EVIDENCE BEING DISSEMINATED

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ABSTRACT

The aim of this thesis was to examine racism in order to participate in the development of anti-racist strategies. For this reason it investigated two central features of racism – the philosophical and the political. In connection with the philosophical feature it examined racism in relation to the constitution of identity. In particular, it focused on the way identity is bound to the relationship between self and 'other'. In connection with the political feature, it explored racism as a defence of a system from which advantage is derived on the basis of culture. In order to pursue different aspects of that defence they were examined in relation to the ‘Pauline Hanson Controversy’ in Australia.

Anti-racist movements often fail to keep pace with changes in racist ideologies and practice. This can have serious consequences during the current time of globalisation, especially as racist ideologies seem to be shifting from biological to cultural principles. A key area within anti-racist strategies in Australia has been the essentialist and social constructivist debates. A central question within these debates has concerned the representation of Aboriginal identity. This is because notions of fluid subjectivities can challenge racisms based on fixed notions of identity; however, in this instance it could undermine the possibility of campaign. In an attempt to explore the impasse between the essentialists and social constructivists, my thesis examines notions of identity and difference. In particular, it focuses on Jacques Derrida’s device of differ(ence), Edmund Husserl’s strategy for reducing prejudice, and Martin Heidegger’s notion of authenticity. In order to focus on the cultural aspect of racism, this thesis examines issues related to the ‘United Nations Draft Declaration On the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ in connection with Fukuyama’s essay about the ‘End of History’. After evaluating the philosophical and political aspects of racism, I will claim that there are certain aspects of Edmund Husserl’s work, which could challenge essentialist based racist ideologies in such a way that does not undermine the possibility of campaign.
INTRODUCTION

The aim of this thesis is to examine the cognitive and political features of racism. In connection with the former, it will explore racism in relation to notions concerning identity and difference - the delineation of self-identity and other. This approach is based on a working definition that the constitution of self-identity is somehow bound to the relationship between self and other and vice versa, and how racism manifests in the relationship between self and other. The political feature of racism will be explored within a working definition that racism is a defence of a system where advantage is derived on the basis of different races. Theories about racism, in terms of individual prejudices, have a tendency to suggest that collective racism is an aggregate of individual attitudes. This notion presupposes that the whole is not greater than the sum of its parts. It is a kind of atomistic view of racism. The aim of this thesis is to investigate the phenomenon from a non-atomistic view. In so doing, it will examine the state’s role in the maintenance of racism. Therefore, as well as exploring racism as the defence of a system from which advantage is derived on the basis of race, it will also examine the system being defended.

While the aim of this work is to explore the cognitive and political features of racism, the objective is to participate in the development of anti-racist strategies for the twenty first century. This is a time when racial distinctions are being superseded by cultural differences, and past forms of racism that were understood as the defence of a system in which advantage was gained on the basis of race, are changing into forms of racism that could be understood as the defence of a system in which advantage is gained on the basis of culture.

As the aim of this thesis is to examine racism, and the objective is to participate in the development of anti-racist strategies for the contemporary world, an
examination of identity within the framework of globalisation will be required. There has been much speculation about the meaning of globalisation. Some understand it as an intense and accelerated extension of modernism, and others argue that it is producing new forms of political, economic, social and cultural life (Held, 1991; Gordon, 1988; Jameson, 1991; King, 1991). Some argue that it is driven by a single factor such as capitalism (Wallerstein, 1991), technology (Rosenau, 1990), or politics (Gilpin, 1987). Others argue that it is multidimensional (Giddens, 1990; Robertson, 1991). Some scholars are concerned with changes in space and time within globalisation (Giddens, 1991; Harvey, 1989). According to Harvey (1989), globalisation has altered the representations, which play a part in the constitution of cultural or national identities. It has done this by altering the notions of time and space, which are the basic coordinates in any form of representation (Harvey, 1989: 240). As the process of globalisation seems to be having an affect on identity it will also be considered within the context of contemporary racism.

The words ‘race’ and ‘racism’ have been referred to above but there seems to be no consensus as to their meanings. Ideas about race and racism have changed throughout history and it has been argued that contemporary understandings of race and racism stem from the Enlightenment period. This is because the Enlightenment’s quest for a single scientifically organized system needed to define man’s place in nature. As this was also a time of European expansion and conquest other races had to be placed within this system. It has been argued that European expansion and trade played an important role in influencing ideas about other races (Curtin 1965: 34-39). It has also been suggested that the Enlightenment thought saw the emergence of articulated ideas about racial diversity, and the difference between the cultural and intellectual attributes of different groups (Mosse 1985: 1-16). According to others, the
attribution of superiority to some racial groups was a crucial element in the
development of racial thinking in the nineteenth century (Horsman 1981: 116-135). It
has also been argued that Gobineau’s ideas about racial degeneration through
miscegenation, and his view of the origin of differences between races, proved to be
an integral element of later racial thinkers in a number of countries including
Germany (Biddiss 1966:256-269).

The historical shifts in the concept of race have been traced from its
emergence in European languages in the late fourteenth century, and it has been
argued that the early racial emphases on decent in terms of origin, lineage, breed, or
stock shifted after the eighteenth century towards racial distinctions based on
geography, climate, and social conditions. This shifted the emphases from notions of
pedigree towards varieties, types, subspecies, or group identities (Banton, 1988: ix-
xii; 11; 167-169). Evolutionary theories also gave a fluidity to the earlier taxonomic
categories based on origins, because races only diverge from each other in their
relative gene frequencies. With the growing emphases on Darwinian theories those
groups also became known as breeding populations.

Social Darwinism, a variant of the theory of biological evolution, had an
enormous impact within the twentieth century because it emphasises “the struggle for
existence” and “survival of the fittest” (Proctor, 1988:10-38). However, these ideas,
which preceded the publication of the *Origin of Species* (Darwin, 1859), led towards
the possibility of planned eugenics within one species, whereas Darwin emphasized
the opportunistic nature of random mutations, which led to speciazation. In other
words, while Darwin’s theory was non-teleological, Social Darwinism was goal
orientated. For example in Germany in 1904, Alfred Ploetz founded the *Journal of
Racial and Social Biology* in order to investigate “the principles of the optimal
conditions for the maintenance and development of the race.” And in 1905 he and E. Rudin founded the *Society for Racial Hygiene.*

Theories about race have changed over time but they have also been transformed into a means for nation-states to achieve their goals of domination, exploitation and extermination of racial difference. For example, the racial hygiene movement was not initially directly connected to the idea of Aryan supremacy, but the right wing of it eventually became incorporated into the Nazi medical apparatus. In Nazi Germany the social problems concerning race, gender, crime, health, unemployment and poverty were turned into medical problems; Medical problems, which drove the public health programmes, that led to the Holocaust (Proctor, 1988:10-38). And Social Darwinism also provided a pseudo-biological justification for the *White Australian Policy* during the early twentieth century (Anderson, 1997: 31).

The issue of identity is a central component of anti-racist strategies as well as racist ideologies. In both Nazi Germany and Colonial Australia the identification of the ‘other’ were based on a belief in natural or innate differences. Anti-racist strategies have criticised this form of essentialism arguing that identities are socially constructed. Others have argued that these socially constructed identities can form a base on which to fight against racism. These different approaches have led to debates between the *essentialist* and *social constructivist*. While notions of fluid subjectivities, compatible with globalised notions of space and time, can challenge racisms based on

1 Initially there were 32 members, which grew to over 1,300 by 1930, with the effect that by 1932 racial hygiene was taught in twenty-six separate courses in most German universities. Additionally, it should be noted that most of the leading journals concerned with racial hygiene were established before the rise of National Socialism (Proctor, 1988: 10-38).

2 Racial hygiene was not unique to Nazi Germany as eugenics flourished in England, America and elsewhere. For example, in 1914 eugenics was taught in 44 American colleges and universities and by 1928 the number had grown to 376. In addition racial hygiene was taught in nearly three-quarters of all American colleges and universities (Proctor, 1988: 400).
the fixed notions of identity, the possibility of campaigning can be compromised by
the deconstruction of the category. In an attempt to participate in the development of
anti-racist strategies my thesis will explore this impasse.

During the early 1990’s in Australia, a significant debate emerged within
Aboriginal studies and anthropology. It was about the concerns expressed by white
scholars that the Aboriginal emphases on blood lines were damaging to the Aboriginal
fight for social justice. According to this argument, biological essentialism could only
lead to racial hierarchies and new forms of racism (Hollinsworth, 1992:137-155);
(Mudrooroo, 1992: 156-158); (Castles, 1996:10); (James, 1993: 207-221). This
argument against biological essentialism was later taken up into the political arena as
a criticism against reverse-racism.

On the September 10, 1996, Pauline Hanson, the independent member for
Oxley in Queensland, delivered her maiden speech to the Australian Federal
Parliament. During this speech she declared that her previous comment, “that
Aboriginals received more benefits than non-Aboriginals,” won her the seat in Oxley
but also resulted in her being called a racist. Against this charge of racism, Hanson
argued that she wanted equality for all Australians, and that the present government
was encouraging separatism by reverse discrimination, and that it was doing so on the
racial basis that the Aboriginals were disadvantaged. Hanson, on the other hand, did
“not believe that the colour of one’s skin determines whether you are disadvantaged,”
and argued that racial emphases should be rejected and that the government should
address the social issues. Issues relating to unemployment, immigration and
multiculturalism, were some of the ones she listed. She argued that the immigration,
which was directly and indirectly lengthening the dole queues, was leading to

3 From http://www.theaustralian.com.au/extras/012/hanson4.htm. The following quotes are taken from
the same speech.
discontent, and that multiculturalism was preventing the assimilation required for a strong and united nation. For example,

A truly multicultural country can never be strong or united. The world is full of failed and tragic examples, ranging from Ireland to Bosnia to Africa and, closer to home, Papua New Guinea. America and Great Britain are currently paying the price.

On June 2, 1998, a few days prior to the Queensland state election, Pauline Hanson addressed the parliament. This speech, which also included her criticism of multiculturalism, was mainly concerned with the possible 2004 signing of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. According to Hanson this would lead to further racial inequalities within Australia. She argued that “to survive in peace and harmony, united and strong, we must have one people, one nation, one flag.”

Hanson’s argument against state policies based on biological essentialism is not inconsistent with scholars who have criticised it in connection with past forms of state racism. For example, the racial policies of the Nazi Reich between 1933 and 1945 have been criticised because they elevated the purification of the Aryan race into a first objective of official policy (Burleigh and Wippermann, 1991: 44-65). The Afrikaner Nationalists were criticised because they imposed a system of racial separation upon the country, including a legal definition of the four racial groups (white, coloured, Indian, and African), which were the basis of the racial system

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5 In 1982, a ‘Working Group of Indigenous Populations’ (WGIP) was established. In 1993, it completed its work on a ‘Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ to be adopted by the UN General Assembly. The Draft Declaration was the result of the work of representatives of indigenous peoples and governments from all parts of the world. In 1995, the ‘Commission of Human Rights’ established its own working group to examine the Draft Declaration. When this commission finishes its work the Declaration will be submitted to the UN General Assembly for final adoption. The Draft comprises 45 Articles divided into 9 parts covering, Fundamental Rights; Life and Security; Culture, Religion and Language; Education, Media and Employment; Participation and Development; Land and Resources; Self-government and Indigenous Laws; Implementation; Understanding and Declaration.
created. The *US Federal government* has been criticised for its role in the maintenance of segregated race relations (King, 1995: 205-210). And the earlier ‘White Australian Policy’ has been criticised (Castles and Vasta, 1996: 1-11).

Some theorists have criticised the British political scene for how thinking on anti-racism has become heavily influenced by essentialist forms of political and cultural discourse, that naturalize and dehistoricize racial difference (Gilroy, 1990: 192-209). On the other hand, Adam and Moodley argue in favour of utilizing identities based on race in post-apartheid South Africa (Adam and Moodley, 1993: 104-116). In America, Marcus Garvey has argued for the need for black people to develop a sense of pride and identity of themselves as a ‘race’ (Garvey, 1987: 314-318). Along similar lines Tony Martin has argued in favour of converting the disabilities of race into a positive tool of liberation (Martin, 1976: 23-33). Ture and Hamilton have also argued for people in America to redraw the boundaries of black political identity under the banner of ‘black power’ (Ture and Hamilton, 1992: 34-56); and Foucault has pointed out the advantages of reverse discourse as a strategy (Foucault, 1978: 101). These arguments reflect the relationship between resistance and oppression in the construction of identities, and there have also been a number of papers looking at the construction of Aboriginal identities (James, 1993; Hinkson, 1997). However, the difference between Aboriginal Australians and non-Aboriginal Australians, which is at the heart of Hanson’s argument and the focus of this thesis, is the difference between different understanding of land ownership – Western liberal democracy and Aboriginal.

There’s an old Aboriginal saying that ‘we don’t own the land, the land owns us’. said Pauline. We think of ourselves as custodians of the land, and the land’s not just soil and rock to us. It’s the whole of creation - all the land, water, and air, and the life everywhere, people, too. All these things are related and linked together in the dreamtime. So you see,
Aboriginals are part of the land and it is part of them. When we lose our land, we lose part of ourselves. 
(Davidson, 1993: 10)

While a number of scholars have argued that Aboriginal identity has been constructed and represented in connection with oppression and resistance, there is no evidence to suggest that their understanding of land ownership was constructed after colonization. In fact, the doctrine of *terra nullius* (land belonging to no one) meant that the land was available to be appropriated by the colonizers without consent, consultation or compensation to the original inhabitants (Poole, 2000: 10). It is this difference in the understanding of land ownership, which marks the fundamental difference between Aboriginal culture and Liberal Democracy.

The common law of aboriginal title, recognized by the highest court of the land in Australia, Canada and New Zealand is based on the assumption that aboriginal peoples have a distinctive relationship to the State based on a unique set of entitlements. In this context the liberal nation-state, based on interconnected principles of abstract citizenship, indivisible sovereignty, and the pre-eminence of individual rights over any notion of collective rights, is called into question. 
(Ingram, 1997: 37)

By calling the liberal nation-state into question, the Aboriginal culture is offering an alternative to Liberal Democracy within Australia. As an alternative this places it in the position of the ‘other’. Not the ‘other’ race but the ‘other’ culture. However, it is the ‘other’ culture, which cannot be assimilated into the present framework of multiculturalism within Australia, because the multiple cultures within Australia are part of the liberal democratic framework.

A number of scholars have examined the incompatibility between Aboriginal culture and the dominant political, economic and social systems within Australia. Suggestions for reconciliation and compromises range from assimilation through to bicultural citizenship or separatism (Young, 1990: Ch. 4; Kymlicka, 1995: 62-98;
Reynolds, 1996). And while this is extremely interesting and valuable work it is not the focus of the present thesis. The aim of this work is to examine the cognitive and political features of racism in order to participate in the development of anti-racist strategies during a time of globalisation.

Within the framework of globalisation, Fukuyama put forward a political and philosophical argument, that the end of history has been reached because ideological conflict is virtually at an end (Fukuyama, 1989: 3), where the underlying argument is the Hegelian dialectical notion that history is moved by conflict. Fukuyama's ideas received many criticisms (Himmelfarb, 1989:24-26) but in response to his critics Fukuyama replied that he did not mean the end of all conflict such as religious groups, Third World countries that remain outside the liberal world or individuals and groups within the liberal world, who have not been fully absorbed. But these, according to him, would not lead to a different system of ideas, which could supersede or replace liberal democracy (Fukuyama, 1989/90: 23-24). From a deconstructive perspective Derrida has challenged Fukuyama by arguing that we are nowhere near the ideal of liberal democracy because “never have violence, inequality, exclusion, famine, and other economic oppressions affected as many human beings in the history of the earth and humanity” (Derrida, 1994: 64).

Against Fukuyama, this thesis suggests that the United Nations Draft Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous People, which is due to be signed in 2004, could be understood as representing an ideological contradiction within liberal democracy itself, and therefore could prevent “the end of history”, as Fukuyama understands the term. However, in order for this draft declaration to go forward the indigenous people must take an essentialist stance. It is this essentialism that Hanson is criticising. Her criticism also reveals a form of cultural racism by promoting the
notion of an assimilated Australian national identity – a national identity that would not be inconsistent with a liberal democratic globalised world. In order to examine this form of cultural racism and to participate in the development of anti-racist strategies, this thesis will focus on the work of three scholars – Jacques Derrida, Martin Heidegger, and Edmund Husserl.

The writings of Derrida, Heidegger and Husserl were chosen for a number of reasons. Husserl and Heidegger were chosen because both wrote before and during the rise of National Socialism. While Heidegger’s work was promoted, Husserl’s was denounced, partly because it promoted an ideal of universal rationality for all men, which included Unmenchen such as Jews and Negroes. This was a form of rationality, which attempted to reduce prejudices. Against Husserl, Heidegger developed an epistemology in which all meaning depends on the context and is permanently anticipated from a particular horizon of intelligibility. The result of this was a powerful critique directed against the ideal of objectivity within Husserl’s Phenomenology. The notion that all meaning depends on a particular context led to the Hermeneutical Turn which laid the foundations for the essentialist / social constructivist debates, which are the focus of this thesis.

In contrast to the atomistic notion of racism mentioned above, the issue of identity is central to anti-racist strategies, which focus on the contexts whereby groups and individuals construct and defend their identities. The former approach is related to the notion of a self, ego or subject which exists as an autonomous source of meaning and agency. This notion stems from Descartes’ Dualistic philosophy, which is intrinsic to Liberalism and psychology. Derrida, Heidegger, and Husserl all criticize this notion, and the following chapters will analyse their different approaches.

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6 These references about Husserl were from the Nazi journal, NS-Frauenwarte 20 (1937/8), p. 625 and were cited in Moran, D. Introduction to Phenomenology. Routledge, London: 2000, p. 88.
In the first chapter the situation in Australia will be introduced and this will be followed by an analysis of the work of Derrida, Heidegger and Husserl. In the conclusion a claim is made, that the post-modern drive to eliminate all forms of essentialism became another totalising *grand narrative*, which requires the elimination of excess. It further suggests that there are certain aspects of Husserl’s work, which can accommodate the impasse in the debates between the essentialists and social constructivists, which are at the heart of the anti-racist debates in Australia.
CHAPTER ONE: FASCISM WITH A DIFFER(A)NCE

a. Hanson’s Dreamtime

On June 2, 1998, a few days prior to the Queensland state election, Pauline Hanson addressed the Australian parliament. This speech was mainly concerned with the possible 2004 signing of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which she argued would lead to further racial inequalities within Australia. This was because inequalities stemming from The Racial Discrimination Act of 1975, according to Hanson, left a loophole for positive discrimination for the Aboriginals and therefore negative discrimination against other Australians. She argued that all Australians should be treated equally with no one group of Australians being given rights over another. Towards the end of the speech she said that,

we will abolish the office of Aboriginal and Torres Straight Islander Affairs, the indigenous advisory council and any other government departments with a charter on race rather than individual need.

