

# Quality of Care and Interhospital Collaboration

## A Study of Patient Transfers in Italy

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**Objectives:** We examine the dynamics of patient-sharing relations within an Italian regional community of 35 hospitals serving approximately 1,300,000 people. We test whether interorganizational relations provide individual patients access to higher quality providers of care.

**Research Design and Methods:** We reconstruct the complete temporal sequence of the 3461 consecutive interhospital patient-sharing events observed between each pair of hospitals in the community during 2005–2008. We distinguish between transfers occurring between and within different medical specialties. We estimate newly derived models for relational event sequences that allow us to control for the most common forms of network-like dependencies that are known to characterize collaborative relations between hospitals. We use 45-day risk-adjusted readmission rate as a proxy for hospital quality.

**Results:** After controls (eg, geographical distance, size, and the existence of prior collaborative relations), we find that patients flow from less to more capable hospitals. We show that this result holds for patient being shared both between as well as within medical specialties. Nonetheless there are strong and persistent other organizational and relational effects driving transfers.

**Conclusions:** Decentralized patient-sharing decisions taken by the 35 hospitals give rise to a system of collaborative interorganizational arrangements that allow the patient to access hospitals delivering a higher quality of care. This result is relevant for health

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care policy because it suggests that collaborative relations between hospitals may produce desirable outcomes both for individual patients, and for regional health care systems.

**Key Words:** ■, ■, ■

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The rise of Accountable Care Organizations, strategic alliances, and collaborative statewide quality agreements has given growing prominence to the role of decentralized coordination between hospitals in the care of patients in the United States.<sup>1</sup> Yet, such systems have been in place in other advanced medical systems—and other sectors of the economy—for many years. In this article, we approach interhospital transfers of patients as patient-sharing relations that constitute an interorganizational network amenable to direct empirical investigation.<sup>2,3</sup> Patient sharing requires that partner hospitals commit resources to joint infrastructural investments to support relational coordination<sup>4,5</sup>—a reliable signal of collaboration between sending and receiving hospitals.<sup>6</sup>

Even as patient-sharing practices diffuse and grow in importance, it remains unclear what drives these collaborations. Do they result in individual patients going to higher quality hospitals? To what extent are they meeting other organizational, rather than patient-centered goals? Extant research on this issue has produced contrasting results. A recent review of the literature on the transfer of critically ill patients, for example, concludes that the destination of patients is not necessarily chosen on the basis of objective evidence about the performance and capabilities of the receiving hospital.<sup>5</sup> Yet, it has also been argued that encouraging interhospital patient-sharing relations so that appropriate patients could be transferred from lower to higher quality hospitals would be an effective policy for facilitating access to higher quality care.<sup>2</sup> For example, in the context of critical-care medicine studies are available that report how directing trauma victims to centers of excellence may lead to a 25%–50% improvement in outcomes.<sup>7</sup> The conclusion seems to be that interhospital collaboration by patient-sharing relations could—at least in principle—facilitate access to higher quality care. In practice, however, this seems not to happen in the United States if the decision is left to individual hospitals.<sup>8</sup> As a consequence corrective policy interventions may be needed to realize the full potential of

1 interhospital collaboration. Regionalization, centralization,  
 3 and quality improvement initiatives have been recently  
 5 proposed as policy instruments to correct potentially  
 7 undesirable consequences of decentralized interhospital  
 9 arrangements.<sup>9</sup>

The purpose of this paper is, substantively, to widen  
 7 the discussion by moving outside the US context, with its  
 9 known insurance-based idiosyncrasies. We collected data on  
 11 all interhospital transfers during 2005–2008 between all 35  
 13 hospitals in a self-contained region in Southern Italy. Modeled  
 15 after the British National Health System, the Italian  
 17 National Health System provides health care coverage and  
 19 uniform access to health care services financed by the gov-  
 21 ernment through taxes.<sup>10</sup> Policies of economic decentral-  
 23 ization consistently enacted since the early 1990s have  
 25 progressively shifted administrative, financial, and mana-  
 27 gerial control from the central to the regional governments.  
 29 Today health care in Italy takes the form of a fully federal  
 31 system with the regions as the relevant organizational units  
 33 of analysis. Despite considerable regional variation in eco-  
 35 nomic, demographic, and social conditions, focusing our  
 37 analysis on all the hospitals present in a region allows us to  
 39 examine a representative subcomponent of the Italian health  
 41 care system.

