Chapter Eight: Sex and war

The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate how rape (specifically genocidal rape) and sexual(ised) violence are used as weapons of war. The chapter also considers the relationship between militarised masculinity and sexual violence within and by military **institutions**. Below we set up our discussion of these topics with two examples, one from popular culture and one from 'national security' political discourse. Please note some readers might find the content of this chapter upsetting and so you should take your time with the material, take breaks and discuss anything that comes up for you with people you trust.

By the end of this chapter you will understand more about:

- The use of rape (specifically genocidal rape) and sexual(ised) violence as weapons of war and the legacy and unresolved trauma associated with these war crimes.
- How militarised masculinity serves as a proxy for **hegemonic masculinity** in the context of war/armed conflict, and the implications of this.
- How military sexual assault is a 'practice' that takes place within a heteronormative institution.
- How the themes you have addressed so far in this book play out in the context of war/armed conflict.

[START TEXTBOX]

In 2019, HBO aired the TV show *Watchmen:* Damon Lindelof's version of the 1986 graphic novel created by Alan Moore. The legacy of racism, racial violence, and the unresolved trauma caused by those phenomena are the key themes of this series. The theme of transgenerational or inherited trauma (trauma passed down from one generation to the next) is viscerally depicted in episode six of *Watchmen*, entitled 'This Extraordinary Being'. In this episode, Angela, our main character, overdoses on Nostalgia, a pill that allows you access to past memories/experiences. Not only does she take too much of the drug, she consumes someone else's Nostalgia: that of her grandfather's, Will Reeve. Under the influence of the drug Angela relives and bears witness to Will's experiences of institutional and violent racism during the 1930s in New York City. As both subject and onlooker, Angela is forced to confront the legacy of the 1920s Tulsa massacre[1] and the impact it has had on her grandfather. By reliving Will's experiences, the (unresolved) trauma of this pivotal event is passed down to Angela.

Ahead of the repeal of the American military's 'Don't ask, don't tell'[2] (DADT) policy in 2010, the then Republican senator John McCain voiced his opposition to the repeal of this policy using 'national security' and 'unit cohesion' to justify his position (Rich, et al., 2012). Here it is worth quoting him at length:

[1] During this event white supremacists destroyed the homes and businesses of black residents in the Greenwood neighborhood of Tulsa

[2] DADT was a policy introduced by President Clinton in 1993. Replacing the ban on gay men and women serving in the military, this measure would allow individuals to serve as long as they did not reveal their sexual orientation. It was repealed under President Obama in 2011.

> Mistakes and…distractions cost Marines' lives…Marines come back after serving in combat and they say…anything that's going to break or potentially break that focus and cause any kind of distraction may have an effect on cohesion…If you go up to Bethesda, Marines are up there with no legs, none. We've got Marines at Walter Reed with no limbs… I hope that when we pass this legislation [repealing DATD], that we will understand that we are doing great damage, and we could possibly and probably…harm the battle effectiveness which is so vital to the…survival of our young men and women in the military. (cited by Rich et al, 2012: 270-1)

In their analysis of this speech Craig Rich et al (2012: 271) argue that the references to torn and limbless bodies – bodies that have been physically impaired – also suggest bodies that have been 'materially mutilated and symbolically castrated'. Furthermore, implicit in this statement is the suggestion that allowing gay men to serve in the military results in '…torn, mutilated, and disabled (presumably heterosexual) male bodies'. Simply put, 'the overt presence of homosexuality leads to violence against (straight, male) soldier[s]' (Rich et al, 2012: 271).

Please think about these two examples as you read through the chapter. We will return to them in due course.

[END TEXTBOX]

We start this chapter with a review of the rape as a weapon-of-war thesis. This is followed by two case studies. Our first case study is children born from genocidal rape. Genocidal rape is when rape is used to commit the act of genocide (a more detailed definition is provided below). Drawing on the concept of transgenerational trauma (Rinker and Lawler, 2018), as depicted in the episode of Watchmen discussed above, we unpack the lived-experiences of children born from wartime rape during the genocides in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and Rwanda in the early 1990s. The key themes we address are, **ethnicity**, nationality, legacy and trauma. In our second case study we trace the relationship between heterosexual militarised masculinity and rape and sexual violence within and by the military. **Heteronormativity, hetero/hypermasculinity** - as reflected in the statement made by John McCain that you read about above - informs our review of these violence(s) within and by the military.

A note on terminology: here, in order to acknowledge the secondary victimisation of children born of genocidal rape, we use the term 'victims' rather than 'survivors' when referring to this group. This is also in keeping with the victims interviewed by Myriam Denov and her team who did not see themselves as 'survivors' of the Rwandan genocide but rather felt they were 'victims' of the crimes committed against their mothers. For all other groups, where appropriate, we use the term victim/survivor (see Chapters Three for our discussion of this choice of language).

Rape as a weapon-of-war: is this always the case?

It might be surprising to think of rape as something that can be used as a weapon of war. And yet, at the macro-level, rape is used as an official strategy of war. It is used as a political device to achieve genocide and ethnic cleaning (Waller, 2012: 85). It can also be used to attack the nation, which as we see in Chapter Three, is a key motivator for controlling sexuality and sexual practice in the first place. In the context of war, the female body becomes the vessel through which national, ethnic, racial and religious identities are reproduced (Cohn, 2013: 14). Rape against the individual female is thus rape against the **nation**. It is also, according to Laura Sjoberg (2013), an attack against 'enemy' men who have failed to protect women belonging to 'their' group. This strategic/tactical use of wartime rape falls within the weapon-of-war paradigm (Buss 2009; Card 1996; Farwell, 2004).

At the meso-level, the military institution (within patriarchal and **phallocentric societies**) socialises men to embody a violent and aggressive heterosexual masculinity. Not only is rape normalised within this setting, it is used to perform this type of masculinity. 'Recreational rape' (Enloe, 2000), which views wartime rape as an opportunistic crime, can be placed at the micro-level. It is related to the 'pressure-cooker' theory which views rape as the result of men's biological/innate sexual urges (Fogelman 2012; Mullins, 2009). Within this line of thinking, and in contrast to the weapon-of-war paradigm, rape is conceived as a by-product of the chaos of war.