Hanson argued in favour of an equality based on individual needs and against reverse racism. “We now have a situation where a type of reverse-racism is applied.” She argued that anyone who could claim some amount of Aboriginal blood had economic advantages over other Australians who could not. According to Hanson, being Australian should be based neither on race nor ancestry.

I am part English and part Irish, yet I do not claim to be English or Irish. Yet I have more English and Irish blood in me than most who claim to be Aboriginal have Aboriginal blood in them. Whatever we may have been, it is Australians we must be.

An Australian identity, according to Hanson, is not connected to race or ancestry but it is assimilation into a culture of “one people, one nation, one flag.”

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1 Appropriation Bill (No.1) from http://www.theaustralian.com.au/extra/012/hanson.htm. The following quotes are taken from the same speech.
2 See footnote 5 page 9.
However, it could be argued that this absorption is not one, which is leaning in the direction of the culture of Australia prior to the European colonization.

At some stage or another, every country in the world was held or owned by someone else - in most cases by many different peoples at different times. There is considerable evidence that even Australia experienced a number of waves of occupation by different people. So you might reasonably ask who were the first or perhaps what is the weight of argument connected to being first. Does being first matter and therefore does being first override equality for all of today’s Australians?

It seems to be leaning towards the European culture of the colonizers. A Liberal Democratic culture based on private ownership and the “modern understanding of land ownership”.

There is no true honest way of connecting Aboriginal hunter-gatherer nomadic occupation with the modern understanding of land ownership, nor should we try.

By identifying the contemporary and traditional Aboriginals understanding of land with a hunter-gatherer nomadic occupation, she rejects the Aboriginal understanding of land and calls the Aboriginal Dreamtime, which is embodied in Aboriginal culture and connected to the contemporary land right debates, a nightmare.

These rural families and miners took land from no-one. They either have paid for their land or are still paying for the land. No-one gave it to them. They have rolled up their sleeves and worked hard to develop their land and now face not the Dreamtime but the native title nightmare.

This argument is a form of reductionism. The advantage of reduction is that it can cover up inconsistencies and oppositions by either absorbing one into the other or dispensing with one in favour of the other. Hanson reduced the Aboriginal understanding of land down to a hunter-gatherer economy because the Aboriginal

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3The Dreamtime, which is understood as the mythological past, was the time when spirit ancestors travelled throughout the land while giving it its physical form and also laying down the rules to be followed by the Aboriginals. Knowledge about beings such as the Fertility Mother, the Great Rainbow Snake and the Djiangawul Brothers and Sisters, were passed down the generations through verbal stories, images, and ceremonies because the Aboriginals had no written documents. This lack of written documentation is one of the problems connected to the current Land Rights issue, because prior to colonization they had no concept of buying and selling land.

(The Native Title Act of 1993 became law on January 1, 1994).
understanding cannot be assimilated or absorbed into the dominant political, economic and social system of liberal democracy within Australia.

In an attempt to identify racism Caleb Rosado connected it to prejudice arguing that ignorance and fear are at the heart of prejudice. According to him, everyone is prejudice on some level through ignorance of the ‘other’ and they can be fearful of losing privilege and power to them. He outlined three levels on which prejudice operates, the cognitive which involve stereotypes, the emotional that involves positive and negative feelings that the ‘other’ arouses, and the behavioural level where people engage in discriminatory and unequal treatment of ‘others’. This prejudice can then give rise to an ideology of negative attitude towards the ‘other’. The negative attitude can be based on biological differences, such as skin colour and other physical features or cultural differences such as language, religion, or ethnicity. However, according to him, racism is not about these differences but it is about power and privilege. He distinguished three types of racism operating in society, which are individual, institutional, and cultural. Cultural racism is a combination of the other two which become manifest as the expression of the superiority of one race’s cultural heritage over that of another race.

Thus, individual racism (based on the attitudes, behaviours, and self-interests by which we have been socialized), is given a structural form through the various institutions in society (such as the church, labour, health, economics, education, politics, etc.), which in turn impacts our cultural expression (our aesthetics, religion, philosophy, ideals, values, needs and beliefs).
(Rosado, 1990: 7)

In an attempt to identify racism in Australia, Hollingsworth has argued that the earlier nineteenth century racism towards Aboriginal Australians was usually violent and brutal and expressed in terms of their complete inferiority. He further suggested that the identity of racism as accusations of inferiority are relatively rare today, but
that nowadays, it can be identified as a recognition that the ‘others’ are different and need to be excluded as a threat to ‘our’ way of life. And, according to him, complaints about ‘others’ being privileged in some way have tended to replace the blatant declarations of racial superiority of earlier times (Hollingsworth, 1988).

The earlier form of racism in Australia was based on Social Darwinism, which provided a pseudo-biological justification for imperialism within colonial Australia. During the early twentieth century the White Australian Policy seemed to oppose established medical theory, as medical science of the late nineteenth century argued, that a race of people were best suited to resistance of disease in their place of origin. It was also argued that the health of Europeans would be affected in the tropical north of Queensland. Richard Barry, a professor of anatomy at Melbourne University argued that, the White Australian Policy was a medical problem of the first magnitude, which required further scientific investigation. This type of argument eventually led to Australia’s first medical research institute, the Institute of Tropical Medicine in Townsville, located in the tropical north of Queensland. Medical scientists there gradually became less likely to relate tropical disease to the environment, and began to argue that poor health was due to minute organisms and germs, which were located on other humans. This meant that the local inhabitants were more likely to be blamed for the European’s bad health than the environment. At the 1920 Australian Medical Conference W. A. Osborne, the professor of physiology at Melbourne declared that white settlement was biologically possible, in the tropical north, so long as there were no native population. The tropical races, therefore, went from being well adapted to their environment, to being dangerously adapted to spreading tropical disease. And by the 1920’s the White Australian Policy was being advocated as a medical necessity (Anderson, 1997: 31).
Pauline Hanson's argument against multiculturalism and reverse discrimination could be understood as an example of what Rosado and Hollingsworth identified as cultural racism. Within her argument for an assimilated Australian society rather than multiculturalism, Hanson listed Ireland, Bosnia, Africa, Papua New Guinea, America and Great Britain, as failed examples of multiculturalism. However, she neglected to list the failed examples of assimilated societies such as Nazi Germany and the earlier version of assimilation in Australia, which was occurring at the same time as the Holocaust. This was when many young Aborigines were pulled from tribal life by the government's policy of assimilation, which included the practice of taking small children from their parents and sending them off to boarding school.\footnote{For a discussion of this policy see Bringing Them Home: National Inquiry into the Separation of Aboriginal and Torres Straight Islander Children from their Families, Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, Sydney, 1997.} Pauline Gordon, the daughter of J.T. Patton who founded the first Aboriginal newspaper called Abo Call, had the following to say about her earlier experience.

‘They grabbed us kids, along with thousands of others all around Australia. This was kept from the public mind,’ said Pauline, talking faster as she became more emotional. ‘I’ll never forget the day I went away on the steam train with my sisters. I was only eight, and I asked, ‘What’s wrong with us, Mom? Why is it everyone is down on Abos? Why’s it a sin to be Aborigine?’” (Davidson, 1993: 3).

There were a number of changes to the situation of Aboriginal people during the 1960’s. For example, this form of assimilation ceased to operate and in the 1967 referendum section 51, of the constitution, was changed to allow Australian Aboriginals the right to vote. Despite these changes, however, all available social indicators show that Aborigines are still highly disadvantaged with regards to health, housing, education, employment, life expectancy and social conditions (Castles and Vasta, 1996: 1-11). And while many government funded Aboriginal organizations have been working towards addressing these health problems, the One Nation Party
wants them abolished. As mentioned above, they want these problems addressed on an individual basis rather than race. However, it has been argued, that the practical solutions to areas such as health, housing, education and employment, offered by an assimilated society, isolates the demands for improving living conditions from the wider complexities of social and cultural well-being, and assimilation is “based on the possibility of absorption and thus cultural genocide” (Hickson, 1997: 31).

Pauline Hanson is arguing for equality to be based on individual needs within a “One People, One Nation, One Flag, Australia.” It has already been pointed out that the people within the One Nation would be treated individually but assimilated towards a non-Aboriginal culture, however, which flag could Hanson possible have in mind - the Union Jack (Figure 1) or the Aboriginal flag (Figure 2)? The Aboriginal flag which was designed by Harold Thomas, an artist and an Aboriginal, in 1971, a flag that is a symbol of the race and identity of the Aboriginal people. The colours of the flag are black, which represents the Aboriginal people, red for the earth and their spiritual relationship to the land, and yellow for the sun, the giver of life. On July 14, 1995 William Hayden, the Governor General of Australia, proclaimed the flag a Flag of Australia under section 5 of the Flag Act 1953.
Take a piece of cloth such as a handkerchief. What is the function of a handkerchief? To wipe off sweat, clean out hands, wipe our mouth, blow our nose-all menial tasks. Is the meaning of these functions in the cloth? No. It is in the culture, in our human society, which has taught us to view and regard a handkerchief in this way. You can take the same piece of cloth and make it into a shirt or a blouse and give it the functions of both protecting and celebrating our bodies. You can also take this same piece of cloth, add some red, some blue and some stars and turn it into a flag, and it becomes the signature of a people, symbolizing their group identity and nationality (Rosado, 1990: 4).
b. Neither alpha nor omega

The assimilation of the Aboriginal people into the dominant political and cultural system within Australia, could be understood in terms of globalisation. Globalisation, like the eighteenth century Enlightenment, seems to be the advancement of Western values around the globe. Some scholars have argued that this marks the end of the old world order and the beginning of a new one (Wallerstein, 1984; King, 1991). ‘The End of The World’, in one form or another, has been pronounced on a number of occasions throughout history. These have ranged from biblical eschatology through to the green movement (and the occasional prophecy from speakers corner in London). Of particular importance to this thesis, however, is Fukuyama’s essay about the *End of History* (1989) and Derrida’s criticism of it (1993).

In *The End of History*? (1989) Francis Fukuyama argued that “what we are witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of post-war history, but the end of history as such.” The end point of mankind’s ideological evolution, and the universalisation of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government. According to Fukuyama “the triumph of the West, of the Western ideal is evident first of all in the total exhaustion of viable alternatives to Western liberalism” (Fukuyama, 1989: 3). He states elsewhere⁵ that “the ideal of liberal democracy can not be improved on” (Fukuyama, 1992: xi) and that we have reached the “final form of human government” (Fukuyama, 1989: 4), which he described as an essential achievement of a classless society envisioned by Marx. “the class issue has actually been successfully resolved in the West” and “the root causes of inequality do not have to do with the underlying legal and social structure of our

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⁵ The 1992 book was written as a defence against the criticisms he received from his 1989 essay.
society" (Fukuyama, 1989:9). And he believes (contrary to Nietzsche) that the world will be populated by the “last men” the “victorious slaves” who have given up art and philosophy in a world where only economics really matters as all the grand ideological claims are defunct (Fukuyama, 1992: 301). He further argued that “consciousness is cause and not effect, and can develop autonomously from the material world” (Fukuyama, 1989: 6).

Fukuyama’s argument about history being at an end was from a Hegelian perspective - a teleological, conflict based form of Idealism. However, unlike Fukuyama, who believed that the struggle for freedom had been won by liberal democracy and the market economy, Hegel argued that the struggle for freedom travelled through the history of thought. According to Hegel, history is a rational developing system moving towards absolute knowledge. He traced the development or evolution of this rational developing system or consciousness within the *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807).

Hegel did not believe that cognition was an instrument or a passive medium for knowledge, but an active process whereby self-consciousness becomes conscious of what the appearances hide. What the appearances hide is the negation of full self-consciousness. Here he argued that the mind or spirit is compelled to move on and search for true knowledge until it reaches absolute knowledge. Absolute knowledge is the final stage of determinate negation. Determinate negation is the realization that knowledge gained is not true knowledge and the mind is compelled to move on and supersede this form of consciousness until it reaches true knowledge, which is knowledge of everything, and it is then no longer compelled to move on. In doing so, the Absolute develops from the objective pole towards the subjective, in both abstract and concrete form. On the concrete side, this development went from art to religion to

The logic, driving force, or motor, which is pushing the developing consciousness towards absolute knowledge, is called the Dialectic. The process of development is a conflict between the opposites. The conflict is between what self-consciousness the Absolute does have, or what it ‘is’, because it ‘is’ self-consciousness, and what self-consciousness it does not have, or what it ‘is not’, because what it ‘is not’ is something other that self-consciousness, because all it will be will be self-consciousness. This means that what it ‘is not’ yet, is other parts of itself that it does not as yet know about. In other words, it is something other than Absolute self-consciousness.

Hegel further argued that anything short of full self-consciousness was only partly true because only the whole was the truth. He understood reality itself to be the fully developed notion, which the cognitive appearances partly hide and partly reveal (Hegel, 1977: 47).

In this knowing, then, Spirit has concluded the movement in which it has shaped itself, in so far as this shaping was burdened with the difference of consciousness [i.e. of the latter from its object], a difference now overcome. Spirit has won the pure element of its existence, the Notion. (Hegel, 1977: 490)

Appearance are plural, incomplete, and in the process of development. A development driven by the determinate negation (Hegel, 1977: 51), where by incomplete plural identities sublimate into different forms until reality is no longer hidden. “The Truth is the whole. But the whole is nothing other than the essence consummating itself through its development”. (Hegel, 1977: 11)
Marx and Engels criticized Hegel’s Idealism by arguing that it is the way we live which leads to what we think rather than what we think leading to the way we live. “It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence”, wrote Marx, in the Preface to *Critique of Political Economy* “but, on the contrary, their social existence determines their consciousness” (Sabine and Thorson, 1973: 698). And unlike Hegel, who charted history as a progress in reason and freedom, they charted the stages via the types of production. “The hand mill gives you society with the feudal lord; the steam mill society with the industrial capitalists”. (Cornforth, 1955: 7).

Marx argued that freedom was connected to the unfolding of human potentialities as “the positive power to assert his true individuality.” However, this would not be possible under capitalism but would require communism (Ollman, 1976: 114-119). And the movement from capitalism to communism would be based on a materialist dialectic whereby the contradictions that force the changes, are contradictions within society rather than contradictions within understanding.

If the proletariat during its contest with the bourgeois’s is compelled, by the force of circumstances, to organize itself as a class, if, by means of a revolution, it makes itself the ruling class, and, as such, sweeps away by force the old conditions of production, then it will, along with these conditions, have swept away the conditions for the existence of class antagonisms and of classes generally, and will thereby have abolished its own supremacy as a class. (Marx and Engels, 1967: 105).

Fukuyama argued that freedom and the classless society are part of the new world order of liberal democracy but according to Marxists, exploitation is the basis of capitalism. In emphasizing Hegel’s notion of determinate negation with its clear division between the thesis and anti-thesis, later Marxists of the Second International believed that the dialectical contradiction between the exploiters and exploited would
lead to change as an historical necessary outcome (Bernstein, 1898). The Frankfurt school, which attempted to adapt Marxist theories to the theoretical and political needs for an even later time, criticized this notion of evolutionary determinism on the materialist pole and also criticized Hegel’s evolution of reason and freedom on the idealist pole. Against Hegel they argued that reason itself was impure and linked to domination instead of freedom. Against the orthodox Marxists, they argued that the identity and difference of the proletariat and bourgeoisie was not clear-cut and there were many other complex variables involved.

According to Horkheimer, there are irreducible tensions existing in history with a multiplicity of contradictions, which can be resolved in a multiplicity of different ways (Held, 1980: 178). Horkheimer agreed with Hegel’s notion of the dialectic because it showed identity to be historically conditioned, incomplete, and requiring continuous criticism and reconstruction, and thereby allowing space to enable a critique of the givens within society. However, he disagreed with the notion that there was a point for point relationship between the object and subjective knowledge that would eventually unify. This was because there was an irreducible tension between them.7

Against the notion of pure reason, Horkheimer argued that history was not unfolding towards a rationally organized and free society but was heading for a new type of barbarism, a totalitarian system in which all individual autonomy would be eliminated. According to Horkheimer, there are no underlying laws moving society towards a more rational and reasonable existence because reason is not autonomous but historically conditioned like desires, and reason is not united with freedom but is

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7 Members of the Frankfurt School rejected both sides of the tug of war between the Idealist identity theory of Hegel and the Orthodox Materialist identity theory. They argued that the subject and object could not unify at either pole – hence non-identity thinking was their aporia.
united with domination. What is taken to be reasonable is unreasonable because it is tied to certain material conditions and practices, which are not fully reflected in human consciousness (Held, 1980: 24). And in the *Eclipse of Reason* (1974) he argued that, even though there is an irreducible tension between the object and subjective knowledge of it, the majority of people are no longer even striving for some form of objectivity because reason is now predominantly instrumental. It is a form of means-ends rationality that can no longer criticize and reconstruct the givens because the gap between objective and subjective reason has collapsed.

Fukuyama’s argument, based on the dialectic method, that history has ended because Western liberal democracy has triumphed over communism, and by implication over Marxism, was criticised by Derrida who attempted to resurrect a non-dialectic Marx. Therefore, Derrida’s deconstructive reading of Fukuyama’s argument was not just a criticism of the end of history, but also a criticism of the end of Marxism. Derrida’s version of Marxism, however, was a long way from the Frankfurt School because he repudiated the notion of dialectics. He accepted Heidegger’s claim about “the end of philosophy”, which can be seen in his essay on Levinas (Derrida, 1978: 79). And in *Plato’s Pharmacy* he argued that it was the instability of the meanings being communicated, which are presented as unambiguous within dialectical reasoning, which makes that philosophy problematic (Kamuf, 1991: 115).

Derrida did not believe that meanings of words can be tied down, and he criticised philosophers for attempting to strive for precision in the language in order to communicate as though the meanings were unproblematic. According to him there was a metaphysics of presence prevalent in Western philosophy since the time of Plato. *The metaphysics of presence* is about the assumption that an identity or concept
can be completely grasped. He argued that consciousness and philosophy are constituted by language, and that the words used to communicate, from a metaphysical viewpoint, were understood to be stable and pure. Derrida called the assumptions behind the *metaphysics of presence*, a belief that words can communicate unambiguous meanings, logocentrism. Like Heidegger Derrida was also interested in the deconstruction of Western metaphysics, but unlike Heidegger, he did not believe that there was an original meaning to be found. Unable to break completely with metaphysical thought, Derrida used the language of reason to show up the inadequacies of reason. He understood this as playing a double game and it can be seen in works such as *The Double Session* (Kamuf, 1991: 171-199) and *Glas* (1986).

