Market concentration, corporate governance and innovation: partial and combined effects in US-listed firms
Ugur, Mehmet and Hashem, Nawar (2012) Market concentration, corporate governance and innovation: partial and combined effects in US-listed firms. Journal of Governance and Regulation, 1 (3/2). p. 199. ISSN 2220-9352 (Print), 2306-6784 (Online)Full text not available from this repository.
Mehmet Ugur and Nawar Hashem aim to contribute to the debate by investigating both partial and combined effects of corporate governance and market concentration on
innovation. Utilising a dataset for 1,400 non-financial US-listed companies and two-way cluster-robust estimation methodology, they report several findings. First, the relationship between market concentration and innovation is non-linear. Secondly, the relationship has a U-shape in the case of input measure of innovation (research and development - R&D – expenditures); but it has an inverted-U shape when net book-value of brands and patents is used as output measure of innovation. Third, corporate governance indicators such as antitakeover defences and insider control tend to have a negative partial effect on R&D
expenditures but a positive partial effect on net book-value of brands and patents. Finally, when interacted with market concentration, anti-takeover defences and insider control act as complements to market concentration.
|Additional Information:|| First published: 2012.|
|Uncontrolled Keywords:||corporate governance|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor > HD28 Management. Industrial Management|
|School / Department / Research Groups:||School of Business|
School of Business > Centre for Economic Performance, Governance & Regulation (CEPGR)
|Last Modified:||08 Jul 2014 15:23|
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