’s theories concluded that the world would make no progress unless it swallows all of Foucault’s (1975) postulations in ‘Discipline and Punish’. As you might expect, all hell broke loose. Many colleagues simply could not accept this conclusion. Needless to say, that they parted ways on a slightly less than friendly basis. Reflecting on this incident struck a chord. Was this colleague merely engaging with theory or was s/he in fact an ideologue? Similarly, were the main actors in the earlier events really furthering the course of knowledge discovery or were they effectively advocating procedural engagement bordering on the fetish? One conclusion was inevitable. It was the latter! It is from our reaction to such fastidious adherence to one theory that our argument in this paper emerged. The line between theory and ideology is rather thin and if care is not taken, an implacable adherence to ideology can tip us over the edge into the realm of totalitarianism. Our goal in this paper, therefore, is to reflect on the issue of theory, ideology and how our perception of these categories might impact on our search for knowledge and our input into policy making.

It seems that the most fruitful way to start in this context is to engage with the significations of these terms. Once we have established what they signify, we will then illustrate how our particular views on them might play out in the various domains in which we might be engaged. In doing this, we will draw from contemporary issues in governmental policies, academic studies and from contemporary history. We will then present this in a binary configuration which will seek to highlight the positives and the negatives that might be associated with each of the positions we identify.

Before delving into all of this, let us make it clear that we do not engage with these terms as a political scientist, economist or sociologist. Rather, we look at these purely from the viewpoint of academics, who constantly interact with theory, either in its intrinsic form in search of knowledge or in its application to practice with a particular focus on policy making.

Theory

What is theory? From the simplest point of view, theory is defined by the Oxford dictionary as ‘supposition or system of ideas explaining something’; one based on general principles independent of particular things to be explained’. In essence, theory is necessarily just one way of looking at things. It is, therefore, one likely answer.
Theory

In pursuance of this theme of generalisation and the notion of world view, Joas and Knob (2009) in their lecture series on social theory write,

‘Theory is as necessary as it is unavoidable. Without it, it would be impossible to learn or to act in consistent fashion; without generalizations and abstractions, the world would exist for us only as a chaotic patchwork of discrete, disconnected experiences and sensory impressions’.

The same theme was even more eloquently pursued in Popper’s (1959; 2002, p.59) ‘The logic of scientific discovery’, where it is suggested that ‘Theories are nets cast to catch what we call ‘the world’; to rationalize, to explain, and to master it. We endeavour to make the mesh even finer and finer’.

From the onset, let us establish that this perception is different from the conceptualisation of theory in science. The perception of theory in the realm of science holds that in science, "theory" does not mean the same thing as it does in everyday life. It is not a guess, hunch, hypothesis, or speculation. It is much more full-blown. It is built upon one or more hypotheses and upon evidence (Pearlstein, 2012). It contains reasoning and logical connections based on the hypotheses and evidence.

But even this science-oriented view of theory concedes that a scientific theory can be wrong, since one of its hypotheses might be wrong, the reasoning might be flawed, or new data might come along that invalidates it. Beyond this, the validity of a theory might be limited. As a result, the expectation is that, a wrong theory gets modified, discarded, or replaced. Just drawing from these, it is evident that theory can be seen as an instrument of ordering our reality. That reality, we argue, can undoubtedly change or be altered from time to time. This perception of theory, at least at the surface level, does not signify any dangers for us as academics. Yes, it is important for us to have a particular way of ordering and understanding what is after all a very complex world and that is what we do most of the time.

While the viewpoint of theory explored above is very appealing, there are other ways of looking at theory. For a start, the preceding appreciation of theory is limited to what might be considered to be a one-level analysis and might quite easily be a simplistic way of looking at the concept of theory. Alvin Gouldner (2012), in his interesting treatise on theory and ideology suggests that there are two sides to theory. One part of this duality presents theory as having ‘an establishing and affirming side’ (p.1), while the other has what he calls ‘an unmasking and polemical side’. With the former, theory is presented as ‘rational discourse about the social world in that, on one level, it is deliberately seeking to advance certain interests in the world’, while with the latter, it is presented as being consumed with the goal of providing a platform for fostering ideological imports concealed in ordinary language.

Theory, therefore, is our way of engaging in a dialogue through which we display our own position. In other words, theory possesses an inherent facility for facilitating a rational discourse. It is, therefore not an avenue for slamming shut the gate to dialogue, but on the contrary, an avenue for engaging in dialogue. However, the same instrument can become a tool for excluding dialogue. As Gouldner warns, in order to advance the case for theory as a facilitator of praxis, we must also ensure that we advance the case for theory as a distinct element from ideology. One of our major concerns is the propensity for us as academics to seamlessly move from the realm of theory into that of ideology. But before looking at the implications of such a crossover, let
us look at what ideology signifies.

