

**University of Greenwich**

**Greenwich Maritime Institute**

**Dissertation submitted towards the**

**degree of Ph D in**

**Maritime History**

**The Royal Navy and Economic Warfare**

**in North America, 1812-1815**

**Brian Arthur**

**Part II**

**February 2009**

## **Chapter 7.**

### **Capital, Credit, Capacity and Trade:**

#### **The Final Phase of Economic Warfare.**

“I will yet hope we may have no more war. If we do, alas...we are not making ready as we ought to do. Congress trifle away the most precious of their days.” Mrs Madison to Mrs Gallatin, 7 January 1814. (1)

On 1 January 1814, the new taxes authorised by Congress the previous August came into effect. These internal excise duties, on the distillation and sale of spirits, sugar refining, auctions, carriages, bank notes and ‘negotiable paper’, were accompanied by ‘direct’ taxes on land, property and slaves. Customs duties alone were failing to meet wartime expenditure, and with public borrowing becoming increasingly difficult, taxation of a wider range of spending had become unavoidable. But these distasteful revivals of earlier Federalist taxes would, as before, have to be paid by the affluent, be predictably unpopular, and if possible evaded. Worse, they were together estimated to yield no more net revenue than \$5.6m, not enough when set against the government’s increasingly urgent need.(2) Funds for the first three months of 1814 had been sought as an additional loan of \$7.5m, agreed in Congress the previous summer, a fiscal and financial consequence of the United States declining overseas trade.(3)

By February 1814, Federalist Joseph Pearson of North Carolina told the House that “the expenditures of the Government, from January 1812, to January 1815, will have exceeded ninety millions of dollars, exclusive of many millions of outstanding claims.”(4) They had, in fact, exceeded \$96.5m by December 1814.(5) Pearson’s estimate that “the public debt will, at the

close of the present year, exceed one hundred and five millions of dollars”, was particularly apposite in view of Gallatin’s reduction of the National Debt to \$48m in 1812, and \$45.2m in 1813.(6) He worried that “the proportion which my constituents will have to pay...unless you restore peace and commerce”, would be “more than they are able to pay”.(7)

Pearson was in no doubt as to the cause of these reverses, and the administration’s financial difficulties.

Blocked up as we are by the enemy’s squadron on our coast; corked up by our still more unmerciful Embargo and Non-Importation laws, calculated as it were, to fill up any little chasm of ills which the enemy alone could not inflict; the entire coasting trade destroyed, and even the pittance of intercourse from one port to another in the same State prohibited; the planters of the Southern and Middle States finding no markets for their products are driven to the alternative of wagoning (sic) it hundreds of miles...or permitting it to rot on their hands. (8)

Given the country’s reduced overseas and internal trade, he doubted whether sufficient credit could be found, or relied on in future, to support the Government’s wartime financial demands. The administration’s position would be “bottomed on credit alone and therefore may fail”. “If we had,” he said, “a flourishing commerce between the States...especially between the moneyed men and the moneyed institutions in all the States...credit might be relied upon to almost any imaginable extent”. Since the British commercial blockade’s restriction of coastal traffic was hindering inter-state trade, “the balance of trade, if trade it may be called...being so entirely against the Southern and Middle States, the whole of our specie is travelling to the North and East.”(9)

It was precisely this difference between the interests of the different States which Warren's commercial blockade had sought to exacerbate by excluding New England from its restrictions. This division was now reflected in the varying prosperity of the different parts of the Union, even in the way in which the bank notes of one area were unacceptable in another, and in how specie was being concentrated in New England, so long opposed to the war.(10) Pearson put his finger on the vulnerable inter-relationship between the banks and the Government.

Suppose some of the principal banks were to contract for the greater part of the proposed loan, and issue their own paper on the credit of the stock to be created; these bills not finding general circulation, or a shock given to the institutions, either by accident or mismanagement, what would be the situation of the Government? Their finances would be deranged, their credit impaired - enriched with debt, but their coffers empty. (11)

The Madison administration was to find obtaining credit increasingly problematic.

William Jones, Secretary of the Treasury, was also until February 1814, Secretary of the Navy, probably an impossible combination of responsibilities for any man. He was by then anxious to leave the Treasury. His replacement was to be Senator George Campbell of Tennessee, who did not inspire confidence since he "wanted promptness of action & more knowledge of finance".(12) Madison had offered the job to abler men, who had declined it. Before leaving office, Jones presented his budget for 1814. He estimated government revenue for the year at \$16m, and outgoings as

\$45.4m, leaving a shortfall of \$29.4m to be raised by loans and Treasury notes.

The growing lack of confidence in government creditworthiness meant that general interest rates were rising, so that, as foreign trade and therefore government revenue fell, money was being borrowed to pay interest on existing loans. As a result, Jones had also to recommend further new taxes.(13) This situation was described by Federalist Alexander Hanson as “deceptive and disingenuous... a most desperate system of fiscal gambling”.(14) Before the war, Gallatin had insisted that a war could be paid for by borrowing loanable funds created over time by profitable foreign trade, which would provide enough customs revenue to cover interest, and finance the government’s ordinary expenditure.

Nevertheless, on 24 March 1814, Congress authorised another loan of \$25m, and a further issue of \$10m of Treasury notes. The Chairman of the House Foreign Relations Committee, John Calhoun, argued that, “The sum proposed” was, “indispensably necessary to meet the expenses of the ensuing year”. Even now some denied the need for further credit. Such opponents, Calhoun insisted, appeared “bold in facing bankruptcy.”(15) Without these steps, the pro-government *National Intelligencer* predicted, “the bankruptcy of the Treasury; confusion and anarchy at home; and...an ignominious submission to whatever terms the arrogance of the enemy might dictate”.(16) This was, however, to be remarkably similar to what was going to happen within a year, when the loan failed.

Meanwhile, the American strategy of maritime economic war on Britain remained theoretically unchanged into 1814. On 5 January, Secretary

of the Navy Jones had written to the commander of the *Constellation*, blockaded in Norfolk, Virginia repeating his view that “The Commerce of the enemy is the most vulnerable interest we can assail, and your main efforts should be directed to its destruction”. Optimistically, he had continued, “The ports of Georgia and North Carolina are the safest and easiest of access, for your prizes,” before adding more realistically, “but the chances of recapture are so great, that no attempt should be made to send in a distant prize”.(17) Jones had earlier ordered that since “the chances of safe arrival of the Prize are so few”, both vessel and cargo should be destroyed.(18) The *Constellation* moreover, was to remain blockaded for the remainder of the war, its crew progressively transferred to the Great Lakes.(19)

### **British Naval Blockade**

British counter measures to attacks on its merchant vessels had included both convoy and the naval blockade of American warships. As shown in Appendix A, Table 2(a), at the end of 1813, the Royal Navy had blockaded in American ports, harbours, rivers and estuaries no fewer than fifteen United States naval vessels, with more to be destroyed in 1814, four in Washington alone. Even according to a contemporary American account, British naval blockade had proved so effective that, of 1,613 British ships taken or destroyed by the Americans, throughout the war and across the world, only 172 had fallen victim to United States “public vessels”.(20)

The British naval blockade, however, had not been an unqualified success. Poor winter visibility offshore contributed to occasional American blockade breaking. USS *President* had escaped from Providence, Rhode

Island in early December 1813, and the *Constitution* from Boston on 1 January 1814.(21) Each escape potentially threatened British shipping, but on this occasion the frigates appear to have taken only four prizes between them, due partly to the rigorously enforced British convoy system, although each proved able to evade British patrols and safely regain an American harbour.(22) Admiralty instructions not to tackle large American frigates single-handed, had meant that HMS *Loire*, of 38 guns, had allowed the *Constitution* to return to Marblehead unmolested. The American brigs *Rattlesnake* and *Enterprise* also escaped into the Caribbean from Portsmouth, New Hampshire in early January 1814, but of their eleven interceptions before their return in March, only two were British, one a merchantman and the other a privateer.(23)

Nevertheless, an important aspect of the success of the British maritime blockades of the United States, both naval and commercial, remained the number of British and neutral merchant vessels recaptured by the Royal Navy while sailing under prize crews to American ports. As shown in Appendix A, Table 1, of the 121 prizes taken into Halifax, Nova Scotia by the Royal Navy during the remaining 28 weeks of 1812 after the American declaration of war, 34 had been recaptures, a substantial recovery rate of 28.1%. In 1813, the Royal Navy took 209 prizes into Halifax, and excluding those of British and Canadian privateers, 42 had been recaptures, a lower recovery rate of 20.1%. During 1814, of 135 Royal Naval prizes sent into Halifax, 36 were to be recaptured British or neutral merchantmen, a rate of 26.7%. During the war and its aftermath, until May 1815, Halifax Vice-Admiralty court was to receive 473 of the Royal Navy's prizes. Of these, 116

were recaptures, an overall recovery rate of 24.5%. Other Vice-Admiralty courts operated in Antigua, Bermuda, New Providence in the Bahamas and Port Royal in Jamaica. If overall, as Lloyd's of London reported to the House of Commons in December 1814, as many as 373 British vessels out of 1,175 captured by the Americans had indeed been recovered, a rate of 31.7%, then the Royal Navy prevented almost a third of American prizes reaching a port in the United States.(24) In preventing this proportion of United States captures reaching American ports, the Royal Navy significantly offset the impact of the American strategy against British maritime commerce.

Measurement of the effects of British commercial blockade necessarily involves allowing for the comparative impact of the at times contemporaneous American restrictive legislation, especially Madison's second embargo, theoretically in operation until mid-April 1814. Concerned by American grain and flour exports to the British army in the Iberian Peninsula and Canada, and of food and timber to the West Indies, as well as provisions supplied to British blockading squadrons offshore, by the end of July 1813, Madison had convinced himself of the need for another embargo. Congress having refused to ratify his suggestion, Madison imposed it by Executive Order through the Secretary of the Navy on 29 July 1813.(25)

As shown in Appendix B, Table 7, when first applied, and thought likely to be rigorously enforced, Madison's final embargo appears at first to have raised New England commodity prices considerably, notably sugar prices. In August 1813, within days of the imposition of Madison's second Embargo, sugar prices in Boston had risen to 31 cents a pound, although by



the new year they had fallen again by almost 42% when the embargo proved largely ineffective.(26)

Boston Sugar Prices 1813-1815 in \$ per cwt of 100lbs.

First Period: New England subject to Embargo but not British commercial Blockade.

	Date		Price	
5	August	1813	31.00	
7	August	1813	31.00	
15	December	1813	24.50	
17	December	1813		Madison's Second Embargo endorsed by Congress
29	January	1814	18.00	
2	February	1814	19.50	
7	March	1814	18.50	
15	March	1814	18.50	40.3% price fall since introduction of 2 <sup>nd</sup> Embargo
19	March	1814	22.50	
30	March	1814		Madison calls in Congress for suspension of Embargo

Second Period: New England subject to neither Embargo nor British commercial Blockade

2	April	1814		Suspension of Embargo learned of in Boston
14	April	1814		Repeal by Congress of Embargo and Non Importation Acts
16	April	1814	15.32	31.9 % price fall since 19 March 1814
25	April	1814		British commercial blockade extended to New England
26	April	1814	15.75	

Third Period: New England subject to British commercial Blockade only

5	May	1814		British commercial blockade of NE known of in Boston
9	May	1814	15.50	
16	May	1814	16.00	
14	July	1814	17.50	Credit sale price still available
16	August	1814	18.00	Cash price
22	August	1814	18.00	
23	August	1814	18.00	
6	October	1814	19.50	Cash price only quoted from this point
19	October	1814	19.50	
20	October	1814	20.00	
22	October	1814	20.00	
27	October	1814	22.50	45.2% price rise since commercial blockade known of in NE
17	February	1815		Treaty of Ghent ratified in Washington
24	February	1815	15.00	

Source: JCBL: Prices from Brown & Ives Corr: Box 160, ff.9-10. from Charles Greene, Brown & Ives Boston agent to Thomas Poynton Ives, of Brown & Ives, Providence, R. I., on dates given.

Congress had been extremely slow to endorse Madison's demand for another embargo, but had finally agreed on 17 December 1813.(27) By then however, much of its initial impact seems to have been lost. On 23 December 1813, still unaware that the rumoured Congressional approval had been given, a Boston business agent, Charles Greene wrote, "We have no embargo yet, but we are in no hurry to receive it".(28) With the embargo apparently not as strictly applied as had been feared, by late January 1814, sugar prices had reverted to an average of 18 cents a pound.(29) As evident from Appendix B, Tables 10-13, average Boston prices of other commodities, including molasses, coffee, and tea of various sorts, followed a remarkably similar pattern. News of the embargo had had an effect on New England commodity prices which was marked, but short-lived.(30)

Moreover, since the *Bramble*'s arrival on 30 December 1813, with news of Napoleon's comprehensive defeat at Leipzig implying more normal trade in Europe, any hope of an American embargo on trade hurting Britain more than the United States, was seen by many to be unrealistic. Madison himself reversed his opinion on an American embargo's likely effectiveness. Although no longer as directly concerned, the recently replaced Secretary of the Treasury William Jones, recommended lifting the embargo in order to gain revenue from trade, which in any case could not be stopped.(31) Madison again addressed Congress on the embargo on 30 March 1814, this time recommending its repeal, together with that of the Non-Importation Act. Operation of the embargo was immediately suspended, and despite outspoken opposition, the Act was repealed on 14 April 1814.(32) Madison's final embargo had lasted only eight months after his Executive Order, with less

than four months between Congressional ratification and its suspension, and eventual repeal.

The repeal of the Embargo and Non-Importation Act creates an opportunity for comparison of apparent consequences, and the relative importance of American restrictive legislation and British commercial blockade as causes of the United States fiscal, financial and economic difficulties. The New England prices of a range of commodities can be systematically observed over the successive time periods covering the operation and repeal of Madison's final Embargo, and during the interval when neither American embargo nor British commercial blockade was in operation, and also that period after 25 April 1814, when British commercial blockade was widened to include New England.

### **Wider British Blockade and New England Prices**

Commodity prices included in the correspondence of Brown & Ives, a long-established firm of import/export merchants of Providence, Rhode Island in New England, provide just such an opportunity for analysis of this kind. The prosperous and influential business, usually represented during these periods by partner Thomas Poynton Ives, had agents in Boston, New England's major port, Philadelphia and New York, and, despite the war, maintained contacts with both Washington and London.(33)

Prices in Boston, as reported to Providence, were sensitive both to events in Europe, and to American political developments. On 25 April 1814, Thomas Ives wrote to Brown & Ives commission agent in Boston about a cargo of sugar, newly shipped from New Bedford, Connecticut to Boston.

“This article”, he wrote, “as well as several others has fallen very considerably [in price] since the Presidents (sic) recommendation to repeal the non-importation & Embargo Laws”.(34)

From averaging \$22.19 a hundredweight on 19 March 1814, with the embargo still legally, if not very effectively in operation, the price of sugar fell to an average of \$15.32 on 16 April, by which time news of Madison’s suspension, although not Congress’s repeal, would have reached Boston, unwelcomed by those used to speculating on the short-lived panic caused by the ‘restrictive system’.(35) News of the repeal of Madison’s last Embargo caused a fall of almost 32% in the price of sugar in New England since 19 March.(36) By 26 April, the price of sugar in Boston had rallied slightly to \$15.50, or \$16.00 for those needing credit. Then, during three successive sales, up to the 16 May, the average price of sugar in Boston, settled at around that price, as shown in Appendix B, Table 7.(37)

Boston prices were also responsive to British blockading activity. Charles Greene, Brown & Ives Boston agent, wrote to them on 15 March 1814 that “The recent captures by the British in the W[est] Indies have occasioned considerable demand for goods coming from there”, and consequently higher prices for them.(38) On 1 April 1814, Vice-Admiral Cochrane had succeeded Warren as commander of the British North America Station. He had acted quickly on concerns that increased neutral trade with New England might contribute sufficient customs revenue to the American government to enable it to fund new naval building, and finance further fighting.(39) On 25 April 1814, he had therefore issued a proclamation from his Bermuda headquarters instituting a British commercial blockade of the

entire coast of America, including for the first time the ports of New England. The impact of this decision is also reflected in Boston commodity prices.

Eight days later on 4 May, Brown & Ives sent their Boston agent important instructions. Partner Thomas Ives wrote to Charles Greene,

We are just informed of an arrival this morning at Boston from Bermuda bringing information of a Blockade of the whole Coast – this unexpected intelligence must have the effect to enhance the value of all foreign productions & you will doubtless avail yourself of it to dispose of our sugars for a good price. (40)

Only the day before – the last before Boston’s dealers took the extended British blockade into account - Greene had informed Brown & Ives that the auction price of sugar in Boston had been \$15.75 per short hundredweight. By 27 October 1814, the last date available from this correspondence before the end of the war, the price for the same amount of sugar had risen to \$22.50, an increase of over 45%.(41) As shown by Appendix B, Tables 10 -13, average Boston prices of other commodities, including coffee, molasses and tea of various sorts, followed a remarkably similar pattern over the same periods, showing that the maritime British commercial blockade of New England made a greater proportional impact on Boston commodity prices than the former American ‘restrictive system’.

Boston Molasses Prices 1813-1814 in \$'s per gallon.

First Period: New England subject to Embargo but not British commercial Blockade

Date			Price	
20	November	1813	1.20	
13	December	1813	1.24	
17	December	1813		Madison's Second Embargo endorsed by Congress
23	December	1813	1.47	
29	January	1814	1.30	
2	February	1814	0.96	
3	March	1814	0.86.5	
12	March	1814	0.92.5	
19	March	1814	0.94.5	
25	March	1814	0.98	
30	March	1814		Madison calls in Congress for suspension of Embargo

Second Period: New England subject to neither Embargo nor British commercial Blockade

2	April	1814		Suspension of Embargo learned of in Boston
14	April	1814		Repeal of Embargo and Non Importation Acts by Congress
16	April	1814	0.77	47.6% price fall since 2 <sup>nd</sup> Embargo passed in Congress
25	April	1814	0.63.5	British commercial blockade extended to New England
26	April	1814	0.60.5	

Third Period: New England subject to British commercial Blockade only

5	May	1814	0.68	cash price, British commercial blockade known of in Boston
21	May	1814	0.74.5	
9	July	1814	0.89	
14	July	1814	0.95	cash price only quoted from this point
12	August	1814	0.91.25	
1	September	1814	1.00	
14	November	1814	1.43	110.3% price rise since commercial blockade of NE applied
22	November	1814	1.40.5	
29	November	1814	1.40	
19	December	1814	1.28	
29	December	1814	1.32	94.1 % price rise since commercial blockade of NE

Source: JCBL: Prices from Brown & Ives Corr: Box 160, ff.9 –10, from Charles Greene, Brown & Ives Boston agent to Thomas Poynton Ives, of Brown & Ives, Providence, R. I., on dates given.