Wartime rape and sexual violence against males have received far less attention compared with the vast amount of research and information on female victims. Despite the dearth of literature on this topic, this phenomenon has taken place in over 25 conflicts during the last thirty years (Vojdik, 2014). Described as 'unrecognized and/or invisible victims' (Gorris, 2015; Lewis, 2009), underreporting (due to shame, fear, stigma and the criminalisation of homosexuality) is common among men This, hitherto, impedes our ability to access complete data on the number of victims/survivors (see Christian et al., 2011; Lewis, 2009; Vojdik, 2014).

Male-to-male conflict-related sexual violence (in the form of rape, castration,[3] sexual mutilation and/or torture) subordinates the male victim, depriving him of his manhood and masculinity (Baaz & Stern, 2009; Christian et al., 2011; Clark, 2017; Ferrales et al., 2016; Lewis, 2009; Vojdik, 2014). Here we are reminded of our earlier discussion (in relation to DADT) about materially and symbolically mutilated and castrated bodies.

This disempowerment takes place at the individual and communal level. As Sandesh Sivakumaran (2007: 274) explains, '…sexual violence against men symbolises the disempowerment of the national, racial, religious or ethnic group. Specifically, [t]he castration of a man is considered to emasculate him, to deprive

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[3] Typically, this involves the removal or destruction of the male testicles, thus rendering the male impotent.

him of his power. The castration of a man may also represent the symbolic emasculation of the entire community'. It is worth noting that these messages of subordination, humiliation, emasculation, and feminisation are heightened when perpetrated by females.

For Janine Clark (2017: 3), these examples of male sexual victimisation speak to the vulnerability of the penis. She states:

> This "side" of the penis is rarely seen. Within contemporary discourses on sexual violence…the penis is typically framed as a weapon. It is a hard, aggressive object that penetrates and tears, causing pain and suffering…the exposure of [the vulnerability of the penis] strips the phallus of its power and strength…hence its dominance. (Clark, 2012: 3)

Clark (2017: 5) argues that when men are raped and sexually assaulted through genital mutilation and castration, the weakness of the phallus is revealed. This is destabilising because war, she argues, 'is the ultimate expression of **phallocentric masculinity**, and the penis is required to perform in a way that upholds and defends the phallocentric-and heteronormative-status quo'. How useful is this notion of the vulnerability of the penis? How do we reconcile this seemingly paradoxical notion of the vulnerable penis when, in cases of male-to-male rape, the penis is used as a weapon against other men? Here we offer a more useful illustration of this thesis. During the conflict in Darfur (2003-5), in addition to rape, soldiers and the Janjaweed would cut off the penises of their victims and insert them into their mouths (Ferrales et al., 2016). For us, this act of sexualised violence, rather than rape, is a more accurate portrayal of the vulnerability of the penis.

Are these acts about sex or power?

Many have argued that rape is not about sex, sexual desire or indeed, sexual pleasure. Rather, it is about power and control over the victim. As Maria Baaz and Maria Stern (2018) note, the removal of the sexual has its roots in early radical feminist work. Susan Brownmiller for example, in her seminal text, *Against Our Will: Men, Women and Rape*, (that we have already encountered in Chapters Three and Four), argued that rape was not the product of desire but rather, an act of aggression. Stating: rape '…is the quintessential act by which a male demonstrates to a female that she is conquered – vanquished - by his superior strength and power' (Brownmiller, 1975: 49). Following on from this, 'rape was cast as a collective violent and political act…[used]…as a tool of power and **patriarchy'** (Baaz and Stern, 2018: 299).

Let us apply this to the context of war.

As noted above, in some instances rape is an official strategy of the war. This was the case in Bangladesh, the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Darfur, and the DRC (Banwell, 2020). However, unlike these examples of systematic and genocidal rape, the use of rape against Jewish women during the Holocaust was not an official element of the Nazi genocide (Banwell, 2015; Goldenberg, 2013). Given the aim of the Final Solution – the elimination of all European Jews – rape, in this case, became a redundant weapon of terror (Goldenberg, 2013).

During the Holocaust, women's quintessentially feminine attributes were diminished. Entry into the camps meant their heads were shaven, they were forced to wear formless clothing and a lack of food meant loss of body weight, especially from their breasts and hips (Banwell, 2015, 2020). Yet German men did not refrain from raping them. Prior to this, before they were subjected to the physical degradations listed above, the motivation to rape these women may have been rooted in sexual desire and sexual gratification (Banwell, 2015,2020). However, in the latter states of their confinement – when their feminine attributes and conventional attractiveness had been undermined – aggression, male power and dominance may have been the motivation behind these assaults (Fogelman, 2012 see also Banwell, 2015, 2020).

Exceptions to this 'desexing' of wartime rape include Cynthia Enloe's notion of recreational violence, the 'pressure cooker' theory and opportunistic rape (discussed above). However, as Baaz and Stern (2018) point out, these approaches present wartime rape as inevitable and run the risk of reviving biological determinism. All deny agency to the actors, and reduce the culpability of perpetrators. We will return to this later.

Having outlined the relevant themes within the literature on wartime rape we now move on to our first case study:

Children born as a result of genocidal rape in BiH and Rwanda

This section is set out in three sections. First, we outline the concept of genocidal rape, reviewing three historical examples of this phenomenon. We then review the literature on transgenerational trauma before, in the final section, applying this to children born of genocidal rape in BiH and Rwanda. Here we explore the individual narratives of these young adults, placing them within the broader cultural and collective memory of their post-genocide societies. The concepts of 'hybridity', 'stickiness' (Takševa & Schwartz (2018) and 'de-ethnicization' (Kuradusenge, 2016) are used to explore the haunting of these unresolved traumatic events, specifically the exclusion and marginalisation of the **abject** 'ethnic other'.

The definition of genocide is based on committing certain acts '…with [the] intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group'. The most obvious example is 'killing members of the group'. Relevant to our discussion below are elements d and e of the genocide convention: 'imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group [and] forcibly transferring children of the group to another group' (The convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide, 2014).

When rape is used intentionally and systematically (the weapon-of-war paradigm) it can be classed as genocidal. Examples include the 1971 Liberation War in Bangladesh, the conflict in BiH and in Rwanda. Given our focus on forced pregnancy and children born of genocidal rape, we will limit our discussion to the latter two.

