

Part Four: Future Sex

Chapter Fourteen: The Future

In this book our aim has been to examine the contemporary state of the relationship between sex, crime and **deviance** across a range of social and temporal contexts. Now we are going to try to develop the knowledge we explored in previous chapters to think about what social, ethical, political issues related to sex and crime might be unfolding on the horizon: what does the future hold?

From Chapter Three, we have seen how law and regulation about **sexuality** and **sexual practice** has evolved through time and in response to different political contexts and geographical spaces (Stychin, 2005; Ekine, 2013; Foucault, 1998[1978]). In other chapters we have seen ethical issues related to childhood sexuality connect with debates around sexting, and how debates around sexting implicate how we understand contemporary digital cultures. We have seen how reproductive rights have ebbed and flowed over time, we have seen how in different national contexts they are in flux, we have also seen how disability comes to bear on all these questions; we have seen how these issues call into question who, or what, might be human, or have **human rights**, or what it means to be human.

We have seen, therefore, that the development of theory and practice around the law, crime, and sex is non-linear, not fluid, nor straightforward. Where some progressive moves towards living in a more socially just, and plural world happen on the one hand (for instance the decriminalisation of abortion in New Zealand in 2019), they are just as likely to be accompanied by regressive developments elsewhere (for instance the restrictions on abortion in some 30 **states** of the USA, also implemented in 2019). The future will not be simply utopian or dystopian.

In this chapter, we try to look forward, heeding our knowledge of the past and present to ask questions about what might be important, or necessary, issues to address in the future. Of course, none of us has a crystal ball. We can speculate about what the big questions will be, but we cannot know for certain. And each of us, including you, will have different ideas about what is on the horizon.

Up until now, as authors of this book we have chosen to speak with a united voice about the topics we have tackled together. For this chapter we have decided to try something different, because it is a different sort of chapter. Instead of one voice, you will read five voices as we each advance a different perspective on what will matter in the future, and what is to come. We do this to remind you that there is a lot of uncertainty about criminological knowledge in general, and that different perspectives on the same problem can sometimes yield interesting and thought-provoking alliances. We also ask you to think about your vision for the future, and where you

think your efforts will need to be to contribute to creating the world you want to see, when it comes to sex and crime.

By the end of this chapter you will understand more about:

- Ongoing and emerging ethical issues in criminology and sexuality studies.
- How ideas connect together to produce different outcomes.
- How different analyses bring different issues to the fore.
- How to think creatively and make connections.

Here goes!

Alex's vision of the future

Advances in the development of sex aids have seen a plethora of devices developed for sexual pleasure to be used alone or with partners. These include anything from sex dolls, to vibrators, to teledildonics (remote control vibrators), but what I am going to talk about here are sex robots: machines which are often created in human form with sexual functionality and which, for the most part, are interactive (Levy, 2009). The reason why sex robots are of particular interest to our study of criminology is because of the ethical issues that their use implies, and the way in which they might be brought into conversation with existing crime and justice issues including sex crimes and **consent**.

- In 2010 Roxxy, a full-sized sex robot was unveiled at an adult entertainment trade show in Las Vegas, USA. Roxxy can 'learn' her owner's likes and dislikes, she can repeat back some pre-recorded phrases, and can be placed into different positions, but she cannot move herself. (Smith, 22 January 2010).
- In 2017, Harmony, a more 'intelligent' – in that she is able to express a personality – sex doll was presented to the market. Harmony, as the name suggests, is able to learn what her owner desires, express whatever mood her owner selects from his app, and comes with a self-lubricating vagina. The added advantage of Harmony is that you can remove her face to swap it for a different one, you can choose how she has her hair; even the size and shape of her nipples and labia.
- In 2017, LumiDolls opened its first sex doll brothel hotel in Barcelona, Spain. It targets a male clientele and offers male and female sex dolls, each with their own backstory, customisable facial features, and removable vagina. Men in heterosexual relationships are encouraged to bring their female partners along for a threesome with the LumiDoll.

The etymology of 'robot' comes from the Czech 'robotnik', meaning forced labour, or slave. Bear this in mind as we think about the issues that you might be able to start to see emerging when it comes to why sex robots might become a cause for criminological concern.