The British commercial blockade became a major consideration for bidders and sellers at Boston commodity auctions. The day after the news reached them of its extension to New England, the price of “Havannah” brown sugar fetched \$16.00 cash, and \$16.25 for those needing credit, beginning its climb to \$23.00 by the end of September 1814, another increase of almost 43%. Greene noted the increased prices of sugar on 5 May, and added, “it is thought that they will improve still more in consequence of the news of the blockade”.(42)

The price of sugar in New England had fallen sharply with the repeal of Madison’s final embargo, measuring the extent by which it had been inflated by the shortage it had caused. After a period of stability, when neither embargo nor blockade were in force, the British blockade was applied to New England. The price of sugar had then risen by a considerably larger percentage margin, indicating the greater relative impact of the British commercial blockade. Comparison of New England sugar prices between the relevant time periods appears to provide empirical evidence of the relative importance of the United States restrictive legislation and British commercial blockade in imposing economic difficulties on the American economy. These difficulties, including inflation and unemployment, in turn produced fiscal and financial problems for the American government, determining its ability and preparedness to continue the war, and influencing the terms on which it was ended.

After initial enthusiasm, both Embargo and Non-Importation Act had been demonstrably ineffective for much of that time. In Eastport, Maine, for example, army officers expected to repress it had shown a “blind indifference

and an almost total disregard...to the prosecution of an illicit trade.”(43)

Conversely, the British maritime commercial blockade was to continue with reinforced squadrons, uninterrupted except by foul weather, for almost another ten months, from 25 April 1814 until peace on 17 February 1815. Measurement of its impact is now uncomplicated by American restrictive legislation other than a residual ban on importing British owned goods, holding a British licence, or trading directly with the enemy. The last restriction was certainly ignored, as when HMS *Nymphe* off Boston, was supplied in June and July 1814, with stock, fruit, vegetables, books, newspapers and information from American boats.(44)

The entrepreneurial flair for which New England was famous meant that the implications of the extended British blockade were quickly investigated and put to the test. Business intelligence in New England was both quickly gathered and acted upon. By 24 May 1814, Thomas Ives knew of a letter from “Captain Milner of the British ship *Bulwark* dated 4<sup>th</sup> inst. To the Spanish Consul at Newport Communicating Ad Cochrane’s proclamation [which] States that ‘no vessels will be suffered to depart with Cargoes’ – it seems to imply that those in ballast will not be molested.”(45) His commercial agent in Boston quickly discovered that a Russian ship already in America when the blockade was extended, the *Nicholas Paulowitch*, could be insured there for \$8,000. For a 5% premium, of \$400, the vessel would be covered to sail in ballast from Newport R.I. to the Spanish-held Amelia Island off the Florida border, “& during the time she will be taking in a cargo” of raw cotton, “possibly for Gothenburg”.(46) The cover specifically excluded “British capture from Newport to Amelia Island”, and the whole contract pre-



supposed that the Russian ship was not one of the three neutrals already “ordered back to Rhode Island” for attempting to contravene the new British blockade. The plan came to nothing – the *Nicholas Paulowitch* was detained by the Royal Navy and sent back to Newport, presumably for trying to export a cargo to the Spanish on Amelia Island.(47) By 31 May, the official *London Gazette* had informed neutral European governments that the whole American coast was under “strict and vigorous blockade”.(48) It was also public news in American cities.(49) On 9 July 1814, in Baltimore, Niles’ *Weekly Register* reported that “The eastern coast of the United States is much vexed by the enemy”.(50) Consequently, when in July Greene attempted to insure the Russian ship for another attempt, he had to report to Brown & Ives that “the underwriters decline altogether the risk of British capture”.(51)

The extended British blockade now clearly affected the volume of American trade, even when conducted in neutral vessels trading in and out of New England. Between 4 May 1814 and the peace, fourteen vessels attempting to reach Boston and other New England harbours from foreign ports were detained by the Royal Navy’s blockading squadrons, and sent into Halifax Vice-Admiralty Court for adjudication. Over the same period, privateers sent in two more. Between 4 May 1814 and the end of the war, the Royal Navy took and sent into Halifax alone, a total of 130 prizes, both neutral and American. Both the *Boston Gazette*, and the *Columbian Centinel* report that by the end of the war, foreign trade shipping movements from New England’s major port had fallen to zero.(52)

Nor was the British commercial blockade extended to New England at the cost of relaxing it elsewhere, it remained rigorous and effective on

other parts of the American coast. When relieved from his station off New London on 30 May, Captain Milne of HMS *Bulwark* wrote that, “The blockade has annoyed them very much, for they thought they would be allowed just to trade as usual on their taking off the embargo, and they were very much disappointed when I would not even allow them to trade along shore.”(53)

The crucial New England price changes during 1814, are reflected in Warren and Pearson’s yearly and monthly indexes of one hundred and sixteen American wholesale commodity prices for 1814, shown as Appendix B, Table 14, which provide evidence of the same pattern of price movements for the United States as a whole.(54) The monthly figures show that, having been constant at 182 for both March and April 1814, the index falls to 179 for May and June, reflecting the reduced opportunities for exploiting shortages formerly offered by the now repealed restrictive legislation. The index shows a continued fall for the summer months of 1814, from 178 in July to 177 for both August and September, partly as American entrepreneurs evaluated the possibilities of evading the widened British commercial blockade imposed on 25 April. This decrease is unlikely to be merely seasonal, as the index for these months in other years often rises. The index may also show a time-lag in the movement of wholesale prices in response to the extended blockade as rumours of peace persisted, and for as long as speculator’s current stocks lasted. The continued deterioration in the condition of some stocks might make selling them increasingly necessary, thereby stabilising prices.

By October 1814, however, by which time neutral trade with America had been curtailed, even with New England, the wholesale price

index rises sharply by six points to 183. This is the largest change in the index since the nine-point rise between February and March 1809, apparently caused by Jefferson's Embargo. The index is seen to rise further to 187 in November 1814, and again to 193 for December, making an increase since September of 16 points. Without the interfering effect of restrictive legislation, the impact of the British commercial blockade of the United States, now including New England, is measured by the index of these American wholesale commodity prices being seen to rise by a remarkable ten points between October and December 1814, as shown in Appendix B, Table and Graph 14.

Indeed, the only comparable changes in the index are the sharp declines, totalling seventeen points, between January and March 1815, when ratification of peace brought the British blockade to an end. It falls from 185 in February 1815, to 176 in March, a startlingly clear measure of the effectiveness of British maritime commercial blockade. The index of American wholesale commodity prices falls another 12 points between March and May 1815, as trans-Atlantic trade resumes. The decline in the index of all United States wholesale commodity prices is seen to continue until the end of 1816, when the resumption of American foreign trade appeared to be lasting, and the peace not merely an armistice. The effectiveness of Britain's commercial blockade can probably be most clearly measured when the application of the strategy is ended. The same pattern is evident in a weighted annual index of all US wholesale commodity prices 1800-20, shown in Appendix B as Table and Graph 15.

Even while increasingly short of funds, the American government had apparently decided against re-doubling of the rate of import duties on 1 January 1814, as Niles had pessimistically predicted in December 1813.(55) This decision was justified by the precipitate fall in American imports, shown in Appendix B, Table 1, which had already fallen almost 72% between 1812 and 1813.(56) They were to fall almost another 42% between 1813 and 1814.(57) American imports between 1812 and 1814 had therefore fallen almost 84%.(58) For just over the last eight months of 1814, this fall had been due solely to the British commercial maritime blockade.

Decreased imports had produced a marked decline in net customs revenue receipts. As shown in Appendix B, Table 4, net customs revenue for 1813 had shown a real decrease of over 65% with allowance made for the doubling of the rates of import duties on 1 July 1812.(59) By the end of December 1814, net customs revenue had fallen another \$2.2m to an unadjusted \$4, 694,318, a further fall of almost a third, the imports of both years being taxed at the higher rates.(60) With adjustment made for those periods subject to the doubled tax rate, during the years from January 1812 to the end of December 1814, net customs receipts had fallen by no less than 76.5%.(61) The absence of adjustment for the American doubling of import duty rates in July 1812 has in the past partially obscured the impact of the British commercial blockade of the United States.(62)

Comparatively, Jefferson's embargo, in force between 22 December 1807 and 15 March 1809, had reduced government income, almost entirely composed of net customs revenue, from \$17.1m in 1808 to \$7.8m in 1809, a fall of almost 55%, eroding Gallatin's accumulated surplus of \$17m.(63) Any

decrease in revenue of over 50% was serious, but is supplanted by one of over 76% which necessitated government borrowing under difficult circumstances. Adjustment for change in the rate of duty therefore allows a comparative assessment of the fiscal impact of Jefferson's embargo compared with that of the British maritime commercial blockade between 1812 and 1815. For less than a third of the war, British commercial blockade was accompanied by American restrictive legislation, which was clearly intermittent, unevenly applied, poorly enforced and widely evaded.<sup>(64)</sup> The major cause of the real loss of more than three-quarters of American net customs revenue between 1812-14 may therefore be attributed proportionately to British commercial blockade.

#### **British Commercial Blockade and American Trade: Exports**

Exports were not taxed, but the unemployment, inflation and disruption resulting from the loss of overseas markets further damaged the American economy and government creditworthiness.<sup>(65)</sup> As shown in Appendix B, Table 16, American total exports had fallen from \$27.9m in 1813 to only \$6.9m in 1814, a decrease of more than 75%.<sup>(66)</sup> During Seyburt's accounting period from 1 October 1813 to 30 September 1814, fear of loss had deterred many American exporters from shipping goods and produce worth more than three-quarters of the value of the previous year's exports; others made the attempt. Seyburt records the value of cargoes reported as having left American ports, not the value of exports successfully reaching foreign harbours. Between 1 October 1814, and peace on 17 February 1815, the Royal Navy detained and sent into Halifax ten vessels

ranging from 250 to 17 tons, which had left American ports with cargoes for foreign destinations in breach of the British commercial blockade.(67)

The loss of American exports during the six months from the embargo's suspension on 30 March to 30 September 1814, was due wholly to the British commercial blockade. But while American exports condemned by British Vice Admiralty Courts during the last three months of 1814, and until 17 February 1815, will have reduced exports during the accounting year from 1 October 1814 to 30 September 1815, the figure is probably impossible to separate from the great increase in American exports after peace was ratified.(68)

Even in the early stages of the war, the prosperity of American foreign trade had been heavily dependent on the export of wheat, oats, maize, rice, barley and rye, together with flour, bread and biscuits. Five hundred licences had been issued to American shippers to allow supplies to continue to the British Army in the Peninsula.(69) Lisbon prices, "frequently double" those elsewhere, had "spurred the American farmer and merchant to greater and still greater effort."(70) However, after May 1813, the Peninsular Army no longer relied on American grain and flour. Supplies of American flour to Spain and Portugal peaked during 1813 such that saturation point was reached, and prices fell.(71) The issue of new British licences was suspended. Usually valid for three or six months, genuine licences became scarce, and forgeries more obvious. During 1814, this once lucrative trade collapsed. If Congressman Timothy Pitkin's high estimate for 1813 is accepted, sales of American flour for the Peninsula between 1813 and 1814, fell by more than 99%. With Madison's embargo suspended after March 1814, the British

commercial blockade ensured that this trade was not replaced by sales elsewhere.(72) By the end of 1814, overall American wheat and flour exports had fallen since 1813 by more than 85%, maize and meal exports by more than 90%.(73) Comparatively, even Jefferson's 1808 embargo had been less severe, reducing such exports by 81%, largely recovered in 1809.(74)

### **American Re-exports**

Most American imports intended for re-export were entitled to a rebate of the import duty paid on entry, less a small administration charge, known as 'drawback'. Other re-exports, like foreign wines, teas, coffee and spices were not, so their sale abroad added to government revenue as did the tonnage, lighthouse and harbour dues paid by all exporters. However, as evident from Appendix B, Table 16, by 30 September 1814, American re-exports had fallen precipitously from \$2.8m worth in 1813, to only \$145,000, a decrease of almost 95%.(75) Between 1811 and 1814, American re-exports of sugar fell by more than 99%, cocoa by 98.8%, and coffee by almost 98%. Pepper re-exports of 3m lbs in 1811, fell to nil in 1814.(76) The contribution of re-exports to American revenue, while never large, fell from \$123,418 for the year ending 30 September 1813, to \$7,932 by the same date in 1814, a fall of almost 94%.(77)

### **British Commercial Blockade and American Trade: Economic Effects**

For comparison, Jefferson's 1808 Embargo had caused a fall of over 68% in the overall foreign trade of the United States, imports and total

exports combined, shown in Appendix B, Table 17.(78) This however had been followed by a 40% recovery in 1809.(79) Combination of import and export figures reveals an *average* value of overall American trade in 1810-11 approaching \$138m, as the effect of Jefferson's Embargo receded.(80) By 1812 it had fallen to \$117m, by 1813 to \$50m and by 1814, to less than \$20m. American restrictive legislation and British commercial blockade, at times contemporaneous, were making a marked impact.

The decrease in overall American foreign trade during 1812 had not been as great as pessimists had feared, with the effect of Madison's first embargo offset by determined attempts to beat it, prolonged dispute over its terms, and by delayed British commercial blockade. Total American foreign trade had decreased from \$119.2m in 1811, to \$117.3m in 1812, a fall of only 1.6%. The fall in total American foreign trade between 1812-13 had been caused by the continued effect of Non-Importation legislation and escalating British blockade, and had exceeded 57%.(81) It was followed, not by recovery, but by a further fall of over 60%.(82) Most significantly, between 1812 and the end of 1814, United States total foreign trade fell by more than 83%, reduced after April 1814 by British commercial blockade extended to the whole American coast alone, unaccompanied by the effects of domestic legislation.(83)

### **British Commercial Blockade and the American Mercantile Marine**

Jefferson's year-long Embargo is held by Gardiner to have caused the unemployment of 55,000 seamen and 100,000 ancillary workers.(84) The cumulative effects of two successive years of reduced American foreign trade



are likely to have been greater. Incomes lost in maritime unemployment and depression would have reduced total spending and other employment, and the ability to pay tax or lend to the government.

In 1811, the British merchant marine was comprised of over twenty thousand vessels and, with a combined tonnage of almost 2.25m., the world's largest.(85) However, in the course of Britain's war against Napoleon, the blockade of French merchant shipping by the Royal Navy had allowed neutral shipping, especially American, to expand rapidly. Gallatin estimated that between 1803-07, the American merchant fleet had grown by 70,000 tons a year, to become the largest neutral fleet.(86) By 1807, over a million tons of American merchant shipping carried the United States foreign trade, almost 93% of all vessels doing so, including foreign 'bottoms'.(87) As clear from Appendix B, Table 18, Jefferson's Embargo of 1808 reversed the trend. Nevertheless, in 1811, 948,247 tons of American shipping had carried the United States foreign trade, still almost exclusively in its own ships. Madison's 90-Day Embargo and British blockade together were to reduce this by almost 30% to 667,999 tons by the end of 1812.(88)

By the end of 1813, British blockade of Chesapeake Bay, the Delaware River and some American Southern ports had produced a further 65% decrease in the tonnage of American shipping carrying United States foreign trade.(89) These blockades had been supplemented to some extent after August by Madison's Executive Orders banning exports and coastal traffic, although widespread corruption and collaboration had done little to reduce their evasion.(90) By mid-April 1814, these restrictions were lifted. Thereafter, decreased United States foreign trade was due solely to British

blockade, now extended to the whole American coast. The tonnage of American vessels engaged in United States foreign trade between 1813 and 1814, fell by almost 75%, to only 59,626 tons.(91) This shows the final strangulation of the American foreign carrying trade, exclusively by British blockade for the eight and a half months from mid-April to the end of December 1814.

Before the war, larger ocean-going vessels had conventionally been 'Registered' for each separate voyage, a fee going to the Treasury. Coastal vessels could be 'Enrolled', licenced for a fixed annual payment for an unspecified number of voyages.(92) A fee was also paid for fishing vessels when in use, although the extent of smuggling, informing and collaborative victualling of British blockading squadrons, meant that these were not used exclusively for fishing. Whether or not fees were actually paid for registration, enrolment or fishing depended on the current level of American legislative restriction, the prospects of profitable trade in competition with the still expanding British merchant fleet, and the likelihood of British capture. Although American embargoes were in force for less than one third of the war's duration, the Non-Importation Act had forbidden American imports until mid-April 1814. Its repeal however had almost coincided with an increase in the range and severity of British blockade. The sense in an American ship-owner paying to take part in either overseas or coastal trade therefore remained limited.