Genocidal rape in the form of enforced impregnation of Muslim and Croatian women by Serbian men was a feature of the genocide in BiH (Sharlach, 2000; Takševa, 2015). Forced pregnancy, as defined by The International Criminal Court (ICC), is the 'unlawful confinement of a woman forcibly made pregnant, with the intent of affecting the ethnic composition of any population…' (Rome Statue of the Criminal Court, 2011: 4). Figures suggest that between 25,000 and 40,000 Bosnian women were victims of this crime (Takševa, 2015). And it is estimated that between 500-600 children were born as a result of genocidal rape in 1993 (see Carpenter, 2000).

During the genocide, women were detained in 'rape camps' where they were repeatedly raped until they became pregnant. They were confined until access to safe abortion was no longer possible (Sharlach, 2000; Takševa, 2015). As outlined in the definition of genocide, this prevents births within the group as women's wombs are occupied with babies from a different ethnic group. It also means the birth of ethnically mixed children. Furthermore, as noted by Christopher Mullins (2009: 18) and Alexandra Takai (2011), these children - in family structures where patrilineal parentage decides lineage membership – become members of the father's ethnic group rather than the mothers. This results in 'transferring children of the group to another group'.

Genocidal rape was also a feature of the Rwandan genocide. During the 12 weeks of this genocide between 250,000 to 500,000 Rwandan Tutsi women were raped. The assailants were primarily Hutu men (Buss, 2009; Mullins, 2009; Sharlach, 1999, 2000). Sexual mutilation and torture were a feature of these rapes. According to Paula Donovan, a UN advisor on Africa, 'between 2,000 and 5,000 children were born to women who were raped from April to July 1994' (cited by Kamuzinzi, 2016: 170; see also Denov et al, 2017; Hogwood et al, 2018). There is also evidence to suggest that the deliberate transmission of HIV was also a feature of genocidal rape in Rwanda. Survivors reported that HIV+ Hutu men raped Tutsi women in order to transmit the disease (see Sharlach, 1999; 2000).

The fate of children born from genocidal rape has, until fairly recently, remained largely obscured from view compared with the copious amount of literature on the female victims of genocidal rape (Brownmiller, 1975; Mullins 2009; Sharlach, 1999; 2000; Takai, 2011; Takševa, 2015). This, to paraphrase Charli Carpenter (2000), is surprising given that children born as a result of these rapes were a key element of the genocidal equation.

Following Carpenter's (2000) early work on the marginalisation of children born of genocidal rape, numerous scholars have drawn attention to the plight of these children (Eramian and Denov, 2018; Erjavec and Volčič, 2010a, 2010b; Denov, 2015; Denov et al 2017; Denov and Khan, 2019; Khan and Denov, 2019; Woolner, Denov and Khan, 2019; see also Hogwood et al, 2019). Historically, however, within legal discourse, forced impregnation was regarded as a crime against the woman only. When they *were* considered, children born as a result of genocidal rape – who, as outlined above, would take on the ethnic identity of their fathers – were '…seen not just as non-victims but somehow as perpetrators' (Carpenter, 2000: 445; see also Erjavec and Volčič, 2010a, 2010b; Hogwood et al, 2019). In the words of Laura Eramian and Denov (2018: 374) these children '…possess the ethnic 'heritage' of two groups, but do not fully belong to either'. In cases where the identity of the father is unknown, children face further marginalisation and stigma. This can lead to 'physical, psychological and structural violence' from family members and the wider community (Eramian and Denov, 2018: 374; see also Denov et al, 2017). In Rwanda they are often referred to as 'enfants de mauvais souvenirs' (children of bad memories) or 'enfants de la haine' (children of hate) (Denov et al, 2017: 5). And in BiH, they are described as 'children of the enemy', 'bastard children', 'Chetnik's whore child', and 'children of hate' (cited in Erjavec and Volčič, 2010b: 362 and 368). In the next section, drawing on the experiences of young adults, we unpack the legacy and unresolved trauma of the genocides in BiH and Rwanda.

What is transgenerational trauma?

Teresa Evans-Campbell (2008: 320; cited in Denov, 2015: 64) defines intergenerational trauma as, '[a] collective complex trauma inflicted on a group of people who share a specific group identity or affiliation – ethnicity, nationality, and religious affiliation. It is the legacy of numerous traumatic events a community experiences over generations and encompasses the psychological and social responses to such events'.

Transgenerational trauma is experienced by individuals who were not directly exposed to the trauma/violence in question but who, nevertheless, ‘catch’ some effects of that experience by virtue of being in contact with individuals who have experienced it, or by being in a society that has experienced chronic violent conflict or trauma' (Rinker and Lawler, 2018: 153). It is also referred to as ‘collective trauma’ (Rinker and Lawler, 2018) or ‘cultural trauma’ (Lehrner and Yehuda, 2018b). Currently there are over 500 published scholarly works on the intergenerational transmission of trauma (Lehrner and Yehuda, 2018a). This phenomenon can be traced back to the 1960s when children of survivors of the Holocaust began seeking psychiatric treatment for trauma-related disorders in Canada (Denov, 2015; Rinker and Lawler, 2018). As Amy Lehrner and Rachel Yehuda explain (2018: 25) these children '…learned of the Holocaust, saw the direct effects in their parents, and for many, felt its complex legacy within themselves'.

Below, based on empirical research with victims, we apply this concept to children born of genocidal rape in BiH and Rwanda.

'I am a cancer': the narratives of victims from BiH

Erjavec and Volčič (2010a) interviewed 19 Bosniak females between the ages of 14-16. All were born as a result of genocidal rape. They were either living in institutions or with their mothers. They found that metaphors – employed by all of their participants – played a significant role in how the girls thought of themselves and made sense of their experiences. The metaphors used can be demarcated along the following three themes: I am a shooting target; I am a cancer; and, I am a fighter. We will deal with each of these in turn (see also their article 'Living with the sins of their fathers', Erjavec and Volčič, 2010b. This is based on the narratives of 11 adolescent girls born from genocidal rape in BiH).

In relation to the first theme - I am a shooting target - through the use of vehicle metaphors the girls conveyed how they felt excluded and isolated from their wider communities. As articulated by Aida: 'In my school I am a *shooting target*. Anyone can attack me. And this happens every day … I am a target … I am their *shooting target* … a *target* into which everyone *shoots* … Everyone is allowed to *shoot* ... The war here still goes on, it is not over yet' (Erjavec and Volčič, 2010a: 530).