Derrida developed Heidegger’s notion of destruction but reworked it into the notion of the deconstruction of texts (Rapaport, 1989). Derrida deconstructed various texts to reveal the multiplicity of meanings, internal differences, repressed contradictions, inconsistencies, inequalities and hierarchies of binary opposites, which lead to the centring of one meaning and the marginalisation of the other. Derrida’s notion of textuality, which is about how a text means rather than what it means, highlights and traces these preconceptions and prejudices behind the various interpretations. He traced the preconceptions and prejudices, as they intersected and diverged, as one would trace a main road, in an A to Z, as it by-passed the interconnecting side streets.

In *Specters of Marx* (1993) Derrida’s main argument against Fukuyama seemed to be the way Fukuyama sidestepped the discrepancy between the ideal and the real in connection with liberal democracy. Against Fukuyama, who acknowledged the gap but argued that the ideal of liberal democracy could not be improved, Derrida

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8 He also called the belief that speech is closer to an original meaning in thought than writing, phonocentrism. A point that will be returned to when discussing the Land Rights issue.
suggested that the gap is a result of a flaw in liberal democracy itself. “this failure and
gap also characterize, a priori and by definition, all democracies, including the oldest
and most stable of so-called Western democracies” (Derrida, 1993: 64). Against
Fukuyama’s argument about the triumph of liberal democracy, Derrida argued that it
was hanging by a thread “the fact that this triumph has never been so critical, fragile,
threatened, even in certain regards catastrophic, and in sum bereaved” (Derrida,
1993: 68).

Derrida was critical of the notion of ‘end’ in Fukuyama’s argument because he
did not believe in the sudden breaks presupposed in ends or origins. “I do not believe
in decisive ruptures, in an unequivocal ‘epistemological break’, as it is called today.
Breaks are always, and fatally, reinscribed in an old cloth that must continually,
interminably be undone” (Derrida, 1981: 24). In addition he extended this notion to
Marxism itself. According to Derrida Marxism cannot suddenly end because it will
only re-emerge as a ghost (Derrida, 1993: 107). And because Marxism cannot just
end it is also open to re-interpretation “there is more than one of them” (Derrida,
1993: 13).

Deconstruction, which is often attributed to Derrida, came under considerable
criticism after Heidegger’s involvement with National Socialism was revealed.9

9Karl Lowith may have began the first Heidegger controversy with The Political Implications of
Heidegger’s Existentialism (1946), an essay which was criticized by Eric Weil and Alphons de
Waehlens in later issues of Les Temps Modernes. In Martin Heidegger: On The Publication Of The
Lectures Of 1935 Jurgen Habermas criticized Heidegger’s philosophy for not including any
counterweights to either the individualistic egalitarianism against the notion of the natural privilege of
the stronger, nor the cosmopolitanism against the motif of the German people as history’s chosen
people, nor a form of objectivity which could counter one-sided thought (Wolin, 1993: 196). In Back
To History: An Interview (1988) Pierre Bourdieu, in his criticism of Heidegger, argued against claims
Ernst Tugendhat argued, that Heidegger’s concept of truth as a clearing, which seeks to surpass
Husserl’s, is an over generalization which extends truth to all uncovering and every disclosedness,
resulting in the loss of any difference (Wolin, 1993: 246).

Since the publication of Farias’s Heidegger et le Nazism (1987) and Hugo Ott’s (1985; 88) archival
work in Freiburg (Wolin: 275), the debates were stepped up by an enormous amount of work. This
work was not only devoted to Heidegger’s involvement with Nazism, and attempts to discredit or
salvage his philosophy, but also the later work that developed out of it. For example, in Heidegger,
Deconstruction is almost impossible to define, however, it could be roughly described as a mission to hunt down phenomenological essences and binary oppositions. An example of this can be seen in Derrida’s *Introduction* (1962) to the *Origin of Geometry*. This is not an introduction in the traditional sense but a deconstructive reading of Husserl’s *Origin of Geometry* (1936). It was an immanent critique, which focused on the ‘origin’ in relation to signs and writing and the nature of historicity. It concentrated on ambiguities latent in Husserl’s notions of ideal history, ideal origins, and the concept of historical a priori. Derrida’s *Introduction* can be understood as a supplement to Husserl’s text. A supplement because he supplements some of Husserl’s key notions with differ(a)nce. As he also uses supplement and differ(a)nce as deconstructive devices in later works, this thesis will examine those devices before proceeding with the *Introduction*.

Derrida used the notion of ‘supplement’ in *Of Grammatology* (1976) where he deconstructed Rousseau’s use of the binary oppositions of speech and writing. Derrida argued that Rousseau was logocentric because he understood writing as a supplement...
to speech. According to Derrida supplement has two meanings in French, it means to add something on to something that is already complete, and it means to add on something to complete the thing. The word ‘supplement’ with these two meanings taken together, destabilises both sides of the binary opposition. This de-centres the hierarchy and its possible reversal. 10 ‘Supplement’ is one of the devices in Derrida’s deconstructive arsenal - his strategy for overcoming logocentrism and the metaphysics of presence. Some of the other devices he employs are trace, ecriture and differ(a)nce.

In addition to supplement Derrida also employed his device of differ(a)nce in the Introduction. Differ(a)nce is understood as a non-concept because it can’t be defined in terms of oppositional predicates, it is neither “this nor that but rather this and that” (Derrida, 1959). 11 Derrida claimed that differ(a)nce is “neither a word nor a concept” (Derrida, 1982: 7) “but the possibility of conceptuality” (Derrida, 1982: 11).

Following Heidegger, he argued that Being and meaning could never coincide, however, where as Heidegger understood difference to be temporal, and articulation to be on the ontic level while discourse to be on the ontological level, Derrida argued that there was a separation in time and identity. Differ(a)nce, according to Derrida, was not a temporal difference between two identities nor an identity itself but both. Derrida’s notion of differ(a)nce is a difference with a difference as it included an excess or trace.

Derrida agreed with Saussure, that the bond within the linguistic sign was arbitrary, however, unlike Saussure he argued that the meaning of words couldn’t be tied down by the meanings of other words, because the meanings of those other words are also unstable. The instability of those other words alters the meaning of each

10 This would be like preventing either side winning the tug of war. I will return to this point when discussing reverse racism.
word. (This is like when waves in the ocean can alter the relative position of boats to each other and create a different pattern). Differ(a)nce could be understood as the non-ground for the conceptuality of the different patterns. According to Derrida, signs point to things and this gives the illusion that the thing is present, but it is not, so the sign stands for the thing’s absence (rather than its presence), therefore, it represents the thing’s presence, in the thing’s absence. It cannot represent it exactly because these signs also have traces, which are the marks of something absent that have never really been present either (Derrida, 1982: 15). And this allows for slippage of meaning. Instead of tracing words back to their origin the word ‘differ(a)nce’, which means both to differ and differ, shows how so-called opposites are joined by these traces. This eliminates clear-cut divisions or binaries because the traces join up meanings and contaminate each other, and this shows that neither is self-contained.

Derrida’s notion of differ(a)nce destabilizes the more violent notion of difference, as a way of presenting the other without the dialectical positive and negative oppositions. In the Double Session (Kamuf 1991: 171-199) he argued that philosophy as truth tried to exclude literature and poetry (with the more violent difference). Derrida also used the device of ‘hymen’ that joins and separates, between Plato’s philosophy and Mallarme’s literature, to show that there is no absolute difference but a differ(a)nce. Derrida also employed the word ‘pharmakon’ in Plato’s Pharmacy (Kamuf, 1991: 112-139), in order to argue that one word can have different meanings. When there are different meanings sometimes one becomes centred or privileged at the expense of the other, however, the privileged meaning can leave traces. This is because the privileged meaning has the marks on it from where it was severed from the unprivileged meaning.

In the Introduction Derrida argued that Husserl’s notion of origin supported a
‘metaphysics of presence’. This is because his understanding of an origin was something that was a present in the past. To be fully present, however, it must have been severed from its past and future, according to Derrida. This is because the notion of a present makes no sense without the notion of a past and future, so the past and future are traces within the present. This would mean that the present could not be identical with itself. It follows from this that the *eidetic reduction* would also contain traces of the tradition, and therefore, the origin that was located could not be outside of the tradition.

Their historicity, then, is one of their eidetic components, and there is no concrete historicity, which does not necessarily implicate in itself the reference to an Erstmaligkeit.

(Derrida, 1989: 48)

Derrida supplemented the reduction, which travelled from the received tradition back to the origin that gave rise to it, with differ(a)nce, to show that the reduction could never make it back to the origin. This is because the origin could not be a presence without limits. And limits have an effect on meanings that are related to where they are limited, and they leave traces of those limits that omit something. This means that the thing’s presence leave traces of what’s absent. And those traces of absence are what metaphysics tries to hide, according to Derrida. They are the omissions or exclusions within the text that should be thought about, because they have effects on the understandings gained from the texts. And it is this non-presence of the origin, which was lacking in the text and needed to be supplemented by Derrida’s *Introduction*. Not as a criticism of Husserl nor to add something that he left out, but to show that there is always something missing necessarily (and by extension

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12 Identity means that the thing is identical with itself. If the thing and itself are identical then the identity is self-contained.

13 It would be like rubbing out all the side streets on the A to Z and just leave the main road. It could also be like rubbing out all the excess pencil marks on a sketch, in order to leave a clean looking drawing with defined boarders.
this could be applied to the gap or aporia, between the ideal of liberal democracy and liberal democracy which Fukuyama tried to cover up)

No identity or meaning or origin or intention or idea or book or anything is fully present, according to Derrida, because to believe that something could be fully captured or identified is to believe it to be self-contained or identical with itself—a fixed, static identity. In other words, what is can never be presented and the deconstruction of what has been presented, points to this necessary defect. In order to present an origin it would have to be severed from things that it was connected to, and traces of these absent severed things are mixed in with the presentation. This means that in a return journey to the origin, the destination would not be the origin itself.

More abstractly, then, an Origin, an absolute Origin, must be a differant Origin - the never-yet-always-already-there as the ‘beyond’ or ‘before’ that makes all sense possible.
(Derrida, 1989: 18)

According to Derrida, there can be no reactivation because the return inquiry begins with this side of the tradition of that origin, which includes the traces of the absence, and is therefore not a static origin but a differ(a)nt origin. In other words, we can never get to reality (present or past) because we re-weave it as we go along interpreting it.

Here, the ‘in which it must have appeared’ clearly reveals Husserl’s intention and sums up the sense of every reduction. This ‘must’ (have appeared) marks the necessity now recognized and timelessly assigned to a past fact of an eidetic pre-scription and of an apriori norm. I can state this value of necessity independently of all factual cognition. Moreover, this is a double necessity: it is that of a Quod and a Quomodo, a necessity of having had a historical origin and of having had such an origin, such a sense of origin. But an irreducible historicity is recognized in that this ‘must’ is announced only after the fact of the event. I could not define the necessary sense and the necessity of the origin before geometry was in fact born and before it had in fact been given to me. Absolutely free with respect to what it governs, the lawfulness of sense is nothing in itself.
(Derrida, 1989: 49)
However, when Husserl wrote that geometry “must have had an origin”, he was implying that no circles, straight lines, triangles or squares etc. existed in the natural landscape. This meant that someone had to abstract the ideal from nature. It is this individual act of abstracting, of thinking philosophically and obtaining an idea, that Husserl was referring to. He was referring to it because he wanted to examine how that individual idea can became understood as an objective fact within the intersubjectivity of collective geometers. In addition, he wanted to reveal the subjectivity mixed in with that objectively understood idea, in order to argue that that objectively understood idea was not pure, but was a subjective abstraction from the landscape. In other words, where Derrida focused on the ‘origin’ and was concerned with traces within the tradition this side of the origin, Husserl was concerned with traces (sedimentations) within the science of geometry. And the return inquiry through the tradition as a form of critical thought, would be to see how so-called objective facts within the discipline of geometry had changed. In addition, this would give an example of how other ideals such as “pure arithmetic” and “ideal laws”, which are understood as the objective reference point within the intersubjectivity, are all subjectively contaminated constructions. 

for a genuine history of philosophy, a genuine history of the particular sciences, is nothing other than the tracing of the historical meaning-structures given in the present.
(Derrida, 1989: 175)

Husserl himself recognized the notion of a ‘now’ to be an abstraction, and he did not even posit the origin as a present, but as a past unknowable act of abstraction from the landscape. This is why he emphasized that “there must have been an origin”.

14 This will be discussed below.
15 This will be discussed below.
Referring to Husserl’s criticism of psychology,16 which was that it omitted the subjective elements of its own objective method, then this present work could be understood as an example of why he believed it was important to study the subjectivity within objective sciences.

It is evident in advance that this new sort of construction will be a product arising out of an idealizing, spiritual act, one of ‘pure’ thinking, which has its materials in the designated general Pre-givens of this factual humanity and human surrounding world and creates ‘ideal objects’ out of them. (Derrida, 1989: 179)

Derrida’s deconstruction was an attempt to examine interpretative methods, which usually rest on shaky grounds. It was also to call unexamined assumptions into question. He did this by drawing out facts of linguistic instability and demonstrating that there are gaps that render value judgements a little suspect. However, Husserl already knew this, because his notion of re-activation was a way to criticise received truth claims. Husserl’s *Origin* was part of his later work that was concerned with the philosophy of history. He argued that history should be examined phenomenologically, and this would involve a dynamic as well as the static description of intentionality. The *Origin* presupposed the static description of the origin of an idea, and contained the dynamic description of its genesis and evolution. He pointed out that within the evolution of meanings, sedimentations are passed on uncritically. The reactivation was intended to criticize those sediments.

In his *Introduction* Derrida argued that Husserl’s notion of intentionality was traditionality (Derrida, 1989: 150). He criticized Husserl for privileging normalcy by privileging normal adults, scientific language and spatiality, while excluding children, the mad, poetic language and movement (Derrida, 1989: 80). However, within the context that Derrida is referring to, Husserl presupposed that it is the so-called normal

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16 This will be discussed below.
that has their ideas inserted into the we-horizon (intersubjectivity). What Husserl was attempting to analyse was, how some abstraction from the landscape can enter that we-horizon of intersubjectivity (culturally accepted objective facts) from an intrasubjectivity, and then not only be understood but also understood as purely objective.

This being presupposed, the primly establishing geometer can obviously also express his internal structure. But the question arises again: How does the latter, in its ‘ideality’, thereby become objective? To be sure, something psychic which can be understood by others [nachverstehbar] and is communicable, as something psychic belonging to this man, is eo ipso objective, just as he himself, as concrete man, is experienceable and nameable by everyone as a real thing in the world of things in general. People can agree about such things, can make common verifiable assertions on the basis of common experience, etc. But how does the intrapsychically constituted structure arrive at an intersubjective being of its own as an ideal object that, as ‘geometrical’, is anything but a real psychic object, even though it has arisen psychically? (Derrida, 1989: 162-163)

Derrida also criticized Husserl’s movement from intrasubjectivity to intersubjectivity, by arguing that he inserted an ahistorical subjective idea into history for the leap to objective ideality (Derrida, 1989: 141). However, Husserl himself recognized this because it was the main point of his argument. He was arguing against the notion of ‘pure’ within the sciences, because ‘pure’ would involve no subjectivity at all. He also argued against the notion of a ‘pure ego’ or self-contained identity. According to Husserl, there was an unstable subjectivity underlying all the so-called exact sciences. Returning briefly to the tug of war between subjectivity and objectivity, if something is completely subjective then it is devoid of objectivity. If something is completely objective, then it is devoid of subjectivity. If there is some relationship between the knower and the known then it can be neither completely subjective nor completely objective. Husserl was examining intersubjectivity and intrasubjectivity, by asking how a group of people could agree on the existence of
something (in this case geometry but it could be extended to include Santa clause or morality) and come to perceive it as though it existed in the objective world. (Do numbers exist in the mind or in the objective world?) This brings in the notion of cultural significance because it is the culture or community (in this case scientific) that passes the information down through the generations. At each stop along the way more things are added and some are eliminated from the body of knowledge, which rests on previous knowledge that is taken to be objective. Husserl argued that this so-called objective knowledge was constructed in a particular cultural framework and therefore was not ‘pure’.

Derrida supplemented Husserl’s notion of transcendental subjectivity by arguing that “writing creates a kind of autonomous transcendental field from which every present subject can be absent,” (Derrida, 1989: 88) and this means that a subjectless transcendental field is a condition of transcendental subjectivity. Derrida argued that Husserl had to unbracket history, culture and language to allow for intrasubjectivity. However, Husserl was criticizing these within his argument about the “seduction of language victims” (Derrida, 1989: 165), which was a criticism of the passive acceptance of the given discursive reality. Husserl was also arguing that sciences, which claim exactitude, presuppose invariants that the reductions could test because “every establishment of historical fact which lays claim to non-conditional objectivity presupposes an invariant or absolute a priori” (Derrida, 1989: 179). This was not just for geometry but all the sciences because he asked, “how does geometrical ideality, just like that of all sciences proceed from its primary intrapersonal origin” (Derrida, 1989: 161). And this means that the logic of these so-called invariants should be able to be traced back by “beginning with the primal self-evidences, the original genuiness must propagate itself through the chain of logical
inferences, no matter how long it is” (Derrida, 1989: 168). He was not arguing that they would reduce to an origin, so much as arguing that they present themselves as though they can - as though they are built on rock rather than sand.