As shown in Appendix B, Table 19, of almost 675,000 tons of American shipping potentially available for foreign trade in 1813, only 37% was thought worth registering for specific voyages.(93) As Mahan argues, of

these, “many doubtless sailed under British license”.(94) By the end of 1814, when British commercial blockade alone constrained American trans-oceanic trade, the proportion of suitable shipping with registration duties paid, had fallen to 8.7%.(95)

The annual enrolment fee, paid irrespective of the number of voyages made, left operators free to exploit opportunities to leave port as they arose, and enrolments had risen by almost 40% between 1812-13.(96) Despite this, the proportion of enrolled vessels for which duty was paid also fell, from almost 54% in 1813, to 41% in 1814.(97) As British maritime blockade tightened, even the proportion of fishing vessels actually paying duty fell between 1813-14 by 11.2%. Between 1813-14, total new building also fell by 8.7%, from 32,583 to 29,751 gross tons, reflecting a lack of demand for shipping space. This rate was probably too low to offset the rapid depreciation of the under-used United States merchant fleet, but fails to justify Mahan’s assertion that American shipbuilding had “practically ceased”.(98)

The widening British maritime commercial blockade severely affected the American whaling ‘fisheries’ in 1814. The total tonnage of American deep-sea whaling vessels had fallen from 2,942 in 1813, to only 562 in 1814, a decrease of over 80%. Settlements largely dependent on whaling, such as New Bedford, Connecticut, began a long-term diversification into textiles. The number of vessels whaling from Nantucket had halved since the war began, adding to the island’s isolation and hardship, and to its need for a negotiated neutrality.(99)

## **British Commercial Blockade and the Size of Prizes**

Further evidence of the ever-tightening British commercial blockade by 1814 can be found in the smaller average size of the ship-rigged vessels and brigs brought into Halifax as prizes as the war progressed. Risk limitation also explains the rising average size of the faster schooners and sloops detained by the Royal Navy and brought into Halifax until May 1815.(100)

The average size of ship-rigged vessel detained by the Royal Navy and brought into Halifax in 1812, had been 317.2 tons. By 1813 this average had fallen to 309.7 tons, and to only 263.1 tons by 1814. No ship-rigged prizes were recorded as having been brought into Halifax by May 1815. The average size of brig sent into Halifax as a prize in 1812 had been 191.4 tons, falling to an average 176.0 tons in 1813, and to 166.4 tons in 1814. The four brigs detained in Halifax early in 1815 averaged only 165.3 tons. The average size of all American vessels newly built as replacements, was also decreasing.

Conversely, the average size of schooners and sloops seems to have risen, being faster and more frequently used in attempts to evade American customs officers, while restrictive legislation still applied, as well as British blockading squadrons. The average size of schooner sent into Halifax in 1812 had been 71.3 tons. By 1813, this average had risen to 93.4 tons and by 1814, to 135.7 tons. The size of the three schooners sent into Halifax in early 1815, averaged as much as 144.0 tons. The average size of sloop detained also rose as the British blockade tightened, as the war progressed. Averaging only 55.5 tons in 1812, sloops detained in Halifax averaged 69.3 tons by 1813, and 73.6 tons by 1814, although carrying relatively little to earn revenue when

compared with the ships and brigs they displaced. The average size of newly built American replacements was also decreasing

The unrelenting British blockade and the occasionally contemporaneous American restrictive legislation until mid-April 1814, appear to have induced an unwillingness to risk the capture of larger and more valuable vessels and cargoes, not to mention their crews. Prohibitively expensive insurance premiums would have added to this reluctance, especially when payment by insurance companies might fail to meet litigation costs. Financial capital would tend to become scarce and expensive as the risks of using larger vessels became more evident, and alternative investments progressively more attractive, among them cotton processing and textile manufacture, ironically protected by the blockade's exclusion of normally cheap British cloth.(101) For those remaining in shipping, smaller cargoes in faster vessels, preferably on inshore journeys, would become a more acceptable risk than a trans-oceanic voyage risking confiscation of a larger vessel and its costlier cargo.

The average tonnage of prizes at different times, seems at first to indicate that the British commercial blockade was at its most successful during Warren's United North America and West Indies command in 1813, not in 1814 when, after 1 April, Cochrane assumed command of the re-separated North America station. When considering the Halifax Vice Admiralty Court alone throughout, in 1812, a total of 121 captures totalled 17,702 tons, averaging 186.34 tons. In 1813, a total of 209 vessels reached 26,795 tons, producing a lower average size of 161.42 tons as smaller schooners and sloops began to be used in preference to larger ships and brigs.

In 1814, 135 vessels were sent into Halifax, together making a total of 15,212 tons, averaging a still lower 139.56 tons. Although the Treaty of Ghent received American ratification in mid-February 1815, prizes continued to arrive in Halifax until May 1815. A total of eight, totalling 1,093 tons, produce a higher average of 156.14 tons, perhaps indicating shippers' attempts to 'jump the gun' with larger vessels before ratification. However, after 1 April 1814, a higher proportion of vessels detained may have been sent to other ports, many in the now re-separated West Indies stations, in preference to Halifax. Vice- Admiralty Courts also operated in Bermuda, the Bahamas, Jamaica and Antigua.(102)

### **British Commercial Blockade and the American Fiscal Problem**

Throughout the war, the British commercial blockade remained selective. In Britain, the Opposition referred throughout to industrial unemployment, caused partly by overproduction in anticipation of South American markets. It was however eased to some extent by continuing American demand for British manufactured goods, met by imports through British occupied Castine, and Spain's Amelia Island. The British commercial blockade had never sought to prevent American trade entirely, nor had British policy makers ever intended that it should. It was clearly in British interests that American flour, livestock and timber continued to reach the British West Indies, and the army in Canada. It was similarly important for supplies to reach the blockading squadrons at sea, and the Lancashire cotton mills. Nevertheless, the British commercial blockade had been sufficiently effective to ensure that as import duty revenues failed, the American government

turned for war finances to the 'direct' taxes and internal excise duties they had once opposed in principle, and to progressively less productive credit. By 1814, the fiscal effects of reduced trade, worsened by persistent and self-interested Congressional procrastination, had accumulated. As shown in Appendix B Table 20, a shortfall in American total revenue in relation to total expenditure had become evident well before the end of 1812.(103)

The 'direct' taxes on property, in effect from 1 January 1814, were initially fairly successful in their first year, producing \$2.2m of the \$3m due, almost 74% of their expected yield. In 1815 however, they actually collected less money when their expected yield was doubled to \$6m. Internal excise duties were less successful in 1814, collecting only \$1.9m of the \$3.3m expected, less than 59%. Internal duties were also inefficient. Writing in 1818, John Bristed recorded the cost of their collection, calculated to be as high as 8.5% of their actual receipts in 1814, and still 5.9% even in 1815, most of which was in peacetime.(104) While the war lasted, even taxes once used by the government's Federalist opponents would do little to rectify a growing shortage of revenue.

As Ezekiel Bacon amongst others had warned Congress before the war began, as British commercial blockade continued and war costs mounted, customs revenue increasingly failed to meet expenditure. As evident from Appendix B, Tables 20 to 22, total tax revenue in 1812 had been less than 44% of total government expenditure, in 1813 under 42%, and by 1814, only just over 28%.(105) Even including miscellaneous receipts, total government income, excluding borrowing, formed less than half of government expenditure in 1812, and less than a third by 1814. Customs revenue of only

\$7.3m in 1815, just \$1.3m more than for the last whole year of war, suggests that the British commercial blockade remained effective up to, and perhaps somewhat beyond, the Treaty of Ghent's ratification, and that the Connecticut Federalist Timothy Pitkin's figures, purporting to measure the post-war recovery of American foreign trade, are a serious over-estimate.(106)

### **British Blockade: Specie, Capital and Credit**

Between 1812 and 1814, United States imports had exceeded exports by over \$40m.(107) This relative lack of American exports meant that any imports either brought legitimately into the United States in neutral vessels, or smuggled, had usually to be paid for with money in the form of precious metal. Since only New England's ports were open to neutral shipping before April 1814, internal American trade in imported goods brought much of the specie formerly held in the middle and southern states into the New England states. By June 1814, Massachusetts banks had accumulated \$7, 326,000 as specie holdings, compared with \$1,709,000 in the same month in 1811.(108) According to Niles, in 1810, Massachusetts bank deposits had totalled \$2,671,619 of which 58% was specie, by 1814 deposits had grown to \$8,875,589 of which 72% was precious metal.(109) In March 1814, Charles Greene, Brown & Ives agent in Boston, could report to them that,

Money has been very abundant here, but I observe that some of our own capitalists who have had 30 to 70,000 dollars in the bank have disposed of their Surplus funds.  
(110)



The risks imposed by the British commercial blockade, although so far only outside New England, ensured that many such funds were to be diverted from traditional shipping.(111)

This accumulation of money by the merchants and bankers of New England led to the unrealistic expectation of their lending much of it to the American government. Greene had continued, “I believe some have bo’t [bought] govt paper, altho’ many think it will experience a very great Depression.”(112) Elsewhere, this reluctance caused caustic comment, and peremptory demands. Greene further reported that “The New York banks have agents here to raise money, and it is asserted that the Manhattan bank has requested from the Boston bank a loan of 300,000 dollars!!”(113)

Moreover, specie flowed out of New England, not only in payment for imports, but also in the search for a safe return in securities other than the American government’s bonds, despite its increasing need for funds. Nevertheless, in April 1814, both houses of Congress had rejected a bill to forbid the export of specie, on the grounds that it was probably impossible to prevent. Federalist Elisha Potter had argued in the House that “you might as rationally [seek to] prevent the ebb and flow of the tide”.(114) This goes far to explain Greene’s revelation that in Boston,

Gold grows scarce. Several persons have been engaged in carrying it to Canada for the purchase of [British] Govt bills; 60,000 dolls in gold were carried in the last weeks for one merchant. These trips consume from 8 to 12 days and leave a net profit of from 4 & 5 per Cent. (115)

Probably impossible to keep confidential, such profit maximising activities were seen elsewhere in the United States as unpatriotic, even traitorous, especially since the American government was becoming increasingly short of funds. In the House as early as February, Republican John Jackson of Virginia had described money lenders withholding funds as unpatriotic, and his fellow representative Felix Grundy had repeated an earlier description of those who, by such measures as exporting specie, “combine together for the purpose of preventing loans being filled” as “guilty of treason from a moral point of view”. Grundy invoked the Federalist’s Sedition Act of 1798, passed during America’s Quasi War with France, which had made it illegal to “combine or conspire together, with intent to oppose any measure ...of the Government of the United States”.(116) The export of specie nevertheless continued; on 3 August Greene again noted that “very large quantities of Specie have been sent to England and its possessions.”(117) Throughout 1814, about \$3.8m in specie left the United States for Canada to buy British government bonds and commercial bills of exchange.(118)

### **The British in Washington: Manifestation, Cause and Effect**

By 26 August 1814, British command of the American eastern seaboard, and the ability to mount complex and logistically demanding amphibious operations without effective opposition, had borne fruit as the successful capture and brief occupation of Washington. The financial and political effects of its seizure were to be far-reaching. The loss of the almost complete heavy-frigate *Columbia* and sloop *Argus*, and the burning of Washington Navy Yard with its timber-yards and ropewalks, were relatively

unimportant. The yard's \$417,745 net repair costs, were comparatively trivial. More significant in the long- run than the destruction of the unfinished Capitol building, Treasury and War Office, and the burning of the President's House, was the reaction of American banks.(119)

Unsurprisingly, an immediate run on Washington banks denuded them of most of their specie. On 31 August, banks in Baltimore and Philadelphia announced that they too had suspended specie payments, as did banks in the southern and middle states, to protect their already depleted reserves. Significantly, the Presidents of six Philadelphia banks began their "public proclamation" of their suspension of specie payments with,

From the moment when the rigorous blockade of the ports of the United States prevented the exportation of our produce, foreign supplies could be paid for in specie only, and as the importations...into the eastern states had been very large, occasioned a continual drain on the banks. This drain has been much increased by a trade in British government bills of exchange which has been extensively carried on, and has caused very great sums to be exported from the U. States. (120)

In their estimation, British commercial blockade had been a direct and immediate cause of their need to suspend specie payment.

On 1 September, New York banks declared their suspension permanent. Then came news that between 29 August and 2 September, the port of Alexandria had accepted terms offered by another British amphibious force, by which twenty-one American ships, stores and merchandise were surrendered.(121) On 6 September, the shockwave reached Boston where, Greene wrote, "All classes of people have been drawing specie out of the

banks today". By 12 September, "The panic" there was "almost universal".

(122) When Congress re-convened on 19 September the government had to admit that specie suspensions by those banks "most important in the money operations of the Treasury, has produced, and will continue to cause difficulties and embarrassments in those operations".(123)

The British action also had adverse commercial effects. "The Suspension of Specie payments by the Banks in Phila. and New York", complained Ives in October, "causes great difficulty and renders it almost impossible to draw funds from New York...little or nothing is doing in business and our goods remain as yet on hand".(124) He received scant sympathy from Philadelphia, where suspension was "considered a prudential matter, and unless your Eastern banks adopt the same plan, they will be drained of their Specie should the war continue much longer".(125) To remain solvent, even New England banks with large specie reserves, and regulated by State laws, were ultimately obliged to suspend cash payments.

Suspensions of specie payments also created immediate problems for a government needing to buy unprecedented quantities of manufactured goods, primary products and services. The wartime proliferation of banks had complicated all transactions, since banknotes were not always acceptable at face value. Compared with 1811 when 89 banks had a combined capital of \$52m, by 1815, 208 banks had a combined capital of \$82m. Over the same period, note circulation increased by more than 100%, from \$22m to \$45m, while specie holdings increased by only 67%.(126) While this increase in money supply alone would not make inflation inevitable, it made those

supplying goods and services to the government wary of accepting banknotes which eventually might prove worthless.

An under-appreciated link clearly exists between British naval blockade, which prevented the intervention of American naval forces in British amphibious operations, and the serious financial consequences of the British incursions. The over-issue of banknotes had already been causing their depreciation, but British landings, largely protected by the Royal Navy's containment of American warships, and the subsequent occupation of Washington, had made American monetary problems considerably worse. As a result, paper currency now circulated "at a discount of 7% in New York and Charleston, of 15% in Philadelphia, of 20 and 25% in Baltimore and Washington, with every other possible variation in other places and States." Congress heard that banknotes had been "placed on a new and uncertain footing", affecting "the pecuniary operations of the citizens in general." (127) In Boston, instead of cash, the government offered holders of maturing bonds either discounted Treasury notes, inconvertible Massachusetts State banknotes, or the undemanded new government bonds. (128) The discount rate on Treasury notes, a useful barometer of public confidence in the government's financial credibility, and the plausibility of current peace rumours, reportedly varied between 15 and 25%. (129)

### **British Blockade and the Collapse of American Public Finance**

The American government's accounts for 1813, published in 1814, encouragingly showed that the \$16m loan Congress had authorised on 8 February 1813 had been raised, even slightly exceeded. (130) No less than

\$534,200 had been raised, with 6% Stock bought at par by early subscribers, also given 13 year annuities with 1.5% interest, to compensate for the better deal given to latecomers, who got a 12% discount, receiving \$100 in stock for every \$88. This had raised another \$15,468,800. Altogether, Stock for a nominal \$18,112,377 had been issued to raise \$16,003,000.(131)

Since this last success however, the lack of overseas and domestic trade had further reduced loanable funds, and the government's credit. Of the \$7.5m loan sought on 2 August 1813, only \$3,907,335 had been raised in 1813, leaving \$3,592,665 still to be raised. This would involve selling each \$100 worth of Stock for \$88.25.(132) By this time however, the Treasury's need for funds was such that Congress sanctioned a \$10m issue of Treasury notes, and on 24 March 1814, authorised an attempt to raise an unprecedented \$25m, in three instalments.

Even before the new loan stock went on sale, the public attitude to the loan was unpromising. One Philadelphia merchant wrote, "as yet the Govt meet with little Success in this City in obtaining Money...at this date I have No Idea that it will fill". More specifically he added that neither "Banks nor Insurance offices...intend to take any...Mr Girard do not intend to Loan them any and I believe Mr Parish has as much as he can well get along with".(133) The reply confirmed his news that a prominent shipping business had stopped payment "in consequence of New York failures", and predicted that "establishments of considerable consequence will follow". He added, "the Govt...has obtained only a very limited sum in New Eng'd".(134)

When after 2 May the Treasury offered the first \$10m of securities, subscriptions were initially received for \$9.8m. However, \$5m of this was

offered by the New York banker Jacob Barker, whose ability to find the money had been doubted at the outset. Jones wrote to Madison describing Barker as a “speculative individual” and his offer as the “bold effort of a gambler”.(135) Barker eventually paid \$3.5m into the Treasury, but defaulted on the remaining \$1.5m. As predicted, others had defaulted on another \$400,000, and of the \$10m hoped for, the government received only \$7.9m, even when offering a 12% discount.(136) Early buyers, finding latecomers getting a better price, insisted on additional stock as compensation, making it in their interests to depress the price further by pessimism and delayed payment, then buying more at better retrospective terms. William Jones, the previous Treasury Secretary, was right when he told Madison on 6 May, “that the stream is nearly dry unless new sources can be opened.”(137)

Barker himself correctly identified the cause of his, and the American government’s borrowing difficulties, when on 17 May he wrote to John Armstrong, the Secretary of War, that,

The success of the allies, and the general blockade, operate very much against the loan; so difficult is it to raise money that Mr Parish told me it was impossible to raise a single \$100,000 in Philadelphia on a deposit of United States Stock. (138)

By 25 May, Madison was sufficiently anxious to write to Campbell, Jones’ replacement at the Treasury, urging him to find such new sources of finance, “with less scruple as to the terms.”(139)

Nonetheless, on 22 August 1814, the government offered another \$6m in bonds, but even at a 20% discount, subscribers offered only \$3.5m, of which the government only ever received \$2.5m “in money”.(140) Again,

subscribers defaulted on \$410,000. When state banknotes worth only 65% in specie were accepted for some stock, early subscribers demanded supplementary stock to make up the difference.(141) The government returned to the original subscribers at 12%, and improved their terms, but for bonds worth \$4m, received only \$2.5m in cash.(142) The high point was reached in late July 1814, when, of the \$25m sought, \$10.4m in cash had been received. The 4 March issue of \$10m of Treasury notes only ever brought in \$7.2m. Of the final \$9m instalment authorised, nothing was ever raised.(143) It now remained only for the government itself to default.