Others, who referred to themselves 'as a cancer', employed biological metaphors to compare themselves to a type of malignant disease. As Marina explains: 'I see myself *as a cancer* … as a cancer that divides weak and sick cells in the blood, and destroys all the strong, the good cells. Yes, the malignant cells destroy the good ones' (Erjavec and Volčič, 2010a: 534). Interestingly, the identity and origins of this second category of girls was not known to the wider community and yet, they had adopted, pre-emptively, a particularly negative self-image, fearing the responses they believed they would receive if/once their identities were revealed.

The final category offers a more positive outlook for children born of genocidal rape. This group, in contradistinction to the first group, used vehicle metaphors to describe themselves as fighters rather than those who are shot at. In the words of Amda: ‘I perceive myself as a fighter for peace… I think I need to be that … because as a child who has blood from two different groups, I am able to negotiate more, and act as a peacekeeper…between both nations in order to overcome divisions and conflicts…’ (Erjavec and Volčič, 2010a: 536).

‘Hybridity’ and ‘stickiness’

In their article ‘Hybridity, ethnicity and nationhood’ Tatjana Takševa and Agatha Schwartz (2018) apply the concepts of ‘hybridity’ and ‘stickiness’ to the narratives of the girls interviewed by Erjavec and Volčič (2010a, 2010b). With regards to the former, individuals who have lived in multiple cultures or come from a mixed cultural background are believed to exist in cultural hybrids. These cultural hybrids subvert monolithic ethnic, national and community identities. As a result, they are excluded and treated as ‘Other’ (Takševa & Schwartz, 2018). Allied to this, ‘stickiness’ uses repetitive language to consolidate who is considered abject, repulsive and in need of expulsion (Sarah Ahmed; cited in Takševa and Schwartz, 2018).

To illustrate how these concepts are at work in survivor accounts, Takševa and Schwartz (2018: 468) also draw upon the biography ‘Leila, ein bosnischesMädchen’ (Leila, a girl from Bosnia) by Alexandra Cavelius. This will be our focus here. The book is based on the story of a 24-year-old Bosniak survivor, Leila. Before Leila is rescued by a Bosnian Serb she is brutally raped by Serbs and Muslim militia. Following her escape, Leila embarks upon a personal relationship with her liberator with whom she subsequently has a child. Leila and her child are subject to harassment in post-conflict Bosnian society: ‘Leila because she is seen as a "Serbian whore" and her child because he is the product of a ‘mixed’ union deemed undesirable and "contaminated"’ (Takševa and Schwartz, 2018: 468).

For Takševa and Schwartz (2018: 467) ‘stickiness’ and hybridity are present within Leila’s story. Both mother and child carry with them the trauma of the war '…but also the "stickiness" of the rapes committed by the enemy and/or of sexual relations with the "enemy"’. The child has a ‘mixed’ ethnic identity reflecting a hybridity that challenges ‘national division lines’ in post-conflict BiH. As a result of her post-conflict relationship with a Serb, Leila is marked as a 'betrayer of her ethnic group', while her child is regarded as the 'embodiment of that betrayal and a symbolic repository of ethnic hatred' that sparked the genocide (Takševa and Schwartz, 2018: 467).

Let us unpack this in more detail. Genocidal rape is used to attack the nation. It divides and tears and leads to the physical and social death of the ethnic group targeted for destruction. We agree with Takševa and Schwartz (2018) who suggest that Leila’s story represents a subversion of this process. Despite being raped by a Serb during the genocide, Leila chooses to engage in a relationship with a member of this group. This demonstrates, Takševa and Schwartz (2018: 468) argue, that '…ethnic labels are meaningless beyond the ideological contexts that construct them, and that it is individual choices that matter'. They believe that Leila’s individual choice 'undermines dominant ethno-nationalist discourses of identity that operate on the basis of ethnic purity and exclusion'. Her actions loosen '…the grip of ethnic identifications that predominate in Bosnian society'. This is reminiscent of Amda's belief (presented above) that she could overcome divisions and conflict between the two nations.

'We are children like others'[4]: the stories of children from Rwanda

The qualitative research project led by Myriam Denov, which included 60 participants, provides the most comprehensive data on the experiences of children born from genocidal rape in Rwanda (see Denov, et al, 2017; Denov and Khan, 2019; Eramian and Denov, 2018; Khan and Denov, 2019; Woolner, Denov and Khan, 2019; see also Hogwood et al,2019, who conducted interviews with ten young people born from genocidal rape in Rwanda).

In-depth interviews and focus group discussion were carried out by Denov and her team of young adults in their earlier twenties (31 males and 29 females) in 2016. All were born as a result of the rapes that occurred during the 1994 Rwandan genocide. The majority of the participants lived with their maternal families, often including extended family members such as aunts, uncles and/or grandparents. Some lived with only their mothers, or with their mothers and new family members that they inherited after their mothers had remarried. The key themes identified from the qualitative data included 'identity and belonging', 'ambivalence in the mother–child relationship' and 'truth-telling' (Denov et al, 2017; see also

[4] This is the title of the article by Khan and Denov (2019).

Khan and Denov, 2019; Woolner, et al, 2019). In terms of feeling accepted by their families and the wider community, all participants felt that the origins of their birth hindered their ability to fit in and feel a sense of belonging. All described being ostracised and marginalised by both their families and their communities. This led to internalised feelings of shame and stigma. As Sarilee Khan and Denov (2019: 518) explain, this was compounded by 'the knowledge that their mothers were deeply traumatised by the genocide and sexual violence that they had endured and that, somehow, participants themselves were ultimately to blame for their mothers' suffering'. As articulated by one survivor:

> When I was 7 years old, I noticed the way she [mother] was treating me differently from my brothers . . . The relationship is now almost good, though me and her know that she used to be traumatised by the fact that I was born from an unwanted pregnancy. Due to that trauma she was not open to me. Even now we have never talked about how she was treating me in such a manner . . . What I don't like the most is that she did not provide maternal care as other children normally get from their mothers. (cited by Denov et al, 2017: 11-2)

De-ethnicisation in post-conflict Rwanda

In terms of moving forward, on both an individual and societal level, participants acknowledged that self-acceptance was key to the former, while truth-telling, self-revelation and formal recognition by Rwandan society, was vital for achieving the latter (Eramian and Denov, 2018; Khan and Denov, 2019; see also Hogwood et al, 2019). While such attempts to move forward are encouraging, the ability to achieve this is obstructed by the ethno-political context of post-conflict Rwanda (Eramian and Denov, 2018). Below we unpack this in more detail.