As truth claims becomes more believed they seem to become more objective. The reason Husserl used geometry as an example, could be because it is easier to reactivate the idea of a circle than it is to reactivate ideal notions such as democracy, freedom, or equality. It also shows how something like an idea in the discipline of geometry can seem so exact and objective, and he also seems to point to (without spelling it out) the possibility that other ideals have more flexibility. The text abounds with statements about geometry followed by a comment relating it to other areas. For example,

Our results based on principles are of a generality that extends over all the so-called deductive sciences and even indicates similar problems and investigations for all sciences. For all of them have the mobility of sedimented traditions that are worked upon, again and again, by an activity of producing new structures of meaning and handing them down. (Derrida, 1989: 171)

As science builds on knowledge it actually thrives on its sedimentations. Sedimented knowledge is not always verified by people who build on what they receive, prior to passing it down through the tradition. Husserl was examining how geometry could change over time but retain the same identity. He argued that the various stages could be judged by social beings themselves, through reactivation, instead of comparing them with other idealities within the same cultural framework, where they may reveal consistency or contradiction. This is similar to Foucault’s notion of ‘statements’.

a statement always defines itself by establishing a specific link with something else that lies on the same level as itself: that is, something else, which concerns the statement itself (and not the meaning or element of that statement). (Deleuze, 1988: 11)
Likewise, Derrida’s notion of differ(a)nce has a great deal of currency as an anti-racist strategy, when racism is based on binary opposites and phenomenological essences. However, when racism is based on fluid identities such as in Australia, then Derrida’s device has a number of limitations. Even though it has limitations as an anti-racist strategy it still has currency within the contemporary understanding of discursive reality. It is limited as a strategy because it deconstructs the category of Aboriginal, which is required within the land rights debates. It is also limited because it undermines the Aboriginal strategy of reading the pastoral leases with fixed meaning. This situation reinforces the notion that the politics of identity should not be abstracted from the material context. That is why the aim of this thesis was to investigate both the philosophical and the political aspects of racism. The next chapter will examine the work of Heidegger, who emphasised the role of context within meaning, in order to explore the possibility of overcoming the limitations of Derrida’s work. Limitations, which stem from the centring of differ(a)nce over and above the political context.
CHAPTER TWO: DESTRUCTION

a. The 'self' in self-determination

If the United Nations Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People is signed in 2004, it will give the Aboriginal people the Right of Self-determination. In order to discuss the meaning of 'self-determination' this chapter will examine the work of Martin Heidegger who, in Being and Time (1927), developed an epistemology according to which all meaning is context dependent and permanently anticipated from a particular framework, horizon, perspective or background of intelligibility. The result of this was a powerful critique directed against the ideal of objectivity - all meaning now depends on a particular interpretative context. This Hermeneutical Turn, which was one of the major events that took place in the contemporary philosophical scene, indirectly laid the foundations for the essentialist/social constructivist debates that are the focus of the present thesis.

According to Heidegger, truth as perfect unconcealment is impossible because Dasein's understanding is profoundly historical. He argued that there is an ontological difference between human existence, as existential characteristics and possibilities which are unique, and its being thrown into existence at a certain time. The uniqueness, according to him, transcends the historical language and thought which it is thrown into, and which attempts to describe it. He further argued that when the unique aspect of Dasein is repressed or forgotten, by its emergence within the historical description of the 'One', then Dasein's existence could be inauthentic, but that this inauthentic existence can be turned into an authentic existence. The notions of authentic and inauthentic existences are both connected to Dasein as a being-in-the-world, however, they are understood as different types of existence. In both cases
Dasein has no choice with regards to the other Daseins in the community that it is thrown into, the time in history, the tradition, nor the culture, but it can exist in different ways within them.

There are three different ways of existing as a being-in-the-world, which Heidegger referred to as undifferentiated, inauthentic and authentic.

Dasein is an entity, which in each case I myself am. Mineness belongs to any existent Dasein, and belongs to it as the condition, which makes authenticity and inauthenticity possible. In each case Dasein exists in one or the other of these two modes, or else it is modally undifferentiated. (Heidegger, 1962: 78)

An undifferentiated existence would be when Dasein did not recognize its thrownness or question the meaning of its own life. An inauthentic existence would be if it did question its thrownness. In this state it may realize that the ‘One’ prescribes the possible options for existence and it may feel anxiety. “Anxiety is anxious about naked Dasein as something that has been thrown into unsettledness. It brings one back to the pure ‘that-is-it’ of one’s ownmost individualized thrownness”. Anxiety appears when it realizes that it will die and return to nothingness. At this point it can do either of two things. Instead of dealing with the anxiety, which comes from the possibility of nothingness, it can refuse to recognize the situation and return to the inauthentic state by falling in with the public and falling away from itself. The second option would be to face up to death and the nothing. Become a being-towards-death.

Only Being-free for death gives Dasein its goal outright and pushes existence into its finitude. Once one has grasped the finitude of one’s existence, it snatches one back from the endless multiplicity of possibilities which offer themselves as closest to one - those of comfortableness, shirking, and taking things lightly - and brings Dasein into the simplicity of its fate. This is how we designate Dasein’s primordial historicizing, which lies in authentic resoluteness and in which Dasein hands itself down to itself, free for death, in a possibility which it has inherited and yet has chosen. (Heidegger, 1962: 435)
The realisation of Dasein’s own finitude is what gives it some form of individuation and authenticity, because its relations to other Dasein’s become loosened. This is because Dasein is a finite totality, which exists between birth and death. Death is not understood as something that happens at the far end of a long life, but a part of Dasein itself. Part of its make-up. Death is the only part of its makeup that it did not inherit from the tradition.\footnote{Death as a lid on Dasein’s total existence cannot itself be experienced\footnote{Death or nothingness is the aporia, the missing bit that is generative.} but its realization allows Dasein to become responsible for its own life. Dasein can choose the best possibility within a world that was prescribed by the ‘One’ during its finite existence. It can project itself into the world and make the most of its own possibilities within the givens. While this realization of its own finitude theoretically or ontologically enables Dasein some form of individuality, Heidegger also examined the practical or ontic side of authenticity.

“The fact that an authentic potentiality-for-Being-a-whole is ontologically possible for Dasein, signifies nothing, so long as a corresponding ontical potentiality-for-Being has not been demonstrated in Dasein itself” (Heidegger, 1962: 311).

The anticipation of death, discussed in his first chapter of the second division, was understood as the ontological basis for authenticity. In the second chapter Heidegger discussed conscience as the ontic base. The conscience is what brings Dasein away from the ‘One’ and back to itself. It is understood as a calling but unlike many other theories about the conscious, Heidegger’s is neither mediated nor does it have any content. It is simply a call to Dasein from itself. Heidegger did not agree with or disagree with the other theories but explored the ontological or existential foundations of the phenomena that they referred to. He investigated what it was that made those experiences possible.

\footnote{However, if immortality was achieved (through spare parts cloning or technology) then authenticity would be impossible.}
The call of conscious was understood as a type of reflexivity of the self with itself in an unmediated fashion, which calls Dasein away from the ‘One’. In so doing it breaks through the chatter, novelty, ambiguity and curiosity of the ‘One’ to call Dasein back to itself. “Conscience summons Dasein’s self from its lostness in the ‘they’” While the caller and listener are both Dasein and not a third party they are also not identical. This is because the hearer is lost in the ‘One’ but the caller is not. “The call comes from me and yet from beyond me.” The call is silent but in its silence signifies a sense of guilt. The sense of guilt is connected to the not-yet of Dasein’s possibilities. The guilt is related to the debt to oneself. The debt of the not-yet that Dasein can take responsibility for, instead of giving it up to the ‘One’. In short, the call of conscience calls Dasein “to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being”, which is the debt that it owes to itself, but it does not tell it what to do with the not-yet part of its finite existence.

In many ways the forgetfulness of the question of Being and the need for its repeat, mirrors the two divisions of Being and Time, the first describing the inauthentic base, the second describing the transfer to authenticity. It also mirrors the inauthentic and authentic poles of Dasein. The former forgotten or repressed by the ‘One’, the latter repeating or calling it back to its potentiality-for-Being. And this split is also mirrored within the book calling philosophy back from its metaphysical repression, a book written by Heidegger from the authentic side to the other inauthentic readers.

According to Stephen Mulhall (1996), Heidegger wrote Being and Time as an attempt to call philosophy itself back from its inauthentic state to authenticity. As a philosopher who had achieved some level of authenticity he wanted to pass this on to his readers. Presumably he planned to call his readers out of the state of
inauthenticity, even though he argued that the call of conscience does not come from some one else. In claiming to have written a fundamental ontology he presented himself as someone who had achieved the state of authenticity in accordance with the method itself. Mulhall argued that there was an apparent inconsistency here between Heidegger’s philosophical inauthentic/authentic analysis and its practical applicable.

If Being and Time was understood as a fundamental ontology which Heidegger alone formulated, it would seem that he attained an authentic philosophical stance unaided by a third party. However, as a self-generated authentic author of Being and Time, in an attempt to call his readers out of their state of inauthenticity, Heidegger put himself forward as a third party. A move that is actually inconsistent with his method. According to Heidegger’s method the call from inauthenticity to authenticity is based on an inherent split. It is an empty call pointing to the not-yet on this side of finitude. He made it quite clear that the call did not come from a third party, “the call undoubtedly does not come from someone else who is with me in the world” (Heidegger, 1962: 320). However, if Heidegger the philosopher did not attain his state of authenticity alone, but as a student of Husserl, this third party may have influenced him, then not only would it be inconsistent with his method, but his generative aporia could have been the absent Husserl – rather than death.

b. The ‘Other’ in self-determination

It has been argued that Heidegger gave Husserl’s Logical Investigations a privileged position, but that the reasons for this remains obscure within his writings while his lectures reveal a link. According to Taminiaux, Heidegger discovered a positive ground for his Being and Time in the sixth investigation of the Logical Investigations. In My way to Phenomenology Heidegger mentions that Husserl touched on the question of Being when he discussed the difference between sensuous
and categorical intuitions (Taminiaux, 1990: 96-100). This is where Heidegger seemed to link Being with the excess connected to the categorical intuition.

When I myself began to practice phenomenological seeing, teaching and studying at Husserl’s side, experimenting at the same time with a new understanding of Aristotle in seminars, my interest began to be drawn again to the Logical Investigations, and especially to the sixth [Investigation] in the first edition. The difference between sensuous and categorical intuitions, worked out in that Investigation, revealed to me its importance for the determination of the “manifold meaning of Being”. (Taminiaux, 1990: 98)

According to Husserl, meaning functions as a form which exceeds the content of pure perception within language and sensations, and this excess is what grounds the given even though it is mixed in with the givens. The excess together with the thing identifies and confirms it in its identity, by joining sensuous intuition to categorical intuition. (Taminiaux, 1990: 102-106). Heidegger seemed to interpret this notion of excess as Being.

Husserl’s tour de force consisted precisely in this presencing of Being [inasmuch as it is beyond the being of beings] made phenomenally present in the category. By means of this tour de force, I was finally in possession of a ground: Being is no mere concept, a pure abstraction obtained thanks to the work of deduction. (Taminiaux, 1990: 108).

Heidegger also acknowledged the influence of Husserl’s preliminary work of phenomenology in his Logical Investigations, towards the end of section seven and in footnote (v), but argued that phenomenology is about possibility rather than the actuality, which is associated with metaphysics.

The following investigation would have been possible if the ground had not been prepared by Edmund Husserl, with whose Logische Untersuchungen phenomenology first emerged. (Heidegger, 1962: 62-63).

Heidegger argued that Husserl’s notion of intentionality pre-supposed a more primary intentional relationship, being-in-the-world, which does not rely on mental activity (Heidegger, 1962: 87; 157; 275). His main argument against Husserl’s
method seemed to hinge on an interpretation of Husserl’s distinction between the ‘ideal’ and the ‘real’, which pre-supposed and relied on a separation between an intentional content that is mental, and an objective world.

The idea of a subject which has intentional experiences merely inside its own sphere and is...encapsulated within itself is an absurdity which misconstrues the basic ontological structure of the being that we ourselves are.  
(Heidegger, 1982: 62-64)

He argued elsewhere, that comportment or a being-in-the-world was more fundamental than Husserl’s intentionality.

As ontic transcendence, the later is itself only possible on the basis of originary transcendence, on the basis of being-in-the-world. This primal transcendence makes possible every intentional relation to beings.  
(Heidegger, 1984: 135).

And He has referred to examples such as doorknobs to argue that being-in-the-world was prior to contemplating about it.

for the kind of Being which belongs to such concernful dealings is not one into which we need to put ourselves first. This is the way in which everyday Dasein always is: when I open the door, for instance, I use the latch. The achieving of phenomenological access to the entities which we encounter, consists rather in thrusting aside our interpretative tendencies.  
(Heidegger, 1962: 96)

Heidegger also criticized Husserl’s method in section 44 of Being and Time. This is where he discussed his notion of truth as opposed to the correspondence theory of truth. Section 44 was made up of an introduction followed by three main sub-sections. In the introduction Heidegger argued that a change took place in the notion of truth, from Parmenides identity of truth and Being found in Fragment 5, to the traditional concept of truth as a correspondence which stems from Aristotle’s Metaphysics. He argued that if truth is understood to be connected to Being, as Parmenides suggests, then it also might need to be analysed within the area of fundamental ontology, which is about the Being of beings.
If, however, truth rightfully has a primordial connection with Being, then the phenomenon of truth comes within the range of the problematic of fundamental ontology.
(Heidegger, 1962: 256)

In sub-section (a) Heidegger discussed three ways in which truth has traditionally been defined as correspondence, and argued that Aristotle’s definition of truth is connected to judgment and correspondence.

Aristotle, the father of logic, not only has assigned truth to the judgment as its primordial locus but has set going the definition of ‘truth’ as ‘agreement’.
(Heidegger, 1962: 257)

The notion of correspondence or agreement pre-supposes two thing which are related. For example, a mind and object or assertion and reality. This was meant to be in contrast to Husserl’s Logical Investigations vol. 2 part 2 where evidence and truth were examined (Heidegger, 1962: note xxxiv, 493). According to Heidegger, if the two things are ontologically distinct then there can’t be a correspondence between them. “What is to be demonstrated is not an agreement of knowing with its object.” (Heidegger, 1962: 261). But according to him, truth as an uncovering, which requires Dasein as a being-in-the-world, is more basic than a correspondence. And later on at the end of the section he argued that “all truth is relative to Dasein’s Being.”

In sub-section (b) Heidegger looked in more detail at the notion of truth as an uncovering. This is a concept of truth as aletheia, a Greek word meaning “uncovering from a concealment.” Heidegger then argued that this notion is the basis or original notion, which the correspondence notion grew out of. “In proposing our definition of truth we have not shaken off the tradition, but we have appropriated it primordial” (Heidegger, 1962: 262). He then argued that this more basic form of truth is connected to Dasein’s disclosedness as a Being-in-the-world. As a Being-in-the-world, Dasein can be authentic and inauthentic in its understanding of itself and of its
understanding of others. This means that its own disclosedness and concealment of its own Being has an effect on the truth and untruth of his understanding of the Being of other beings. When Dasein uncovers the truth of another Being it can communicate this in an assertion, however, this assertion or correspondence is built on the foundation of the uncovering.

Truth as disclosedness and as a Being-towards uncovered entities - a Being which itself uncovers - has become truth as agreement between things which are present-at-hand within-the-world. And thus we have pointed out the ontologically derivative character of the traditional conception of truth. (Heidegger, 1962: 268)

In the second division of Being and Time, the meaning of Being was understood to be the horizon or temporalization required for comportment between past, present and future, which made the understanding of Being possible. An understanding, which made the comportment to other beings possible. Against the traditional ontologies, which presupposed a distinction between the subject and object and understood truth to be ahistorical, Heidegger argued that Dasein as a being-in-the-world was not a being which could be in possession of a world or along side of it. “There is no such thing as the “side-by-side-ness” of an entity called “Dasein” with another entity called “world”” (Heidegger, 1962: 81).

In The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking Heidegger also criticized Husserl’s reductions and appeal for an ultimate source of evidence within the world. “Husserl’s method is supposed to bring the matter of philosophy to its ultimate originary givenness, and that means to its own presence” (Heidegger, 1993: 440). He rejected Husserl’s reductions (except for the scientific one) because as Dasein is its thrownness, then they cannot be reduced from it. Perfect truth as unconcealment is impossible because Dasein’s understanding is profoundly historical. However, it was pointed out above that Husserl argued that the only apodictic evidence was that there
was no apodictic evidence. This was because the ego has an open horizon and can’t have apodictic evidence for its memory or the future. And he has argued elsewhere that a search for an essence does not necessarily mean that it could ever be attained.

We do not give up Descartes’ guiding goal of an absolute foundation for knowledge. At the beginning, however, to presuppose even the possibility of that goal would be prejudice. (Husserl, 1975: 5)

Heidegger’s later work revolved around his replacement of Husserl’s notion of signification as intentionality with the Being of language. In one of his essays, The Way to Language, Heidegger attempted to experience the Being of language instead of making assertions about language. He argued that the earlier notion of language as a kinship between language as a showing and what it shows, was transformed into a conventional relationship between the sign and its signified, which reflects the transformation of truth from aletheia to representation. “The alteration of the sign - from that which shows to that which designates - is based on a transformation in the essence of truth” (Heidegger, 1993: 401-2) And according to him, this form of linguistic studies does not show the Being of language.

He argued that the essence of language is in the saying, which unfolds as pointing, but not signs, because the signs arise from the showing. (This is similar to his argument that the essence of technology is not the technology itself but the understanding of Being that gave rise to it. It is also similar to the understanding of Being which gives rise to the notions of truth and representation). The showing, according to Heidegger, is not just human because the thing letting itself be shown precedes it. “We not only speak language, we speak from out of it” (Heidegger, 1993: 411). And in listening we can hear language speaking. Language is what speaks through the saying or showing of what is spoken. As beings-in-the-world we can only
understand the speaking and hearing of the Being of language within the historical setting. “We hear it only because we belong to it.”

Heidegger argued that the possibility of catching a glimpse of the essence of language, instead of representing language, we need to let ourselves be guided by it along its own movement (Heidegger, 1993: 419). His notion of propriation, which is the telling of language, reveals and withdraws different modes of speech. However, this propriation is currently being distorted as the language of Enframing, which orders what is present. And this current distortion, which results from the metaphysical understanding of Being, turns speech into information and formalizes language.

The Being of language is not solitary because it needs humans to speak it. Humans are part of the essence of language and can not step outside of it, just as being can’t step outside of its Being. W. Humboldt who was a German linguist argued, that the inner structure of language reflects the spirit of its speakers. And according to Heidegger, Humboldt’s work shows the possibility of an appropriate transformation of language (Heidegger, 1993: 425).