### **Financial Embarrassment and Political Implications**

Before this point was reached, the fiscal and financial predicament of Madison's administration had become evident, even to well-informed outsiders. Rear- Admiral Cockburn in Chesapeake Bay knew in May, by "Intelligence from the Shore" that, "the Money voted by Congress...cannot be obtained". "[I]t is therefore doubtful whether the [American] Government will be able to Act up to its Intentions with Respect to Canada". (144) The French Minister at Washington, Louis Serurier, thought that "The Cabinet is frightened, it tries however to keep a good face externally, but the fact is that it has the consciousness of its own weakness, and the full strength of the enemy."(145)

As this level of financial embarrassment becoming increasingly evident, Madison put "Motion 2" before his Cabinet meeting on 23 June 1814. It dealt with the matter which Madison and Monroe had made the crucial point of Anglo-American dispute in October 1812. It asked, "Shall a



treaty of peace silent on the object of impressment be authorised?" When asked for their opinion the following day, all voted "no" except William Jones, until so recently Secretary of the Treasury, and John Armstrong, Secretary of War, "who were aye".(146) These were precisely the two who knew just how weak the United States had become, both financially and therefore militarily. On 27 June, exactly the day on which the French Minister wrote of their "fright", Madison again consulted his Cabinet. According to Madison, "in consequence" of Bayard and Gallatin's letters, and "other accounts from Europe as to the ascendancy & views of Great Britain & the disposition of the great Continental powers, the preceding question No 2" was again put to the Cabinet.(147) This time it was unanimously "agreed to by Monroe, Campbell, Armstrong and Jones, Rush being absent."(148) Secretary of State Monroe was instructed to inform the American Peace Commissioners that an American insistence on a British end to impressments, as a prerequisite of peace, had been abandoned.(149) Nor would government revenues meet the cost of an American occupation of Canada. British commercial blockade without American prior fiscal reform, and now no longer accompanied by any American legislative trade restrictions, had eviscerated American war aims.

The British had earlier rejected offers of Russian mediation in its war with the United States, and had insisted on direct negotiations, originally intended to take place at Gothenburg in neutral Sweden. The effectiveness of the British blockade of the United States eastern seaboard was such that the American government had felt it necessary to apply to Rear-Admiral Cockburn for a safe-passage across the Atlantic for its Peace Commissioners

and their staff. Cockburn wrote to Cochrane on 9 May 1814, hoping that he would “approve of my having granted the Passports to Gothenburg requested by the American government.” Cockburn confessed to having “not the most distant Idea” of how many more such requests were likely, but thought that “negotiations may offer plausible excuse for it.”(150)

When Madison’s hopes for a “well-digested system of internal revenue” and of “improving terms on which loans may be obtained” had both been disappointed, he looked speculatively towards Europe.(151) On 25 May 1814, exactly a year after last addressing Congress on the “State of the Finances”, Madison wrote to Secretary of the Treasury Campbell that,

as money is cheaper in Europe than here, especially while disaffection withholds the greater part of the capital for Market, it is obviously desirable that we should avail ourselves of the foreign market, now become the [more] practicable in consequence of the repeal of the Non-Importation law. (152)

Apparently oblivious to the British effort and expenditure in securing it, Madison saw the new “Independence of Holland” as relevant. Dutch bankers had largely financed the Louisiana Purchase in 1803 and, now that Napoleon had abdicated, would perhaps re-finance the United States war against Britain. He would seek advice, and gain Congressional approval.

Accordingly, on 1 August 1814, Campbell wrote to the bankers Wilhelm and Jan Willink of Amsterdam, asking for their help in negotiating a European loan. Copies were sent to Gallatin and John Quincy Adams in Ghent, and William Crawford, the “Minister at Paris”, authorising them to act. Campbell’s letter to Willink & Co did not specify the amount sought, but

the Treasury agreed to send United States 6% stock worth \$6m to Crawford in Paris, already made out in the name of the Dutch bankers. The whereabouts and value of this stock was later to prove problematic.(153)

By 19 September 1814, Madison found it necessary to summon Congress to another special session, now obliged to meet at the Post and Patent Office, the only undamaged public building available in Washington. He hoped to “replenish an exhausted Treasury and restore public credit.”(154) During the following weeks, ‘direct’ tax for 1815 was to be doubled to \$6m, and the internal excise duty on carriages raised. The duty on distillers was to be continued, and the duties on alcohol retail licences and auction sales were to be increased. (155) However, as Bristed explains, taxes accrued in one year were very often not paid until the next. This late in the financial year, these new taxes were clearly not going to produce the amounts hoped for in time.

For domestic party-political reasons, Madison found it necessary to tell Congress on 20 September 1814, that citizens were “everywhere paying their taxes, direct and indirect, with the greatest promptness and alacrity”.(156) The assertion was unsupportable. As shown in Appendix B, Tables 20, 21 and 22, while in 1814, ‘direct’ tax gathered almost 74% of its expected yield, indirect excise duties realised less than 59%. By 1814, total tax revenue was less than 30% of Dewey’s outgoings for nine months. Even total receipts, excluding loan contributions, raised less than one third of that expenditure. When writing to Alexander Dallas, about to become Campbell’s successor as Secretary of the Treasury, Jones’ summary of this dire state of the national finances was again accurate. On 15 September, he wrote, “Something must be done, and done speedily or we shall have an opportunity

of trying the experiment of maintaining an army and navy and carrying on a vigorous war without money.”(157)

By 23 September 1814, this financial crisis was evident from Campbell’s report to Congress. It revealed that \$20m had been paid out by the Treasury between January and July 1814, with another \$27m payable between that July and January 1815.(158) While Treasury income for the nine months ending 30 June 1814 had been \$32m, expenditure already exceeded £34m.(159) On 1 July, the Treasury held \$4,722,639, and expected revenue of \$4,840,000 during the remainder of the year, which together with \$4,320,000 from the loans already contracted, made a total of \$13,882,639, about half of the \$23,327, 586 needed.(160) At best, Campbell estimated a shortfall of \$11,660,000 for the remainder of 1814.(161)

Campbell even doubted the possibility of borrowing more, admitting in his report that, “The experience of the present year furnishes ground to doubt whether this be practicable”.(162) This reflects the effectiveness of British commercial blockade in reducing both the ability and preparedness of Americans to lend the government more to continue the war. Campbell’s dismissal of customs revenue, which in 1812 had been the mainstay of government income, measures the success to date of the British commercial blockade. Campbell admitted to Congress that, “While the whole navy of the enemy is disposable for the interruption of our trade, this source of revenue cannot be very productive.”(163) This is precisely what the British had intended at the outset.

After some delay, on 3 October 1814, Gallatin wrote at some length directly to the Willinks, seeking “a sum not exceeding six millions of dollars

or part there of”, and, trusting that they would keep the matter “perfectly confidential”, enquired about the American government’s current financial standing in Europe.(164) On 6 October however, Crawford wrote to Gallatin from Paris stating baldly that he had “made sufficient enquiry to ascertain that no loan can be obtained in France, upon terms which can be accepted.” He was also “apprehensive that the same difficulty will be found to exist in Holland. The Capture of Washington will no doubt [have] increased the obstacles which previously existed.” Crawford also reported a remark made “to a person on holding a large amount of the funded debt of the US, that he would not give one sou for the whole of it.”(165)

As soon as 11 October 1814, Gallatin received an answer from Amsterdam. The Willinks had consulted another important Dutch banking house, Nicholas and Jacob van Staphorst, and both firms felt that they,

must candidly confess that the late untoward circumstances & the fear of what may further happen has operated forcibly on the minds of our monied people so much so that we consider it not advisable to come forward at this juncture with any proposal of Loans, because it would never do to offer terms of too favourable a nature or such as would not be deemed decent. (166)

The Dutch bankers added that, “The abatement of Spirits is such that Louisiana Stock whose interest is payable here was in the beginning of the Year at par and is now as low as 76 to 78%.” The latest 6% American stock now sold at 72%.(167) Moreover, since Gallatin’s original approach, Britain had signed a peace treaty with Holland on 13 August 1814, which may well

have affected Dutch willingness to lend any money to the United States while it was at war with Britain.

By 25 October, Crawford in Paris was anxious that the implications of American failure to borrow European money were worse than he had realised. In a partially coded letter to Gallatin in Ghent he wrote, "From the answers to your inquiries the inference is almost necessary that the US have not in the hands of their bankers funds sufficient to discharge the interest of the publick payable in Europe on the first of Jan'y next", meaning the interest payment due on the United States Louisiana debt. It would be "too late to make remit[t]ances for the purpose after they are advertised of the failure of our efforts. In this event the credit of the US will become worse instead of better." Despite being "fearful that no effort that can be made will be attended with success", he insisted that "the sum necessary to make the payment of the interest due...ought to be raised upon any terms which can be arranged."

(168)

On 26 October, Gallatin and Adams wrote jointly to Campbell from Ghent telling him formally that, "Although the prospects of success may improve after the 1st of January, we think that it would be unsafe for Government to place any reliance on that resource", that is, borrowing in Europe.(169) That same day, Gallatin wrote Campbell a more forthright letter in his own hand. "I think that you should not place the least reliance on obtaining a loan in Europe." "Breaches of faith" having "taken place everywhere", real interest rates had "risen from less than 4 to more than 7%". "Nor is our past fidelity" he added, "considered as a sufficient pledge of our ability hereafter" of "fulfilling our engagements". "On the contrary, I

apprehend that owing to” the war, “& to our distance which increases the fears of the result, we cannot at this time borrow on as good terms as European powers.” Moreover, Britain had exerted diplomatic pressure on Holland to enact laws “forbidding foreign loans”, forming he thought, “another formidable obstacle”. Britain had contrived to preclude the possibility of itself financing continued American war effort since, even if such laws were repealed, there was, ironically, “no prospect of borrowing elsewhere than in England”. Gallatin had, “thought it right to prevent any unfounded hopes being entertained by our Government.”(170) On the same day, Gallatin also wrote to Secretary of State Monroe, simply stating that, “No loan can be obtained in Europe, and our financial resources will be deficient.”(171)

Meanwhile in Washington, after submitting his ‘Financial Statement’ to the Senate on 26 September, Campbell had resigned as Secretary of the Treasury, later admitting to Madison that he had been “humbled” by the task.(172) He was replaced by the able, respected, but not popular Alexander Dallas, whose appointment was not confirmed until 6 October. By 17 October, Dallas had estimated a shortfall in revenue for the remainder of 1814 of \$13.8m, and argued for further loans and Treasury note issues. The smaller Treasury notes, in denominations down to \$3, would have to be non-interest bearing.(173)

The \$8m of Treasury notes already issued, circulated only at an increasing discount. On 19 October they were discounted at between 10 and 11%, and a further issue in Boston on 27 October led Greene to comment, “Treasury notes are selling here today... but I think they will fall”. By the 29

October he noted them “selling from 15 to 20 per Cent disco’nt, at the latter rate the Sailors have been selling the paper paid for their wages”.(174) Dallas was aware of how unpopular Treasury notes had become, and rejected a suggestion that they become an official medium of exchange. They were he said “an expensive and precarious substitute” vulnerable “to every breath of popular prejudice or alarm.”(175) Discount rates continued to rise when, without further options, the government issued another \$3m of Treasury notes on 15 November.

### **American Financial Failure**

By this time however, the government had reached the point of actual bankruptcy, more technically ‘insolvency’, but in either case an inability to access either saved or borrowed liquid assets when required. It was not a matter of the United States long-term potential, which remained under-developed and enormous, but present ability to pay those with an immediate and unassailable right to be paid.(176) For most contemporary Americans, this meant payment in specie, a universally acceptable currency, not discounted State or private bank notes, or more Treasury notes. The first formal notification of the government’s inability to meet even interest payments on the National Debt was sent by Dallas to the Boston Commissioner of Loans on 9 November 1814, later published by Niles’ *Weekly Register*.(177)



By 27 November even Dallas appeared dejected, and wrote that his “means consisted first of a fragment of an authority to borrow money, when nobody was disposed to lend, and to issue Treasury notes, which none but necessitous creditors or contractors in distress...seemed willing to accept.”

(178) On 29 November, failure abroad was narrowly avoided when \$132,000 due in Holland as interest on the Louisiana loan stock was paid to the Willinks by the British banker Alexander Baring, although according to Gallatin, other Dutch bankers were still owed money for diplomatic expenses.

(179)

By 2 December, Dallas had admitted that \$200,000 in dividends in America were unpaid.(180) On 16 and 31 December, “two temporary loan repayments of \$250,000 each, which became payable to the State Bank in Boston were not paid, it having been impracticable in consequence of the general suspension of payment in specie” precipitated by the British occupation of Washington. Dallas told Congress on 6 February 1815 that, “they remain unpaid”.(181) “From the same causes” he said, Treasury notes due for redemption, worth \$2,799,200, also went unpaid, similarly still unpaid in February 1815, since, “The Treasury was unable to make any other provision than that of Treasury notes”.(182) The worsening shortage of specie made the redemption and interest of Treasury notes an increasingly serious problem., shown in Appendix B, Table 35.

Unsurprisingly, respect for Treasury notes, unacceptable to several Boston banks a year before, continued to fall. By 14 December they passed at a 25% discount, “& the expectation of a new emission renders their further depreciation very probable. You had better avoid having anything to do with

them, for I tell you in confidence there is very little probability of the govt being able to redeem them.” According to Greene, in Boston alone, a total of \$1.7m was payable in interest and dividends on the “funded debt” at the beginning of January 1815. He told Ives that, “A loan to the Govt will prob’y be made for the express purpose of paying the Int. & div’d, but not for the payment of the Treas’y notes.” Nor were Treasury notes any longer universally acceptable even to a loan-hungry government prepared to accept a 20% discount. “The Loan office told me today that the T’sy notes payable on 1<sup>st</sup> Oct last ...were receivable for stock of the 6 million at 80 per Cent, but no others”.(183) On 29 December, he wrote that, “The Interest” on government loan stock “will be paid on the Next monday in Treas y notes for am’ts over \$100, & no provision is made for those under.”(184)

On 14 December 1814, Wilhelm Willink and Nicholas van Staphorst had informed the American envoys in Ghent that “we may have a chance” to find purchasers for “more or less” all of the \$3m stock, in a way which would “avoid the difficulties” of “a general or usual” loan. The terms, however, would be punitive. The 6% stock would be discounted at 75, a 25% discount, for a maximum of ten years, at 8% annual interest. At the outset, the bankers would get a commission of 1% of the \$3m, and their expenses, and on completion, another half-of-one percent of the principal. Throughout, they would also get 1% of the annual interest, “to be remitted in Amsterdam in Dutch hard money before falling due”. The stock was to be bought, and the interest paid, at a fixed exchange rate. The putative purchasers were unnamed, but their opportunity for abnormal profit was to be overtaken by the peace negotiations in Ghent, by then making progress.(185)

Relatively recent suggestions that the United States did not go abroad for finance during its war with Britain include the assertion that, “ The government did not borrow internationally during the War of 1812.”(186) It had not been for want of trying. Initial American intentions are confirmed in the Peace Commissioner’s first letter to Dallas, referring to, “instructions from the Treasury having been given with a view to the continuance of the War”. But, with Dutch financial help available only on such disadvantageous terms, the Commissioners concluded, “we will not now act on the subject without hearing from you.”(187) Meanwhile, Alexander Baring’s timely financial help, given perhaps in part because of his American marriage and business ties, had almost certainly been on too small a scale to affect the war’s outcome.

#### **British Trade in the District of Maine.**

The effectiveness of the British naval blockade had contributed to such a degree of control of the American eastern seaboard as to allow the practically unchallenged occupation of the ports of the District of Maine. (188) Eastport fell on 18 July, and Castine had surrendered on 3 September. The British also passed virtually unopposed up the Penobscot river, taking “120 vessels of all descriptions”. At Hampden, the Americans burned the *Adams*, a 24 gunned corvette, and at Bangor, twelve vessels were captured and property destroyed. In addition to immediate tactical gains, this amphibious operation brought the British the benefits of newly unhindered communication between Halifax and Quebec, commercial use of the

Penobscot river, and of eastern Maine's ports for bringing British manufactured goods into the United States.

After 21 September, the local population had been encouraged by Sir John Sherbrooke, Governor of Nova Scotia, and Rear-Admiral Edward Griffith, to swear an oath to keep the peace or leave the area. Those swearing allegiance to the Crown gained a certificate of protection, British commercial rights, and a Coasting Licence.(189) It was soon reported "that trade in Castine is very brisk; that there is a great and constant influx and efflux of traders to such an extent that the town is overflowing". A vessel was "warped backwards and forwards laden on the British side and unladen on the American." As a result, Niles reported that,

Specie is travelling rapidly from Boston &c to Castine, and the want of it is about to be as severely felt by the late purse-proud people of that quarter as anywhere else. If the enemy is not driven from that post, between smuggling and dealing he will soon drain the whole eastern country that has nothing else but *cash* to give in exchange for his goods. (190)

Although the British occupation continued until the end of the war, official figures show total British exports to the United States in 1814 as only £8,000; neither the British nor American government was able to quantify the amount of smuggling.(191) American attempts to control illicit imports cost both money and lives, although their efforts showed the level of government concern.(192) Illegal imports paid no customs duties, nor were questionable incomes going to be lent to the government.

In May 1814, Rear-Admiral Cockburn had felt secure in Tangier Bay in the Chesapeake, and thought that the [American] “Government not being able to obtain Money to go on with is not likely to improve their Means of Resistance”.(193) In July, he conceded that the American defence of some “exposed” towns like Norfolk had been organised, but, “In the Mean time the total Stop to the Trade & other resources, renders it extremely difficult for them to pay the War Taxes”. He presumably meant internal excise duties and ‘direct’ taxes, but in any case thought them “inadequate” to prosecute the war “with Vigor”. He concluded that, “the Treasury is at this Moment without sufficient Funds to pay the various Demands on it, in short it is quite impossible for any Country to be in a More unfit State for War than it now is”.(194) The defeat of the British attack on Baltimore in mid-September was to prove such a view to be complacent.