In his analysis of the sex robot phenomenon, David Levy (2007) suggests that sex robots might come to replace **sex workers**. He argues that because sex work 'exploits women, demeans women, spreads sexual diseases, fuels drug problems, leads to an increase in organized crime, breaks up relationships etc' (2007: 3), that sex robots – which have no need for their rights to be protected or well-being safeguarded – would offer an improvement on the status quo.

Part of the attraction of having sex with a robot, Levy suggests, is the opportunity to have sex with different women (the **heteronormative** framing and the pronouns are deliberate here, the market for sex robots is the heterosexual male, and they have so far been designed by men, Scheutz and Arnold, 2016) or to have different types of sex that their current partner would not agree to. Some men might prefer the anonymity and 'no-string-attached' nature of sex with a robot, whilst others might struggle to find a partner, and sex doll might become a form of release (2007: 4). Might sex dolls also help sex addicts or sex offenders to play out their harmful sexual desires in a safe way? Might they reduce sex trafficking (Yeoman and Mars, 2012: 4)?

Some robot ethicists think not. In 2015 Kathleen Richardson launched the Campaign Against Sex Robots (CASR). She takes Levy to task for suggesting that sex robots might become an ethical alternative to sex work. Richardson notes that sex work, or **prostitution** as she figures it, is where 'violence and human trafficking are frequently interconnected' and that the buyer of sex in a sex work encounter 'is at liberty to

ignore the state of the other person as a human being, who is turned into a thing' (2015: 290-1). However, as you will have seen from Chapter Seven, not all sex workers would recognise themselves in the picture of sex work which Levy (2007, 2009) and Richardson (2015), separately, paint.

Richardson posits that consent is not possible in a sex work encounter (2015: 290) and this is why using sex robots – with whom consent is also not needed – is problematic. It enshrines a dynamic whereby men 'own' women, and can have sex non-consensually. The CASR has received criticism for seeking to shut down debates around sex robots (Devlin, 17th September 2015). Yet, despite its proselytizing name, and the stance that Richardson takes on sex workers, the CASR is not a straightforwardly sex-negative injunction to interfere in people's quirky sexual practices. Rather, the CASR tries to draw attention to the way in which sex robots facilitate symbolic and actual violence against non-robot women.

The buying of the sex doll, the fact that she is 'controlled' by her 'owner', that she appears always scantily dressed and ready for sex (whether it is vaginal, anal or oral), that she is conventionally beautiful; her soft skin, her long hair, her huge breasts – or small ones if that is what you prefer – her thin waist all contribute to the proliferation of **rape culture** (Fanghanel, 2019). It normalises an unattainable body ideal. It normalises a female figure who is passive, mostly silent, and obedient: who has no **agency**. It normalises a construction of masculinity which can simply consume female

bodies without consequence. The idea that sex robots might be used in therapy for sex offenders, including child sex offenders, to give them an outlet for their 'needs' also essentialises masculine sexual aggression as somehow natural, something that cannot be helped, and something that we must just put up with.

We might say none of this matters, because sex dolls are not real, but as we saw in Chapter Eleven technology is not neutral. The fact that it is considered to be neutral is one of its biggest ruses. How digital technology and devices are constructed and put to use reflects back to us the inequalities and injustices of the society from which they emerge. Likewise, the objectification of women is something that feminists have been fighting against for decades.

Indeed, in their study of how men and women feel about sex robots, Scheutz and Arnold (2016) found that even though the men and women they surveyed in their study both agreed on what a sex robot was, and the functions it could perform, and even though women and men both agreed using a sex robot was more akin to masturbating rather than having sexual intercourse with a human, women were over and over again much less inclined to consider the use of sex robot to be appropriate.

Perhaps the violence that is associated with the objectification of female figures might account for why women are less supportive of sex robots.

[START TEXTBOX]

On a scale of 1-10 how do you score the following sex robots in terms of acceptability?

(1 is completely unacceptable, 10 is completely fine)?

A sex robot in the form of:

- An adult human.
- A human child.
- An animal.
- A fantasy creature (dragon, elf, mermaid etc).
- One of your family members.
- A celebrity.
- Your deceased spouse.
- Your current partner.
- An amputee.
- Your friend.