In Being and Time, which was his attempt at a fundamental ontology, he criticized Husserl’s understanding of intentionality as metaphysical, and argued that the understanding of Being underpinned or made possible the various modes of

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3 Wilhelm von Humboldt was one of the founders of modern liberalism and placed the idea of Bildung at the centre of his work. Bildung can be interpreted in two main ways. Firstly, it can be about producing or giving shape. Secondly, it can be about a likeness or imitation between the original image and its reproduction. In the former, it’s related to production according to an order that gives rise to a form. Secondly, it’s related to a goal that should be aimed at. The latter is connected to ideas around model and copy, original and reproduction. These two different meanings are related to two meanings of Bildung, which come from the medieval mystics who interpreted certain passages of the Bible. The first translates the act of creation. The second meaning corresponds to the fact that this creation or production occurs in the likeness of a Creator. (F. Beiser, Enlightenment, Revolution and Romanticism. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 111-137). From a Heideggerian perspective, the historical context creates Dasein and its meanings. From a Husserlian perspective, subjects can recreate themselves and reconstitute meanings. These two different understandings are also connected with the idea of ‘self-determination’ in Australia. It could either mean recreating him or herself in the contemporary world (along Husserlian lines), or going back to some tradition along (Heideggerian lines). The first would challenge the dominant system but the second would not.
comportment. He did not dismiss human features such as consciousness, self-consciousness, intentionality and reason, but they were not understood to be foundational. He did not disagree with Husserl that intentionality was part of Dasein, but in opposition to his interpretation of Husserl’s phenomenology, Heidegger argued that being-in-the-world was primary to mental activity about it because it determined that mental activity.

He did not believe that the inheritance of concepts and language meant that the understanding of the world is condemned to historicism and cultural relativism, because historicism and relativism are related to the representational thinking of metaphysics that he rejected. His rejection of representational thinking was shown above in section 44 where he criticized the correspondence theory of truth, and he also mentioned it in *Identity and Difference, Nietzsche, vol. 2, section 16*, and it can also be seen in section 34 of *Being and Time*, where he criticized the representational theory of meaning.

In section 34 he argued that, as a being-in-the-world Dasein has states of mind and understandings, which it acquired from the historical environment that it was thrown into. Communication between Daseins, which share the historical environment, is not from the interior of one subject to the interior of another subject because both already share the same discourse. If they did not share it, according to Heidegger, they would not be able to communicate. This is because discourse is the ontological foundation of language, which underlies interpretation and assertions. The worldly being of discourse gets expressed in language, and only the discourse, which is already shared by contemporary Daseins, can be understood. “Only he who already understands can listen” (Heidegger, 1962: 208). What gets communicated is already shared because talking and hearing are based on a shared understanding. This means
that the communicated information is a sharing of what is already shared. And keeping silent authentically is also a part of the shared discourse because to keep silent pre-supposes that Dasein has something to say. “In that case one’s reticence makes something manifest, and does away with idle talk”. Heidegger’s notion of Dasein as a being-in-the-world, therefore, also included the discourse of that world. In other words, Dasein has language and meaning before it can use it. “sense is an existential of Dasein, not a property attaching to entities, lying behind them, or floating somewhere as an intermediate domain”.

Heidegger further argued that the Greeks originally had no word for language but later interpreted it with the logic of the ‘logos’, which they used to describe phenomena. And according to him, this same understanding of language is part of contemporary studies of language. Because the ontological foundation for human language is the language of Being, he argued that the first person and second person detached philosophical reflections on language are incapable of understanding the sense that is revealed from dwelling within the linguistic practices. (Dreyfus, 219).

In connection with the first person understanding Heidegger criticized the doctrine of signification in Husserl’s Logical Investigations. vol. 11. (Heidegger, 1962: note x, 492). However, Husserl was examining signification phenomenologically and this meant that he was not so much interested in the meaning itself, but how the meanings get constituted. Husserl’s main aim was not to study language, but to contrast the phenomenological and genetic-psychological clarifications of theoretical thinking and cognition, which stem from statements. “the author attempts to give a certain account of the goals of these investigations and, in general, of the peculiarities of phenomenological clarification of knowledge in contrast to genetic-psychological clarification of it” (Husserl, 1975: 5).
Both Heidegger and Husserl argued that phenomenology was about letting things show themselves instead of being dictated to by some system, however, while Husserl argued that people in general could criticize the system and take responsibility for their own judgments, Heidegger was criticising the last two and a half thousand years of philosophy. And in Being and Time, which launched his international career, he criticized Husserl’s phenomenology as metaphysical. Against Husserl’s notion of reductions he argued that because Dasein has no essence, but is the result of its throwness, this throwness could not be bracketed out. Instead of examining Husserl’s apodictic evidence, as a method concerned with judgments and critical distance, Heidegger criticized Husserl’s distinction between the ideal and real and argued against the notion of truth as perfect unconcealment. It could be argued that Heidegger constructed a straw man out of Husserl’s phenomenology, in order to place it within his criticism of metaphysics and justify his repression of Husserl’s influence on his own work.

c. Determination

Husserl argued that his work has been misinterpreted on a number of occasions and has re-written a number of introductions to his phenomenology. These include Ideas, Cartesian Meditations, Formal and Transcendental Logic and the Crisis.\(^4\) One area where Husserl seems to have been misunderstood concerns his *eidetic reduction*. Some scholars understand this as an example of idealism or an attempt to get to the presence or essence. For example, in On Science and Phenomenology (1965) Marcuse questions this aim of the reduction.

The breakthrough to the transcendental subjectivity is supposed to be the road to uncover the foundation on which all scientific validity rests. I ask the question: can reductive phenomenological analysis ever attain its goal, namely, to go beyond scientific, and pre-scientific, validity and

\(^4\) These will be referenced below.
mystification? (Arato and Gebhardt, 1994: 475)

However, in section 6 of Cartesian Meditations Husserl argued that nothing is certain except the critical attitude within human subjectivity. He argued that while full certainty excludes doubt it is not apodictic because it does not exclude the possibility of future doubt. And this open possibility of becoming doubtful can be recognized in advance by critical reflection on what the evidence does (Husserl, 1999: 15). He also argued that the evidence of critical reflection is itself apodictic, because no evidence excludes future doubt. In other words, the only absolute certainty is that there is no evidence that is beyond the possibility of future doubt, because the possibility of critical reflection as part of consciousness, accompanies the presentation of the evidence.

Furthermore the evidence of that critical reflection likewise has the dignity of being apodictic, as does therefore the evidence of the unimaginableness of what is presented with apodictically evident certainty. And the same is true of every critical reflection at a higher level. (McNeill and Feldman, 1998: 101)

It could be argued that Husserl was not attempting to isolate and represent some form of truth through his reductions, but only highlighting its impossibility by examining all the variables in the way. By way of analogy, he may not have been pulling the motorbike apart to find the essence of the bike but examining the complexities and interconnections of the various components. The impossibility of getting to the apodictic essence through the complexities and interrelationships can be seen in his Inaugural Lecture at Freiburg (1917).

Consciousness and what it is conscious of is therefore what is left over as field for pure reflection once phenomenological reduction has been effected: the endless multiplicity of manners of being conscious, on the one hand, and, on the other, the infinity of intentional correlates. (Husserl, 1917)5

5 From http://www.baylor.edu/~Scott_Moore/essays/Husserl.html p.7
It would seem unlikely that someone using words such as “endless multiplicity” and “infinity” would be advocating the possibility of reducing down to an essence. And in the same essay it legitimises his use of the word ‘pure’ in pure phenomenology, by contrasting it with the ‘pure’ in other disciplines. This was a criticism of the objectivity of science.

We often speak in a general, and intelligible, way of pure mathematics, pure arithmetic, pure geometry, pure kinematics, etc. These we contrast, as a priori sciences, to sciences, such as the natural sciences, based on experience and induction.

In section 6 of the *Cartesian Meditations* he argued that there is neither apodictic evidence that the world exists or that it does not exist, and this means that the existence of the world in which science rests is not certain apodictically either. He clarifies this in the following section by saying that “the world is for us only something that claims being.” And this also applies to not just all the other beings, objects, meanings, values, language and culture etc., within the world, but also beliefs in their existence, non-existence or even somewhere in between. “In short, not just corporeal Nature but the whole concrete surrounding life-world is for me, from now on, only a phenomenon of being, instead of something that is” (McNeill and Feldman, 1998: 101).

While it is the phenomena itself that allows the doubts or assertions this does not mean that the world does not exist, it still exists as it did prior, however, this shift allows a reflecting ‘philosophical’ attitude as opposed to a non reflective ‘natural’ attitude. Reflective attitudes that can give some form of critical distance. “the meant judgment, theory, value, end, or whatever it is still retained completely - but with the acceptance-modification, ‘mere phenomena” (McNeill and Feldman, 1998: 103). According to Husserl, we are not confronting nothing but have gained something. This is because the epoche “can also be said to be the radical and universal method by
which I apprehend myself purely;" (McNeill and Feldman, 1998: 103). Descartes called this the cogito but in section 9 Husserl argued that the cogito is not itself apodictic because it has an open horizon. In *Being and Time* Heidegger argued that his phenomenology was not about the actual but the possible. However, in his Introduction to the *Cartesian Meditations* it seems quite clear that Husserl’s was also open and about possibilities. However, unlike Heidegger’s finite Dasein with the not-yet as a debt to itself, Husserl’s not-yet was open because he did not place any absolute limits on the ego.

Husserl argued that Descartes’ cogito was grounded on scholastic presuppositions. In section 11 Husserl argued that his was a transcendental phenomenological ego and as such its identity was not apodictic like it was for Descartes. This is because the ego has no absolute boundaries around it; boundaries which would need to include apodictic certainty of its own history and future possibilities. In discussing the concept of the phenomena Husserl also argued elsewhere, that all ways of consciousness of something means that it includes “as well, every sort of feeling, desiring, and willing with its immanent comportment” (Husserl, 1982: 3).

In short, Husserl seemed to be rejecting both extremes of Materialism and Idealism, subject and object, real and ideal etc., in order to argue that the ability to criticize and judge the givens instead of just blindly accepting them, is part of what it is to be human. He also argued that the framing and the critique of the framing are ignored within genetic psychology, which understands a casual relationship between the mind and body.

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6 This is based on the principle that time is a boundary condition to identity. If time has an open horizon then so does identity.
Husserl’s thesis, that consciousness constitutes the world, has been interpreted as a form of idealism whereby the existence of the world is dependent on consciousness. However He makes it quite clear that the point of his argument is about apodictic certainty and reflective criticism, and in many ways his argument is similar to the Frankfurt school’s notion of non-identity thinking.

We shall retain only this much: that the evidence of world-experience would, at all events, need to be criticized with regard to its validity and range, before it could be used for the purposes of a radical grounding of science, and that therefore we must not take that evidence to be, without question, immediately apodictic. (McNeill and Feldman, 1998: 102).

Heidegger’s phenomenology, which distanced itself from ontic studies such as psychology, overshadowed Husserl’s phenomenology that was directly criticizing them. And by omitting any detailed references to Husserl’s work within Being and Time he also omitted any influence Husserl may have had on his work. This would not be inconsistent with his argument that the transfer from inauthenticity to authenticity was based on a split Dasein with no third party influences. However, Stephen Mulhall argued that Heidegger’s windowless monad was a distortion within his philosophy. According to him, this distortion resulted from Heidegger’s need to present himself as self-originating and to repress Husserl’s influences. He further argued that the notion of a closed split Dasein achieving authenticity was incoherent because a capacity in eclipse could not bring about its own eclipse. He then offered a modified version of Heidegger’s inauthentic/authentic transfer, and argued that it was not inconsistent with the rest of Being and Time.

According to the modified version, an inauthentic Dasein is one that conflates its existential potential and its existentiell actuality. This conflation can be disrupted by an encounter with a genuine other. The genuine other awakens otherness within Dasein itself, and this allows Dasein to have a real relation to itself as other. This
relation would not be self-identical as it would be within the conflated state. This new model raises a couple of questions. If the genuine other is considered to be authentic, then finding out how it achieved authenticity would lead to an infinite regress. On the other hand, if the encounter only needed to disrupt Dasein's conflation of actuality and possibility, then the other would not need to be authentic if it was a genuine other. Genuine other here would mean other than the norm, but not necessarily authentic within its otherness. This otherness would then apply to Daseins from other cultures, backgrounds, nationalities, religions or lifestyles etc. However, as a replacement for a split Dasein's conscience, which offers an empty call, the other would not necessarily assimilate Dasein into its lifestyle. As an empty call from this other, Dasein would only need to have its conflated actuality/potentiality disrupted. If a genuine other was encountered by Dasein in an assimilated or closed society then the otherness of the other would be obvious. On the other hand, if it was encountered within a pluralistic mass culture then its otherness would need to be radically other to be noticed. If the radical otherness was encountered authenticity could result by disrupting Daseins relationship with its 'One'.

As the Aboriginal understanding of land is radically different from that found in the dominant liberal democratic system currently in Australia, then their radical otherness could disrupt the actuality/potentiality there. And as it is also within the sphere of globalisation, that disruption could have a knock on effect and challenge the dominant system that Fukuyama believes marks the end of history. Unfortunately an encounter with radical otherness does not usually have this desired outcome. In fact, according to members of the Frankfurt School, it is usually the need for conformity that leads to the rejection of otherness within oneself and the other.\(^7\) It was noted

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\(^7\) This will be discussed below.
above how the ‘One Nation’ form of equality based on individual needs within a biased assimilated culture, requires the silencing of the ‘other culture’ which could itself disrupt the conflated actuality/potentiality of that assimilated culture. This was taken to be a form of racism, where the defence of the system was based on cultural principles.

You can hardly practice these traditions when you’re living in a white man’s world, ‘Pauline said later.’ They tried to destroy our culture. They are still, still, trying to assimilate us, to make us disappear into their world. (Endangered Peoples: 4)

However, the United Nations Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People due to be signed in 2004, which will give Aboriginal people the right of self-determination, is itself part of the dominant culture. It is this declaration that Hanson criticised in her argument that all Australians should be treated equally with no one group having an advantage over others. However, the dominant non-Aboriginal group already do have advantages over the Aboriginal people. It is this declaration that should address the current form of inequality, but it really depends on how the words ‘self-determination’ are interpreted. In agreement with Derrida’s criticism of Fukuyama, the existence of the inequality does point to the flaw within the ideal of liberal democracy itself, however, if the words are interpreted by giving priority to Derrida’s device of differ(a)nce over and above the political context, then it could undermine the fight for social justice. And if the ‘self’ in ‘self-determination’ is understood as Heidegger’s notion of Dasein, then it is difficult to see how the Aboriginal people could be understood as an ideological conflict, which could challenge the dominant Western liberal democratic system in Australia. In an attempt to overcome these limitations the next chapter will examine the type of philosophy that Heidegger and Derrida were criticising.
CHAPTER THREE: REDUCING RATIONALITY

a. Du(e)lism

Rene Descartes, often called the father of modern philosophy, was living at a time of intense religious wars, global exploration, and when Galileo was challenging established ideas. He attempted to break with the philosophical tradition of his day and free himself from prejudices. His method was to locate a foundation, which would be independent of religion, custom, culture, language and other influences. In the Meditations (1641) he argued that we acquire many prejudices, which interfere with our reason. In an attempt to gain some autonomy by way of a secure foundation, he developed the Method of Doubt. According to this method we should reject everything we believe and start again. He understood truth to be what was indubitable as opposed to hearsay and opinion, and by doubting everything, which was not indubitable, he hoped to discover a foundational certainty on which to build.

Archimedes, that he might transport the entire globe from the place it occupied to another, demanded only one point that was firm and immovable; so also, I shall be entitled to entertain the highest expectations, if I am fortunate enough to discover only one thing that is certain and indubitable.

(Descartes, 1994: 79)

Descartes began his First Meditation with three arguments. In the Dream Argument he argued that it was not possible to completely distinguish dream experiences from waking experiences. In the Deceiving God argument even mathematics became problematic, and he may have included the Evil Demon argument for those who would reject the notion of a deceiving God. With these arguments he concluded that the secure base for knowledge would not lie in the senses but in the mind. This was because an indubitable truth would be one, which was not only free of illusions but also totally free of any determining influences. This implied that at least part of the mind had to be completely separate from the body and
nature, which were understood to be causally determined (Descartes, 1994:74-79).

Descartes understood the mind to be res cogitans, a substance that thinks, and the body to be res extensa, a substance that extends into space. In humans the two substances interact via the pineal gland. Res extensa was also understood to be the substance of the brain as well as the rest of the material world. Res extensa or determined nature was what made science possible because it was casual. Res cogitans or undetermined mind would seem to make any form of human science impossible because there could be no uniformities, regularities, or laws determining a completely free mind, for science to discover.

In the Second Meditation Descartes found his first indubitable truth that was beyond God, the evil demon, physical and biological causal processes, history, culture and religion. This certainty was his famous Cogito Ergo Sum (Descartes, 1994: 78-87). According to Descartes the rebuilding of the world begins with the discovery of the self by way of his Cogito Argument (I think therefore I am). Descartes’ notion of ‘self’ separated from subjectivity, was not only a foundation for knowledge, but also became a foundation for the Enlightenment understanding of reason and individuality.

At the heart of the Enlightenment was the ideal of a single scientifically organized world system governed by reason. In contrast to the prevailing pessimistic view of humanity based on the Christian doctrine of original sin, the optimistic Enlightenment creed stressed the possibility of planning a society on rational grounds. Enlightenment social thought was developed on an analogy with physical science. The desire to master nature developed into a dream of mastering society. However, the daydream about human society being improved through knowledge and technology had a darker side. The other side of the dream, the nightmare, was analysed in 1947 by Adorno and Horkheimer. According to them, “The
Enlightenment has always aimed at liberating men from fear and establishing their sovereignty. Yet the fully enlightened earth radiates disaster triumphant” (Horkheimer and Adorno, 1979:1). The aim of their analysis was to discover why “mankind, instead of entering into a truly human condition, is sinking into a new kind of barbarism” (Horkheimer and Adorno, 1997: ix). Their objective was to rescue the Enlightenment idea of emancipation by promoting critical thought.

The other type of reason that leads to domination rather than emancipation, according to Horkheimer and Adorno, was not born in the Enlightenment but comes from the beginnings of Western culture. It was a type of rationality that is bound to identity and is compelled to deny, repress and violate difference and otherness. When the ‘other’ is philosophy’s ‘other’ then what is being denied or repressed is the unpresentable, that which cannot be conceptualised, anything that lies beyond the representations of the mind. If identity requires difference, then philosophies ‘other’ constitutes a philosophical problem in that it has no concept of its otherness, in which to give it an identity. The inability to maintain the notion of thoughts outside can lead to the substitution of thoughts ‘other’, with other thoughts or empirical objects.

