Board structure as a corporate governance mechanism: evidence from China's real estate stock companies

Ke, Qiulin, Chen, Jian and Isaac, David (2006) Board structure as a corporate governance mechanism: evidence from China's real estate stock companies. In: Globalization, Competition and Growth in China. Routledge Studies on the Chinese Economy . Routledge, pp. 15-40. ISBN 978-0-415-35197-3 (hardback), 978-0-203-69869-3 (e-book)

Abstract

The monitoring role of corporate boards in public corporations has become a central issue in both the financial and academic press. Berle and Mean's (1932) seminal work suggested that managers did not have sufficient equity in the firms they managed to give them the incentive to turn their full attention to profit maximization. As a result, managers may persue self-interested initiatives at the expense of the share-holders. One monitoring mechanism that may temper that tendancy is the oversight of the board of directors: this oversight, or control, function of a board is often described as the most critical of directors' roles (Farna, 1980; Mizruchi, 1983; Zahra nad pearce, 1989).

Actions (login required)