Since the genocide, ethnic labelling has been prohibited in Rwanda and ethnicity has been removed from government identity cards (Denov and Khan, 2019). Indeed, the use of ethnic labels - defined as a crime of 'divisionism' - is regarded as a criminal offence that can carry jail time (Denov and Khan, 2019). This law is called the Prevention, Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Discrimination and Sectarianism (Kuradusenge, 2016). Added to this, The Punishment of the Crime of Genocide Ideology was put into law in 2008 (Kuradusenge, 2016). Genocide ideology is defined in article 2 as 'an aggregate of thoughts characterised by conduct, speeches, documents and other acts aiming at exterminating or inciting others to exterminate people basing on ethnic group, origin, nationality, religion, colour, physical appearance, sex, language, religion or political opinion' (Reyntjens 2013: 75; cited in Denov and Khan, 2019: 155).

Despite these attempts to eradicate ethnic divisions or rather, because of these measures, expression of ethnic identity has become a key concern for Rwandans. As Claudine Kuradusenge (2016: 61) explains '[t]he [S]tate policy of attempting to eliminate ethnicity as a dividing line between Rwandans - either by accident or by design – has…resulted in reifying ethnic identity and concretising social and political lines between Hutus and Tutsis'. These attempts to de-ethnicise post-conflict Rwandan society resonates with the aspirations of the young adults discussed above. Reconciliation was a key objective for these victims. Yet, their experiences of abuse, marginalisation and alienation – in sum, their treatment as the 'enemy other' – hinders their attempts to fully integrate into post-conflict Rwandan society.

Legacy and unresolved trauma

At this point we return to where we began this chapter: *Watchmen* and the legacy and trauma associated with racism and racist violence. In the examples reviewed above, the children born of genocidal rape, like Angela, experience transgenerational or inherited trauma. The trauma of the rape and forced impregnation continues to haunt their mothers. This unresolved trauma is inscribed – both materially and symbolically – upon the bodies of their children. Here things become complicated: on the one hand, by virtue of being born as a result of genocidal rape, these children inherit the trauma visited upon their mothers. They are the embodiment of the violence she endured. However, on the other hand, the stigma and trauma they experience is related to their genetically mixed-ethnic identities (specifically their alignment with the 'enemy' group) and the rejection they face from their societies. Indeed, because of their hybrid identities - which serve as both literal and symbolic reminders of the genocides - these children are excluded and marginalised. They experience transgenerational trauma and their own/separate trauma (related to these events) simultaneously. As we saw in both cases, despite their attempts to move past these hybrid identities (and broader state-wide attempts at de-ethnicisation in Rwanda), as well as Leila's efforts to move past divisive ethno-nationalist labels, the trauma and 'stickiness' of these events remains unresolved for their wider post-conflict societies. The latter compound the experiences of victims and curtail their attempts to move forward towards reconciliation.

[START TEXTBOX]

Questions and reflection:

Before you begin, we suggest that you refamiliarise yourselves with the definition of genocide. For this exercise you may want to read the definition in full. Please also look up the definition of forced pregnancy provided by the International Criminal Court.

Now consider the following:

- How useful is the concept of genocidal rape? Does this create a hierarchy of wartime rape where genocidal rape is considered more severe than recreational or opportunistic rape?
- Can wartime rape be genocidal if it does not involve elements d and e of the genocide convention, in other words, if it does not lead to forced impregnation and the birth of an ethnically mixed cohort of children?
- In what other ways might wartime rape destroy the group? The work of Sharlach (1999, 2000) and Takai (2011) will assist you in thinking about these questions.
- How useful is the concept of transgenerational trauma? Do you think it reflects the experiences of children born of genocidal rape? What limitations do you identify with this concept?
- Can you think of other examples of unresolved trauma that has been passed down from one generation to the next?

[END TEXTBOX]

Rape and sexual violence within and by the military

This case study is divided into two sections. We begin by addressing militarised masculinity and the use of rape and sexual violence in combat zones, specifically the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), before moving on to consider rape and sexual assault within the American armed forces. While the DRC forms the basis of our analysis in our first example, we also acknowledge the use of rape and sexual violence by (USA) military personnel against civilians in occupied territories. For example, personnel from the USA have abducted, raped and sexually assaulted women and girls at their bases in Okinawa, South Korea, and the Philippines (Mesok, 2016; see Park, 2016 for a detailed review of militarised masculinity in South Korea). There are also reports of American soldiers abducting and assaulting Kosovar women during the Kosovo war (Cerretti, 2016). Added to this the American military have committed acts of sexualised violence and torture against Iraqi male prisoners at Abu Ghraib following the invasion and occupation of Iraq (for a detailed review of this work, as well some new insights, see Stacy Banwell's (2020) analysis of this case in chapter five of her open access monograph *Gender and the violence(s) of war and armed conflict: More dangerous to be a woman?*).

Rather than simply focus on war/armed conflict which, as Nancy Farwell (2004) points out, 'is a time-limited process', we unpack the broader issue of militarisation. This is because the '…military, largely a masculine institution in terms of its members and policies, determines and reinforces hierarchies of power…thereby reinforcing and re-creating gender relations and patriarchy' (Farwell, 2004: 394). To this end, our second example examines rape and sexual assault within the military in the USA. This phenomenon is not limited to the USA: other (Western) examples of sexual harassment and assault within the military include both the UK and Canadian armed forces. However, for our purposes here, we focus on the USA's armed forces which consists of the Army, Marine Corps, Navy, Air Force, and Coast Guard (USA Department of Defence).

We will start our analysis by unpacking the term militarised masculinity.