This problem can be extended to the liberal humanist notion of individual, which stems from the Enlightenment. If the individual has no ‘other’ then the individual has no way of constituting self-identity. In other words, the relationship between self and other is bound to the notion of self-identity. When the ‘other’ is other than white European heterosexual Christian males, then the empirical objects can be objects such as female, gay, Jew or black etc. It is not surprising then, that these others have been the subject matter of contemporary political discourses in the form of sexism, homophobia, anti-Semitism and racism.
Descartes’ *Method of Doubt* left a legacy of two interlocking features, which are relevant to the development of anti-racist strategies. The first was his understanding of freedom and the elimination of subjectivity, the second was the explanatory gap left by the separation of mind and body. If the mind/body problem stemming from dualism is understood as a tug of war, then some theories drag the body and matter over to the side of the mind, while others drag the mind and consciousness over to the side of the body. Hegel’s Idealism would be an example of the former, while Marx’s Materialism would be an example of the latter. Horkheimer and Adorno’s notion of ‘Non-Identity Thinking’ is an example of the refusal to either assimilate or reduce to one or the other sides.

In the *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807) Hegel criticized the materialist understanding of the mind/body relationship underlying phrenology and physiognomy. “it conceals from itself the disgracefulness of the irrational, crude thought which takes a bone for the reality of self-consciousness” (Hegel, 1997: 209). He united Descartes’ *res cogitans* and *res extensa* in the direction of the former and gave priority to subjectivity within his system. According to Hegel, reality itself is reason and it is in the process of becoming self-conscious and free. This means that history is the process of a rational developing system. He argued that the Absolute, in both abstract and concrete form, developed from the objective pole towards the subjective. On the objective side, which is the subjective concrete side, this development went from art to religion to philosophy (Hegel, 1977: 580-591). In other words, it went from the material towards the ideas. He also charted the stages of history as a progress in reason and freedom from the ancient Orient through classical
Antiquity and into the Christian-Germanic epoch, which included Feudalism, Reformation, Enlightenment, and the French Revolution.¹

Marx and Engels criticized Hegel’s system by arguing that it is the way we live which leads to what we think rather than what we think leading to the way we live. “It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being”, wrote Marx, “but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness”. And unlike Hegel, who charted history as a progress in reason and freedom, they charted the stages via the types of production. “The hand mill gives you society with the feudal lord; the steam mill society with the industrial capitalists” (Carnforth, 1955: 7). Marx also argued that freedom was connected to the unfolding of human potentialities as “the positive power to assert his true individuality” however, this would not be possible under capitalism but would require communism (Ollman, 1976:114-119). And the movement from capitalism to communism would be based on a materialist dialectic whereby the contradictions, which force the changes, are contradictions within society rather than contradictions within understanding.

A number of scholars known as members of the Frankfurt School adapted Marxism to the theoretical and political needs of a later time. In his analysis of fascism and the Holocaust, Horkheimer argued that the division of reason from the body not only reflected the hierarchical social division of labour, but also severed reason from its subjectivity and turned it into an uncritical and dull apparatus for registering facts.

¹ While his leaps of imagination would seem to dispel any notion of a correlation between a bump on the skull and thought, it could be argued that if there was absolutely no correlation then portraiture would not be possible. However, the correlation would not necessarily be a point for point representation because this would indicate that the closer the correlation between the entity and its representation was, such as a two dimensional photographic representation or a three dimensional plaster cast, the closer it would come to being identified as portraiture, but this does not seem to be the case.
anti-philosophical spirit that is inseparable from the subjective concept of reason, and that in Europe culminated in the totalitarian persecution of intellectuals, whether or not they were its pioneers, is symptomatic of the abasement of reason.
(Horkheimer, 1974: 54)

In *The Dialectics of Enlightenment* Horkheimer and Adorno criticised the Enlightenment notion of individual by arguing that the subjectivity, which was separated from reason, was being replaced with a false form of individuality. A false form of individual that is no more than

The generality's power to stamp the accidental detail so firmly that it is accepted as such. The defiant reserve or elegant appearance of the individual on show is mass-produced like Yale Locks, whose only difference can be measured in fractions of millimetres.
(Adorno and Horkheimer, 1947)\(^2\)

In their analysis of the disappearance of autonomy, members of the Frankfurt School combined their theories about fascism with their studies of mass society, and argued that economic, political, social and cultural conformity were producing institutionalised cohesion, and that society was becoming totally administered producing false notions of individuality, and that the autonomous individual was disappearing. In addition, as reason becomes more instrumental and loses interest in striving for some objectivity, judgments become more and more relative and easily manipulated.

According to Horkheimer (1974), the combination of subjective reason and domination leads to a social cohesion based on submission, regression, and conformity. Survival in the contemporary world is seen as success, an economic success that depends on adaptation to the current environment. To succeed within this environment, subjects have to give up any hope of ultimate self-realization. Social beings have to change into individual members of a powerful organization. Instead of

using reason to find truth it is used for imitation and adaptation for survival. Horkheimer argued that this sort of survival tends to make people more submissive, and social cohesion is achieved through conformity and identification with a powerful group.

He continuously responds to what he perceives about him, not only consciously but with his whole being, emulating the traits and attitudes represented by all the collectivities that enmesh him - his play group, his classmates, his athletic team, and all the other groups that, as has been pointed out, enforce a more radical surrender through complete assimilation.

(Horkheimer, 1974: 141)

Drawing on Freud, members of the Frankfurt School argued that the mechanism bonding individuals into a society are also of a libidinal nature. Individuals gain gratification via the pleasure principle when they are accepted into a group. If outsiders want to join the group they have to change and identify with it. The ego of the individual within the group stands between the pleasure and reality principle. The pleasure of self-awareness is sacrificed for self-preservation within the group. This leads to a loss of autonomy, because by opting for self-preservation the individual neglects their development for potential self-differentiation. They lose their autonomy because they are pre-occupied with their place in the group. This loss places a strain on the ego, to release the strain they can either change group or retreat into their id - regress. If regression takes place the group’s social forces easily manipulate the person, and this ensures social cohesion.

In *Freudian Theory and the Pattern of Fascist Propaganda* (1951), Adorno drew on Freud’s *In Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, to discuss de-individualized social atoms that form fascist collectivities.

Socialized hypnosis breeds within itself the forces which will do away with the spook of regression through remote control, and in the end awaken those who keep their eyes shut though they are no longer asleep.
In *Five Lectures* (1970) Marcuse argued, that society is still held together by a form of libidinal relationship, which is of reified social relations and personified things such as cars. He added that everyday gratification remains ungratifying and this reflects a repressive desublimation (Held, 1980: 137-138).

Drawing on Freud’s distinction between the sex and self-preservation instincts, and his notion that instincts were the motive force behind human behaviour, Eric Fromm argued, that the sex instincts are more flexible than the instincts for self-preservation because they can be “postponed, repressed, sublimated and interchanged”, and this allows a certain amount of flexibility in the satisfactions which are on offer (Arato and Gebhardt, 1994: 480).

In *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (1947) Horkheimer and Adorno argued, that the culture industry was using entertainment to sugarcoat an ideological content of oppression. In the *Culture Industry Reconsidered* (1975) Adorno argued, that popular culture was in fact administered culture imposed from above. And in *The Public Sphere* (1964) Habermas argued, that artificially induced public opinion binds individuals to the existing situation (Bronner, 1989: 4-10).

Within the framework of the Frankfurt School’s criticism of Western mass society, it could be argued that the resolution of the *Land Rights* issue as a form of separatism would be similar to changing groups, while remaining within the dominant culture would force many into submission, regression and conformity and prevent self-determination. However, if they were able to gain some form of autonomy, within the existing system, it would challenge that system. If so, then this could be beneficial to other non-Aboriginal Australians because according to Horkheimer, a fully developed individual is the consummation of a fully developed society. The emancipation of the individual is not emancipation from

society, but the deliverance of society from atomisation, an atomisation that may reach its peak in periods of collectivisations and mass culture (Horkheimer, 1974: 135).

As Australia is also part of the Global village, this could have the knock on effect of challenging the Liberal Democratic system within other parts of the world. This is because globalisation includes an intensification in the levels of interaction, interconnectedness, and interdependence between the countries, states, and societies, within the contemporary world. In an analysis of globalisation, Harvey argued that ‘time-space compression’ means that events in one place impact immediately on people and places a long distance away (Harvey, 1989: 240). He further suggests that the process is not linear and smooth but discontinuous. This would mean that here are ‘spaces’ for change within the process.

Returning to the conceptual feature of racism momentarily, consciousness seems to have a great deal of trouble with these ‘spaces.’ Dialectically it tends to jump from thesis to the anti-thesis. The last two thousand years of philosophy has witnessed this as a jump from various forms of Materialism to Idealism and back again. It is also a stumbling block for perceptions as seen in illusions such as the rabbit duck; with logical contradictions such as the double bind in Aristotle’s syllogism; the zero in mathematics; and in Zeno’s paradoxes. It is also the problem encountered with the relation between particular and universal, subject and object, one and many, and mind and body. It is also connected to the excluded middle, which makes identification possible. The Greeks called it the Aporia, which means the absence of a passage. In Of Grammatology (1976) Derrida examined them as textual gaps or stumbling blocks. Hegel understood it as the now. Lyotard (1979:75-79) identified it as a kind of impossibility of judgement. Because it cannot be tied down or identified, it can also be understood as a moment of possibility, in the form of generativity. A generativity
based on our conceptual limitations. However, it tends to be our conceptual limitations that limit its generative capacity. In order to release the generative capacity of reason, after it had been made impotent by severing it from subjectivity and replacing that subjectivity with a false form of individuality, the Frankfurt School argued for a type of non-identity thinking. A type of thinking which would neither identify the aporia, nor be reduced or assimilated to either one or other of the poles.

While many scholars including the Frankfurt school focused on subjectivity, Husserl’s Phenomenology was one of the first attempts to reclaim it after Descartes banished it two hundred years earlier. Husserl was writing prior to the rise of National Socialism but the Nazi’s later denounced his Phenomenology because he was promoting a form of rationality for everyone, including Jews and Negroes. Husserl, like Descartes before him, was attempting to reduce prejudice. As the conceptual feature of racism is linked to prejudice, the next section will begin by examining that aspect of Husserl’s Phenomenology.

b. The Evidence

In order to examine the conceptual features of racism and anti-racist strategies, this section will examine Husserl’s Phenomenological method. The content of Husserl’s work may not be directly related to racism, but he was attempting to reduce prejudices within consciousness. As racism is a form of prejudice and this thesis is examining the conceptual as well as the political features of racism and anti-racist strategies, and Husserl’s work was denounced by the Nazi’s because he was promoting a type of rationality for everyone – including ‘Jews’ and ‘Negroes’. The importance of Husserl’s development of rationality could lay in the possibility that rationality itself could be culturally relative. Therefore an examination of his work may permit us to explore rationality anew.
Between about the last quarter of the nineteenth century and the first quarter of the twentieth century, the scientific reductive accounts of the mind/body explanatory gap were pulling the mind and consciousness over towards the material realm. This was a time when the gap was widening between philosophy and genetic psychology (Husserl, 1970: 53-57). During this time Husserl was criticizing the prejudices within the naturalistic accounts of consciousness. A number of features of Husserl's work are important for the development of anti-racist strategies, and these include his reductions, empathy and intersubjectivity. The first was an attempt to reduce prejudices, the second was a mid-point between assimilation and exclusion, and the third because of its connection with community. This section will begin with an examination of his reductions in connection with his intentional analysis as the constitution of identity, and then it will examine his understanding of empathy and intersubjectivity. The second section will examine Heidegger's criticism of Husserl's Phenomenology.

Husserl's Phenomenology has been understood as a method that emphasises the attempt to get at the truth of matters, to describe phenomena, as whatever appears in the manner in which it appears, that is as it manifests itself in the consciousness of the experiencer. This means that explanations are not to be imposed before the phenomena have been understood from within. Phenomenology seeks to avoid pre-judgements and misconstructions placed on experience in advance. It tries to reduce prejudices drawn from religious or cultural traditions, from everyday common sense, and from science.

In the *Prolegomena to Pure Logic* (1900-1901), which was the first volume of his *Logical Investigations*, Husserl was arguing against psychologism within

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3 Genetic Psychology studies the material substrate of psychic acts, (the nature of the sense organs, the patterns of the nerves, and so on), and is mainly about causal explanations.
philosophy. Psychologism means that the universal laws of maths and logic have their foundations in the concrete functioning of psychological mechanisms. Psychologism only looks at the ‘real’ facts of the human mind and ignores the ‘ideal’, and in so doing, places philosophy under empirical psychology. Husserl argued that the human sciences were failing because they ignored intentionality. Intentionality has to do with the way that the mind frames the object. Consciousness, according to Husserl, contains meanings that are its intentional content, and these meanings make the encountered things intelligible. Failing to take intentionality into account tends to reduce the experience of material objects to sensations, logic to psychology, and values to feelings, which could lead to a dangerous form of relativity.

In our attacks on relativism, we have of course had psychologism in mind. Psychologism in all its subvarieties and individual elaborations is in fact the same as relativism, though not always recognized and expressly allowed to be such. It makes no difference whether, as a formal idealism, based on a ‘transcendental psychology’, it seeks to save the objectivity of knowledge, or whether, leaning on empirical psychology, it accepts relativism as its ineluctable fate.
(Husserl, 1970: 145)

Husserl argued that consciousness, which includes concepts as well as their criticism, should transcend and be independent of those psychological functions. In other words, consciousness or intentionality should not be imprisoned within human physiology even if objective knowledge is unobtainable. In the Prolegomena to Pure Logic, Husserl argued that the truths or validity of mathematical and logical principles must exist independently of consciousness, even though their appearance in thought is dependent on consciousness. For this he has been accused of being Platonic (Kockelmans, 1994: 38). However, he was not arguing that they themselves existed outside of consciousness, like the Platonic Forms, but that their truth or validity, as pure logic, was not dependent on the empirical psychology and other natural sciences, which utilize the notion of ‘pure’ arithmetic and logic themselves. This is because to
be considered ‘pure’ they must be independent of factual thinking, yet they are used as ‘pure’ within the factual thinking of those sciences.

Pure logic is the scientific system of ideal laws and theories which are purely grounded in the sense of the ideal categories of meaning; that is, in the fundamental concepts which are common to all sciences because they determine in the most universal way what makes science objectively science at all: namely, unity of theory. In this sense, pure logic is the science of the ideal ‘conditions of the possibility’ of science generally, or of the ideal constituents of the ideal of theory.

(Husserl, 1975: 4)

Husserl also argued that because the truth of logical and mathematical structures exist independently of psychological mechanisms, an investigation into the psychological aspects of maths and logic should not be confined to psychological science, but extended to include subjective experiences (Husserl, 1975: 3-9). This is because the subjective experiences are also part of the founding of the original abstractions from nature, which later get transmitted and reified via the culture and language. In other words, maths and science are not completely separate from the magic, rules of thumb, and other subjective experiences out of which they rose.

In *Cartesian Meditations*, Husserl argued that all knowledge should be grounded on apodictic evidence in intuition. Apodictic means that the evidence is beyond doubt. Husserl understood the evidence to be a combination of the meaning act or ‘cogito’ as well as the object meant or ‘cogitatum’, because they are two sides of the same coin. In other words, between thinking and what is thought. He argued that preconceptions and prejudice form part of the synthesis of the phenomena. The phenomena experienced within various acts of consciousness were not restricted to

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4 Kant understood it to be necessary.

5 Thinking of a table, and the table thought of, are two sides of the same coin. Thinking of your hand, and your hand thought of, are two sides of the same coin. This decentres the priority of the organ between your ears. In many respects it is similar to Spinoza’s mental and physical attributes, which will be discussed below.
perceptual acts, but also included other cognitive aspects such as judgments, valuations, feelings, desires, aesthetic appreciation, language and ideals.

There is not only ‘perception’ of ‘real’ objects, but also of ‘categorical’ or ‘ideal’ objects, e.g. of ranges, of identities and non-identities, of states-of-affairs of every sort, of universals, etc.

(Husserl, 1975: 9)

He was interested in reducing prejudices by finding apodictic evidence (Husserl, 1982: Section 24). By apodictic evidence he also meant the thing itself. Not the Kantian notion of the thing itself, which was the noumena, but the phenomena thing in itself, which is the immediately given original data of consciousness. According to Husserl, the aim of philosophy is to describe the thing in itself, which is the data of consciousness, without bias or prejudice. This meant that the prejudice and bias, inherent in metaphysical and scientific theories as well as cultural presuppositions, needed to be bracketed out so their influence on the evidence could be reduced. While Kant had previously argued that no object could be given to consciousness as is or without the minds modifications via the categories, Husserl argued, that besides the categories there were also sedimentations which prejudice the phenomena.

In his attempt to reduce the phenomena to the thing in itself, the pure phenomena excluding sediments, Husserl bracketed out areas concerned with objective reality such as causal origins and existential status, and subjective association such as scientific and cultural presuppositions, and judgments about likes and dislikes etc. He bracketed out the natural and scientific attitudes with the philosophical reduction, and the belief in the existence of the world with the phenomenological reduction.

The universal epoche of the world as it becomes known in consciousness (the putting it in brackets) shuts out from the phenomenological field the world as it exists for the subject in simple absoluteness.

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6 This will be examined below.
And while this suspension in the belief of the existence of an object of consciousness could be seen as a form of idealism, a suspension in the belief of the existence in an object does not necessarily mean the denial of its existence. The bracketing could be seen in a similar vein to the mathematical use of bracketing, however, when mathematical units are bracketed they are placed outside the immediate area of focus. In phenomenological bracketing, which is a form of critical distance, the transcendent signified is reduced to the immanent signified of consciousness.\footnote{Husserl’s reductions share similarities with the later collapse of the transcendental signifier, but not in a manner that necessarily leads to relativity.}

I must similarly abstain from any other of my opinions, judgments, and valuations about the world, since these likewise assume the reality of the world. But for these, as for other phenomena, epistemological abstention does not mean their disappearance, at least not as pure phenomena. (Husserl, 1975: 8)

Husserl’s reductions, unlike Descartes’ method of doubt that ended up with a dyadic ‘ego cogito’, also included the transcendental reduction that transformed the dyadic into a triadic ‘ego cogito cogitatum’. This was understood as the phenomenological residue that existed in three forms, and understood as an intentional stream of consciousness (Husserl, 1982:11; 59). According to Husserl, when eidetically reduced the essence of the pure transcendental ego is temporality (Husserl, 1975: LX). It is a pure stream of consciousness that precedes the time consciousness of Kant’s, which makes possible the intentionality, that is the basic structure of consciousness. When objects appear to time consciousness as now, this now is not part of the object but part of the ego. Now, past and future form the temporal horizon that objects appear in, rather than part of the temporal objects that appear. The now does not exist without the past and future, and this means, “the idea of a separate ‘now’ is an indivisible ideal created by abstraction” (Kockelmans, 1994: 75).
In *Cartesian Meditations* Husserl argued that an apodictic ego would need to have apodictic knowledge of its complete past and future, and for this reason his ego, unlike Descartes', has an open horizon.