Beyond this substantive motivation, this paper also  
 27 brings to bear new dynamic statistical models to analyze the  
 29 temporal sequence of discrete acts of “network-con-  
 31 struction”—such as patient transfer events over time—rather  
 33 than simply presuming the presence of immutable (or slowly  
 35 changing) network ties between hospitals. Sequences of  
 37 dyadic patient-sharing events link hospitals in the com-  
 39 munity and give rise to an evolving dynamic network of  
 41 interorganizational relations that we interpret as the  
 43 observable traces of collaboration between hospitals. The  
 45 explicit objectives of the study are to:

- Examine how measurable differences in hospital quality  
 37 affect the direction of interhospital patient flows, net of  
 39 other organizational relationships. In particular we ask,  
 41 Q1: do patient-sharing relations allow patients to access  
 43 better hospitals and hence—presumably—higher quality  
 45 care?
- Understand the micro-mechanisms that facilitate collab-  
 47 orative patient-sharing relations between hospitals. In  
 49 particular we ask, Q2: what organizational and institu-  
 51 tional factors affect the propensity of hospitals to  
 collaborate?
- Explore how dynamic patterns of interhospital patient-  
 53 sharing relations change for different types of patient-  
 55 sharing events. In particular we ask, Q3: how do different  
 57 interorganizational collaboration routines affect the struc-  
 59 ture of patient-sharing relations linking the hospitals?

## 53 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS

### 55 Setting


57 We used patient-level information on hospital-sharing  
 59 events from 2005 to 2008 for all 35 hospitals in Abruzzo  
 (Italy)—a region of 1,300,000 inhabitants (Fig. 1).<sup>11</sup>  
 Approximately 10% of the population lives in Pescara—the

largest urban center in the region. The regional health system  
 is partitioned into 6 (nonoverlapping) local health units  
 (LHUs) designed to ensure availability of and access to ho-  
 mogenous service throughout the region by allocating re-  
 sources and coordinating the activities of the hospitals.  
 Health care services are provided by 35 hospital organ-  
 izations of which, 22 are public and 13 are accredited private  
 hospitals. Two of the 22 public providers are teaching hos-  
 pitals linked to universities. Public hospitals provide speci-  
 alized tertiary care, and are characterized by managerial  
 autonomy. Private hospitals are investor-owned organ-  
 izations providing ambulatory, hospital care, and/or diag-  
 nostic services that are partially financed by the regional  
 health care service. Hospitals enjoy considerable managerial  
 discretion and management retains full responsibility over  
 the budgeting process and economic outcomes. Patients are  
 free to choose providers operating within the public system  
 of universal coverage that also includes accredited private  
 hospitals. Reimbursements and fees for services provided to  
 hospitalized patients are determined according to a general  
 diagnosis-related group (DRG) system. Patients are asked to  
 contribute to the coverage of part of the cost of service.

### 83 Data Collection

85 Data were provided by the Agency of Public Health, an  
 87 agency whose institutional mandate is to collect and manage  
 89 patient discharge data (Schede di demissione ospedaliera) for  
 the purpose of assessing regional hospitals’ activities and  
 performance. Discharge information is organized into 3 main  
 databases. The first includes demographics, such as place and  
 date of birth, sex, place of residence, and LHU to which  
 patients belong for administrative purposes. The second  
 contains hospitalization-specific data, including the principal  
 diagnosis and intervention (ICD9); the number and type of  
 comorbidities; the major diagnostic category (MDC); and  
 other relevant information such as the date of admission and  
 discharge, the type of admission (eg, where the patient  
 comes from), and the type of discharge (whether patients  
 are transferred to another hospital or discharged to their  
 residence). Information about the hospital admitting a  
 transferred patient is contained in the third section of the  
 discharge data file.

103 Data were provided for each and every hospital ad-  
 105 mission and discharge ever recorded in the region during the  
 107 period 2005–2008. A patient transferred from a sender hos-  
 109 pital to a different receiver hospital within 24 hours from  
 111 admission in the sender hospital is one observation in the  
 113 sequence of relational events that we analyze in the empirical  
 115 part of the study. Patient information was made anonymous  
 117 through an identification code that the regional agency as-  
 signs to admitted patients. The unique identification codes,  
 together with information about the date and nature of dis-  
 charges/admissions, were used to identify collaborative  
 patient-sharing events between hospitals. Specifically, ad-  
 ministrative discharge data were matched so that a patient  
 transfer event between 2 hospitals is recorded when a given  
 patient is discharged and, in the same calendar day, admitted  
 into another hospital.<sup>3</sup> Information on hospital-specific



19 **FIGURE 1.** Map of Abruzzo and its location in Italy. Gray circles represent the geographical location of the hospitals in the region. [full color online](#)

21 covariates (staffed beds, occupancy rate, readmission rates, etc.) was also provided by the Agency of Public Health.