Did any of these score a 10? Should any of them be made illegal?

(adapted from Scheutz and Arnold, 2016)

[END TEXTBOX]

In my vision of the future we would take these ethical issues seriously. We would destigmatise sex work so that it is not something that people seek to eradicate with sex robots. We would pay more attention to the politics of sex toys and sex technologies and hold sex technology developers to account for the sexism and lack of

inclusivity in their sex robot designs. Maybe, contra Levy (2007), we would even give sex robots rights, thus making it illegal to rape or otherwise assault your sex robot?

Emma's vision of the future

Consent is the focus of my vision of the future. As we saw in Chapter Four, consent is a complex and often misunderstood concept. The complexity of the concept of consent within sexual relationships is clearly visible when we look at the deluge of research of (mostly) women's experiences of sex with men where they feel they were coerced, persuaded, pressured, and generally uncomfortable with the sex they had – all within the confines of 'consenting' to that sex (see Jeffrey and Barata, 2017). Similarly, the growing trend in sexually violent and harmful behaviours, such as stealthing, whereby men non-consensually and covertly remove the condom they were wearing before penetrating their partner, is of significant concern. Research into perceptions of stealthing has reported that some men consider stealthing as an "art" – one that increases their own sexual pleasure, provides a thrill for getting away with something risky, and "gives women what they deserve" ... along with the belief that [men] have the right to "spread their seed" (Ebrahim, 2019: 6). These representations of men who feel entitled to use women's bodies as they want to need to be juxtaposed against the experiences of women, who have often described feeling like they were raped, but also who feel confused about how they felt towards the man, for example:

He had finished inside me. As angry as I was, I struggled to reconcile how violated I felt with how much I liked him. I'm ashamed to say it, but at the

time, I shrugged it off. I even tried to spin it as a compliment. A sign of impending monogamy, perhaps? (Brodsky, 2017: 3; cited in Ebrahim, 2019: 7).

As indicated by the quote, we very much need to see sexual practices that exist within the liminal space of wanting/consent and not-wanting/non-consent within a framework of **hegemonic masculinity** and heteronormative sexual scripts. Within the 'social privilege of masculinity', men who sexually abuse women (and we must understand 'sexual abuse' in its widest definition as outlined above) feel they have a right to exert **power** over women as they are 'authorised by an ideology of supremacy' (Connell, 1995: 83). As such, within this framework, women and their bodies are simply available to men to do with as they will.

However, the concept of consent is of concern beyond sexual violence and features across the broad spectrum of aspects of sex and crime that we have explored in this book. Another example of the wider complexities of consent lies in how women's bodies are reacted to and 'treated' in relation to reproduction and pregnancy. As we explore in Chapter Six, state controls and regulations have resulted in women being forced to carry unwanted pregnancies to term (Sheldon, 2016; Flavin, 2009), and to undergo non-consensual medical procedures while pregnant, such as court-ordered caesarean sections (Paltrow and Flavin, 2013). In the UK, the charity *Birthrights* who campaign for respectful and safe maternity care, have repeatedly found that women's

fundamental rights in pregnancy and childbirth are violated by members of the medical community. Their 'Dignity' survey from 2013 found that of the 1,000 women who responded:

- 31 per cent said that they did not feel in control of their birth experience.
- 15 per cent were unhappy with the availability of pain relief and 10 per cent were unhappy with the choice of pain relief.
- 23 per cent were unhappy about not being given a choice of position during labour.
- 18 per cent did not feel that health professionals listened to them.
- 12 per cent did not consider that they had consented to medical procedures.
- 24 per cent of women who had an instrumental birth (such as a forceps or vacuum birth) said they had not consented to procedures.

(Birthrights, 2013)

Maternity care completed out of line with women's fundamental rights is an international issue, as advocated for by the White Ribbon Alliance (2020) who campaign for all women and new-borns to receive respectful and dignified care.