Ideology is an unusually difficult term to nail down. Indeed, while there is no
dearth of discussions on ideology, there are very few actual definitions of the term.
Nevertheless, scholars have identified two strands in the discourse on ideology. While
one view argues for a perception of ideology as false theories (Habermas, 1968 &
Wodak, 2007), the other presents it as an unavoidable moment of all thinking and act-
ing. What is clear from contemporary literature is that ideology is often proffered as
something negative. But this has not always being the case. It would seem that the
major reason for the negative connotation that ideology now attracts is its association
with politics. When the French philosopher, Destutt de Tracy coined the term
‘ideologie’ in 1796, it was used to refer merely to a body of ideas with socially benefi-
cial intentions notably in the arena of education. As such, the concept itself originally
had a much closer link with education than politics and a significantly positive conno-
tation. With the shift in slant to politics starting with Napoleon’s condemnation of
those he called ‘ideologues’, the term has since significantly attracted a negative rather
than a positive concept of scholarly discourse. The real problem for us as contempo-
rary academics is that we have not been able to dissociate the term form the negative
connotations because we employ and relate to it mostly in the political sense. Let us
illustrate this with one of the descriptions of the term in the literature

Generally, ideology is described as ideas that are characteristic of either a
class or group which form the basis for some social or political position. From this
simple view of ideology, there is a suggestion implied in the word characteristic that,
this is usually a near permanent position. Perhaps such perception of permanence is
what accounts for Habermas’ suggestion that we might conceive of ideology as some-
thing that arises when rational discourse breaks down. In order words, ideology is our
way of saying, no; I do not want to hear your views. Gouldner (2012, p. 69) puts this
succinctly when he says that ideology ‘is a way of concealing’ the breakdown of ra-
tionale discourse. A pertinent question for us at this juncture is, why does rational
discourse break down? Why is the door of discourse frequently shut?

The answer is as simple as it is hidden; rational discourse breaks down when
we allow our interest (in this case, political or ideological interest) to stifle it. In other
words, when we become ideologically driven, the tendency is for us to discountenance
all the potential good that might emanate from an engagement with rational discourse
in order for us to be able to promote a chosen interest. Ideology, therefore, as Gould-
ner concludes, has the potential of playing two roles. First, it can be seen as a false
discourse because it has super-imposed itself on rational discourse and second, it can
be seen as an instrument of concealment (of the forces that led to a break down). In
effect, ideology aligns to both interest and to discourse. Whichever side of the divide
we see ideology from, it continues to reflect and sustain two primary elements all ema-
nating from its political adventures. First, it reflects power and second, it reflects the
element of rigidity. It is these two elements that our reflections have thrown up as fea-
tures to be wary of.

Considering our earlier views about theory, it seems that ideology and theory can be
located on a cline with each positioned at the two extremes of this cline. Most of us
will agree that our calling as academics regularly locates us at the first end of the cline
-engagement with theory as an instrument of dialogue. The real danger is inherent in
the possibility of sliding from one end of the cline to the other. That is, sliding from
our engagement with theory as an instrument of rational discourse to an engagement
with ideology in its form as an agent of concealment of a breakdown in discourse and
in effect, as a fraudulent discourse. From our starting position as professionals who
engages with theory, how and where does totalitarianism come into the equation? We suggest that once we have shifted across the cline from point A to B, we immediately become subject to a regime of totalitarianism, which is the third variable in this configuration.