25 **Statistical Approach**

27 The statistical models we estimate are described in detail in the Supplemental Digital Content 1, <http://links.lww.com/MLR/A685>. Here we provide a conceptual overview. In brief, we model the dynamics of sequences of relational events connecting a sender and receiver hospital. At each (daily) time point, we estimate the probability that a patient is transferred between every pair of hospitals. We estimate this as a function of characteristics of the particular hospitals, the differences in the measured variables of those hospitals, and of time. Further, the model takes into account the history of past transfers from the sending to the receiving hospital. This is done using a multiplicative Cox function for empirical relational event sequences described in detail in the Supplemental Digital Content 1 and used in the existing literature on relational event models.<sup>12</sup> The resulting hazard ratios can be interpreted as with conventional hazard ratio from survival analysis or converted to predicted probabilities. One feature of this class of models that makes them uniquely useful for our current purposes is their ability to represent directly a variety of local dependencies in temporal sequences of relational events. This allows us to go beyond simple patient-level data and estimate the effect of hospital quality on patient transfer while controlling for a variety of systematic network-like dependencies that are known to characterize data on interorganizational relations.<sup>3,6</sup> More specifically, we examine the extent to which patient-sharing relations are affected by the network-like effects summarized in Table 1.

55 Table 2 summarizes the control variables that we incorporate in our empirical models to control for differences in organizational elements that may affect the flow of patients between hospitals.

57 Our primary measure of hospital quality is the publicly reported risk-adjusted readmission rate within 45 days; this

81 measure counts as readmissions those for the same primary diagnosis, not all hospitalizations. The risk-adjusted readmission rate takes into account specific patient characteristics that may increase the risk of readmission, such as, for example, patient’s age (above 65 years) and a variety of comorbidities, such as diabetes mellitus, acute coronary syndrome, cancer, and asthma. Although readmission rate is an imperfect single measure of quality,<sup>13,14</sup> readmission rate is one of the main metrics adopted by regional health supervisory authorities to evaluate hospital quality and allocate resources to hospitals—and as such, is recognized as a quality indicator by the relevant decision makers in this system. Readmissions impair patients’ conditions and frequently imply avoidable costs.<sup>15</sup> The 45-day (instead of the more conventional 30 d) cutoff is established and enforced by the regional health authorities with exclusive jurisdiction over the health care services rendered within the community. The publicly reported data at our disposal do not allow us to examine the effects of different definitions of readmission rates.

101 Throughout our analyses, we estimate separate models for transfers where the patient had the same MDC diagnosis at both the sending and receiving hospitals (calling those “within” a specialty) and cases where the diagnoses at the 2 hospitals were distinct (calling those patient-sharing events “between” specialties). Transfers were categorized as “within” or “between” specialties based on an official classification system of the medical specialties adopted nationally—a system based on the internationally accepted MDC classification. The purpose of disaggregating the overall sequence of relational patient-sharing events into “between” and “within” events is to identify and examine 2 potentially different sets of interhospital relations. The first set (patient sharing “between”) may be driven by a logic of complementarity because 1 hospital (the sender) may not have the clinical capacity to assist the patient who is being transferred to the partner hospital (the receiver). The second set of relations (patient sharing “within”) may be driven by

**TABLE 1.** Behavioral Principles Underlying the Formation of Patient-sharing Relations and Their Relation With Predicted Event Sequences