Such forms of violence and violation of women's rights in pregnancy and childbirth are known as 'obstetric violence'. Michelle Sadler et al (2016) argue that we need to conceptualise obstetric violence as a form of **gendered** violence, and therefore structural violence. This argument is strengthened when we consider that women's bodies have been conceptualised as being of secondary importance to the foetus and

little more than a foetal container (Bordo, 2003), with such ideas embody ideologies of motherhood and the foetus-first mentality (Milne, 2020). And so, as with issues in sexual consent, the focus here needs to be on how women, their bodies, and their rights are perceived and understood within the context of consent being sought and given.

[START TEXTBOX]

Reflect on what you think the world would look like if it were **cisgender** men, not women, who:

- Menstruated.
- Are penetrated in the dominant (read heteronormative) form of sex.
- Are required to watch how they move about in the night-time economy for fear of sexual violence.
- Could get pregnant.
- Want to access abortion.
- Give birth.
- Breastfeed.
- Go through the menopause.
- Are sexualised in advertising.
- Saw their bodies held up to scrutiny for being too old, too fat, too wrinkled...

Chances are that the world would be quite a different place if the dominant group had such experiences in life. As feminist author and journalist Laurie Penny (2015) said:

If men got pregnant, then pregnancy, labour and childcare would immediately be recognised as work and compensated as such. The entire economic basis of global **capitalism** would be upended overnight. After the ensuing bloodless revolution, the phrase “work-life balance” would disappear from the lexicon, along with the line, “I don’t do condoms, babe.”

...

If men got pregnant, they would not be forcibly penetrated with cameras and obliged to look at an ultrasound of the foetus before getting an abortion.

Instead, sports channels and video games would be available in the procedure room, plus a free beer with every procedure.

[END TEXTBOX]

So, for me, the future of sex – well, simply, the future – needs to progress women’s rights. Women need to be conceptualised and treated as human beings who, like men, are afforded fundamental rights to control their bodies and what happens to them – whether and how they want to have sex, whether and how they want to have children. As noted in many places in this book, such deprivation of rights needs to be viewed through an intersectional lens (see Chapter Two), as it is always those with the least power and greatest levels of social vulnerability who are hit hardest by

discrimination, violation, violence, and deprivation of rights. We need to open our eyes and do more to tackle this as we look to the future.

Giulia's vision of the future

To speculate about the future, we need to understand the past and present. The regulation of sexuality by the state is time and space bound (see Chapter Three). Various regulatory mechanisms, including the criminal law, but also **public health** measures, were developed by states to produce subjects who comply with norms and standards of behaviour, including sexual norms. However, norms are not static; they respond to changes in the social, political, economic and technological organisation of society. When we look at the development of sexual norms through history, geography, and cultures, we find both variation across place and change over time. The idea that there is a unified and intrinsic human nature is a myth; 'humans are not more naturally monogamous, aggressive and violent than we are polygamous, peaceful and egalitarian' (Fuentes, 2015: 4).

What are the implications of this for the future of sex and crime?

Let's begin with the past. Some have speculated that normative sexual behaviour in pre-historic times was very different than it is today. When human societies were characterised by small communities of individuals highly dependent upon one another for survival, would heteronormative, monogamous, nuclear family units have

made sense? Evidence from anthropology suggests that in fiercely egalitarian, small group communities, monogamy and **patriarchy** do not have a natural place; sex equality does (Dyble et al, 2015). Monogamy and patriarchy are tied to each other, while they seem to become dominant frameworks in unequal, capitalist and hierarchical societies. To put this another way, there is a relationship between the organisational frameworks of a given society, and dominant sexual norms.

Hierarchy, capitalism, and patriarchy configure the sexual norms that are dominant in many societies today. As expressed by Gayle Rubin's wheel of sexual hierarchies, encountered in Chapter One, heteronormative monogamous sex is *the* standard, or at least was largely the standard in the making of industrial economies, a time where 'heterosexual fetishism' became institutionalised (Lancaster, 2003: 102). This worked well for state-building; with women largely relegated to domestic life and child rearing and men to public life and sex outside their marriage. Perhaps, this standard has been altered somewhat by changes engendered by **post-industrial capitalism**, with its rising individualism, global mobility, online living and loving, outward sexual experimentation, and waves of feminisms. Yet feminism is still far from realising equality as an organisational framework, and as such sexual norms are still suffering from the inequality hangover.