Militarised masculinity

Hegemonic masculinity - the most dominant type of masculinity, positioned above all other masculinities (and femininities) - is constructed as heterosexual. As noted earlier, hegemonic masculinity is linked to **phallocentrism.** The military institution – where men learn to fight and kill on behalf of the nation/their women – is where aggressive hegemonic heterosexual masculinity is enacted. This is referred to as militarised masculinity (see Meger, 2010; Zurbriggen, 2010; Rich et al, 2012; Trenholm et al, 2013). In this context militarised masculinity serves as a proxy for hegemonic masculinity.

A key element of militarised masculinity is 'anti-femininity' and 'No Sissy Stuff' (Branon 1985; cited in Zurbriggen 2010: 539). This requirement to '…avoid being seen as feminine leads men to purge the self of anything feminine'. It also involves '…devaluing woman and believing that women are different from, and inferior to, men. Such devaluing is correlated with sexual aggression perpetration' (Zurbriggen, 2010: 540; see also Rich et al, 2012). Added to this purging of all things feminine, the heterocentric culture of the military also requires its members to renounce 'queer' identities (Rich et al, 2012). Stereotypes of gay men as threatening and predatory are reproduced within military discourse, leading to fears of penetration reflected in the infamous adage 'don't drop the soap'. This tongue-in-cheek advice relates to the fears that if one bends down to pick up the soap, they expose themselves to penetration (by gay men) (Britton and Williams, 1995; cited in Rich et al, 2012: 278).

This reminds us of the statement (included above) by John McCain. The ostensible argument about 'unit cohesion' and 'national security' is, in reality, about the fear gay men pose to the heterosexual male soldier. Reminiscent of Clark's (2017) thesis regarding the vulnerability of the penis discussed above, Rich et al (2012: 271, 276) note: '[t]he soldier is predator, not prey; invulnerable, not vulnerable; the penetrator, not the penetrated'. Indeed, as they argue, homophobia and transphobia are so entrenched within the military institution that, even in a post-DADT context, **LGBT+** soldiers continue to conceal their sexual and gender identities. This '…self-policing …leaves uncontested the heteronormative and patriarchal image of the soldier that remains at the military's core' (Rich et al, 2012: 283). Rich et al wrote their article in 2012, since then President Trump (in 2019) banned trans men and women from serving in the military.

Rape and sexual violence by the soldiers in the DRC

Now that we have outlined militarised masculinity and the heteronormative culture of the military more broadly, our discussion moves on to consider the use of military rape and sexual violence within combat zones. Militaries across the world use rape as a weapon of war. In this context rape is used systematically to target women who belong to the enemy group (see Farwell, 2004 for a historical review). The DRC is no exception. Rape is used by soldiers to terrorise the civilian population (Banwell, 2014, 2020). According to Sara Meger (2010: 128), understanding why individual soldiers actively choose to engage in rape and sexual violence '…requires an understanding of the social constructions of masculinity both within Congolese society and, most importantly, within the military institution'. We review both below.

According to localised discourses of hegemonic masculinity, Congolese men are expected to have financial stability, high-sex drives, and multiple wives (Mechanic, 2004: 15; cited in Meger, 2010: 1290). In addition, they are required to have '…the physical, economic, and social power to protect their wives from other men' (Mechanic, 2004: 15; cited in Meger, 2010: 1290). Their ability to fulfil these requirements are obstructed by a number of ethnic, cultural, and socio-economic constraints (Banwell, 2014, 2020). The military, as Marie Ohambe et al (2005: 46) point out, offers these young, impoverished men – who lack other employment options – a stable income and the opportunity to acquire 'social promotion and power'.

These marginalised soldiers take advantage of the chaos of the war and perform militarised masculinity (which involves the use of rape and sexual violence) to subvert their marginal positions within the gender hierarchy (Banwell, 2014, 2020). Baaz and Stern (2009), in their interviews with one of the main perpetrators of rape and sexual violence in the DRC, the FARDC, discovered that for these soldiers it was their failure to live up to the expectations of 'the provider' (the equation of manhood with money and material wealth) and 'the sexually potent fighter', (Baaz & Stern, 2009: 511) alongside 'negative and sexualised images of women', that led them to rape (Baaz and Stern, 2009: 507; see also Trenholm et al, 2013). The narratives of these soldiers drew upon constructions of heterosexual masculinity (and femininity). These are formed and reproduced within the military institution. Within this context, soldiers' sexual needs were treated as a '…natural driving force which required "satisfaction" from women whose role it is to satisfy these needs' (Baaz and Stern, 2009: 505).

In this example rape is both a political and sexual act. At the macro-level it is used as an official weapon of war (reinforced, at the meso-level, within the military institution). At the micro-level it is used by individual soldiers seeking to perform militarised masculinity and satisfy sexual urges. In this instance it is both sexual (recreational rape/pressure cooker theory) and non-sexual (about power, dominance and control).

Sexual violence within the USA military

The inherent sexism and misogyny within the USA's military facilitates the persistence of rape and sexual assault (Maxwell, 2010). Sexual assault is defined by the US military as 'intentional sexual contact characterized by use of force, threats, intimidation, or abuse of authority or when the victim does not or cannot consent' (Department of Defence, 2017: 3; cited in Wood and Toppelberg, 2017: 622).

The 1991 Tailhook scandal is a telling illustration of this environment (Ceretti, 2016; Maxwell, 2010; Wood and Toppelberg, 2017). During the 1991 annual conference for active and retired members of the US Navy and Marine Corps, a number of male officer's wore T-shirts which read: WOMEN ARE PROPERTY (on the back) and HE-MAN WOMEN HATERS CLUB (on the front) (see Department of Defense; cited in Maxwell, 2010: 112). These T-shirts are illustrative of the reservations that were circulating at the time about whether women should serve in the military. They were worn by men who took part in the annual 'Gauntlet'. This is a scheduled evening event that takes place during the convention. Drawing on the Department of Defence's (DoD) inquiry into the incident, Caitlin Maxwell (2010: 112) runs us through what happened.

> At an agreed time, male Navy and Marine Corps personnel lined the hallway of the hotel's third floor and pretended to 'mill about'… until a female approached. Once a woman entered the hallway—and was deemed sufficiently attractive for the group's purposes…the men closed themselves around her on both sides so that she could not escape, and proceeded to pass her amongst the group so that those present could

> touch, grab, and otherwise violate her breasts, buttocks, and genitals. In many cases, men groped beneath the undergarments of women or went so far as to rip or remove their clothing.