Behavioral Principle	Network Effect $s(i, j, t)$	Relational Protocols (Patient-sharing Routine)	Predicted Event Sequence	
			$(t)$	$(t + \Delta t)$
Mutuality	Reciprocity	“Share patients preferentially with partners willing to share their patients with you”	$i \leftarrow j$	$i \rightarrow j$
Specialization	Assortativity	“If I need to send many patients, I send them preferentially to hospitals receiving many patients”	$j \leftarrow k$	$j \leftarrow l$
Stabilization (Recency)	Repetition	“Share patients preferentially with partners with whom you have shared patients in the past”	$i \rightarrow j$	$i \rightarrow j$
Transitivity	Transitive closure (embeddedness)	“Partners of my partners are my partners”	$i \rightarrow k \rightarrow j$	$i \rightarrow j$
Generalized exchange	Cyclic closure	“Accept patients from partners of partners even without reciprocity”	$i \rightarrow k \rightarrow j$ $i \leftarrow j$	$i \leftarrow k \leftarrow j$ $i \rightarrow j$

the recognition that the receiver hospital may be better able to treat the patient. These 2 logics frequently coexist within public health care systems—and within interorganizational networks more generally.<sup>16</sup> It is important, therefore, to assess the role that differences in quality between receiver and sender hospitals might play in shaping the interhospital collaboration under these 2 very different conditions.

**RESULTS**

We carry out our empirical investigation at 2 different levels of analysis. The first is aggregate and includes the complete series of patient-sharing events recorded during the observation period between the 35 hospitals in the region. The total number of patient-sharing events observed was

3461. The daily average was 2.37 (SD = 1.81; range, 0–10). The total risk set includes all the 1,490,071 possible edges in the network (event edges+nonevent or “control” edges).

The second level involves disaggregation by type of patient-sharing event. More specifically, the second level distinguishes between patient-sharing events observed “between” and within the various medical specialties, or “discipline” organized by the hospitals in the region. The observed number of “within” events was 603 (daily average = 0.825, SD = 0.661; range, 0–5). The observed number of “between” events was 2858 (daily average = 1.956, SD = 1.615; range, 0–9).

Table 3 reports maximum likelihood estimates of Cox regression models for series of patient-sharing events. The first column reports the estimates for the aggregate series.

**TABLE 2.** Organizational Control Factors

Factor (x)	Unit of Measure	Controls for Differences in	Predicted Effect of Difference ( $\Delta_{r,s}(x) = x_{receiver} - x_{sender}$ )
Size	Hospital beds	Organizational size	Positive: larger hospitals tend to attract more patients from smaller hospitals
Revenue per discharged patient	Monetary units (Euros)	Cost absorption computed on the basis of the reimbursement claims made on the basis of the DRG system	Positive: patients tend to flow toward hospitals offering more sophisticated and hence expensive services
Complexity	Case-mix index	Capabilities and experience in dealing with complex clinical cases	Positive: patients tend to flow toward hospitals capable of treating more complex cases
Occupancy rate	Dimensionless proportion of beds occupied	Hospital capacity management	Positive: patients tend to flow toward hospitals that are better able to manage the allocation of their capacity
Level of care	Dimensionless binary indicator variable	Level of care that partner hospitals offer (rehabilitation, secondary, tertiary)	Negative: patients flows are less likely to be observed between hospitals offering the same levels of care
Geographical distance	Kilometers	Distance	Negative: the intensity of patient flows between 2 hospitals decrease as the distance between them increases
Local health unit (LHU)	Dimensionless categorical variable	Membership in the same local health unit	Positive: hospitals belonging to the same administrative units will find it easier to coordinate patient-sharing activities. As a consequence patients flow will be more intense between hospitals in the same LHU
Institutional category	Dimensionless categorical variable	Membership in the same broadly defined institutional category (public vs. private)	Negative: patients sharing activities are more likely to be observed across the private/public divide

**TABLE 3.** Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Proportional Hazard Models for Relational Patient-sharing Events Between 35 Hospitals in a Regional Community