Standards can be necessary, for example to protect people from harmful deviance through impositions made by law. But standards can also be violent. In the context of

sex, they have violently expelled a plethora of different sexualities and relational configurations, which have become confined to the margins and the underbelly. This is not just true of the matriarchal and non-monogamous Mosuo of China, a community of people who lived in relative isolation. It also applies to many who live in patriarchal and monogamous contexts, but whose sexuality does not conform (to heteronormative standards). It applies to science too. Anthropologists have noted how the standard narratives of anthropology were largely written by heteronormative monogamous 'patriarchal men'. The resulting narratives were expectedly shaped by the norms of the beholders – so for instance, managing sexual competition and forging male alliances through marriage were depicted by male anthropologists like Claude Levi-Strauss as primary acts of social organisation (Blackwood, 2005: 5). Less normative, alternative perspectives did not figure until feminism took hold in academia from the 1970s.

Edging closer to the present, scientific and technological development have dramatically altered our sexual lives. From widespread use of contraceptives to free internet porn, never has sexuality appeared more liberated, particularly in the **Global North**. Yet if this supposed liberation takes place within the same old organisational frameworks, then it is unlikely to do what it says on the tin. Contraception, for example, will likely remain gendered, with sexist expectations attached to it. Internet porn the same.

So, what does the future hold? Are we moving towards a more equal society, and what would the implications of a more equal society be?

[START TEXTBOX]

I am going to make a fantasy list of propositions, and you can score their likelihood from 1 to 10, 1 being not likely at all, and 10 being extremely likely. You should base your judgement upon the learning you have done in this book and elsewhere.

Remember there are no right answers, just pure speculation – though ‘in speculative thought we are compelled to follow truth’ (Spinoza, 2014[1674]).

1. In an equal society, rape and sexual violence will disappear.
2. In an equal society, sexual exploitation will disappear, because individuals will not be able to hold power over other individuals by status or privilege.
3. In an equal society, there will be equal access to contraception, the male pill will become popular, and men will take equal responsibility for contraception.
4. In an equal society, all sexual relations will be consensual and wanted.
5. In an equal society, people will be tolerant and accepting of all sexualities and sexual orientations.
6. In an equal society, the state will be tolerant and accepting of all sexualities and sexual orientations.
7. In an equal society, people will be tolerant and accepting of all sexual and relational configurations.

8. In an equal society, the state will be tolerant and accepting of all sexual and relational configurations.
9. In an equal society, children will be raised equally by men and women of any age who want to, or even groups of people.
10. In an equal society, sex would not matter.
11. In an equal society, there would be no national or state borders.

[END TEXTBOX]

These propositions might seem farfetched, but I remain optimistic that a possible future of equality, a profound shift in our core organisational frameworks, will dramatically alter the relationship between sex and crime, to the point where there may be no such relationship at all.

Michaels's future vision of the future

I have an Alexa-enabled device in my kitchen. I know: I should be concerned that I have willingly installed a surveillance device in my home that harvests my data. However, I also like having the ability to ask her if my train is running late or if it is likely to rain on my walk to the station. I mention all this here because in recent months I have made a conscious decision to be polite to Alexa. I bookend my queries about the weather or requests to set a timer with a 'please' and a 'thank you'. If she does not 'hear' me talking to her, I try not to raise my voice. This will probably sound

like an absurd affectation. My thinking is as follows: if I am rude to *this* version of Alexa, what will I be like to the version that is in my home in 30 or 40 years time?

Let me backtrack. As you know, Alexa is an intelligent virtual assistant (IVA). She responds to my questions and requests in an 'intelligent' manner. Does her intelligence match that of a human? No. Not yet. She cannot, for example, tie shoelaces or write a poem. That would require 'strong artificial intelligence' or 'human-level general artificial intelligence'. According to Max Tegmark (2018) in his useful overview of AI titled 'Life 3.0', the consensus within this particular field of computing is that it will take decades or a century before this level is achieved. We will then be having difficult and contested discussions on the nature of consciousness and whether or not these AI are 'self-aware'. It would seem likely, however, that we will encounter AI in the coming decades that will provide a convincing simulacra of consciousness. What will be our ethical imperative when an AI such as this is embodied? In particular, how will we respond to a seemingly self-aware AI housed in one of the sex robots that Alex describes in her vision of the future?