However by October, shortage of government funds was presenting practical difficulties. When Congress refused compensation to the unpaid men of Barney’s Chesapeake gunboat flotillas for clothing lost in action, but nonetheless ordered them to recover merchant’s property from Baltimore harbour, their commanding officer offered his resignation.(195) Secretary of the Navy Jones instructed one Navy agent that debts should be paid only in Treasury notes “or in money 60 or 90 days after purchase.”(196) But, naval contractors A & N Brown, employing “one thousand Carpenters” building warships on Lake Ontario, protested that, “it will ruin us if money is not Sent from the Navy Department that will pass in this State”. “[O]ne hundred thousand Dollars was Due on 22<sup>nd</sup> December 1814, and the Like Sum on the first of february 1815...if we are to be paid in money Seven Per Cent under

par we never will be able to fulfil our contract.”(197) In Maryland, a bill of exchange for the Mint’s purchase of copper for striking cents was “protested and returned unpaid”.(198) The Mint’s last supplies of copper were exhausted in 1814, and no cents were struck in 1815.(199) The repercussions of British commercial blockade were reaching even the everyday transactions of ordinary people.

### **‘New England Sedition’: The Hartford Convention**

By the summer of 1814, particularly in New England, increasingly serious hardship was being attributed to the cumulative effects of “the predatory system of the English on the Coast”, no longer accompanied by any component of American restrictive legislation.(200) Although Massachusetts alone still owned more than a third of American merchant tonnage, New England’s share of the United States reduced exports had been more than halved.(201) Such trade had been transferred to the Southern and Middle states where it was easier to evade customs and blockade. By October, a Federalist told the Massachusetts Legislature that,

We are in a deplorable situation, our commerce dead; our revenue gone; our ships rotting at the wharves...Our Treasury drained – we are bankrupts. (202)

As difficulties accumulated, expressions of discontent appear to have become more extreme, not always from New England. On 12 October, John Maybin wrote from Philadelphia to Rhode Island, “I look for something decisive from your Quarter to oblige our worthless President to resign – untill that is done, I

fear the Br. government will not make peace with us.” He added as a postscript that the previous day’s elections had produced “a 1,200 Federal majority in the City”, overturning the 500 vote “Democratic majority” of the previous year.(203) Some in New England had begun to discuss more radical political change.

Madison’s second embargo, and later, the depression caused by the wider British commercial blockade, had revived talk of a New England Convention, for the first time since of the summer of 1812. The federal government’s right to deploy local militia was still hotly debated, but the desire expressed by some New Englanders for constitutional reform and peace, came partly from anxiety over an increased risk of British invasion. Thomas Ives in Providence, Rhode Island, feared “that attempts will be made to burn the Shipping in our port”, and wrote that, “– it has been decided to fortify a point of land about three miles below the Town, & application is already made to the Pres. for Guns & Ammunition. We are about thirty miles from the Sea, & until latterly have considered ourselves safe from the British.”(204) The defeat of France led Maybin to think that, “The wicked and unjust war which our Mad Rulers thought proper to declare, is only just commencing on the part of Gt Britain.” In September he was, “fearful for the safety of the goods” in his care, “at Washington Private property was not Molested but at Alexandria”, British “conduct was very Extraordinary.” By October, he thought Ives had “good reason to fear that the British will take up their Winter quarters at Newport”.(205)

Some Federalist newspapers aired extreme views. The *Salem Gazette* called for the sequestration of federal taxes, a separate peace with Britain and

a “convention of neighbouring states in an alliance of amity and commerce.”  
(206) On 19 October 1814, the Massachusetts Legislature chose delegates for a Convention at Hartford, Connecticut, to meet on 15 December. The other New England states were invited to send representatives to discuss their “affinity of interests”.(207) At least one Boston newspaper openly advocated secession, describing the appointment of first, Connecticut’s, and then Rhode Island’s Hartford delegates, as the “raising of the Second” and “Third Pillars ...of a new Federal Edifice”.(208)

But, while Massachusetts would send twelve delegates, Connecticut, seven, and Rhode Island four, Vermont declined to send any delegates, only an unofficial observer. New Hampshire also wavered, sending only two unofficial observers. Nonetheless, Republican Charles Ingersoll reported to Congress that the Convention intended “to proceed deliberately to the disintegration of New England from the Union.”(209) Its meeting in secret was seen by some as confirmation of a treasonable intention to secede, although known extremists had been deliberately excluded from both its morning and evening sessions.

In the event, the seven moderate resolutions for amending the federal constitution, adopted at Hartford and taken to Washington, were overtaken by the end of the war, but not before the Convention had had its effect on Madison personally. He had been described as early as October as “miserably shattered and woe-begone. In short, he looked heartbroken. His mind is full of New England sedition.”(210) In fact, the disaffection had been more severe and widespread than Madison may have known. Perhaps, like Gallatin, fearing a British attack on Boston, Governor Caleb Strong of Massachusetts



had sent an agent to Sir John Sherbrook in Halifax to discuss a separate peace, again overtaken by progress at Ghent. Earlier, Ohio and even Virginia, had threatened sequestration of customs duties gathered there, to settle their financial disputes with the federal government.(211) Some Federalists remained unrepentant. “[T]he report of the convention at Hartford you must have seen”, Ives wrote to Maybin on 20 January 1815, “& we think you must be much pleased with the course taken by that body of enlightened Statesmen ...as being prudent and correct.”(212) Economic difficulties and social distress caused by the skilful and persistent application of British commercial blockade, had evidently contributed to political as well as fiscal and financial effects, all making American success less likely.

Not until 14 October 1814, had the House of Representatives received documentary evidence of the Cabinet’s decision of 27 June, to abandon American insistence on a British ending of impressment as a prerequisite of any peace treaty.(213) Madison had first referred to the American plenipotentiaries’ new instructions on 10 October, and then only in a message to Congress, by which time an inkling of their contents may have leaked. Federalist Thomas Oakley of New York speculated that, “the Administration...must have been prepared to abandon some of the grounds on which it [the war] had been declared.”(214)

Since hearing of Britain’s suspension of its Orders in Council in 1812, Madison had made impressment the war’s major issue. It had been the central point of Monroe’s answer to Warren on 27 October 1812, rejecting Britain’s offer of an armistice. Monroe’s letter of 25 June 1814, two days before the crucial Cabinet meeting, told the American Peace Commissioners

that “on the subject of impressment, on which it is presumed your negotiations will essentially turn”, they might, “concur in an article stipulating that the subject of impressment, together with that of commerce between the two countries, be referred to a separate negotiation.”(215) A postscript which the Commissioners received on 2 August insisted that, “all American citizens who have been impressed into the British service shall be forthwith discharged.”(216)

Long after Britain had rejected the Russian offer of mediation, Gallatin and Bayard had eventually left St Petersburg, ostensibly on their way home, but having reached Amsterdam, obtained agreement to their passing through London. There, they remarked on the hostility of British public opinion, which ascribed the American declaration of war “solely to a premeditated concert with Bonaparte at a time when we thought him triumphant and their cause desperate”.(217) This contributed to an apparent British intention to drive a hard bargain in any peace negotiations. The British right of impressment was to remain a priority. On 22 April 1814, Gallatin had written from London to fellow Commissioner Henry Clay, noting that British success in Europe now left the Americans “ill prepared” to continue alone, which gave “room to apprehend that a continuance of the war might prove fatal to the United States.”(218)

In June, Madison had received via William Jones, Reuben Beasley’s account from London, dated 18 May 1814, that in any peace negotiations, Britain expected the United States to renounce its traditional Newfoundland fishing rights, any American trade with the West Indies and beyond the Cape of Good Hope, and to cede Louisiana to Spain.(219) These views taken into

Madison's meetings with his Cabinet on 23 and 24 June, together with continued difficulties with loans, seem likely to have promoted pessimism.

Then, on 26 June 1814, Madison saw Gallatin and Bayard's dispatch to Monroe, dated 6 May from London. In addition to Beasley's fears, it said that the British sought to curtail America's northern boundary, and exclude all American shipping from the Great Lakes. Furthermore, Britain had extracted promises from its European allies not to become involved in its war with the United States. With the defeat of France, the issue of impressment amounted "to little more than questions of abstract rights", best left out of a negotiated settlement.(220) The dispatch also sought Monroe's leave to transfer negotiations from Gothenburg to the newly-liberated Ghent.

Significantly, Britain's senior negotiator there would be Lord James Gambier, a retired Admiral rather than career diplomat or politician. Another was to be Dr William Adams, an expert on maritime law.(221) In Washington, Monroe asked the French Minister to delay the return of the dispatch vessel *Olivier* to France a second time, in view of the need for a further letter to the American Peace Commissioners.(222)

Madison took the Peace Commissioner's views, and the diplomatic news, together with the knowledge of his administration's dire financial straits, to a further Cabinet meeting the next day, 27 June. During it, Madison set aside earlier hopes of dealing separately with Britain's major requirement, and instead, sought and gained the Cabinet's agreement to the abandonment of any reference to impressment in the peace treaty, should it prove necessary. The letter Monroe was instructed to write on 27 June 1814, had informed the Commissioners, in a different tone, that,

On mature consideration it has been decided that, under all the circumstances above alluded to, incident to the prosecution of the war, you may omit any stipulation on the subject of impressment if found indispensably necessary to terminate it. You will of course not concur to this expedient until all your efforts to adjust the controversy in a more satisfactory manner have failed. (223)

Any remaining doubt Madison might have had on his decision and the Cabinet's, advice would have been reduced by a letter from Gallatin to Monroe, written from London on 13 June 1814. Gallatin had thought, "it probable that Washington or New York are the places the capture of which would most gratify the enemy". This letter had arrived in late August, after the British capture of Washington. Gallatin had also added,

I have the most perfect conviction that, under the existing unpropitious circumstances of the world, America cannot by a continuance of the war compel Great Britain to yield any of the maritime points in dispute, & particularly to agree to any satisfactory arrangements on the subject of impressment; & that the most favourable terms of peace that can be expected are the *status quo ante bellum*.  
(224)

With its contents unknown outside the Cabinet, even to Congress, Monroe's letter of 27 June had reached the Commissioners in Ghent on 10 August. By October, Oakley was insisting in Congress that, "The government's conduct could not be properly estimated until the instructions to our Commissioners are laid before the House." It would then, "appear how far they had thought it important to maintain the grounds on which they had deemed it expedient to commence a war; the conclusion of which was not

now within their control, and [which] appeared to be removed to a hopeless distance.”(225)

Just how distant the original American war aims now were, was shown by the government’s fiscal and financial predicament. Total expenditure for 1814 had been estimated at \$47.3m, later amended to \$57.7m, while actual receipts for the year were only just over \$40m., despite which, on 3 December, Congress had rejected a proposed income tax as “inexpedient”.(226) The decision of Congress on 23 December to increase internal excise duties by 50%, would do little to help.(227) On 26 December, Congress authorised the issue of another \$10.5m in Treasury notes, despite the \$1.9m already owed on those which, having “fallen due, remain unpaid”.(228) By the end of the year, an attempt to raise a loan of \$3m, authorised by Congress on 15 November, had clearly failed. Three New York banks offered to take \$600,000 in bonds for cash, but paid in depreciated notes worth only \$390,000 in specie.(229)

A second United States national bank, another potential solution to the government’s crucial shortage of cash or credit, was however, foundering for lack of public support. Ives wrote from Providence that, “[W]e very much doubt whether the new Bank – should it go into operation will gain any confidence – mixed up as it must be, with depreciated public Debt”.(230) With a capital of \$50m, subscribed as specie and government 6% stock, it could lend to the government \$30m at 6%.(231) By January 1815 however, U.S. 6% stock was reportedly quoted at a 40% discount, and although post-war publications, shown as Appendix B, Table 23, recorded the discount as

having been 24%, such wartime accounts as those in Niles' *Weekly Register* damaged the government's financial standing.(232)

Congress, as so often before, procrastinated, and, Ives suggested, “does not appear to know what to do – the Bank bill, we see is bandied between the two Houses & will be lost most probably”. In any case, he thought, “it will not answer” as a means of providing “a general currency while the War lasts – all the advantage to the Govt would be to absorb part of the National Debt thereby making room for the circulation of a new emission – this relief they would find only temporary and a most miserable expedient as a financial Scheme.”(233) News of peace arrived before even an emasculated Bank bill could both pass Congress and avoid the President's veto. Congress had repeated the self-interested inertia which had resulted in its failure to renew the charter of the first United States Bank, even when already contemplating a declaration of war on Britain.

On 17 January, with news of peace still almost a month away, Dallas estimated 1815's income as \$15.1m, to meet expenditure of more than \$56m. This included \$15.5m interest on debts of \$40.9m to be incurred as new loans and Treasury notes.(234) Interest payments greater than income would be a nadir in American public finance, which “filled” Republicans “with dismay” When John Eppes read Dallas' report to the House, one hearer said, “All his former communications were but emollients and palliations, compared with this final disclosure of the bankruptcy of the nation.”(235)

To raise the \$40m needed for 1815, Dallas sought to borrow \$25m, and issue \$15m worth of Treasury notes, which Congress dismissed as unrealistic given the recent failure to borrow less than an eighth of this

amount. Congress authorised instead, \$25m Treasury notes, only \$8.3m of which were ever issued.(236) News of the Treaty of Ghent, and the completion of its ratification by the Senate on 16 February, came before the American need to borrow as much as \$40m while still under British commercial blockade, was put to the test.

During December and into January 1815, Cochrane had implemented his long-held intention to attack New Orleans, bloodily repulsed by American defenders given time to prepare, and led by the determined General Andrew Jackson. Even the decision to appoint Jackson to organise the defence of New Orleans was to reflect the financial standing of an administration deprived of sufficient overseas trade and revenue. Jackson had been told, probably unconstitutionally, that he could draw on Monroe's personal funds to finance the transfer of troops to New Orleans.(237) Nevertheless, a British frontal attack on 8 January had been heavily defeated. By 18 January, it had become clear that British forces should be withdrawn. Their capture of Fort Bowyer in the course of their retreat, in apparent preparation for a second attack on Mobile, was rendered unnecessary by news of a peace treaty having been signed on 24 December.

A land attack on New Orleans had, in any case, been unnecessary. Resources spent instead on the stringent enforcement of the British maritime commercial blockade of New Orleans would have denied Louisiana much of its access to the sea, and exerted further pressure on the American economy and further restricted their political options, without Cochrane's involvement in a second unsuccessful British assault on a land target. This should have become apparent, especially after news of the successful American defence of

Baltimore had reached Ghent in October 1814, and so changed the outlook of all involved in negotiating a settlement.

It had been agreed at Ghent that enemy vessels captured on the American coast would still be “good prize” for only twelve days after the treaty’s ratification, although for thirty days on the Atlantic, and for longer “on distant seas”. The Admiralty therefore recalled Cochrane by a letter dated 30 December 1814, anticipating that by the time it was delivered, Britain’s commercial blockade would be successfully completed, largely on lines established by Warren.(238) Cochrane’s decision to close Boston to neutral as well as to American shipping was to remain his most significant contribution.

Although unmeasured at the time, evidence is available of real and contemporary damage to the American economy, due less to an intermittent American restrictive system than to the British commercial blockade. In addition to the wholesale commodity price rises in New England, and across the United States, discussed earlier, other economic indicators show adverse trends which would have been making an impact on the everyday lives of the majority of the American population. The impact of the war in general, and the British commercial blockade in particular, on the consumer prices paid by ordinary people, can be seen in a composite consumer price index. That constructed by McCusker, shown as Appendix B, Table 24, peaks in 1814, rising 32 points between 1812-13 during Warren’s blockades, and rising a further 19 points between 1813-14, before falling by 26 points by 1815, during three-quarters of which the blockade was not in force.(239) These levels of American consumer prices, as measured by the same index, were not to be reached again until 1919-20.



According to Rockoff, “prices rose 45% between 1811 and 1814.” As shown as Appendix B, Table 25, his index of American wholesale prices based on those of 1811, peaks in 1814 and falls by ten index points in 1815, despite both the amount outstanding in Treasury notes, and the value of commercial banknotes issued, continuing to rise.(240) This suggests that by late 1814, Britain’s commercial blockade had been, by constricting imports, and largely preventing the exports which might have paid for them, more responsible for American price inflation than domestic factors. Internal factors, such as the proliferation of depreciating Treasury notes, and the uncontrolled banknote issues of both state and private banks, can be seen as still rising after the war. If, as Rockoff suggests, internal wholesale price inflation had been “fuelled primarily” by Treasury and banknote issues, it is unlikely to have peaked in 1814 as shown, and fallen in 1815 before any decrease in government currency and banknote issue. British commercial blockade therefore appears to have been a more important determinant of American wholesale price inflation than the continued rise in money supply. American prices fell in anticipation of peace and the end of the British commercial blockade, as well as immediately on peace becoming a certainty. As early as 5 January 1815, Maybin wrote to Ives from Philadelphia that, “after the dispatches of the *Chauncey*” raising hopes of peace “were made publick”, prices of “Merchandize in General have been declining.”(241)

One of the clearest indications of the impact of the British commercial blockade on the American economy, particularly its international position, is provided by the United States terms of trade. Those shown in Appendix B as Table 28, make a correlation between an import price index

and an export price index for the United States between 1807 and 1815. The import and export price indices from which these terms of trade were calculated, are shown as Tables 26 and 27.(242) Because of the importance of customs duties to overall tax revenue, and the impact of trade restrictions on the incomes of the affluent, the terms of trade also throw light on the fiscal and financial position of the United States before and during its war with Britain. It is also possible, to some extent, to compare the relative impact of American legislative trade restrictions and the operation of the British commercial blockade by reference to the relevant United States terms of trade.

Having fallen by 18 points between 1807-9 as a result of Jefferson's Embargo, the United States terms of trade reflect a more favourable relationship between export and import prices after 1809, improving by 16.2 points between 1809-11, recovering all but 3 points of the index for 1807. This will provide a bench-mark for later changes. Between 1811-12, the effects of both Madison's first 90-day Embargo, which ended on 3 July, and the tentative beginnings of the British commercial blockade, combine to produce a 9.7 point fall in the American terms of trade, as official export prices fall 1.5 points, and the index of legitimate import prices rises by 10.6 points, reflecting their increasing scarcity. So far, the combined impact of Madison's Embargo and British blockade does match the impact on America's trading position of Jefferson's Embargo.