	M1 (All Events, N = 3461)			M2 (Between Events Only, N = 2858)			M3 (Within Events Only, N = 603)		
	Estimate (SE)	Pr > $\chi^2$	Hazard Ratio	Estimate (SE)	Pr > $\chi^2$	Hazard Ratio	Estimate (SE)	Pr > $\chi^2$	Hazard Ratio
Propensity to collaborate (outdegree)	0.1895* (0.0140)	<0.0001	1.209	0.1712* (0.0160)	<0.0001	1.187	0.3293* (0.0510)	<0.0001	1.39
Propensity to initiate patient-sharing events (weighted outdegree)	0.4310* (0.0752)	<0.0001	1.539	0.6080* (0.0805)	<0.0001	1.837	0.1608 (0.2790)	0.5644	1.174
Propensity to be selected as partner (indegree)	0.1131* (0.0082)	<0.0001	1.12	0.0975* (0.0083)	<0.0001	1.102	0.1669* (0.0255)	<0.0001	1.182
Propensity to receive patient-sharing events (weighted indegree)	0.3010* (0.1018)	0.0031	1.351	0.5983* (0.1090)	<0.0001	1.819	0.5967 (0.3416)	0.0807	1.816
Recent sending	-0.0014* (0.0002)	<0.0001	0.999	-0.0014* (0.0002)	<0.0001	0.999	-0.0011* (0.0003)	0.0004	0.999
Recent receiving	-0.0031* (0.0002)	<0.0001	0.997	-0.0028* (0.0002)	<0.0001	0.997	-0.0029* (0.0003)	<0.0001	0.997
Quality of care (45 d R-rate)	<b>-0.0996* (0.009)</b>	<b>&lt;0.0001</b>	<b>0.905</b>	<b>-0.0888* (0.0095)</b>	<b>&lt;0.0001</b>	<b>0.915</b>	<b>-0.1094* (0.0261)</b>	<b>&lt;0.0001</b>	<b>0.896</b>
Geographical distance (km)	-0.0255* (0.0012)	<0.0001	0.975	-0.0271* (0.0014)	<0.0001	0.973	-0.0201* (0.0029)	<0.0001	0.98
Institutional category	-1.3674* (0.0856)	<0.0001	0.255	-1.2617* (0.0877)	<0.0001	0.283	-2.7813* (0.4848)	<0.0001	0.062
Local health unit membership	1.4445* (0.0530)	<0.0001	4.24	1.5260* (0.0575)	<0.0001	4.6	1.0029* (0.1098)	<0.0001	2.726
Level of care provided	0.2723* (0.0481)	<0.0001	1.313	0.2405* (0.0547)	<0.0001	1.272	0.3561 (0.1403)	0.0111	1.428
Size (number of staffed beds)	0.0007* (0.0002)	<0.0001	1.001	0.00074* (0.0002)	0.0001	1.001	0.00073 (0.0005)	0.1161	1.001
Occupancy rate	0.0177* (0.0015)	<0.0001	1.018	0.0155* (0.0016)	<0.0001	1.016	0.0112 (0.0053)	0.0328	1.011
Revenue per discharged patient	0.0002* (2.6E-05)	<0.0001	1	0.0002* (2.7E-05)	<0.0001	1	0.0003* (9.2E-05)	0.0003	1
Complexity (case mix)	0.6549* (0.1433)	<0.0001	1.925	0.5968* (0.1478)	<0.0001	1.816	1.1879 (0.4733)	0.0121	3.28
Reciprocity	0.0402* (0.0107)	0.0002	1.041	0.0322* (0.0112)	0.0039	1.033	0.2374 (0.0997)	0.0172	1.268
Assortativity (by degree)	-0.0045* (0.0011)	<0.0001	0.995	-0.0045* (0.0013)	0.0004	0.995	-0.0207* (0.0056)	0.0002	0.979
Assortativity (by intensity)	-0.0877 (0.0722)	0.2249	0.916	-0.3519* (0.0907)	0.0001	0.703	-0.1458 (0.4079)	0.7208	0.864
Event Recurrence	0.1886* (0.0089)	<0.0001	1.208	0.1912* (0.0118)	<0.0001	1.211	0.6569* (0.0604)	<0.0001	1.929
Transitive closure	0.0721* (0.0215)	0.0008	1.075	0.1196* (0.0246)	<0.0001	1.127	-0.0054 (0.0834)	0.9481	0.995
Cyclic closure	0.0352* (0.0126)	0.0052	1.036	0.0542* (0.0146)	0.0002	1.056	0.1128* (0.0486)	0.0202	1.119
Goodness of fit (GoF; Pr > $\chi^2$ )	LRat=18114.2249 (21; <0.0001)			LRat=14936.0144 (21; <0.0001)			LRat=3744.089 (21; <0.0001)		
(Global null hypothesis B=0)	Score=119197.084 (21; <0.0001) Wald=11009.4902 (21; <0.0001)			Score=111928.51 (21; <0.0001) Wald=9351.5354 (21; <0.0001)			Score=4530.026 (21; <0.0001) Wald=2299.3437 (21; <0.0001)		

Standard errors in parentheses.  
\*P<0.01.

The second and third columns report the estimates for the series of relational patient-sharing events between and within specialties, respectively.