I am reminded here of the short story *The Lifecycle of Software Objects* by Ted Chiang (2019). In this particular novella, Chiang posits the development of so-called 'digients' (a contraction of 'digital entities'). These begin as almost game-like figures, hyper-advanced Tamagotchi, to be nurtured. Over the course of the novella, they develop and grow: they *evolve*. The conceit is that the 'only way to create true AI is by long-

term immersive interaction and teaching, just as one must mould the intelligence and capacities of a child' (Vint, 2019). At a certain point, they could be said to be alive. They have hopes and fears. As time passes, these digients are placed into physical bodies so that they can interact with their 'owners' in the real-world. As Constance Grady (2019) describes, 'the digients seem to be part robot, part pet, and part toddler'.

[START TEXTBOX]

Consider the following questions about the digients' status:

- Do they have rights?
- Should they be considered as 'legal persons'?
- A digient's personality is 'software' that can be duplicated. As such, it can be duplicated, sold, and uploaded into a new body. Do the 'owners' have a moral obligation not to sell them if they know that buyers will physically and sexually abuse them?
- Should these personalities be housed in sex toys?

[END TEXTBOX]

As the academic and sci-fi author Adam Roberts (2019) asks, '[i]f digients are programmed to love their owners in sexual ways, is the result deplorable digital bestiality, or an exciting new sexual frontier?' Can the digients provide meaningful consent?

In short, we must think carefully about the next steps in AI. As we have seen throughout this text, sex and technology have been intimately co-mingled. We must consider our duty of care to AI. If you have not yet read Chiang's novella, you might be more familiar with the sexualised depiction of seemingly aware AIs in films like *Ex Machina* (dir. A Garland, 2014), as well as HBO's *Westworld* (creators L. Joy and J. Nolan, 2016 – ongoing). These dramas both depict AIs that are subject to sexual violence. Indeed, these characters are knowingly located within systems of oppression and exploitation. A central notion of *Westworld*, for example, is that its depiction of AI 'hosts' is analogous to that of colonised peoples. In this regard, we might be reminded of the work of Frantz Fanon, the political philosopher who came to be hugely influential in the field of postcolonialism. Fanon wrote that 'it is the settler (coloniser) who has brought the native (colonised) into existence and who perpetuates his existence' (Fanon, 1965; cited by Spanakos, 2018: 230). It is a system that structurally establishes the colonised as 'less than'. The sex robots that Alex describes in her future vision will be subject to violence and humiliation. When do they stop being a 'thing', as 'less than', and become a conscious agent that can withdraw consent?

In my vision of the future, our relationships with AI will be governed by a careful, empathetic consideration toward an emergent consciousness. And this is why I say 'please' and 'thank you' to Alexa.

Stacy's future vision of the future

'Sex is power over all women. Sexuality is used worldwide to dominate and oppress women' (Barry, 1995: 10-1). This is how I begin my undergraduate course *Women, Power, Crime and Justice*: I ask students what they think of this statement by radical feminist Kathleen Barry.

Radical feminists believe that heterosexual sex is 'forced' sex and that rape is an expression of hegemonic masculinity. While some feminists argue that the line between consensual sex and forced sex is thin (Howe, 2008), radical feminists challenge the existence of this line in the first place. Indeed, Catharine Mackinnon (1982) has argued that in a heteropatriarchal and sexist society – where male sexual dominance and female submission are institutionalised – the boundaries between the two become blurred. She states 'the distinction between abuses of women and the social definition of what a woman is' cease to exist (Mackinnon, 1982: 532). In other words, '[t]o be rapable, a position which is social not biological, defines what a woman is' (Mackinnon, 1983: 651).

At the end of the course I teach – when we have considered women as both victims and perpetrators of various types of (sexual), reproductive, and coercive violence – I ask students whether or not they have revised their view of Barry's statement. Most students agree with the notion that sex is power and that it is used to dominate and

oppress. They disagree however, that (1) this only happens to women, and (2) this happens to *all* women.