By 1813, the effectiveness of the British commercial blockade was evidently increasing, while Madison's second embargo was widely evaded. North's index of American import prices between 1812-3, rises by no less

than 48 points, while the index of export prices falls by 0.6 points. American grain and flour surpluses still exported to the Iberian Peninsula, although at lower prices, absorbed one last season's output, before output was reduced to levels nearer self-sufficiency. North's terms of trade are therefore 26.1 points lower in 1813 than for 1812, largely measuring the success of the British commercial blockade during the year.

In 1814, with the British commercial blockade extended to include New England, unaccompanied for the final ten months of the war by any American legal constraints on trade, the index of import prices rises by 52.6 to a remarkable 232.3 points, reflecting scarcity and exploitative speculation. The index of export prices for 1814 shows a small increase of 0.8 points. Nevertheless, the United States terms of trade show a further decrease of 15.6 points. While protecting developing textile manufacturing, thereby producing a short-term prosperity in some areas of the United States, the worsening terms of trade reflect a lack of overseas trade, associated unemployment and falling wages in others, including New England.

Altogether, North's American terms of trade fell by 41.7 index points between 1812 and 1814. As shown in Appendix B, Table 32, the declining terms of trade caused a fall in the American national income, as measured by real GDP, for each year of the war, falling by 0.7% in 1812, almost 6% in 1813, by over 9% in 1814, and by 8.8% in 1815 despite the peace in February of that year.(243)

The effect on individual citizens of the deterioration in the United States' trading position is shown by the total export and import figures given as Appendix B, Tables 29 and 30, but disguised by *real* exports and imports

per head in dollars by their having subtracted the effect of inflation.(244)

Making allowance for changing prices, real exports per head fell between 1812 and 1814 by \$2.27, and real imports per head fell by as much as \$4.16 over the same period. Such a shortage of overseas export markets, and of imports for either consumption or re-export, would almost certainly have reduced incomes while raising prices. Severe inflation would be part of the economic damage expected of British commercial blockade, and to remove its impact on import and export prices is to invite misunderstanding. The decision to declare war on the world's major maritime power had indeed involved costs for ordinary American citizens.

North omitted shipping prices from his calculation of the American terms of trade, and points out that since freight rates increased more than other international prices between 1790-1815, and that, since for much of that time, shipping prices formed a "significant proportion" of the credit items in the American terms of trade, they would have been "much more favourable" if the price of shipping had been included.(245) As shown in Appendix B, Table 18, this would certainly have been true in 1807, in the prosperous pre-war period without embargoes. However, the wartime tonnage of American shipping, engaged in diminishing United States foreign trade, had fallen by over 94% between 1811 and 1814.(246) As the British commercial blockade continued, what remained of American foreign trade had increasingly been carried in neutral vessels. The inclusion of shipping prices in wartime American terms of trade, with a British commercial blockade in operation would have made little difference by 1814. As shown in Appendix B, Table

31, the net earnings of the American merchant marine had fallen by almost 94%, from \$40.8m in 1811, to \$2.6m in 1814.(247)

The British commercial blockade theoretically ended on the Atlantic in early March 1815, following the ratification of peace in February. Most of the year therefore saw a resumption of more normal overseas trade. The export price index for 1815 shows an immediate 55.6 point increase, while the import price index falls by a significant 41 points. The measured competitiveness of American foreign trade therefore improved by 40 index points, immediately the British commercial blockaded ended, itself a useful reflection of its effectiveness.

Lipsey's terms of trade index for 1789-98 to 1904-13, given as Appendix B, Table 32, show that the war of 1812-15 contributed to an interruption in an overall improvement of 41 index points during that time.(248) Lipsey points out that the rise in the United States terms of trade during most of the nineteenth century, also shows that any wartime fall is not caused solely by an American dependence on exporting primary products, such as cotton and grain. The fall of six index points in the United States terms of trade during the decade including the war, more probably indicates the American wartime difficulty in exporting anything, due to British commercial blockade.

As seen in Appendix B: Table 28, the greatest change in North's United States terms of trade during 1813, corresponds with the greatest level of operational success in British commercial blockade. Considering only the North America section of Warren's United Command, and excluding other stations, a total of 209 prizes reached Halifax in 1813, with a further 9 up to 1

April 1814 when Warren relinquished command. During Cochrane's command of the North America Station alone, 136 prizes reached Halifax. Clearly, Warren's North America squadrons were operationally more effective than those commanded by Cochrane, probably as potential prizes became scarce.

It took time however for Madison's administration to realise its predicament. From the end of 1813, to 27 June 1814, the increasingly obvious destruction of American overseas trade as source of revenue, and the unreliability of credit, had eroded the possibility of American success. Later, American isolation with the defeat of France, and frequently unopposed British landings, the destruction of Washington, awareness of impending insolvency and growing internal dissent, brought Madison to the point of serious illness and despair, and of issuing instructions which limited the American Peace Commissioner's options. These constraints on their negotiating position were relieved only by American naval successes on the Lakes, and British failure at Baltimore. American success at New Orleans came too late to affect the outcome of the Ghent treaty. With the effectiveness of the Royal Navy's convoys in protecting the bulk of British seaborne trade, and both its commercial and naval blockades of the United States, British maritime economic warfare had been a resounding success.

### **The Treaty of Ghent**

The growing need for peace was increasingly discussed between Americans aware of the government's financial position. John Jacob Astor wrote to Gallatin on 22 December 1814, "I have not a Doubt that unless we

have a Peace there will be a great Depression”.(249) Nevertheless, rumours of peace were treated with caution even in February 1815. Ives wrote to Maybin from Rhode Island on 6 February that, “until proven information be received business of all ports of this country must be at a stand, much distress prevails in our section of the Union which will increase with the direction of the war.”(250) However, the peace treaty, already ratified by the Prince Regent, reached New York on the evening of 11 February. It arrived in Washington on 14 February and was unanimously ratified by the Senate on 16 February. Having been signed by Madison later the same day, and with ratifications duly exchanged between Monroe and Baker, it came into effect at 11 p.m. on 17 February 1815.(251) On 15 February, Maybin had replied to Ives from Philadelphia that bonds and “Stocks of Every description have advanced very materially”, even Treasury notes were at par, and Government 6% stock had risen to between 90 and 92. “Imports will not sell unless at such prices as the holders are not disposed to accept. British Manufactures I am told have fallen about One Half from what they were last week”.(252)

### **The Outcome and the Cost**

Unsurprisingly, given the disparity in naval terms between Britain and the United States, on 1 February 1815, the Admiralty issued figures making clear its overall success against American warships during the war. The Admiralty admitted to having lost 16 British ships of war and armed vessels at sea, with a total of 266 guns, and the loss of 2,015 men and boys. It had lost another 7 vessels on Lake Erie, including the unlaunched *Detroit*,

and a further 5 on Lake Champlain and the rivers of North America, making a total of 28.(253)

On the same day, the Admiralty accounted for all the national “Ships of War and Armed Vessels belonging to the United States of America, taken or destroyed by His Majesty’s Ships since the Commencement of the War.” To 34 American ships and vessels taken at sea, with 400 guns and 1,956 men and boys, were added 8, with 47 guns, taken on the Lakes. This totalled 42 ships and vessels, with 454 guns and 2,294 men and boys, killed or captured. This excluded “Privateers and other Ships and Vessels Armed and Commissioned for War”, of which there had been 228 with 906 guns and 8,974 men and boys.(254)

Commercial maritime warfare had been extensive, although with different proportional effects on each economy. The highest claim of British losses to American vessels, John Russell’s list of 1815, included prizes said to have been taken into foreign ports, sunk or burned, and reached an overall total of 1,613 craft.(255) Even this number represented only 7.5% of the British merchant fleet comprised in 1814 of 21,449 vessels, which, despite such losses, had grown in number by 4.7 % between 1811-14, as shown in Appendix B, Table 33. The tonnage of the British merchant fleet had also risen by 7.4 % between 1811 and 1814, as vessels increased in size.(256) The \$45.5m claimed as the value of total British losses throughout the war, to the United States Navy and American privateers combined, loses much of its significance when converted to the £10.25m it then represented, and when compared to the aggregate value of British overseas trade in 1814, in that year alone worth £151.1m.(257) Compared with the impact of British commercial



blockade on American overseas trade shown earlier, British maritime losses seem to have left Britain's foreign trade in 1814 relatively unaffected, its aggregate value having increased by as much as 67.3 % since 1811, as seen in Appendix B Table 3. The value of British imports by 1814 had increased by 59.4 % since 1811; domestic exports having risen in value by 38.3 % in the same time. Most notably, British re-exports, of largely colonial produce, had increased in value by a remarkable 270.2 % between 1811 and 1814.

By comparison, the aggregate total of 1,407 American merchant vessels captured or destroyed by the Royal Navy throughout the war, constituted a much larger proportion of the American merchant navy, about half the size of its British counterpart.(258) The statistics issued by the Admiralty Office on 1 February, were accepted by the House of Commons, which ordered their printing on 9 February 1815.(259) The Parliamentary Paper's total of American losses was conservative, excluding captures by British privateers, "not reported regularly to the Admiralty". Nor were the Royal Navy's returns complete. If many reports resembled that of Commander Richard Coote of HMS *Borer* to his commanding officer, that he had "captured five merchant vessels and destroyed many more", the British total is certainly an underestimate.(260) The illegal ransoming of captured American vessels had continued throughout 1814. HMS *Nymphe*, for example, blockading New England during that summer, had ransomed at least ten, which had naturally not been reported.(261) No returns had been "received from the East Indies or Cape of Good Hope Stations", those of other stations had been received only "in part". American vessels detained in Irish ports were not included.(262) In addition, further legitimate British

prizes would continue to reach Halifax and other North American and Caribbean ports until May 1815. The 1,407 merchant vessels reported to the Admiralty as taken or destroyed by the Royal Navy between June 1812 and February 1815, can be usefully compared with the number of American merchant craft still in use for foreign trade by 1814, estimated to have been no more than 420 vessels of average size.(263) Even the 1,407 United States merchant vessels officially taken or destroyed during the Royal Navy's wartime commercial blockade, exceeded by more than three times the number still in American use for foreign trade by the war's end. It would still have represented almost 30% of those American merchant vessels engaged in foreign trade during the time of post-war recovery and booming overseas trade after February 1815, when the fleet approached 1.4m gross tons.(264)

Throughout the war, the British maritime commercial blockade had captured American vessels and cargoes worth more than £500,000 in prize money, then worth \$2.2m.(265) As eventual proceeds through Vice-Admiralty prize courts, rather than through an open market at the commercially appropriate time, this also seems likely to be a conservative estimate of values, and a poor measure of the damage caused to the American economy, counting only lost capital, and excluding lost profits, and the wages and spending power from employment. The British commercial blockade had ended America's virtual monopoly of shipping its own overseas trade. In 1811, 96.6% of the net tonnage carrying American foreign trade had been American.(266) Only 6.6% of the net tonnage arriving in American ports in 1812 had been foreign. By 1813, 32.5% of this tonnage was foreign, and by 1814, no less than 44.4% of arriving tonnage was non-American.

(267) American merchant shipping space had been so little used that North's shipping activity index based on 100 for 1796-1800, fell to 9.0 by 1814.(268) Furthermore, the Royal Navy's captures, and the deterrent effect of the proclamation of successive British blockades, progressively reduced the overall number of arrivals in American ports, of whatever nationality.

The damage caused to American merchant shipping by between 1812 and 1814 had significantly exceeded that caused earlier by Jefferson's embargo. The net tonnage of vessels of all nationalities entering American ports in 1807 had fallen by over 51% from 1.2m to 586,000 in 1808. By 1809 however this had recovered by 20.3% to 750,000 net tons. The proportion of American shipping involved throughout had changed little, from 92.7% in 1807 to 91.9% in 1808. Between 1812 and 1814, entries of vessels of all nationalities to American ports had fallen 84.9%, from 715,000 to 108,000 net tons. Moreover, the proportion of American vessels had fallen from 93.4% in 1812 to only 55.6% in 1814, from 668,000 net tons in 1812 to just 60,000 in 1814. For the last ten months of the war, this reduction had been due solely to British commercial blockade. The impact of the war is shown by the peace. By the end of 1815, American imports had recovered quickly with port entries totalling 918,000 net tons, of which 76.4% were American owned. By 1816, entries to American ports had again reached 1.1m net tons, of which 77.2% had been American.(269)

The monetary cost of the war to the United States has been variously estimated between \$105m and \$158m, excluding damage to property, but including veteran's pensions.(270) Up to 1815, the American government had borrowed a nominal \$80m, repayable over twelve years, although because of

the discounts found necessary, and the depreciated Treasury and banknotes accepted in payment for loan stock, this has been estimated as having been worth only \$34m in specie.(271) According to Dewey, as shown in Appendix B, Table 34, more than \$16.6m of interest was paid on money borrowed by the war's end.(272) Having reached a low point of \$45.2m in 1813, the United States national debt had reached \$127.3m by the end of 1815.(273) As early as September 1814, Liverpool had written to Bathurst, "I confess I cannot believe that, with the prospect of bankruptcy before them, the American government would not wish to make peace, if they can make it upon terms which would not give a triumph to their enemies"(274) In December, just such a peace had been offered at Ghent.

In human terms, the war is estimated to have cost the United States 20,000 lives in battle and disease, and the suffering of 20,961 naval prisoners.(275) With the single exception of Baltimore, the populations of the major ports dropped, and for the only time in American history to date, the urban proportion of the population decreased.(276) As American wartime export markets decreased, and imports generally became more scarce and expensive, and with taxation heavier, Thomas Jefferson summarised the effect of the war on a still primarily rural population by asking, "How can people who cannot get 50 cents a bushel for their wheat, while they pay \$12 a bushel for their salt, pay five times the amount of taxes they ever paid before?"(277)

During it, the war had sometimes been unjustifiably described, both in Congress and out, as a second war of independence.(278) However, had the Ghent treaty not been ratified, it seems doubtful whether Britain would

have been able to sponsor the separation of New England from the Union, beyond the initially selective British blockade, because of further potential British military and financial commitments in Europe in 1815.(279) In America, the apparent possibility of New England's secession, and a separate treaty with Britain, had prompted discussion of its commercial isolation, and military intervention, by the rest of the Union.(280)

The first of the "Headings of Negotiation" which Foreign Secretary Castlereagh sent to the British Commissioners at Ghent concerned the "Maritime rights of Great Britain, including impressment." The future right to, "claim and enforce in war the allegiance & services" of British subjects was a prerequisite from which the Government could "never recede".(281) In the event, the ratified Treaty of Ghent preserved important British naval rights. It made no mention of British impressment, or provision for compensation for American mercantile property legitimately destroyed or confiscated during the war. The treaty left unresolved the issues of British navigation rights on the Mississippi and American fishing rights on the Canadian coast, as well as the ownership of several islands in Passamaquoddy Bay, between the coast of the District of Maine and Nova Scotia. The treaty established joint legal Commissions to fix the borders between Canada and the United States, and to determine ownership of islands. It specified the continued opposition of both countries to the slave trade. Less effectively, the treaty sought to protect the rights of the indigenous tribes of North America.(282) In signing it, Madison had made an expedient withdrawal from a war he had declared without adequate fiscal and financial preparation.

In writing to Monroe from Ghent on 25 December 1814, Gallatin appears to have made his own assessment of the impact of the British commercial blockade, especially that of New England. He considered its fiscal and financial consequences, and their eventual political effects, both domestic and international. Gallatin thought that, “The treaty of peace we signed yesterday with the British ministers is, in my opinion, as favorable as could be expected under existing circumstances, so far as they were known to us.” On the effectiveness and political consequences of the British maritime blockades he added, “The attitude taken by the State of Mass[achusetts], and...in some of the neighbouring States, had a most unfavorable effect” on the American negotiating position.(283)

Ironically, a month to the day before the war was to end, the Republican semi-official newspaper, the *Washington National Intelligencer*, was to summarise precisely why the Americans had in effect lost the war they had declared on Britain, probably with insufficient forethought, and certainly without adequate fiscal reform or financial preparation. On 17 January 1815, an editorial reflected that,

Whilst again other nations find it difficult to provide the pecuniary means for commencing war, and are quickly checked by that difficulty in carrying it on, Great Britain is under no embarrassment of that sort. Such is her credit and such her capacity, honorable doubtless to sound maxims in her political economy...such her resources and systems of revenue, that the greatest part of the tax is so disguised as scarcely to be known to those who pay it. And such finally is the superiority of her capital in trade and her predominance on the ocean that she levies contributions on the whole commercial world, and not infrequently, more in time of war than at other times. (284)

Apart perhaps from passages owing more to hyperbole and bitterness than fact, the editorial recognises the causes of the United States abandonment of its original war aims, and its inability to continue financing the war for much longer. Had this analysis appeared in one of the more outspoken New England newspapers in 1812, it was then likely to have been dismissed by the *National Intelligencer* as representative of the undue pessimism, if not the actually unpatriotic misgivings, of the prosperous minority conducting most of the American shipping and foreign trade with what was then the world's industrial, commercial and maritime super-power. Had the influential and well-connected editor of the *National Intelligencer* arrived at his conclusion in the early months of 1812, the war itself might conceivably have been avoided. In a very real sense, the prediction made in Congress by Republican Representative Adam Seyburt in January 1812, that "The British force in the American seas is too competent for our interest", had proved to be true.(285)

## CONCLUSIONS

“It will be agreed on all sides that most operative [of causes] have been the inadequacy of our system of taxation to form a foundation for public credit...but the public credit at this juncture is so depressed that no hope of adequate succour on moderate terms can safely rest upon it”. John Eppes, Committee of Ways and Means, to Secretary of the Treasury, Alexander Dallas, 14 October 1814.(1)

If, in the early nineteenth-century, defeat in war lay in the inability to continue fighting while an opponent was able to do so, then, despite its victory at New Orleans in January 1815, the United States was defeated in the Anglo-American War of 1812. The Americans had failed to occupy Canada, either as a bargaining-counter or permanently, as Jefferson, Madison and Gallatin had earlier agreed. Even more importantly, the Royal Navy's economic warfare, in the form of its commercial and naval blockades, had deprived the United States of the financial means to continue fighting beyond the first few months of 1815. By depriving the United States of its imports, the British commercial blockade had so reduced American customs duties, the major source of government revenue until the last year of the war, as to create major budget deficits, and cause American dependence on increasingly unreliable public credit.