Across all the models we estimated that the effect of readmission rate within 45 days is negative and significant. According to these estimates our answer to Q1 is that patient-sharing relations between hospitals systematically increase the mobility of patients toward more capable hospitals (ie, hospitals with a lower readmission rate). The estimate of the hazard ratio (or odds) corresponding to our measure of hospital quality in the aggregate model is (0.475/0.525)=0.905.

Yet, measured quality differences between hospitals are not the only factor driving the destination of patients. To address question Q2 we estimated models that incorporate a number of institutional and organizational differences between the hospitals in our sample. The probability of observing patients-sharing events is significantly reduced by geographical distance between hospitals. The probability of observing a patient-sharing event connecting 2 hospitals in the sample that are maximally far apart (146 km) is approximately 97% lower than the probability of observing patient-sharing relations between hospitals that are minimally distant (2 km). Hospitals within the same administrative area (LHU) are significantly

1 more likely to collaborate by sharing patients, even condi- 61  
 3 tional on distance between the hospitals. Hospitals are more 63  
 5 likely to collaborate across broadly defined *institutional cat-*  
 7 *egories* defined in terms of ownership (public-private) rather 65  
 9 than across such categories. Collaborative relations between 67  
 11 hospitals tend to move patients from less sophisticated sender 69  
 13 to more sophisticated receiver hospitals (as measured by *revenue per discharged patient*), from less complex sender to 71  
 15 more complex receiver hospitals (as measured by the *case-mix*  
 17 *index*), from hospitals less capable to hospitals more capable  
 19 of managing their capacity (as measured by the *occupancy*  
 21 *rate*), and from smaller to larger hospitals (in terms of *number*  
 23 *of beds*). The role played by the case mix is particularly  
 25 noteworthy. In the aggregate model, the odds are approx-  
 27 imately 2:1 to observe a patient transfer event toward hospi-  
 29 tals. The parameter estimate in the aggregate model (0.6549)  
 31 implies that as the interhospital difference in case mix in-  
 33 creases from its minimum (0) to its observed maximum (0.76)  
 35 the probability of observing a patient transfer event from a less  
 37 to a more complex hospital increases 84%.

39 Importantly, the longitudinal models also control for  
 41 the heterogenous unobserved propensities of hospitals in the  
 43 community to collaborate (*propensity to collaborate—or*  
 45 *outdegree: number of partners*) and to share patients with  
 47 partner hospitals (*propensity to initiate patient-sharing*  
 49 *events—or weighted outdegree: number of patients shared*  
 51 *with partners*). In the aggregate model the hazard ratio as-  
 53 sociated with the propensity to collaborate is 1.209 (see M1  
 55 in Table 3). This estimate implies that, on an average, the  
 57 conditional probability of observing a patient-sharing event  
 59 originating from a hospital experiencing a unit increase in  
 the number of partner hospitals (the “outdegree”) is ap-  
 proximately 0.55. By a similar reasoning, a unit increase in  
 the number of shared patients between hospitals *i* and *j*  
 corresponds to a probability of observing a new patient-  
 sharing event between *i* and *j* of approximately 0.61. Similar  
 qualitative implications may be associated with the other 2  
 general controls the *propensity to be selected as partner* (or  
 the “indegree”) and the *propensity to receive patient-sharing*  
*events*. The estimates of these important effects are fairly  
 stable across models. The recency effects (*recent sending,*  
*recent receiving*) are significantly negative indicating  
 that activities of sending and receiving patients in the past,  
 respectively, are associated with shorter time between  
 successive events.

Prior studies have argued that the selection of patient-  
 sharing partners is affected by routinized procedures and  
 consolidated hospital practices that may be unrelated to  
 quality considerations.<sup>7</sup> As the figures reported in Table 3  
 clearly show the effect of interhospital patient transfer rou-  
 tines is significant, answering Q3. In general we find that  
 patient-sharing relations are more likely to be observed be-  
 tween reciprocating hospitals (*reciprocity*). We also find a  
 significant tendency against assortativity (*assortativity by*  
*degree*): hospitals sending patients to many others tend not to  
 select as partners hospitals that receive patient from many  
 others. This may be interpreted as a relative lack of inter-  
 organizational division of labor between hospitals in the  
 community. Interestingly, there is no evidence of assorta-

tivity in numbers (*assortativity by intensity*): hospitals shar-  
 ing many patients do not necessarily share them with  
 hospitals accepting many patients. In Table 3, the sig-  
 nificantly positive estimate of the parameter associated to  
 event *recurrence* tells that hospitals have the tendency to  
 reinforce their collaboration over time. Finally, we find that  
 patient sharing is more likely between hospitals sharing  
 common partners (*transitive closure*), and between hospitals  
 embedded in cyclic relations (*cyclic closure*) even after  
 controlling for geographic proximity in terms of distance and  
 membership in the same territorial/administrative units  
 (LHU).