Following the incident 140 junior officers were referred for investigation. Only six of these faced court martial (a court martial is a court used for military cases when members of the armed forces have broken military law). Charges against all six were subsequently dropped. While 29 admirals were implicated in the 'incident' they did not face any charges (Warner and Armstrong, 2020). The following July (1992), American soldiers were accused of committing 31 acts of sexual assault against female soldiers in the Persian Gulf (Ceretti, 2016). And five years later, reports of rape, inappropriate sexual behaviour and sexual assault were revealed at the USA Army's Aberdeen Proving Ground (Cerretti, 2016). This was followed by the USA Air Force Academy sexual assault scandal in 2003 and the USA Air Force Training scandal between 2009-12. Based on these examples, we suggest that sexual assault within the military, and the way it is dealt with, is both a symptom and reflection of **rape culture.**

A number of academics and reporters have written about the prevalence and scale of military rape and sexual assault (see for example, Cerreti, 2016; Maxwell, 2010; Mesok, 2016). In her 2011 article for *The Guardian*, about rape within the USA military, Lucy Broadbent included the following sub-heading, 'A female soldier in Iraq is more likely to be attacked by a fellow soldier than killed by enemy fire'. (Broadbent, 9 December 2011). Let us take a minute to let that sink in.

In 2010 the USA military reported 3,158 cases of sexual crimes, only 529 received a court martial while only 104 resulted in convictions. This is only the tip of the iceberg. For the same year, at least 19,000 cases of sexual assault were unreported (Broadbent, 2011). More recently, the DoD's annual Report on Sexual Assault in the Military, reported 20,500 cases of 'unwanted sexual contact' for the year 2018. These numbers are higher than in previous years (Phillips, 2 May 2019a.) The same report noted that 63 per cent of these assaults were perpetrated against women this, despite that fact they only make up 20 per cent of the military (Phillips, 2 May 2019a). To put it another way, 'one out of every 16 military women reported being groped, raped or otherwise sexually assaulted within the last year' (Phillips, 2 May 2019a). In fact, as Elizabeth Mesok (2016) points out, the 'crisis' of sexual assault within the military has been linked to women's increased presence within the institution and the failure of the military to fully integrate its female members. In this retelling, sexual assault is framed as simply another example of the 'growing pains' the military has faced over the years. Servicemen are also victims of sexual harassment, sexual assault, and rape. According to 2012 DoD report, of the 26,000 victims of 'unwanted sexual contact, 14,000 of these were male (Scarborough, 20 May 2013). We will discuss their experiences shortly.

Stories of victims being blackmailed by their units are common (Broadbent, 9 December 2011). The culture of silence that surrounds rape and sexual assault within the military compounds the trauma experienced by victims, who are forced, in many cases, to work alongside the perpetrator. Suicide, homelessness, and various mental health problems are common among survivors (Broadbent, 2011). The testimonies of these survivors are included on ‘mydutytospeak.com’ (Broadbent, 9 December 2011; see also Service Women’s Action Network SWAN that addresses sexual violence within the military). Our use of the term survivors here is in keeping with the terminology used by Broadbent and mydutytospeak.com.

This situation is exacerbated by the fact that the USA military investigates cases of sexual assault, unlike in Britain, for example, where cases are dealt with by the civilian Criminal Justice System (see Broadbent, 9 December, 2011). In their review of 585 cases of sexual assault within USA military bases in Japan, Carolyn Warner and Mia Armstrong (2020) found that, despite the military’s attempts to address and punish these crimes, a lack of evidence meant that many cases were not ‘prosecutable’ or, could not be tried as sex crimes. The results by Warner and Armstrong (2020) found that when individuals were found guilty punishment/penalties ranged from mandatory counselling, to short periods of confinement to dishonourable discharge. Based on their analysis of these cases, they come to the conclusion that 'the military… does not take sexual assault seriously, and so protects, rather than prosecutes, the perpetrator' (2020: 287).

What about the experiences of LGBT+ servicemembers?

Those who identify as gay, bisexual, or transgender are particularly vulnerable to sexual assault (Mathews et al, 2016). Indeed, in their 2016 Sexual Assault Report, the DoD included sexual orientation as a demographic factor for the first time.

Their review support findings that LGBT+ servicemembers are at a higher risk of sexual assault (See Gurung et al, 2017). Sitaji Gurung et al (2017) conducted empirical research with LGBT+ servicemembers based on their experiences of military sexual trauma (MST). MST ranges from overt acts, such as unwanted sexual contact (for example, sexual assault), to covert acts like stalking and the use of sexually charged language (sexual harassment). It can also manifest in sexual orientation discrimination (Sitaji Gurung et al., 2017). Research on MST among the LGBT+ population is in its infancy. Most studies are based on descriptive statistical analysis within limited theoretical engagement. As a starting point, we suggest drawing on research that addresses sexual gender-based violence (SGBV) against LGBT+ individuals within the wider population. This sexual GBV includes hate crime or transphobic violence (where victims are targeted on the basis of their gender identity) or heterosexist abuse/homophobic violence (where victims are targeted on the basis of their sexuality). Caterina Peroni (2015) has written about this and draws on **neoliberalism** and (hetero)**patriarchy** to explain sexual GBV against the LGBT+ population. Some of these theories are also discussed in Chapter Two. See also Chapter Three in which we discuss the regulation of homosexuality.

Research on 'corrective rape' in South Africa might also offer some insights for understanding rape against LGBT+ servicemembers. Commonly, corrective rape contains two elements (1) the punishment of black African lesbians for violating traditional gender norms by persons of the opposite sex and (2) the belief that rape will 'cure' them of their 'deviant' sexual orientation by 'turning them straight' (Brown, 2012). Increasingly, the term is being used to describe rape against all sexual minorities in order to ‘correct’ their sexualities (Brown, 2012). Mirroring the context in which military rape takes place, corrective rape takes place within a male-dominated society that normalises and privileges heteronormativity and heterosexuality.

Military rape and sexual assault against men

As noted earlier, sexual assault is perpetrated against male servicemen. According to the Pentagon, an estimated 10,000 men are sexually assaulted ever year by the US military (Phillips, 10 September 2019b). Victims are young, low-ranking members of the military (Mathews et al, 2018; Phillips, 10 September, 2019b). Sexual assault is either used as part of hazing rituals or to humiliate male victims (Jaycox et al, 2015; cited in Mathews et al, 2018).