The British naval blockade had so largely confined the American navy to port as to prevent its being able to lift the British commercial blockade, or prevent British amphibious landings and major incursions into the United States at will. The unopposed landing which led to the British capture of Washington in August 1814, had had far-reaching but hitherto under-appreciated financial consequences which contributed to an outcome of the war favourable to Britain.



The British commercial blockade had over time so far reduced American agricultural exports that newly-introduced taxes were paid from reduced incomes, only with difficulty and evident reluctance. Overland transport intended to replace increasingly blockaded coastal traffic, had become so expensive as to permit farmers to sell either to local markets at prices depressed by glut, or to distant urban consumers at high prices, which effectively reduced demand. Speculators had made the most of real or contrived shortages. Unemployment, especially in ports and other cities had combined with rising prices to contribute to popular unrest. The proliferation of state and local banks with poorly controlled note issues had contributed to severe inflation, and reduced the overall acceptability of paper money. Banknotes, even those held by the government, had become far from universally acceptable, frequently refused or accepted only at a discount. Banks had eventually been forced to suspend payment in precious metals.

The proportion of the American merchant fleet actually taxed and in use declined sharply as blockades continued during a war which damaged it more severely and for longer than Jefferson's Embargo, or either of Madison's. This reduced further the American government's income, from light and harbour dues, and registration and enrolment fees. Shippers and merchants deprived of much of their business had sought alternative outlets for their financial capital, and declined to lend to an administration seen as responsible for their loss of livelihood. In 1811, 96.6% of net tonnage capacity entering United States ports had been American, compared with 55.6% in 1814.(2)

Peace had bought a rapid but temporary recovery. By the end of 1815, 76.4% of net tonnage capacity involved in United States foreign trade was American. Measured differently, the proportion of total gross tonnage of documented United States merchant vessels engaged in foreign trade in 1810, had been 68.8%. It then fell from 62.4% in 1815, to a low point of 44% in 1822, not rising again above 50%.(3) The American merchant fleet was never again as relatively important to the American economy as it had been before 1812. The relative diversion of investment funds from merchant shipping became permanent. The American government had declared war after seeking to secure a maritime trading advantage during Britain's prolonged war in Europe. For largely commercial reasons, it had interposed itself between Britain and its French enemy, and the American merchant fleet had paid the price.

It is often argued that it was precisely the extended British commercial blockade that greatly stimulated expansion in American manufacturing industry, especially of textiles, and notably cotton.(4) However, on close examination, the war's exclusion of British imports created a temporarily protected and short-lived explosion of growth, largely reversed when British textile exports to America resumed on a large scale in 1815. Then, almost 92% of American cotton manufacturing was concentrated in New England, and produced in around 165 mills in 1815.(5) Output having more than doubled between 1812 and 1815, the collapse of American military demand, and re-exposure to cheap British imports, reduced New England cotton production by almost 65% the following year. "As a result, virtually

every cotton mill in New England was closed in 1816”, at least temporarily.(6)

Only those with the financial capital to re-invest in new water power-looms survived to re-open. When, after a post-war gap, growth in the American textile industry began again, especially in cotton manufacturing, it had more to do with tariff protection, initially for two years after the peace, but again in 1816, 1824 and 1828, than with a false start provided by the war.(7) The availability of high-quality American raw-material was also significant. Recovery when it came, had more to do with the application of new power-loom technology, some of it British, as well as American developments. The higher productivity of American physical capital, and more expensive American labour and finance, was of greater lasting significance than the temporary wartime diversion of some financial capital from shipping.(8)

When the Treaty of Ghent ended the war after thirty-two months of fighting, the Americans had gained none of the aims they had hoped for at the outset, and had bankrupted themselves in the process. Between 1812 and the end of 1814, the American government had collected \$35.1m in wartime taxes, at the same time spending \$86.7m, creating a \$51.6m shortfall. Over the same period, it had sought to borrow \$62.5m by selling government stock, of which it appears to have received only \$42.6m, probably worth less than half that value in specie.(9) The Treasury’s short-term loan notes had changed hands only at discount, and calls for loans had fallen short of their targets, even when the securities were sold far below par. Before the negotiated peace of 1815, the government’s credit worthiness had collapsed.

As well as learning that the Treasury had indeed needed a wider tax base before any declaration of war, members of Congress concluded from its course that the United States had after all needed a National bank. When in 1811 they had, for reasons of their own, refused to renew the Charter of the First, thereby precluding use of its paper currency or loans, Congressmen had made a successful war against Britain all the more improbable. Creation of the Second Bank of the United States in 1816, allowed the establishment of a fiduciary currency which in time was to become practically universal

No part of the Ghent treaty had narrowed contraband solely to 'munitions of war', nor prohibited mid-ocean 'paper blockades' imposed far from named coasts or harbours. None of its clauses had removed or limited a belligerent's right to stop and search neutral merchant vessels in wartime, a right on which Britain would have to depend in later wars. This feature of the peace agreement reflected the Royal Navy's successful implementation of maritime economic warfare in North America, and the American's inability to withstand its fiscal and financial consequences.

The treaty had not even required Britain to concede its assumed right of impressing apparently British seamen found in neutral merchant vessels, formerly so often American. This was despite its having been the point on which Madison and Monroe had concentrated after Britain had revoked its 1806 Orders in Council restraining neutral trade as far as the United States was concerned, an earlier bone of contention. Secretary of State Monroe's answer to Warren's peace-feeler in November 1812, had required Britain's abandonment of impressment as an unacceptable prerequisite of peace negotiations, ensuring that war continued. The temporary ending of the long

European war which had made Britain's manpower shortage so urgent a problem as to make impressment necessary, did not make the principle of Britain's future rights over its subjects any less important. Napoleon's first abdication did not mean that the potential recovery of valuable British seamen from foreign merchant vessels would not again prove crucial in the event of another prolonged nineteenth century war.

American awareness that the currently under-employed state of their merchant fleet made it less useful for the United States to retain foreign seamen, may have contributed to American preparedness to forgo insistence on a formal solution to what had earlier been seen as a "crying enormity". The issue of impressment had been abandoned by Madison's cabinet in late June 1814 when it became clear that nothing would come of the administration's penultimate wartime attempt to borrow money, not even enough to maintain current expenditure. Between June and December 1814, Madison had come to understand that during this war with Britain, unlike the last one, no financial, material, or even diplomatic help from France would now be forthcoming. Nor, despite an urgent application, would any financial help come from a country like Holland, recently liberated from the French, but unwilling to lend to a United States unable to defend its foreign trade, maintain overseas communications, or keep the enemy out of its capital. Nor was Russia, itself still in receipt of British loans and subsidies, in any position to offer financial or military help to America, or repeat the offer, earlier rejected by Britain, to mediate between the United States and its enemy in the hope of winning concessions for trading neutrals in wartime.

Conversely, when ratifications were exchanged on the evening of 17 February 1815, no territory had been due to change hands. Despite the British occupation of parts of northern Maine since September 1814, news of American successes reaching London in October had caused the British Peace Commissioners to relinquish earlier territorial claims. The *status quo ante bellum* was to be resumed. This reflected the abandoned British intention to invade the United States from Canada, unrealistic without naval control of the Lakes, although costing the hoped-for overland route between Halifax and Quebec. British concern over disagreements between the victorious Allies meeting in Vienna, and the real possibility of renewed fighting in Europe, with its the implied need for continued heavy taxation and borrowing in Britain, had moderated attitudes on anything less vital than the retention of British maritime rights. Comparison of the British government's unimpaired ability to borrow, with their own inability to raise any appreciable loans at home or in Europe, had renewed the American Peace Commissioner's search for a negotiated settlement.

Having been in a position to defend and maintain its own overseas trade, Britain had remained the world's major financial as well as maritime power, subsidising allies but withholding funds from others. While the British banker Alexander Baring advanced small sums to American envoys in Europe, to avoid their immediate embarrassment, he did not apparently, despite his close personal and business links with the United States, lend significant sums to its government.

British success in maritime economic warfare in Europe and North America up to 1815, was to affect thinking on war and its legality during the

rest of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, and the way in which it was conducted in the 20<sup>th</sup>. Britain had softened its position regarding neutrals before the Crimean War, to facilitate its use of blockade against Russia, and again after the war, with the 1856 Declaration of Paris. Despite this restrictive agreement, Britain had maintained its right in wartime to seize contraband from neutral vessels, and incapacitate an enemy's merchant fleet. Especially after 1900, Britain would remain heavily reliant on maritime economic warfare.(10) In both 1914 and 1939 Britain was to use what remained of its naval supremacy to blockade in turn the Central Powers and Nazi Germany, much as it had earlier blockaded the United States. At the same time, in both world wars, the Germans had adapted the strategy, using submarines to conduct efficient blockades of Britain, countered, only after serious delay, by the use once more of merchant convoys as defensive economic warfare.

Therefore in 1914 and again in 1939, the cargoes of enemy and neutral vessels, often materials crucial to the opponent's war effort, would again be intercepted by the Royal Navy, often with punctilious care to avoid the entry of neutrals into the war on the wrong side. In an effort to avoid confrontation, before the United States joined the Allies in 1917, Britain bought some intercepted neutral cargoes, and repaid the American producers of canned meat, oil and cotton.(11)

As early in Britain's war against the United States as 4 April 1813, the Russian Minister at Washington had enquired into the possibility of an armistice during a proposed Russian mediation. He concluded that, "It would be almost impossible to establish an armistice without raising the blockade, since the latter does them more harm than all the hostilities".(12) This

realisation made such an impact on succeeding United States administrations that a House of Representatives Committee on Naval Affairs referred to British commercial blockade as long after the Anglo-American war as 1842. At a time when a series of diplomatic incidents made another war with Britain a possibility, the Committee expressed concern over the defencelessness of the southern and Gulf of Mexico ports, vital not only for American international, but also internal trade. Their report, dated 12 May 1842 concluded, "If you desire to measure the hazard to which a maritime war with a formidable naval Power would expose this commerce, you have but to consult the testimony of experience."(13)



### **List of Abbreviations used in References.**

- AC: Annals of Congress: e.g. 13<sup>th</sup> Congress, 2<sup>nd</sup> Session, column 1095, abbreviated as AC: 13 - 2, 1095.
- ASP: FR: American State Papers: I, Foreign Relations, 6 vols.
- ASP: F: American State Papers: III, Finance, 5 vols.
- ASP: C&N: American State Papers: IV, Commerce and Navigation, 2 vols.
- ASP: NA: American State Papers: VI, Naval Affairs.
- ASP: C: American State Papers: IX, Claims.
- ASP: M: American State Papers: X, Miscellaneous.
- BJL:UH: Brynmor Jones Library, University of Hull.
- BL:Add Mss: British Library, Additional Manuscripts.
- BL:C: British Library Newspaper Collection, Colindale, London.
- BL:E: British Library, Euston, London.
- DNB: *The Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, OUP., 2004.
- FCO: Foreign and Commonwealth Office Library, London.
- GP: Gallatin Papers. Correspondence of Albert Gallatin, held in New York Historical Society, New York.
- IHR: Institute of Historical Research, University of London.
- JCBL: John Carter Brown Library, Providence, Rhode Island.
- JHL: John Hay Library, Providence, Rhode Island.
- LBK/2: Correspondence between Admiral Sir John Borlase Warren, and Lord Melville, held in Caird Library, National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, London.
- LC: Library of Congress, Washington D.C.
- NC: *Naval Chronicle*, vols. 28-33.
- NLS: Correspondence of Vice Admiral Sir Alexander Cochrane, held in National Library of Scotland, Edinburgh.
- NMM: Caird Library, National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, London.
- NYHS: New York Historical Society, New York.
- TNA: The National Archives, Kew, Surrey.

## References

### Introduction: References

1. Albion R and Pope J. *Sea Lanes in Wartime - The American Experience*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. New York, Archon Books, 1968, p.118, with undetailed citing of Alfred T. Mahan; see *Influence of Sea Power in the War of the French Revolution*, London, Samson Low, Marston & Co, 1893, 2 vols., vol. II p.118.
2. James W., *A Full and Correct Account of the chief Naval Occurrences of the Late War between Great Britain and the United States of America...* London, T. Egerton, 1817; see also, *Warden Refuted, being a defence of the British navy against the misrepresentations of a work recently published at Edinburgh – A letter to D. B. Warden Esq. late Consul for the United States at Paris*, London, J. M. Richardson, 1819.
3. Mahan A. *Sea Power in Its Relation to the War of 1812*, Boston, Little Brown, 2 vols.1905; and London, Samson Low, Marston & Co, 1905, 2 vols. vol.I, p.402- 4.
4. *ibid.*, vol.II, p.208, quoting from Niles' *Weekly Register*, Baltimore, 17 June 1815.
5. *ibid.*, vol.II, p.207. The italics are my own.
6. Roosevelt T. 'The Naval War of 1812', in Clowes W. *The Royal Navy - A History from the Earliest Times to the Present*, 7 vols, London, Sampson Low, Marston & Co, 1897-1903, vol.VI, 1901, Chapter 1, p.65.
7. *ibid.*, p.177.
8. *ibid.*, p.156.
9. Horsman R. *The War of 1812*, New York, Knopf, 1969, pp.166-7, 210, citing Balinky A. *Albert Gallatin - Fiscal Theories and Policies*, New Brunswick, Rutgers' Univ. Press, 1958, and Adams H. *History of the United States during the Administrations of James Madison*, New York, Scribner's, 9 vols.,1889-96, vols.5-9.
10. Stagg J. *Mr Madison's War – Politics, Diplomacy and Warfare in the Early American Republic, 1783-1830*, Princeton, Princeton Univ. Press, p.505.
11. *ibid.*, p.500.
12. Toll I. *Six Frigates – How Piracy, War and British Supremacy at Sea gave Birth to the World's Most Powerful Navy*, London, Penguin/Michael Joseph, 2006.
13. Latimer J. *1812- War with America*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, Belknap Press, Harvard Univ. Press, 2007, pp.150-173, p.163.
14. Dudley W. 'Without some Risk: A Re-assessment of the British Blockade of the United States, 1812-1815,' Ph D dissertation, Tuscaloosa, University of Alabama, 1999, pp.276-86, since published as *Splintering the Wooden Wall: The British Blockade of the United States, 1812-1815*, Annapolis, Naval Institute Press, 2003.
15. Dudley W. 'Without some Risk' p.276-7; and Rodger N. *The Command of the Ocean – A Naval History of Britain, 1649-1815*. London,

Penguin/Allen Lane/ NMM, 2004, p.569.

16. Tracy N. *Attack on Maritime Trade*, Toronto, Univ. of Toronto Press, 1991, p.78.
17. Imported sugar prices are an excellent indicator, readily affected for example by successive interruptions in New England's supply at different times in the Spring of 1814, by Madison's second embargo and British blockade, and regularly included in lists of current prices. American attempts to produce sugar from 1795 were relatively unsuccessful; since Caribbean productivity was at least four times that of Louisiana, almost all sugar was imported, especially from Cuba. See: Nettels C. *The Emergence of a National Economy 1775 -1815*. New York, Holt Rinehart & Winston, 1969, pp.196-7. Similarly, Treasury note prices indicate government credit-worthiness over time.