It is apt, therefore, to ask the question; what is totalitarianism? Conventional literature often associates totalitarianism with distinctly negative and more often than not, odious periods in our social history. The essence of such a description is the recognition of political power, just as is the case with ideology, as a variable and perhaps a mandatory ingredient in totalitarianism. Bernholz (2001) proposes a number of essential features of totalitarianism. Apart from what is generally accepted as an ideology with supreme values, he, similar to Maier and Shaefer (1997) also identified a monopoly of ideological interpretation often spearheaded by a leader or leaders, a combination of secular and spiritual power and a state of societal crisis. These additional three factors in my view locate the classical notion of totalitarianism within the realm of politics and power structure. Because of this, examples of totalitarianism are readily drawn from the era of Nazism, the communist dictatorship of Stalin in Russia, for those who are so inclined etc. But this merely emphasises the dichotomy drawn by Cassinelli between totalitarian regimes and totalitarian movement. While the notion of political power is a given with regimes, this might not necessarily be the case with other manifestations of totalitarianism. The totalitarianism we present here is slightly different from that which is often associated with regimes. We argue that totalitarianism is not simply a product of such negatively heralded periods in our history which is informed by power and political structure. Although the fundamental feature of ideological supremacy is shared with the classical notion of totalitarianism, the other factors identified above are not represented at the same detailed level as they are in classical totalitarianism. As with classical totalitarianism, the form that we describe here requires some form of leadership, but not necessarily within an organisation as would be the case with classical totalitarianism. Such leadership for us as academics might be reposed in the proponents of the theories we embrace. The other two features have very limited roles in the type of totalitarianism we offer here. In place of the existence of state secular and spiritual power, we offer what we describe as attitudinal and positional power which allows a totalitarian ideologue to impose their world views on others, failing which they shut the doors of rational discourse. The third feature, crisis, has limited relevance for us here largely because we see crisis in society as arguably unending and a significant part of the justification for what we do. If we accept the position presented here, it is easy to see the form of totalitarianism we present as one which differs slightly from the classical notion of totalitarianism on the basis of the notions of the state as against individualised and attitudinal power, and on the grounds of the aversion to an association with politics and political regimes. Having said this, we hasten to add that there is no reason why the two might not converge and that in fact, history has shown how the former can morph into the latter.

Illustrating the version of totalitarianism we present here, Vikki Bell (2002) wrote an article on what she calls Feminist thought and the Totalitarian Interloper. In this article, Bell uses the ‘highly inflammatory terms and frames of reference’ used in an exchange between two feminists, Judith Butler and Martha Nussbaum, to illustrate the danger that this form of totalitarianism might hold for us as academics. Bell’s central question in this article is instructive: ‘How is it that those who are understood as leading feminist theorists can be read as dangerous collaborators with evil and those who defend normative theories of social justice can be read as fascists?’ Our answer to Vikki’s question is simple; rational discourse broke down because of a fastidious
adherence to theory. This in turn has turned the adversaries into totalitarian ideologues. The result is a total lack of willingness to accept that there might be any values in others’ positions. It becomes obvious, therefore, I would hope, that every time we remain fastidiously attached to a theoretical position to the detriment of rational discourse, we assume the dimension of an ideologue and in effect become totalitarian in our outlook. Capturing this relationship between ideology and totalitarianism, Jameson (1991) writes,

*The fundamental gesture of all ideology is exactly such a rigid binary opposition between the self or familiar, which is positively valorised, and the non-self or alien, which is thrust beyond the boundaries of intelligibility*.

In order words, ideology has the tendency of making us see just our own world views with a total refusal to entertain the remotest possibility that others might also be intelligent in their postulations. In essence, ideology lives and dies on the altar of self or group identity. Similarly, Adorno (Cited from Eagleton, 1991, p. 126) paints a poignant picture of this relationship when he claims that, ‘Identity is the primal form of all ideology’ and further that, with ideology,

*our reified consciousness is frozen in a kind of monotonous self-same being we find ourselves bound to what is and this blinds us to what could be*.

More importantly, Adorno explicitly highlights the link between ideology and the notion of totalitarianism when he describes ideology as,

*a totalitarian system through which you manage and process all social conflicts, ruthlessly expunging whatever is heterogeneous to it*.

What is clear in this characterisation of ideology is an infallible recourse to atavism. This atavistic tendency tends to drive ideologues back to their roots—usually a particular theory—compared with which no other theory makes sense. This, we suggest, contrasts the two categories in bold relief. While theory should be seen as one likely answer to a problem, ideology insists on dictating how things should be. As academics, there are times when we have found ourselves in this mode. No other theory can adequately explain the phenomenon at hand. No other theory can account for the state of the society and the only way in which we can remedy societal malaise is through recourse to a particular theory. That stance effectively leaves us on the altar of totalitarianism.