In addressing question Q3 it is particularly interesting  
 to note how the effects of interorganizational patient-sharing  
 routines vary across different types of patient-sharing event.  
 Patients-sharing events occurring across hospitals but  
 “within” the same clinical specialty (eg, patients leaving a  
 coronary unit in the sender hospital to arrive at a coronary  
 unit in the receiving hospital) are not affected by tendencies  
 toward triadic closure. Patients-sharing events occurring  
 across hospitals and “between” different clinical specialties  
 (eg, patients leaving a neonatal unit in the sender hospital  
 and arriving at an intensive care unit in the receiving hos-  
 pital) are significantly affected by tendencies toward tran-  
 sitive closure. Differences in patterns of triadic closure  
 across event types suggest that patient transfer events em-  
 bedded in transitive sequences are unlikely to be observed  
 when hospitals are better able to assess directly the value of  
 the partners because they share common knowledge bases  
 and operational experiences (“within” transfers).

Unlike interspecialty patient sharing, the number of  
 past intraspecialty patient-sharing events does not help to  
 predict future relational events of *this kind*. However, once  
 an intraspecialty transfer event connects 2 hospitals this re-  
 lation tends to be repeated and hence to become more stable  
 over time (see *event recurrence*). Conditional on the rest of  
 the model, the estimated odds are roughly 2:1 to observe  
 the recurrence of an intraspecialty transfer event between  
 the same partner hospitals, as compared with any 2 other  
 hospitals that have not yet shared patients.

## DISCUSSION

Hospitals are embedded in complex interorganizational  
 networks of relations emerging from decentralized patient-  
 sharing decisions, activities, and arrangements. The results  
 we have reported in the context of Italian health care clearly  
 demonstrate that these relationships matter for the ability of  
 patients to access higher quality care. Beyond these ongoing  
 relationships, we show that decentralized patient-sharing  
 decisions systematically tend move patients from less to  
 more capable hospitals. This is the case also after controlling  
 for organization-centered rather than patient-centered con-  
 siderations.<sup>10</sup> More specifically, we have shown that ten-  
 dencies toward reciprocation, transitivity, assortativity and  
 the tendency to rely on prior relations in the aggregate event  
 sequence are also and at the same time significant among  
 the hospitals in our sample. These organizational relation-  
 ships extend beyond simple dyads of senders and receivers;

1 sharing multiple partners—or “embeddedness”—makes 2  
 3 hospitals more likely to collaborate in the case of patients  
 4 transferred between different specialties. Thus, “embedded  
 5 ties” are ties that are part of closed triads.<sup>17</sup>

6 For readers who may be less familiar with the in-  
 7 stitutional features of the national health care system in the  
 8 background to our study, it is important to understand that  
 9 patient-sharing decisions should be considered as organiza-  
 10 tional decisions taken jointly by the sending and the re-  
 11 ceiving hospital. Patients are free to decide what hospital to  
 12 use but—in the typical case—they have no control over  
 13 transfer decisions. Of course, patients can refuse transfer in  
 14 the same way as they can refuse treatment. In such cases  
 15 there will be no transfer and patients will be free to leave the  
 16 hospital under their own responsibility. There are no par-  
 17 ticular constraints related to health insurance policies as long  
 18 as the hospitals involved are accredited hospitals and hence  
 19 recognized as legitimate participants to the system of public  
 20 health (all the hospitals in our sample were either public or  
 21 private accredited hospitals). Insurance is public and uni-  
 22 versal and there are no uninsured patients. Costs of care are  
 23 computed on the basis of the DRG system. Documented  
 24 costs of treatment are reimbursed by a single payer—  
 25 occasionally with a direct contribution of the patient.