Does not transcendental subjectivity at any given moment include its past as an inseparable part, which is accessible only by way of memory? But can apodictic evidence be claimed for memory? (Husserl, 1998: 104)

Husserl also included the *eidetic reduction* to show how a transcendental-phenomenological ego could free itself from sedimented opinions (Husserl, 1982: Section 8-11). The *eidetic reduction*, which can be applied to the ego as well as the other phenomena, is as an examination of the structure of objectivity. During 1923 and 1924 Husserl wrote a number of articles concerned with the ethical renewal of the culture. In one of these articles, *Renewal: Its Problems and Method*, he argued that the *eidetic reduction* should be applied to the socioethical sphere, where people should take responsibility for their own judgments rather than blindly conforming (McCormick, 1981: 326-331). And in the *Paris Lectures* he said that,

Once I have banished from my sphere of judgments, the world, as one which receives its being from me and within me, then I, as the transcendental ego which is prior to the world, am the sole source and object capable of judgment.
(Husserl, 1975: 11)

And elsewhere he stated that,

the aim of philosophy is to prepare humanity for a genuinely philosophical form of life, in and through which each human being gives him - or herself a rule through reason.
(Kockelmans, 1994: 11)

Husserl’s *transcendental reduction* could be understood as a form of asymmetrical self-reflective criticism, this is because the transcendental reduction posits the ego itself as phenomena among other phenomena to be analysed. And “as a phenomenological ego I have become a pure observer of myself” (Kockelmans, 1994: 76)
14). In this situation the ego itself is understood as a phenomena, like any other cogito/cogitatum synthesis, which can be analysed. And between this *transcendental reduction* and the *phenomenological reductions* the ego and the object are transported to a transcendental sphere, where the phenomena becomes a synthesis or constitution of the cogito and cogitatum, which can then be described from a *noetic* and a *noematic* view point within the intentional analysis.

According to Paul Ricouer, Husserl was arguing for the notion of a personal cogito in the *Fourth Meditation*.

Is this cogito personal or impersonal? Husserl unequivocally opts the personal character of the ego cogito. This option is consistent with the method itself; for if the cogito is a field of experience, the cogito is mine, even when elevated to its eidos. The Fourth Meditation, as we shall see, leaves no doubt about this point. The eidos ego is not the self-function in general; it is not the power, which you, I, and all men have to say ‘I’. It is the purity of myself reached through imaginative variations on my own life.

(Ricouer, 1967: 92)

However, as Husserl criticized Descartes’ notion of a closed ego it would be unlikely that he would understand the ego to be personal apodictically. It was shown above how Descartes required a certain amount of autonomy from causal determinism. Husserl seems to be arguing that this autonomy itself is built into human consciousness, because it is apodictically certain that there is no apodictic certainty.

The reductions could have led to solipsism because they bracketed out other subjects; however, Husserl’s overcame this problem with his notion of empathy and intersubjectivity (Husserl, 1975: 34-35). Husserl’s argued that the creation of meaning is an active process that results from intentionality. In connection with his understanding of intersubjectivity, this means that subjects have their own interpretation of the world that they share through language, actions and their encounters with others. This creates a community or intersubjectivity in which.
various individuals have their meanings fulfilled if others agree with them, or unfulfilled if others do not agree.

Husserl focused his understanding of intersubjectivity within the discipline of science. The scientific community share meanings intersubjectively and these meanings are related to something which is empirically observable. His criticism of psychologism was because it was based on the identity theory of the mind. This meant that mental events were understood to be objective and publically observable, in the brain and nervous system. Husserl criticised the reduction of mental events to the empirical level because it ignored the subjectivity, which was involved with intentionality. This subjectivity was also mixed in with the scientific method, which was understood to be ‘pure’ or objective. Husserl examined geometry in order to bring out this subjective feature of science, because it is based on idealities and not objective empirical objects.

In the *Cartesian Meditations* Husserl discussed two important areas in relationship to the problem of accounting for the ‘other’, from the ego of the ‘ego cogito cogitatum.’ One was the objectivity of the world, and the other was the reality of the historical communities. His solution to the problem of *intersubjectivity*, which is particularly relevant to anti-racist strategies, included notions of *alter ego*, *empathy* and community of *transcendental egos*. His notion of *empathy* was about placing oneself in the position of the other, without reducing the other to oneself or oneself to the other. The notion of *empathy* is connected with a form of community that is not based on exclusion and dogma, but extremely fertile because the more different ego’s there are the more different views of reality there are.

Despite all this, we come to understandings with our neighbours, and set up in common an objective spatio-temporal fact-world as the world about us that is there for us all, and to which we ourselves none the less belong (Husserl, 1982: 105)
In *The Paris Lectures* Husserl explained how to experience the world as an *intersubjective* world, and he also gave a phenomenological description of the act of *empathy* (Husserl, 1975: 34). He began by suspending belief in the existence of other minds, and called this an egological reduction. Drawing on Leibniz he compared the experience of others with universal expression.

We can say, with Leibniz, that within the monad, which is given to me apodictically and originally, are the reflections of alien monads.

(Husserl, 1975: 35)

He then argued for a distinction between the *intentionally* belonging to the other ego, and the *intentionally* belonging to the alter ego as a reflection of the ego. And because the other egos, as alter egos, only make sense as a reflection within his ego, this leads to the notion of empathy. Husserl also discussed the notion of *intersubjectivity* and establishment of the objectivity of the world in a number of other places including the *Encyclopaedia Britannica article* of 1928 section 13, and in his *Fifth Cartesian Meditation*.

Husserl’s phenomenology has been criticized within two main areas, his reductions and intentional analysis’ as a search for essences, and for laying too much stress on perception (Derrida, 1989: 9). However, it must also be remembered that the context, or in Husserl’s words the external horizon in which he was working, was one where experimental psychology was gaining a footing in the study of perception also. While he may have stressed perception his notion of phenomena covered all phenomena including language and its meanings. In fact many of the reductions were directed at the meanings within language. Philosophical, scientific, and cultural sedimented meanings, which were prejudicing the phenomenal evidence.

To understand geometry or any given cultural fact is to be conscious of its historicity, albeit ‘implicitly’. This, however, is not an empty claim; for quite generally it is true for every fact given under the heading of
‘culture’, whether it is a matter of the lowliest culture of necessities or the highest culture (science, state, church, economic organization, etc.), that every straightforward understanding of it as an experiential fact involves the ‘coconsciousness’ that it is something constructed through human activity.
(Derrida, 1989: 173)

And rather than searching for an essence his reductions were an attempt to free the ego from sedimented opinions. He attempted to reduce the phenomena down to the basic evidence, not to find some essence but because judgments rest on evidence. Because judgments rest on evidence it is the evidence itself that should be examined. Even if objective knowledge is not possible people must make judgments, which either assert or deny opinions, beliefs and knowledge. People can assert or deny their own past judgments or the judgments from some authority or tradition. As the evidence changes so can the judgments that rest on it. Sometimes judgments are based on past judgments, which rested on a certain evidence which may or may not any longer be believed to be true, yet the judgment underlying the current judgment still occupies a place within a tradition. Husserl examined this within the *Origin of Geometry*, which was examined in connection with Derrida’s work.

Derrida’s Deconstruction was influenced by the work of Heidegger who argued that subjects (which he replaced with Dasein) are constituted by the things that Husserl tried to bracket out through the reductions. He replaced Husserl’s intentionality with comportment because Dasein as a being-in-the-world with no human essence preceded thinking about the world. In addition he argued that the phenomena of phenomenology was not consciousness of evidence but Being, and the study of Being required an examination of the student of Being which is Dasein. And in *Being and Time*, which launched his international career and overshadowed Husserl’s work, he defended psychologism against Husserl’s criticism.

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8 Although Heidegger tried to bracket out the technological attitude himself.
Does not the actuality of knowing and judging get broken asunder into two ways of Being - two ‘levels’ which can never be pieced together in such a manner as to reach the kind of Being that belongs to knowing? Is not psychologism correct in holding out against this separation? (Heidegger, 1962: 256).

c. Circumstantial Evidence

Heidegger distinguishing his notion of phenomenology from that of Husserl, by arguing that being-in-the-world preceded thinking about the world and therefore, the ontological base was not intentionality but comportment. He argued that the phenomena of phenomenology, was not consciousness of evidence but Being. Husserl’s Phenomenology was part of Heidegger’s over-all criticism of traditional philosophical understandings of Being and time, understandings that presupposed Being and time to be separate prior to the various attempts at re-unifying them. Being was understood as that which did not change, and time was understood as the changing realm of existence. “It is also held that there is a ‘cleavage’ between ‘temporal’ entities and the ‘supra-temporal’ eternal, and efforts are made to bridge this over” (Heidegger, 1962: 39). Heidegger argued, that the metaphysical attempts to unify the changeless and the changing distorted Being by representing it as a kind of presence (Heidegger, 1962:36-49). He criticized the notion of presence, as objective being, because it presupposed an independent subjectivity. He argued, “there is no such thing as the ‘side-by-side-ness’ of an entity called ‘Dasein’ with another entity called ‘world’” (Heidegger, 1962: 81). Dasein cannot understand the world objectively because this presupposes that Dasein’s understanding can be ahistorical, however, Heidegger’s notion of Dasein is profoundly historical. According to him, Being and time are not separate, but Being should be understood in terms of time.

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9 Heidegger’s notion of Sorge, which was articulated in respect to time but not to space, underpinned the distinction between inauthenticity and authenticity on the basis of temporality. His notion of authenticity will be referred to below in relation the ‘self-determination. It is worth pointing out here, however, that the Aboriginal people have a different notion of time and space to that of the Western tradition that Heidegger is criticising.
Our provisional aim is the Interpretation of time as the possible horizon for any understanding whatsoever of Being” (Heidegger, 1962: 1). With this argument he began his destruction of metaphysics, which influenced later scholars.

One of the problems with identifying Being with presence, according to Heidegger, is that it leads to an obsession with the accurate and effective ahistorical representation of beings within philosophy, science, and technology, and an attempt to gain control over them. Heidegger called this the Forgetfulness of Being, within his criticism of metaphysics, but focused his later argument around Enframing and technological domination.\(^\text{10}\) (The Frankfurt school’s notion of instrumental reason, which was discussed above shares similarities with Heidegger’s Enframing).

In *Being and Time* (1927) Heidegger utilized a number of hyphenated words to highlight the inseparability of subjectivity and objectivity.\(^\text{11}\) For example in his anti-Cartesian section 12, he argued that Dasein as a *being-in-the-world* is not a subject related to an objective world but is always already present in it. And in sections 25-27 Dasein as *being-with-others* is always already in joint situation with others. In section 16 he understood objects within the world of Dasein as *ready-to-hand* when they are not brought out into awareness, however, when something goes wrong which makes them a focus they are understood as *present-at-hand*. When *present-at-hand* they are understood as the objective part of the subject/object relationship within metaphysical thought.

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\(^{10}\) Heidegger understood the metaphysical separation of Being and time and the representation of their reunification as presence, as the abandonment of Being which he related to technological exploitation and nihilism. For a later example of this see (Martin Heidegger, “A Question Concerning Technology,” in *Basic Writings: Martin Heidegger*, ed. David Farrell [London: Routledge, 1993]. pp. 311-341). It is worth noting that Kant had earlier made a distinction between the phenomena and noumena, which also criticised the notion of an accurate subjective interpretation of the object. This is because the closer you get to the limit between them, the further you move away from both the subjective and objective poles. This resembles Zeno’s paradox mentioned above and is related to the aporia’s as the limit of consciousness.

\(^{11}\) It is worth noting that he wrote in the German language and his play with language makes English translations difficult.
Heidegger argued that the forgetfulness of Being was only possible because it was wholly other. While there are many differences between things such as stones, trees, animals etc., the greatest difference is the ontological difference, which is the difference between Being and being. Even though there is an ontological difference between Being and being Heidegger tried to find a path from the being of humans, which he called Dasein, to Being itself. This procedure was reversed in his later work where he tried to open a path to Being in a meditative and/or aesthetic way to gain an understanding of being-in-the-world in light of Being.

In Section one of *Being and Time* Heidegger argued that the meaning of Being had been forgotten. In the very first line he wrote that, “This question has today been forgotten”. A little further down he wrote that there was a “necessity for restating the question about the meaning of Being.” Heidegger rejected the metaphysical notions, including his interpretation of Husserl’s work, where transcendental subjectivity or consciousness is related to objectivity, and he replaced it with his phenomenology based on comportment to investigate the meaning of Being. He understood truth to be an unconcealedness and concealment, which is currently being repressed by the metaphysical horizon of understanding, but which stems from the earlier notion of the Greek word ‘aletheia’, the unconcealedness of what is present. According to Heidegger, traditional metaphysics is the wrong way to study the Being of beings because Being “is something that proximally and for the most part does not show itself at all” (Heidegger, 1962: 59). And while it does not show itself it belongs to what does shows itself and, as such, constitutes its meaning and ground.

12 The different beings here equate with Husserl’s notion, that the study of different things in the world are only separated by the disciplines, but the scientific method underpins all of them. He wanted the philosophical attitude to operate as a regulator – like a critical distance.

13 Heidegger linked Being, which constitutes meaning and ground, to temporality, where as Husserl linked it to the time consciousness.
In section 7 of the second Introduction in *Being and Time* Heidegger described his phenomenology, as a more appropriate method for investigating the Being of being than other traditional ontologies. This is because Dasein misinterprets itself through the tradition, which it has been thrown into. A tradition, which has served to conceal Dasein from itself. This is because it uses the categories of the tradition that do not belong to it, in order to interpret itself. Heidegger argued that the Metaphysical categories should be destroyed in order to uncover what they have covered. 14 “The question of Being does not achieve its true concreteness until we have carried through the process of destroying the ontological tradition” (Heidegger, 1962: 49)

Heidegger divided section 7 into three parts: The concept of Phenomenon and The concept of Logos that separated phenomena from logos, and The preliminary conception of phenomenology, which re-joins them up again into phenomenology. In the first one he described four interconnected structures of phenomena and argued that only the later three are included in traditional notions. The first was “that which shows itself in itself”, which is interconnected with “phenomena as semblance” which is a modification of the first, then “appearance” which shows itself in a way that announces something else, and “mere appearance.” 15 Heidegger then argued that the first is the phenomena of phenomenology, the Being of beings or “that which shows itself in itself” (Heidegger, 1962: 51-55).

In the second part of section seven Heidegger discussed four different understandings of the word ‘Logos’. Logos as a making manifest, logos as language, logos as synthesis, and logos as being true or false. Truth for Heidegger is letting “them be seen as something unhidden” and being false amounts to “deceiving in the sense of covering up” (Heidegger, 1962: 56-57). Heidegger understood truth and

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14 Husserl was interested in showing that the objective sciences were themselves a result of tradition, and therefore also subjectively constituted instead of being purely objective.

15 This is similar to Kant’s notion of phenomena limited by the categories.
falsity as uncovering and covering, and argued that the other traditional forms of logos are related to ratio as reason, ground and relation, which are connected to judgments.

In the third part of *section seven* Heidegger put together the phenomena as a type of “showing” and logos as a “letting be seen”, and argued that the formal meaning of phenomenology is “to let that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself” (*Heidegger, 1962: 58*). He then argued that the meaning of this method lies in interpretation, but this interpretation has been made more difficult by a tradition of interpretation, which stems from the ontological sections of Plato’s *Parmenides* and chapter four in book seven of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* (*Heidegger, 1962: 63*). The meaning of phenomenology for Heidegger is not about letting be seen of what shows itself but the letting be seen of what does not show itself, but which is connected to what does show itself, which is the *Being of beings* and not the *being of Being* connected to traditional ontologies.¹⁶

Being, as the basic theme of philosophy, is no class or genus of entities; yet it pertains to every entity. Its ‘universal’ is to be sought higher up. Being and the structure of Being lie beyond every entity and every possible character, which an entity may possess.

(Heidegger, 1962: 62)

Because the Being of being, as the phenomena of Heidegger’s phenomenology rather than the being of Being, does not show itself it has to be brought out. This bringing out requires an investigation of Dasein because Dasein is what brings it out by interpreting Being. Without Dasein there would be no Being but only the entities. And because Dasein interprets through its everyday phenomenal experience, this everyday experience needs to be examined to uncover the ground or ontology of the everyday or ontic experience. And this ground is the Being or ontological structure of

¹⁶ This is where Heidegger understands phenomenology to be hermeneutical rather than transcendental.
the everyday experiences which, according to Heidegger, is the *care* structure. And later on in the *second division* Heidegger argued that time grounds this structure of care. This joined Dasein, as the meaning of human being, to time (Heidegger, 1962: 364). Dasein is linked to temporality within its understanding of the world. And in *section six* he argued that when Dasein is thrown into a historical moment of the One, and therefore its own historical meaning, this historical meaning, which can be seen as a dogma conceals Dasein from itself. Heidegger understood this concealing as a form of repression, which prevented authenticity.

When tradition thus becomes master, it does so in such a way that what it ‘transmits’ is made so inaccessible, proximally and for the most part, that it rather becomes concealed. Tradition takes what has come down to us and delivers it over to self-evidence. (Heidegger, 1962: 43)

The context of the essentialist/social constructivist debate in Australia could be understood as an extension of the Western metaphysical tradition, as Heidegger understands it. As the Aboriginal people have been encultured into this tradition by two hundred years of Western domination, the possibility of self-determination in the form of self-formation, may have to uncover what that tradition has concealed. On one level, this could mean bypassing the debates that are an extension of that tradition. On another level, it might mean a realisation that the type of reason being criticised is not universal. The importance of Husserl’s development of rationality may lay in the possibility that rationality itself could be culturally relative. This means that the criticism of Western notions of reason, which are central to the essentialist/social constructivist debates, may be a criticism of a type of reason that is in some way different from Husserl’s. Not a difference based on a philosophy that denies and represses the Other of thought, but a difference understood by Husserl as “what is effectively seen is seen in light of what is not effectively seen”.
With this in mind one could draw on Derrida and argue, that Husserl’s ideas, which were not effectively seen may have been reinscribed into the work of Heidegger. It could also be argued, that the ‘difference’ between Heidegger and Husserl’s philosophy, and Heidegger’s denial of Husserl’s influence, could be understood as a violence that left the traces, which allowed Mulhall’s re-interpretation and new model.