**Extending our argument to reality: contextualisation**

Our next task is to attempt to illustrate how on the one hand, a deviation from ideological totalitarianism can yield positive results and how on the other hand, a fastidious adherence to it can yield negative results. Given our pre-occupation as academics, it seems right that our starting point with these illustrations should be research. As researchers, we are all too familiar with the constant bickering between the advocates of positivist and interpretive paradigms of research. To put it more bluntly, we have either been witnesses to, or participants in the seemingly unending battle between disciples of the quantitative and qualitative approaches to research. This legitimate debate
has, however, for some, become a struggle to the death. Let us illustrate this with the views of two of the adversaries in this struggle to emphasise this point. In one of its reports, the Department of education strategic plan (2002) argues that the qualitative approach to education research does not and cannot be seen to be based on any kind of evidence. It, therefore, concludes that, ‘there is a need to change education to make it an evidence-based field’. Of course, the implication is that the department will not be informed by anything originating from a qualitative approach to research. You can imagine the consternation of the advocates of the qualitative approach to research. But this extremist view is not monopolised by those who prefer the quantitative approach to research. Representing the other side of the debate, Kozulin, (1990, p. 230) writes, 

‘In some studies... purity has taken precedence over theoretical meaningfulness. This could easily lead to methodological fetish when the direction of research is dictated neither by theory nor by the subject of inquiry, but by the methods that guarantee the reliable reproduction of data’

As researchers, our view on these seemingly implacable positions is that the fruitful way forward is for us to be guided by the principle of contextualism. Recently, one of the authors of this article won some funding to pursue a collaborative research on literacy practices in some parts of Africa. One of the requirements for securing the fund was the use of an ethnographic approach to research. One of the features of ethnographic study is embedding the researcher(s) in the research setting. For pragmatic and financial reasons, this was a near-impossibility for us. Our response was to draw on the principle of contextualism through which we emphasised the need to put things in context. The result, in the short term was that we were able to persuade the funders. In the long-term however, the result was even more significant; as it led to the emergence of what is now called the density of literacy practices approach to ethnographic studies in literacy. For researchers, that was more pleasing and more enlightening. Drawing from the principle of social literacy, we recognised that literacy can be seen as social practice and that these practices are populated by literacy events. Based on this, we proposed a modification of the requirements of ethnographic studies such that we were able to focus on identified periods of literacy events rather than on the totality of the existence of the subjects. The results were highly significant and more importantly credible. Through our focus on literacy events, we found that the dominant discourse in literacy has somehow influenced many of the subjects to assume that they were not literate simply because their literacy was not in the English language. We found people who were functionally literate in a range of languages classifying themselves as ‘illiterate’. Two lessons emerged for us here. First is that we realised that our willingness to insist on a research approach that is contrary to the state-preferred approach has enabled us to gain some highly significant insights into people’s perception of the self in the context of literacy. For this, commendations must go to our funders who have not become ideologues of the cognitive approach to literacy which they clearly preferred. The second point is that our willingness to contextualise enabled us to again gain significant insights into literacy practices in the areas we studied.

In contrast, we offer you insights from the work of Rosina Lippi-Green (2012) on language, ideology and discrimination in the United States. Rosina’s work illustrates how the hegemony of assumptions has developed around theories to produce a language ideology which has become an instrument of discrimination. She suggests, for example, that the theory on accent has indeed become an ideology and has inevitably promoted exclusionary and destructive practices. Crucially, the assumption
that accent belongs to only a particular group of language users and that some users might actually not have accents has limited the search for understanding the ac-cent of the so called non-accented language variety. A key concern for Rosina in this work was how to answer the question on how we must approach the dissemination of sociolinguistic information in a situation where ‘language diversity is interpreted in terms of a prescriptive/correctionist model’. The elements of prescription and correction, we will argue, have in fact pushed elements of sociolinguistic theory into the realm of ideology. Attendant to the ethos of prescription and correction is a refusal to entertain other viewpoints and to inexorably push through the conventional argument on a number of issues in spite of other viewpoint. For example, why can we not accept that despite the general acceptability accorded to some dialects and accents, it is logical to accept that all spoken languages change, are equal in linguistic terms and that variation is intrinsic to all spoken languages. We invite you to consider what we could have learned about the emergence of language varieties if we had admitted the so called standard language as just another variety of language use.

Perhaps the best illustration of our argument in terms of policy can be found in the recent economic history of China. As we well know, China is now the second largest economy in the world. This was not always the case. When Deng Xiaoping took over as the Chinese premier post-Mao, the hallmark of his reign was moderation and contextualisation. China was a communist country and was no doubt governed by the principles of the theory of communism. However, what Deng did was to engage with rational discourse and because of this, entertain the possibility that things could be done in other ways. In other words, he recognised that there could be other answers. In so doing, Deng moved away from the totalitarian stance of his predecessors by recognising the potentials inherent in a mixture of communism and capitalism. Unlike his predecessors who were limited by a fastidious attachment to one form of political ideology which derived from a theory of communism, Deng allowed the theory of capitalism to inform his economic leadership. For example, he permitted households to replace collective and governmental restrictions, decentralised production, and overall, brought an economic explosion that increased the revenue of the country considerably. All of this was done in a climate where a totally different theory informed the political arena. By the time Deng left in 1993 and Jang became president, China had become the world’s fastest growing economy by both nominal GDP and PPP (Purchasing power parity) indices. In my view, the advancement that China made was informed by the willingness of its leader at the time to listen to other views; to engage in a rational discourse which permitted him to recognise that there could be other fruitful ways of doing things. Effectively, there was a conscious deviation from a totalitarian stance by Deng as the leader of China.