26 Patient outcomes may be improved if collaboration  
 27 between hospitals allows patients to access more capable  
 28 hospitals. This issue is important because patients would  
 29 clearly like to trust that hospital collaboration effectively  
 30 facilitates their access to better care. Similarly, policy mak-  
 31 ers would like to support collaboration between (possibly  
 32 competing) hospitals if it leads to desirable outcomes without  
 33 increasing the costs of care. Our analysis of patient-sharing  
 34 relations within a regional community of hospitals supports  
 35 the view that decentralized collaboration between hospitals  
 36 may give rise to a network of interorganizational relations  
 37 that systematically helps patients to access more capable  
 38 hospitals. This result is valuable because extant US-centric  
 39 research on interhospital patient transfer has argued that  
 40 patient transfer decisions may be driven more by organiza-  
 41 tional concerns, bed availability, and established routines—  
 42 and less by considerations of partner quality and capabilities.  
 43 Despite the recent interest in the analysis of relational co-  
 44 ordination between hospitals,<sup>8,18</sup> to the best of our knowl-  
 45 edge this is the first study of patient-sharing relations based  
 46 on newly derived relational event models that allow repre-  
 47 senting relations between hospitals in terms of sequences of  
 48 individual patient-sharing events.

49 Their contextual elements that may result in differ-  
 50 ences between Italian and American hospital behavior—but  
 51 that may increase the generalizability of these findings out-  
 52 side of the United States. First, Italian hospitals are members  
 53 neither of superordinate multihospital systems, nor of insur-  
 54 ance groups, such as health maintenance organizations or  
 55 private public organizations. Patient-sharing decisions are  
 56 therefore more decentralized and less constrained by cor-  
 57 porate boundaries or insurance policies than similar deci-  
 58 sions that may be taken by American hospitals. Second, the  
 59 general DRG-based prospective payment system typical of  
 60 European countries (including Italy) is a second factor that is

likely to affect the empirical scope of our findings; there may  
 be less perceived opportunity for using transfers in order to  
 take advantage of differential payment systems. Third, and  
 finally, the Italian National Health Service provides univer-  
 sal coverage and general access to health services. In this  
 context, hospitals are mainly public and competition is  
 limited. In such systems competition is frequently implicit  
 and balanced by the network of institutional relations in  
 which public hospitals are embedded. This institutional  
 feature of many European public health systems may be  
 more supportive of interhospital collaboration strategies  
 from which patients may benefit.

**Limitations**

In its current stage of development our study suffers  
 from 3 main limitations—each indicating clear directions for  
 future research. First, the period covered by the study is  
 limited. Although sample size is defined in terms of number  
 of events—rather than calendar years—it may be useful to  
 collect additional data in order to verify the robustness of our  
 conclusions. We note that computational requirements in-  
 crease steeply with the number of events, as possible non-  
 events also need to be considered. For example, in the  
 current analysis we considered all possible nonevents, but  
 larger risk sets may require sampling of nonevents. Second,  
 the value of the hospital-specific covariates is updated at  
 yearly interval. Consequently we had to assume that the ef-  
 fect of covariates was piecewise constant. The extent to  
 which this assumption actually affects the results we have  
 reported needs to be determined using data containing in-  
 formation on finer-grained time variation in the relevant  
 hospital-specific covariates. Third, the measure that we  
 adopted is generally considered as a reliable indicator of  
 the quality of care that hospitals effectively deliver. Yet, the  
 hospital readmission rate captures only selected aspects of  
 quality that may be correlated with others that we have not  
 observed directly in our study.<sup>19</sup> Further research is needed  
 to assess the extent to which collaborative interhospital pa-  
 tient-sharing relations allow patients to access better care  
 when quality of care is evaluated on different metrics.

**CONCLUSIONS**

In this study we applied newly derived statistical  
 models for the analysis of relational events to assess the  
 extent to which interorganizational collaboration allows pa-  
 tients to access more capable hospitals. Our empirical anal-  
 ysis supports the view that this is indeed the case in the  
 regional community of hospitals that we have examined. We  
 have found that this result holds when we control for the  
 main sources of hospital-level heterogeneity. The tendency  
 of patient to flow from less to more capable hospitals con-  
 tinues to be detectable when we control for the main sources  
 of relational dependencies that shape patient transfer event  
 sequences connecting the hospital in our sample. If rep-  
 licated in different institutional contexts, the results re-  
 ported in this study could inspire public health care policies  
 that better utilize decentralized collaboration and partnership  
 between hospitals as a way to reduce costs of care and im-  
 prove patient access better care. Although our sample may be

1 characterized by a number of institutional idiosyncrasies that  
 3 could limit the external generalizability of our results, the  
 5 problem that we have addressed remains of general interest  
 and relevance for policy. Similarly general are the analytic  
 solutions that we have provided.

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