[Heidegger’s need to deny his dependence on Husserl] led to a fundamental mutilation of the potential wholeness and integrity of his text – a distortion of the fit between its form and its content that amounts to a distortion of its authenticity.
(Mulhall, 1996: 136)

However, we can never know for sure because we can never reactivate back to those origins. This is due to the gaps or aporias between the signifier and signified that allows the slippage, which allows different interpretations to occur. It allowed me to foreground one interpretation of Husserl’s *Origin of Geometry* and put the other interpretations on hold. Perceptually, it allows the foregrounding of black squares on a chessboard while putting the white ones on hold.
It is an example of what Husserl was referring to within his intentional analysis in connection with the external and internal synthesis. Husserl understood it as, what is effectively seen is seen in light of what is not effectively seen (Husserl, 1973: 31-39). This could apply to perception or a constitution from something ambiguous like ‘a small bike shop’. It could also apply to the constitution of a “One People, One Nation, One Flag” Australia.

It is impossible to see the inside and the outside of the box at the same time even though they both exist at the same time.

Heidegger’s ‘not effectively seen’ is the time we live in which frames what we see.

Derrida’s ‘not effectively seen’ is the bike shop that sells mopeds.

You can hardly practice these traditions when you’re living in a white man’s world, ‘Pauline said later.’ They tried to destroy our culture. They are still, still, trying to assimilate us, to make us disappear into their world. (Endangered Peoples: 4)
CONCLUSION:

The aim of this thesis was to examine the cognitive and political features of racism, in order to participate in the development of anti-racist strategies for the twenty first century. It was argued that past forms of racism were based on biological features but contemporary forms are based more on cultural features. The former stem from the Enlightenment period that was also a time of European expansion, and the latter seem more related to the period of globalisation. However, according to Caleb Rosado, there is no real difference between these two because racism is not about biological or cultural features but about power and privilege. It was also argued that many anti-racist strategies, which were developed in order to critique the former, usually criticise essentialist notions of identity. However, this critique has not only tended to undermine the identities of those who base their social justice strategies on essentialist identities, but are also ineffective in countering racism based on notions of fluid identities. For example, according to Pauline Hanson there is no difference between the Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people. In her criticism against reverse racism she argued that equality should be based on individual needs rather than race. According to her, they are all Australians and should be treated equally with no one group being given advantages over the other. It follows from this that anti-racist strategies are context dependent rather than universal.

Prior to the Enlightenment period identity was based on lineage but after the enlightenment identity was based on population. Some populations were understood to be inferior and both Nazi’s Germany and Colonial Australia tried to purify their races. Hanson is currently attempting to purify the culture in Australia. In order to save their culture the Aboriginal people must base their identity on lineage. This implies that they must take an essentialist stand. However, the social constructivists
argue that in making an essentialist stance the Aboriginal people are participating in their own domination. Against this charge it has been argued that the extension of Western tradition into the Australian context, which includes the essentialist/social constructivist’s debates, represents a new type of paternalism in Aboriginal studies. This is where white scholars try to preserve their role as ‘experts’ who can help decide on how to constitute the identity of the ‘other’ because,

When Aborigines seek to give a mythological content to, or to reclaim, a primordial past for themselves then they are accused of essentialism and of participating in their own domination. This is identity without content and without a primordial past; it is identity stripped to the bare logic of being simply a relation. The demand that Aborigines reduce their popular consciousness along the lines of a social theory of identity is a request that they become conscious of themselves as purely relational identities; they are to be resisters without producing an essence for themselves. (Lattas, 1993: 245-6)

Because this new paternalism could be included within the globalisation of Western values, it is worth mentioning that the eighteenth and nineteenth century philosophers found little to object to, in the European advance into the non-European world (Poole, 2000: 10). This demonstrates that ruling over the constitution of identity is no different to rubbing out the song lines and dividing up the continent into separate states or renaming the flora and fauna in non-Aboriginal language (Chatwin, 1987).

The difference between the Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people within this thesis was presented as a difference between understandings of land ownership. The decision of the High Court of Australia in 1992, with regards to the Mabo verses Queensland case, has been understood as a breakthrough in Aboriginal/non-Aboriginal relations (Stephenson, 1995). This case, with its recognition of Native Title, brought the issue of Land Rights to the forefront of Australian politics. The issue of Land Rights is based on the notion that the Aboriginal people were the original inhabitants of Australia. It has been argued that this court decision had a
positive and negative outcome. On the positive side it gave many Aborigines the opportunity to have their ownership of traditional land legally recognized. On the negative side, *Native Title* was recognized within the existing legal system. This meant that it could recognize that Aboriginal people had a form of property rights over portions of the continent prior to 1788, but it could not recognize the Aborigines legal and political sovereignty. It could not do this because it would be outside of its powers to do so. This is because British sovereignty was the foundation of the court’s own authority (Poole, 2000: 11). This implied an inequality in the power relation between the two cultures.

Prior to British settlement in Australia, there were about a million Aborigines spread over the continent with a range of different lifestyles and cultures. It has been estimated that there were over two hundred and fifty different languages with six hundred dialects (Bourke, 1994). These different communities became one people, the Aboriginals as opposed to the non-Aboriginals, both conceptually and politically, through the experience of colonization. The Aboriginal people, who make up about 2% of the population in Australia, are now spread out over the continent, some living in the rural areas, some in traditional communities, and others in the urban towns and cities (Poole, 2000: 12). It follows from this that the Aboriginal people cannot be easily categorized.

The Third Article of the *Draft Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples*, submitted to the United Nations in 1994, reads, “Indigenous Peoples have the right of self-determination”. If this is signed it will mean that the Aboriginal people will be able to freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural development (Poole, 2000: 12). If the Aboriginal people (as a group) are identified from an ancestral perspective then all contemporary
Aboriginal people are part of the same group. However, every process of political unification implies some measure of homogenisation and the assimilation or exclusion of difference. This not only applies to Hanson’s *One Nation* but also to the Aboriginal people. The Aboriginal people or ‘self’ as a group, in the self-determination section of the Draft, might mean that all Aboriginals are free to go back to the past traditions, cultures and languages, or it might mean a process of self-formation. The former, which would exclude some of the Aboriginal population, would lead to separatism within Australia while the latter, which would not necessarily exclude some of the Aboriginal population, would lead to a certain amount of autonomy within the dominant non-Aboriginal political, economic and social context. The former is closely related to the Land Rights issue, the latter to Aboriginal sovereignty. The former is related to freedom from the dominant liberal democratic system, the latter is related to freedom to within the dominant system. We may deduce from this that in some cases the Aboriginal people can gain freedom from the dominant system via separatism, (living on land where they can continue their traditional way of life), but this does not challenge the dominant liberal democratic system. For this reason, it could be understood as an example of Rosado’s notion of institutional racism. It could be understood as institutional racism for two reasons. Firstly, because the denial of rights to Aboriginal people had become an international embarrassment (Castles and Vasta, 1996: 8), a decision to compensate for the past wrongs actually defended the dominant system from international criticism. And secondly, the Aboriginal people were compensated in a way that did not challenge the system itself. We may infer then that this situation would not represent the ideological conflict, which could challenge Fukuyama’s notion of the end of history.
The other type of freedom, presupposed in the Draft Declaration, is ‘freedom to’ within the dominant system. In order for self-determination, in the form of self-formation, to have some possibility then ‘freedom to’ must include some form of autonomy, because the core idea of autonomy is that of sovereignty over oneself or self-governance. However, in connection with Heidegger’s notion of Dasein this type of autonomy would not be possible. Heidegger criticised Western philosophy and ‘fallen’ human existence for privileging the disclosure of the entity over the concealment of Being but argued that philosophy and ‘fallen’ Dasein could become more authentic. The former could achieve authenticity by a realization of the radical finitude of disclosure, the latter by the realisation of their radical finitude. He argued against the notion of freedom or autonomy, but described how Dasein’s authenticity could eclipse inauthenticity as a being-towards-death on the ontological level, and by a call of conscience on the ontic level. This implies that the Aboriginal people would not have the autonomy required for self-governance. However, Heidegger’s understanding of authenticity stemming from a call that was not from a third party was criticised by Mulhall who argued, that there were inconstancies in Heidegger’s philosophy that stemmed from his need to distance himself from Husserl and this distorted his philosophy. In addition, within this distancing Heidegger also distorted Husserl’s philosophy.

Husserl’s Phenomenology was a development of Brentano’s notion of intentionality, which overcame many of the earlier limitations. Like Husserl Brentano was also challenging the newly emerging psychology. In 1874 he published his Psychology from the Empirical Standpoint, this was the same year that Wundt published his Principles of Physiological Psychology. In this book Wundt established the alliance between experimental psychology, anatomy and physiology of the central
nervous system. He was appointed professor of physiology at Leipzig in 1875 and established the first laboratory in the world, *The Institute for Experimental Psychology*, which aimed at the advancement of experimental psychology. During the turn of the century, when the gap between philosophy and psychology was widening, Husserl was attempting to overcome the dangerous form of relativity, which he detected in the limitations of genetic psychology (Husserl, 1970: 53-57). He was critical of psychologism within philosophy because concepts as well as their justification and criticism in consciousness, should transcend and be independent of physiological functioning (Husserl, 1970: 145). He argued that philosophy should focus on subjectivity in the examination of consciousness. This was because the phenomena experienced in various included other cognitive aspects such as judgements, valuations, feelings, desires, aesthetic appreciation, language and ideals (Husserl, 1975: 9).

Husserl further argued that the scientific method underpinning genetic psychology was not as pure and objective as it seemed. He argued that the empirical sciences ignored the subjectivity within their own methods. In Book 1 of Ideas (1913) he overcame the limitations of Brentano’s theory of Intentionality (Brentano, 1874). In order to challenge the omniscience, omnipresence and omnipotence of the scientific method, Husserl reclaimed the subjectivity that Descartes had denounced two centuries earlier. In order to study consciousness and focus on subjectivity Husserl developed a number of *Reductions*, the *Intentional analysis* (which has also been called the Constitutional analysis) and theories about *Empathy* and *Intersubjectivity*.

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1 Translated by F. Kerstein as *Book 1: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology*. 1982
Husserl’s *Phenomenological reduction* was an attempt to move from the natural attitude to a philosophical attitude (Husserl, 1982: 3-36). *The Transcendental reduction* was an attempt to reduce the natural human ego and the natural psychic life of a transcendental-phenomenological ego, the to realm of transcendental-phenomenological self-experience (Husserl, 1975: 6-12). The *Eidetic reduction* and *Arbitrary variation* were intended to reach apodictic evidence - the combination of cogito or thinking, and cogitatum or what is thought (Husserl, 1982: 8-11). In the *Constitutional analysis* Husserl examined the synthesis from a noematic and noetic perspective, and examined the relationship between the internal and external horizons. In the *Neomatic description* he examined how the unity of one identity did not depend on the various acts but on the intentional correlates or noemata (Husserl, 1982: 326-29). In the *Noetic* description he examined how the unity of different acts of perception did not depend on the temporal relationship between them. He also examined the *Acts of Constitution* in the synthesis of the external and internal horizons, and argued that what is effectively perceived is perceived in light of what is not effectively perceived (Husserl, 1982: 51-55).

The reductions could have led to solipsism because they also bracketed out the existence of other subjects. Husserl overcame this problem with his notion of *Empathy* and *Intersubjectivity* (Husserl, 1975: 34-35). He understood the creation of meaning to be an active process that results from intentionality. His understanding of intersubjectivity was that subjects have their own interpretation of the world that they share through language, actions and their encounters with others, and this creates a community of intersubjectivity. Within the discipline of science, the scientific community share meanings intersubjectively, and these meanings are related to something that is empirically observable. In relation to the *Identity theory of the mind*,
mental events are understood to be objective and publicly observable in the brain and nervous system. Husserl was criticizing the dominance of this form of psychologism by arguing that ideals and meanings etc. were not publicly observable.

Husserl’s critique of psychologism was overshadowed by the publication of *Being and Time* in 1927, where Heidegger replaced Husserl’s intentionality with comportment. Heidegger replaced Husserl’s subject with a finite Dasein and developed an epistemology according to which meaning is totally dependent on context. Heidegger argued that we could never understand entities fully and immediately but only partially and discursively. We can never know things in their essence but only in the meaning they have in a certain context. Heidegger argued that being-in-the-world was ontologically prior to consciousness-in-the-world. According to him, things such as hammers are ready-to-hand before they are present-at-hand. However, it was pointed out that Husserl was not a carpenter but a philosopher and his broken hammer was the psychologism within philosophy, which he was criticizing as a dangerous form of relativity. Here we can conclude that while Heidegger made all meaning dependent on context he ignored the context of Husserl’s work.

Heidegger’s critique of objectivity, which made all meaning depends on a particular interpretive horizon, laid the foundations for the ‘Hermeneutical Turn’ along with critiques of essentialism including Derrida’s work. In his criticism of the ‘metaphysics of presence’ Derrida argued that there are gaps, supplements and contradictory tensions within texts that can be exposed to reveal different meanings. His device of differ(ence) is what allows one meaning to be fore grounded while others are put on hold. In his deconstructive reading of Fukuyama’s *End of History* Derrida pointed to the way Fukuyama glossed over the aporia between Liberal democracy and its ideal. In his deconstructive reading of Husserl’s *Origin of
Geometry he argued that the origin could never be reactivated because it can only be reinterpreted from its inscription within the tradition. Derrida’s argument focused on Husserl’s notion that there was some objectivity in the origin in order for it to be recognised. This thesis presented a different understanding of Husserl’s Origin, and in doing so it confirmed Derrida’s argument about the different meanings on the surface of the text.

This thesis argued that in the Origin, Husserl was examining a science that was based on idealities rather than on publicly observable empirical objects (objective facts). In this sense geometry is very close to other ideals that are shared intersubjectively. Husserl argued that there were accepted objective facts within geometry that were originally mixed in with subjectivity (not objective as Derrida argued against Husserl). Husserl also argued that accepted beliefs within the non-scientific intersubjectivity (community) were also the result of subjectivity. He argued that these - like the objective facts in science - could be verified or denied by reactivation. Ideas could also be verified or denied by checking them against other things within the same community, but the intersubjectivity of that community places certain limits that can be critiqued by the reactivation, according to Husserl. Husserl’s intersubjectivity and reactivation as a form of criticism, was overshadowed by Heidegger’s argument that Daseins already share the same discourse and can only speak from out of it. Hence it is the case that Heidegger’s work not only overshadowed Husserl’s but also covered over Husserl’s method of critical thought.

The interpretation of the land leases are at the heart of the land rights issue. The only way the Aboriginal people can benefit is if the leases are interpreted as literally as possible. This is because the leases were given out to the white settlers for pastoral purposes. If they want to change the way they are using the land then, on a
literal interpretation, the leases are no longer valid and the Aboriginals get the land back. If they are interpreted in a different way, then the leases are still valid. According to deconstruction, there is a multiplicity of interpretations and we should not privilege one over the other. However, even if linguistic and conceptual grids do always mediate our access to reality, there are still some interpretations of reality that are more just than others.

If ‘Self-determination’ is interpreted in such a way that it gives the Aboriginal people the opportunity to retrieve their tradition and live separately in certain areas, it may not challenge the globalisation of Western values. This is because it might only materialise as a twenty first century equivalence to the earlier forms of ghettos and reserves. If the declaration is interpreted in such a way that the Aboriginal people can determine themselves within the present dominant non-Aboriginal society, then it could offer a challenge to Western liberal democracy. Not to the ideal of liberal democracy, found within Derrida’s criticism of Fukuyama’s argument, but as an example of Husserl’s notion of empathy. According to this notion, the other is encountered in a way that neither reduces the other to oneself nor oneself to the other – neither assimilation nor exclusion. Admittedly, Husserl’s empathy was within the transcendental field, however, this was only because he bracketed out existence. In addition, the tug of war between materialism and idealism and the problematic nature of the mind/body relationship, suggests that Husserl’s transcendental field may be just one side of a two-sided coin. According to Spinoza in the Ethics, where he was arguing against Descartes’ distinction between the mind and body, the mind and body or thought and extension might be different attributes of the one substance.

Hence it is manifest that, although two attributes are conceived as really distinct, that is, one is conceived without the aid of the other, we cannot thence conclude that they constitute two beings, or, two different substances. (Spinoza, 1989: 9)
Hence we can conclude that the ability to conceive of the mind in light of the body, and vice versa, is the same thing that allows something to be perceived in light of what is not effectively perceived. It could also be argued that Mulhall’s model could be applied to Husserl’s empathy in a way that compensates for the limits of the transcendental field. And if the Aboriginal people are understood to be radically other in terms of their understanding of land ownership, then this could disrupt the conflated actuality/potentiality of the Western understanding.

There is still the question of who these Aboriginal people are. Who is this self that is going to determine itself in order to disrupt the conflated actuality/potentiality? The Aboriginal people have been part of a white dominated culture for over two hundred years. This itself would conceal the self that is to determine itself. Heidegger criticised Husserl’s reductions on the basis that what Husserl tried to reduce was itself that which constitutes consciousness. If Heidegger is right then we are our prejudices. Heidegger also argued that a being-towards-death could gain some form of authenticity. This notion could be extended to the idea of the death of a culture. That is the position the Aboriginal people face today. Their strategy for saving the culture is to take an essentialist stance. It is this essentialism that they are being criticised for.

Since we know that undecidables and fluid identities are a good strategy when racism is based on notions of essences and fixed identities, we may infer that fixed identities are a good strategy when racism is based on notions of fluid identities. It was noted above, that the inability to maintain the notion of thought’s outside can lead to the substitution of thought’s ‘other’ with other thoughts, or empirical ‘others’ such as black, gay, Jew or female etc. The anti-thesis of turning the inability of accessing thought’s outside by the substitution of thought’s ‘other’ with other devices, or
empirical undecidables, is no better if it too becomes another grand narrative which
denies the excess. Instead of swinging from the thesis to the anti-thesis and back again
at a later date a different type of rationality may be more beneficial. Since we know
that the importance of Husserl’s development of rationality could lie in the possibility
that rationality itself may be culturally relative, we may deduce that the criticism of
Western notions of reason, which are central to the essentialist/social constructivist
debates, may be a criticism of a type of reason which is incompossible with Husserl’s.
Therefore we may say that an uncovering of Husserl’s philosophy from the tradition,
which has covered it up, may enable us to think and exist differently. However,
whether or not these kinds of conceptual and practical political dilemmas can ever be
fully articulated or explained is itself undetermined, but we do know that the evidence
is being disseminated.
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