In contrast, we offer our own interpretation of the social situation in Britain at the moment. To our mind, a lot of the social problems confronting the country is informed by a fastidious adherence to specific theories by succeeding governments. In particular, the seeming intractable impasse on BREXIT is a product of ideological fastidiousness. In our view, the seemingly irreconcilable differences are informed by advice from ideologically driven people. Prior to the current Brexit crisis, divisions had always been entrenched in our society because of conflicting ideological stances. Let us take for example the differences between the last Labour government and the Conservative government of Cameron which is now inherited by May.

The immediate past government, The Labour government, were consumed by the Keynesian economic theory which insists on government manipulation through monetary policy actions, hands-on fiscal legislation, heavy taxation to support state
projects and a heavily regulated private sector. As a result, there was a massive expansion of the state sector, a huge outlay on public facilities and of course, a massive debt. There is no doubt that the New Labour government did not leave the country in the best shape. That, however, should not detract from the fact that their Keynesian outlook benefitted the country in the areas of education, health and welfare. The crucial question for us is; how much better would they have done if they had listened to rational discourse and agreed that it is possible that other areas of governance such as trade and the economy, employment etc could have been better administered through a recourse to the arguments of the Smithian economic theory? Contemporary developments would suggest that they might have fared significantly better.

The conservative government on the other hand subscribe to the Smithian economic theory and will not budge on their perception of how the country must be run. They insist on a similar pattern of single minded ideological allegiance, fuelled by academics who are followers of Adam Smith’s theory. They insist on the invisible hand of the private sector rather than governmental intervention, a limit to the role of the state and the creation of private wealth. As we are not economists, we are probably not suitably equipped to legitimately argue about the merit or otherwise of either of this model. Within our limitations, however, we argue that some of the current policies, particularly in spheres other than the economic are ideologically driven. Our honest view is that a flexible approach which might, as was the case with the Chinese; admit the possibility that other viewpoints might be effective in different spheres might well offer desired solutions. In the contemporary setting, education, welfare and health have all been consigned to the postulations of the Smithian theory. The current state of education and welfare in the country suggests that there could well be other ways of addressing these issues which might benefit society better.

**Conclusions**

So, what do we propose to us as academics? How do we ensure that we are not fastidiously attached to one world view through our relationship with theory? For us, our engagement must be governed by two principles. In the realm of knowledge discovery, we suggest that we embrace the principle of flexibility and openness. By being flexible and open, we locate ourselves in the advantageous position of learning more through a willingness to consider other possibilities. We offer ourselves the chance to experiment. As we well know, one of the greatest routes to knowledge discovery is through experimentation. Our plea is that we give ourselves the chance to benefit from this.

In terms of our contributions to policy making, a crucial principle must be contextualisation. In this context, we proudly accept that we are incurable contextualists and make no apologies for that. Let us illustrate this with the current situation in many developing countries. Africa, by the fact of history and the reality of contemporary existence often import social theories from Western Europe and North America through her academics. There is nothing wrong with that. What is wrong is the refusal of many academics to locate those theories in the context of totally different social and historical settings. The so-called Arab spring is an illustration of this phenomenon. We offer no views about whether democracy or any other form of governance is best for the Arab world. That is not our concern. What concerns us is the suggestion that a Western-style democracy can be imported in its totality. Where, in that context do we confine the realities of history? In our view, the attempt to import a rigid structure of western democracy to these parts has resulted in the on-going anarchy in the Arab world. Yes, Gadhafi is gone, Mubarak is gone, Sadam is gone but what have we
replaced him with? We are creeping into the realm of politics now and that is not our intention. So, we leave the rest to your imagination.

Let us then round up our reflections. When we venture into the realm of ideology as academics, there is the danger that we might be venturing into the realm of totalitarianism. To put it simply, we are insisting that everyone else’s ideas, theories and arguments must conform to what we consider correct. Yes, theory is the lifeblood of what we do and we must inevitably interact with it. Within the framework of this interaction, we must remember that it is only a tool for us to use. Our plea is that we must never allow ourselves to be manipulated to a situation where theory uses us.

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