Echoing the experiences of male victims/survivors discussed above, shame and stigma prevent many men from coming forward to report these crimes. As one victim/survivor articulated, 'if you came forward and said you were raped, people would have thought you were a queer or a child molester — you were treated like it was your fault' (Phillips, 10 September 2019b). In order to address the underreporting of male victims/survivors the Army introduced the Male Survivor Tribute and Portrait Tour. The tour will present the narratives of service men who have been victims of sexual assault in the hope that this will incentivise other victims to come forward (Vergun, 2016). In addition, in 2016 the DoD started working on the Plan to Prevent and Respond to Sexual Assault of Military Men (DoD, 2016).

How do we explain military male-to-male rape and sexual assault?

Military sexual assault is about '…dominance and power, not about sexual desire or the sex of the victim' (Mesok, 2016: 58). Given the heteronormative environment of the military how do we interpret the use of male-to-male rape and sexual violence? Furthermore, if militarised masculinity relies on the performance of heterosexual masculinity, how does male-to-male rape assist soldiers in accomplishing this?

In the context of war, as discussed above, the logic of rape and sexual violence is clear: it marginalises the male 'enemy' while simultaneously demonstrating their failure to protect their women/nation. However, outside of the ethno-politics of war – where, in cases of genocide and ethnic cleansing, rape is used to destroy the 'enemy' group and/or the nation – why do men rape and sexually assault men who are fighting on the same 'side'? What purpose does rape serve in this instance?

In their article on the persistence of sexual assault within the USA military, Elisabeth Wood and Nathaniel Toppelberg (2017: 625) distinguish between 'rape as practice' and 'rape as a strategy of war'. In the cases of the latter, rape can be used as a tool to target civilians, but it may not always be 'ordered, authorised or institutionalised'. For them, military rape and sexual assault are 'pattern[s] of violence that [are]…tolerated by officers, and…driven by social dynamics among soldiers' (Wood and Toppelberg, 2017: 621). This 'practice' persists, they argue, due to a combination of informal socialisation (processes among peers such as sexualised hazing) and formal socialisation (top-down processes that take place during recruitment).

Conversely, can these acts be explained by the pressure cooker theory? Do men, in these closed institutions, use rape to satisfy sexual urges? Is military rape recreational rape? Baaz and Stern (2018) have voiced their concerns about the erasure of the sexual from explanations of wartime rape and, concomitantly, the view that this type of violence is always and already about power and a tool of patriarchy. However, within the (heterocentric) context of the military (and the militarised masculinity it fosters), how else do we understand military rape other than as an act designed to humiliate, feminise and emasculate the male victims? Arguably for men who are concealing homosexual or queer identities, rape may be rooted in sexual desire. Indeed, victim/survivor testimonies talk of broken bodies and of feeling they are no longer real men. This, they explain, is because '[r]eal men don't get raped' (see Phillips, 2019b). The following words, from a male victim/survivor of military rape, brings together our earlier discussion about DADT, Clark's (2017) vulnerability of the penis and broader explanations of male-to-male (wartime) rape. He says: 'Our society treats men differently when they have been raped…In society's eyes I am somehow less of a man because I have been raped, or I must be a latent homosexual. Rape is a very emasculating thing' (see Broadbent, 2011).

[START TEXTBOX]

Consider the following:

- Can you find other examples where rape by soldiers is both sexual (recreational rape/pressure cooker theory) and non-sexual (about power, dominance and control)?
- What are your thoughts on our suggestion that sexual assault within the military is both a symptom and reflection of rape culture?

Before you engage with this thought exercise, we suggest revisiting our definition of militarised masculinity outlined above.

Militarised masculinity, like all masculinities, is performed. 'What would this performance look like without the penis?' (Clark, 2017: 13) which, as noted earlier, is often framed as a weapon. In other words, what happens if we decouple masculinity from phallocentric masculinity? Is this even possible? As a thought exercise, start thinking about the ways in which we might challenge the power of the phallus and de-centralise the penis from the construction of militarised masculinity. We will return to this in the Chapter Fourteen where we outline our thoughts on the future relationship between sex and crime.

[END TEXTBOX]

Summary

In this chapter on sex and war we have examined how rape (specifically genocidal rape) and sexual(ised) violence are used as weapons of war against both sexes. We have considered how wartime rape is sometimes used as an as an official strategy of war (in cases of genocide and ethnic cleaning) while in other instances it is treated as a by-product of war, a crime of opportunity. We also asked whether or not these crimes are always and already about power and control.

In order to unpack the legacy and unresolved trauma associated with genocidal rapes that took place in BiH and Rwanda, we explored the experiences of children who were born as a result of these war crimes. We argued that the trauma experienced by these victims was both separate from, and directly connected to/ as a result of, the trauma experienced by their mothers (i.e. transgenerational trauma).

As you learned, military rape and sexual assault take place within a heteronormative and hypermasculine institution. In the two examples that we reviewed – rape by soldiers in combat zones and rape and sexual assault within the military – militarised masculinity is at work. In the case of the former, rape is used both as a political and a sexual act. In the latter, military rape and sexual assault against women can be connected to the wider rape culture in which we live. In the case of men, given the heteronormative context of the military, we argued that humiliation, feminisation, and emasculation best explained these crimes. Research on MST against LGBT+ servicemembers is limited. More qualitative research on their experiences is need. For now, we suggest drawing insights from the broader literature on sexual GBV against LGBT+ populations as well as research on corrective rape.

Review questions

- How and why is rape used as weapon of war? What does this type of violence achieve?
- What is the material, symbolic and cultural legacy of genocidal rape? Think about this in relation to both the direct and indirect victims of this crime.
- What is the relationship between militarised masculinity and the use of rape and sexual violence both within and by the military?
- In terms of rape and sexual assault within the military, how do the experiences of servicewomen, servicemen and members of the LGBTQ+ differ? Do we require different explanations/understandings of their victimisation?

Other chapters that this links to:

Chapter Three (Sex and crime in time and space)

Chapter Five (Sex and institutional cultures of abuse)

Chapter Six (Reproduction, sex and crime)

Chapter Thirteen (Illegal representations)

Chapter Fourteen (The Future)