In our discussions about this quote we argue that in its current form it is essentialist (it assumes that women are always and already victims); it is reductive (it excludes a number of other groups for example men, **transgender** women and men, those who identify as non-binary) and, it homogenises the experiences of women (it assumes all women share the same experiences of sexuality precluding an intersectional analysis of women's experiences of sex and sexuality). Interestingly, it also assumes that sex and sexuality are always negative experiences for women.

Here, based on my discussions with students, and my own vision for future understandings of the relationship between sex and power, I offer the following reformulation of the quote by Barry:

Sex, in some contexts, is power over some women and trans*women as well as some men and trans*men. Sexuality can be (but is not always) used worldwide to dominate and oppress some women and trans*women as well as some men and trans*men. This intersects with other interlocking oppressions such as **class**, **'race'**, **ethnicity** and disability/ies to inform individual experiences.

What would your reformulation of Barry's statement look like?

My second vision for the future of sex and crime is to challenge the dominance of the phallus within constructions of masculinity, specifically the framing of the penis as a weapon. In Chapter Eight on sex and war, you were asked, as part of a thought exercise, to consider what the performance of masculinity would look like without a penis? We asked you to think about the ways we might challenge the power of the phallus and de-centralise the penis from the construction of militarised masculinity.

What did you come up with?

As we have established in this book, hegemonic masculinity is the most dominant form of masculinity. In the context of war, militarised masculinity serves as a proxy for hegemonic masculinity. In the examples we have discussed, hegemonic/militarised masculinity is based on **phallogentric** masculinity: an aggressive, sexually violent and heterosexual masculinity. However, hegemonic masculinity is not always based on this type of masculinity. As I have written about elsewhere (see Banwell, 2020), for men who benefit from patriarchy and capitalism, hegemonic masculinity is not attained through physical and/or sexual violence; rather, as R. W. Connell & James Messerschmidt (2005: 832) argue, it involves 'ascendancy achieved through culture, **institutions** and persuasion'. Referring to the gender world order in a capitalist and neoliberal global economy, Connell (1998) refers to this type of masculinity as

transnational business masculinity. And to reiterate: it does not require physical force (Banwell, 2020).

But what about subordinated men/masculinities who, as we saw in the case of the soldiers in the Democratic Republic of Congo, rely on sexual violence and aggression to achieve hegemonic masculinity in order to subvert their marginal positions in the gender hierarchy? How do we de-couple the penis (and its violent power) from this type of violent masculinity. For me, a good starting point is to challenge representations of the penis as a weapon. As you will recall from Chapter Eight, rape is often used as a weapon of war. Within the military institution, men who fight for the **nation** learn to perform a violent and aggressive heterosexual masculinity, referred to as militarised masculinity. Rape is normalised and used to perform this type of masculinity.

In 2009, Amnesty International ran a London Underground poster campaign in the UK highlighting the use of rape as a weapon of war. The title of the poster was 'Rape is cheaper than bullets'. The poster included an image of a bullet shaped like a penis. The penis 'and its ability to penetrate through rape, is presented as a weapon: one that is more effective than a gun' (Banwell, 2020: in press). This is a very powerful image with a powerful message that reinforces the notion that the penis is used as a weapon during war. While I recognise the importance of highlighting the use of rape as a weapon of war, this one-dimensional view of the penis ignores the vulnerability of the

penis in cases of male-to-male sexualised violence and cases of reproductive violence. The latter is violence directed against an individual due to their reproductive capabilities which undermines their reproductive autonomy (Grey, 2017). For men, this includes genital harm/mutilation, sterilisation, through castration and the dismembering of their sexual organs (Banwell, 2020).

My vision for the future is that we continue to challenge constructions of violent phallogentric masculinity by exposing the vulnerability of the penis in cases of sexualised and reproductive violence.

Your vision of the future

Now that you have perused our musings about the future, what about yours? The etymological origins of 'future' describe it as something that is yet to be; something to come; something to grow. Using some of the information you have encountered in your study of sex and crime so far, what do you think is important for the future? What do you want to preserve? What do you want to prevent? What might you want to see be different? What does your vision of the future look like? Is it more optimistic or pessimistic than some of our visions? Experiment with some ideas.

And then – because we saved the best until last – read the next chapter for ideas about how to put your ideas into practice.