## Chapter 1: Convoys and Blockades.

### References.

1. Wm. Eden MP., Under Secretary of State 1772-8, Commissioner for Conciliation with America, 1778-9, in 1779, quoted by Black J., in 'Naval Power, Strategy and Foreign Policy 1775-1791', in Duffy M., ed., *Parameters of British Naval Power 1650-1850*. Univ. of Exeter Press. 1992, p.93.
2. Some writers distinguish between privateers and letters of marque, trading vessels primarily carrying cargoes, but also licensed to take prizes in wartime, although admitting the distinction to be "often blurred in practice", see for example Dudley W. *The Naval War of 1812 – A Documentary History*, Washington, Naval Historical Center, 1985, vol. I, p.166, and 1992, vol. II, p.18.
3. Kert F. *Prize and Prejudice – Privateering and Naval Prize in Atlantic Canada in the War of 1812*. Research in Maritime History No:11, International Maritime Economic History Association, St.John's, Newfoundland, 1997, p.154, Table 6.1, 'A Comparison of Prize Tonnages Captured by Privateer and Royal Naval Vessels', 1812-15.
4. *London Gazette*, June 1808. See also: Hill R. *The Prizes of War – The Naval Prize System in the Napoleonic Wars 1793-1815*, Stroud, Sutton/RNM pubs., 1998, pp.201-10.
5. Hattendorf J. *The Boundless Deep: The European Conquest of the Oceans, 1450 – 1840*. Providence RI, JCBL, 2003. pp.154-5.
6. *ibid.*
7. *ibid.*
8. Harding R. *The Evolution of the Sailing Navy, 1509 – 1815*, New York, St.Martin's Press, 1995, pp.72-3.
9. The word 'strategy' as used here is an anachronism, not appearing in its modern sense in OED until 1810. Stratagem is still used by Fenning D., in *A New Spelling Dictionary and Grammar of the English Language*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., London, S. Crowder, 1773, to mean "an artifice, a trick".
10. Rodger N. *The Command of the Ocean – A Naval History of Britain 1649-1815*, London, Allen Lane/Penguin/NMM, 2004, p.76.
11. Harding R. *op. cit.* pp. 95-7.
12. *ibid.* p.97-9.
13. Hattendorf J. 'The Struggle with France, 1689-1815' in *The Oxford History of the Royal Navy*, Hill J. ed., 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., Oxford, OUP/BAC, 1995, p.87.
14. Roskill S. *The Strategy of Sea Power – Its Development & Application*, first published London, Collins, 1962, republished Aylesbury, John Goodchild, 1986. pp.38 & 44.
15. Baugh D. 'The Eighteenth Century Navy as a National Institution, 1690-1815', in *The Oxford History of the Royal Navy*, Hill J. ed., 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., Oxford, OUP/BAC, 1995, p.158. The development of the Royal Dockyards at Portsmouth and Plymouth was particularly rapid and important between 1711 and 1770, *ibid.*, p.127. See also, Baugh D., 'Naval power: what gave the British Navy superiority?' in Escosura L. ed.,

- Exceptionalism and Industrialisation, Britain and its European Rivals, 1688 – 1815*, Cambridge Univ. Press, 2004, pp.235-257, which includes Rear Admiral George Anson's advocacy of sea-keeping in the evolving blockade of France.
16. Duffy M. ed., 'Devon and the Naval Strategy of the French Wars, 1689-1815', in *The New Maritime History of Devon*, Exeter, Conway/Univ.of Exeter, 1992, vol.I, p.186, citing TNA: ADM2/1331, Admiralty to Martin, 17 August 1745.
  17. *ibid.*
  18. BL: Add. Mss: Leeds Papers, vol.CXLI , Egerton Ms 3464 ff. 28-31, Walter Titley, English Minister to Copenhagen, to Robert D'Arcy, Lord Holderness, Secretary of State for the Northern Department, Copenhagen, 19 February 1757. The Earl of Holderness became Sect. of State for the Southern Department in April 1757. I am grateful to Jeremy Michell of NMM, London, for directing me to this reference.
  19. Anderson F. *The Crucible of War: The Seven Years War and the Fate of Empire in British North America, 1754 –1766*, London, Faber and Faber, 2000, pp.237, 417-8.
  20. Harding R. *Seapower and Naval Warfare 1650 –1830*. London, UCL Press, 1999. p.51. For Hawke's close blockade of Brest, see Rodger N. *op.cit.* p.281.
  21. Michell J. 'Vexing your Neighbours for a Little Muck, British Prize-taking during the Seven Years War, 1756-63,' Staff Seminar Lecture, NMM, London, 16 May 2007, Table 1. 794 enemy vessels were condemned, between 1755-62, comprising 82.79% of those captured.
  22. Kennedy P. *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery*, London, Allen Lane, 1976, p.114, citing Graham G. 'Considerations on the War of American Independence' in *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research*, XXII, (1949) p.23. quoted in full in Richmond H. *op.cit.*
  23. Barnes G. and Owen J. (eds.), *The Private Papers of John Montague Earl of Sandwich, First Lord of the Admiralty 1771-1782*, Memorandum in 'Sandwich Papers, North America 1773-7', London, Navy Records Society, 4 vols. vol.I, 1932, pp.64-5. [In Adm Palliser's writing: unsigned and undated, but evidently written in July 1775]'; and Grave's List Book, 1 June 1775.
  24. Barnes G. and Owen J. (eds) *op. cit.*, vol.I, p.328, Lord Sandwich to Lord North, 7 December 1777.
  25. Kennedy P. *op.cit.* p.114.
  26. Stephenson O., calculates 'nine-tenths' in *American History Review* XXX, cited by Mackesy P. *The War for America 1775-1783*, London, Longman, 1964, p.99.
  27. Rodger N. *op.cit.* p.331. For North Atlantic currents and prevailing winds, see also Maps, 'The North Atlantic', pp. lvii - lix
  28. Graham G. 'Considerations on the American War of Independence', *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research* XXII (1949) p.23.
  29. Harding R. *Seapower and Naval Warfare 1650-1830*, London, UCL Press, 1999, p.292, citing Glete J., *Navies and Nations: Warships, Navies and Statebuilding in Europe and America 1500-1860*, Stockholm, Almqvist and Wiksell, 1993, 2 vols., vol. 2. Table A3, 'The changing structure of selected sailing navies 1770-1850.'

30. Plumb J. *England in the Eighteenth Century -1714 –1815*, Harmondsworth, Pelican, 1950, p.129.
31. Syrett D. *The Royal Navy in American Waters, 1775-1783*, Aldershot, Scolar,1989, pp.56-7.
32. Buel R. *In Irons: Britain's Naval Supremacy and the American Revolutionary Economy*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1998, p.86. See also Baugh D. 'The Politics of British Naval Failure,1775-7', in *American Neptune*, LII,(1992).
33. Buel R. op.cit. p.229.
34. Duffy M. op.cit. vol.I, p.187, Table 27.1, citing Merriman R., ed., *Queen Anne's Navy: Documents concerning the Administration of the Navy of Queen Anne, 1702-14*, NRS, vol.103, 1961, p.373; and Knight R. 'The Royal Dockyards in England at the Time of the American War of Independence', App.IV, pp.397-8, London, Ph D thesis, 1972. The actual increase is 70.18%.
35. O'Connell D. *The Influence of Law on Sea Power*, Manchester Univ. Press, 1975, p.20.
36. NMM: Hulbert Papers, HUL14. Copies of 1793 and 1798 Acts for reference of George Hulbert, Warren's Flag Secretary and Prize Agent.
37. Black J. *Britain as a Military Power - 1688-1815*, London, UCL Press, 1999, pp. 235-6.
38. Duffy M. op.cit. p.187, and Rodger N. op.cit. p.465.
39. Richmond H. *Statesmen and Seapower*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1946, Appendix 1, 'Dundas and Castlereagh on the Principles of British War, 1801-15', pp.338-9,citing *Parliamentary History* vol.XXXVI, p.1071.
40. Evans E. *The Forging of the Modern State – Early Industrial Britain 1783-1870*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. London, Longman, 1996, p.89.
41. Crouzet F. 'War, Blockade and Economic Change in Europe 1792-1815.' in *Journal of Economic History* XXIV, (1964), pp.567-90, pp.568, 571-4.
42. Mahan A. *The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire*, London, Samson Low, Marston & Co, 1892, in 2 vols., vol. II, p. 219.
43. Davies D. *A Brief History of Fighting Ships*, London, Constable, 1996, re-published Robinson, 2002, p.58. See also Dunne W. 'The Inglorious First of June: Commodore Stephen Decatur on Long Island Sound, 1813', in *The Long Island Historical Journal*, 2, Spring 1990.
44. Repair facilities existed at Chatham, Portsmouth, Torbay and Plymouth, and from 1728, in the Caribbean at English Harbour, Antigua. Victualling was also from Deptford and Devonport.
45. O'Brien P. *War and Economic Progress in Britain and America*, Milton Keynes, Open Univ. Press,1997, p.182.
46. Evans E. *The Forging of the Modern State – Early Industrial Britain, 1783-1870*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., London, Longman, 1996, pp. 415-6, citing Davis R. *The Industrial Revolution and British Overseas Trade*, London, Pinter, 1979, pp. 94-101. Britain is estimated to have imported 43% of its food by 1804-6. Trade percentages calculated from data in Mitchell B. & Deane P. *Abstract of British Historical Statistics*, Cambridge Univ.Press, 1962, p.281, Table 1B, 'Official Values, Overseas Trade, Great Britain,1772-1804', merchant tonnage, p.217, 'Shipping Registered in UK 1738-1938'.

47. Evans E. op.cit. p.439; and French D., *The British Way of Warfare 1688-2000*, London, Unwin/Hyman, 1990, pp.106-7.
48. Pitkin T. *A Statistical View of the Commerce of the United States of America...* 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., New Haven, Durrie & Peck, 1835, p.363. British registered tonnage in 1807 had reached almost 2.1m tons, see: Mitchell B. & Deane P. op.cit. p.217.
49. Hill R. op.cit, p.10, citing Marsden M. ed. *The Law and Custom of the Sea*, vol.II, London, Navy Records Society, 1915, p.348.
50. Hattendorf J. *The Boundless Deep*, p.155. Robinson's work was originally published in London in 1799. See also Robinson's translation of chapters 273 and 277 of *Consolato del Mare relating to Prize Law*, London, White & Butterworth, 1800.
51. Robinson C. *Reports of Cases heard in the High Court of Admiralty under Sir William Scott*, London, 1798-1808, 6 vols., vol.3, 1800, pp.157-8, quoted by Hill R., op.cit. p.37, citing Townley L., 'Sir William Scott, Lord Stowell, and the Development of the Prize Law in the High Courts of Admiralty, 1798-1828, with Particular Reference to the Rights of Belligerents', unpublished thesis, University of Birmingham, 1994, p.341.
52. Seyburt A. *Statistical Annals*, Philadelphia, T. Dobson, 1818, p.93. For concern of West India Committee growers and merchants on American re-export of sugar, and views of Spencer Percival and Castlereagh see: Hansard T. *Parliamentary Debates: House of Commons*, vol.VIII, 630-2 & 641-4; and Crouzet F., 'America and the crisis of the British imperial economy, 1803-1807' in McCusker J. and Morgan K. (eds.) *The Early Modern Atlantic Economy*, Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press, 2000, pp. 278-315, pp.311-12.
53. *American State Papers*, Washington, Gales and Seaton, 1832-61, Class 1, Foreign Relations, 6 vols., 1833-59, vol.III, p.267 for text of 'Fox Blockade'. Hereafter, ASP: FR: vol.III. Outside the Seine to Ostend coastline, only direct trade between 'ports hostile to Britain' was to be blockaded, implying that trade to Europe from American ports carried neutral goods.
54. Richmond H. op.cit. Appendix III, p.344-5, citing Cobbett's *Parliamentary Debates*, vol.XXI, p.1152.
55. AC: 9-1,1259-62, Non-Importation Act, 14 December 1807. Although passed by Congress in December 1806, America's first Non-Importation Act was suspended, not to come into effect until December 1807. Macon's No: 2 Bill of April 1810 became what is referred to as the Non-Importation Act of 1811.
56. Hope R. *A New History of British Shipping*, London, Murray, 1990, p.254, citing Hutchison J. *The Press-Gang Afloat and Ashore*, London, 1913, p.327. One-in-three pressed men deserted; 42,000 during the French Revolutionary War before 1803.
57. James W. *Military Occurrences in the Late War between Great Britain and the United States*, London, 1818, vol.I, p.36, quoting part of the Prince Regent's 'manifesto' of 9 January 1813, 'in reply to Mr Madison's', see also p.16.
58. Gwyn J. *Frigates and Foremasts – The North America Squadron in Nova Scotia Waters 1745-1815*, Vancouver and Toronto, Univ. of British Columbia Press, 2003, p.131, citing Jackson S., 'Impressment and Anglo-

- American Discord 1787-1818', unpublished Ph D dissertation, Univ. of Michigan, 1976, p.52.
59. AC:12-1, 818, Langdon Cheves in House of Representatives, 17 January 1812. See also: Adams H. ed., *The Writings of Gallatin*, Philadelphia, J.P. Lippincott & Co, 1879, 3 vols., vol. I, p.336, Gallatin to Jefferson, 16 April 1807. Gallatin calculates that between a half and two-thirds of the 8,400 increase in American merchant seamen in the previous two years, i.e. between 4,200 and 5,600 men, will have been British.
  60. Niles H. *Weekly Register*, Baltimore, vol.II, p.119.
  61. James W. op.cit. vol.I, pp.41-2, citing Federalist Representative Timothy Pickering of Massachusetts, March 1814, subtracting duplicates, volunteers, and those with "fraudulent" or "insufficient documents", quoted, *The Massachusetts' Manual; or Burdick's Political and Historical Register*, Boston, 1814. Perhaps significantly, Buel R, *America on the Brink: How the Political Struggle over the War of 1812 Almost Destroyed the Young Republic*, Basingstoke, Palgrave/Macmillan, 2005, p.23, asserts that Pickering's father, John, also a Federalist Representative, was "clearly insane".
  62. Dudley W. op.cit. vol.I, p.62.
  63. TNA: FO: 115/22, no:7, Letter to Foreign Secretary the Marquis Wellesley, from the Collector of Customs, Richmond, Virginia, dated 12 January 1812, seeking the repatriation of impressed seaman P. Randolph Page, currently serving in HM sloop *L'Eclair*, a minute description of whom proved him to be a native-born American.
  64. James W. op.cit. vol.I, p.36.
  65. ASP:FR: vol. III, pp.140-63, corr. re: Monroe-Pinkney treaty, pp.140-63.
  66. BL:C. *Morning Post*, London, 6 August 1807.
  67. Adams H. ed., *Writings of Albert Gallatin*, Philadelphia, Lippincott & Co, 3 vols., 1879, vol.1, p.343, Gallatin to President Thomas Jefferson, 'Memorandum of Preparatory Measures', Washington, 25 July 1807.
  68. Toll I, *Six Frigates -How Piracy, War and British Supremacy at Sea gave Birth to the World's Most Powerful Navy*, London, Penguin/Michael Joseph, 2006, p.285.
  69. Adams H. ed., op.cit. p.343.
  70. Adams H. ed., op.cit. p.248-9.
  71. Dewey D. op.cit. p.126.
  72. Adams H. ed., op.cit. p.350.
  73. *ibid.*
  74. AC: 10-1, 2814-5.
  75. Johnson P. *A History of the American People*, London, 1997, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, p.214, citing Brandt I, *James Madison, Commander in Chief 1812-36*, New York, Bobbs Merrill & Co Inc, in 6 vols., 1941-61, vol.IV, p.306.
  76. AC:10-2,1824.
  77. ASP:FR, vol.III, p.386, letter from J.B. Champagny, Duc de Cadore, French Minister for Foreign Affairs to John Armstrong, American Minister in Paris, apparently dated 5 August 1810. Appearing to revoke the Berlin and Milan decrees from 1 November 1810, it was ambiguously worded, but published in March 1811. It was apparently accepted by Madison at its face value, but dismissed in Britain as



- fraudulent, as in the Prince Regent's speech of 1 January 1813. See also, James W. op.cit. vol.I, p.24.
78. *Naval Chronicle* vol.XXV, 'Naval History of the Present Year', May-June 1811, p.502;
  79. Tracy N. ed., *The Naval Chronicle: The Contemporary Record of the Royal Navy at War*, Consolidated Edition, 5 vols., London, Chatham Publishing, 1999, vol.5, '1811 - Naval News', p.1.
  80. *Naval Chronicle* vol.XXVII, 'State Papers: Message of the President of the United States, James Madison, to Congress, 5 November 1811', pp.28-32.
  81. *ibid.*
  82. James W. op.cit. vol. 1, pp.2-4. 'President's message to both houses of congress'.
  83. Buel R. *America on the Brink: How the Political Struggle Over the War of 1812 Almost Destroyed the Young Republic*, New York, Palgrave/Macmillan, 2005, p.125. The Royal Navy had added four vessels to its North America squadron.
  84. TNA: CO 43/49, p.153/266, Henry Goulburn to George Harrison, Second Secretary at the Admiralty, 're Upper & Lower Canada', dated, Downing Street, 27 November 1812.
  85. AC: 12-1, 815, Langdon Cheves, House of Representatives, 17 January 1812.
  86. Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, 1812, quoted in Johnson P. op.cit., p.217, citing Lipscomb A. and Bergh A. , eds., *Thomas Jefferson's Writings*, New York, 1903, 20 vols, vol. IX, p.366.
  87. Lambert A. 'Introduction' in Gardiner R.(ed) *The Naval War of 1812*, London, Caxton Editions/NMM, 2001, p.10.
  88. TNA: FO: 115/22, letter 2, John Morier, British charges d'affairs in Washington, to Foreign Office, London, dated Washington, 12 January 1811.
  89. TNA: FO: 115/22, letter 8, Morier to Foreign Office, 24 January 1811. Robert Smith was replaced as Secretary of State on 11 April 1811, by James Monroe.
  90. TNA: FO: 115/23, letter 9, p.107, Foreign Secretary Lord Castlereagh to Augustus Foster, British Minister in Washington, dated Foreign Office, 10 April 1812.
  91. *ibid*; in the contemporary Foreign Office copy, an expletive was apparently dictated, but subsequently expunged, although precisely when the offensive word was removed, and by whom, is unfortunately, unknown.
  92. AC:12-1, 2322-3. Voting on Declaration of war, in the House of Representatives, 4 June 1812, voted for: 79, against: 49; in the Senate, 17 June 1812, voted for:19, against:13.
  93. NMM: KEI/37/9, 'Private' letter, Ld. Melville to Admiral Ld. Keith, dated, Admiralty, 11 June 1812.
  94. TNA: ADM 1/4220: Letter from Foreign Secretary, Marquis Wellesley, Foreign Office, to Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, 21 January 1812.
  95. TNA: CO 43/49, pp.266-7, Lord Bathurst to Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, dated Downing Street, 21 November 1812.

96. Dudley W. op.cit. vol. I, p.633, citing ADM 2/ 1375, Secret Letters and Orders, pp.337-8, Lords of Admiralty Rbt. Melville, Wm. Domett and Geo. Hope to Warren, 26 December 1812, refers to earlier order of 27 November 1812.
97. *The Edinburgh Review*, for 1813, vol.6, p.112.
98. TNA: ADM 1/4222, p.169, Confidential letter from Lord Castlereagh to Admiralty, dated Foreign Office, 12 August 1812.
99. Huntington Lib: Melville Papers. reel 1. April 1812.
100. Dudley W. op.cit. vol.II, pp.11-14, 'Private' letter from Admiral Sir Henry Stanhope to Melville, dated Stanwell House, Staines, 5 January 1813.

## Chapter 2: Constraints and Solutions: References.

1. George Hulbert to his brother John Hulbert, 2 January 1813, quoted by Guttridge A., in unpublished M Phil dissertation, 'Prize Agency 1800-1815 with special reference to the career and work of George Redmond Hulbert', University of Portsmouth, 1989, p.83, citing Portsmouth City Records Office, 626A1/1/21.
2. *Naval Chronicle* vol.XXVIII, p.159. Warren left Portsmouth on 14 August 1812, and reached Halifax, Nova Scotia, on 26 September 1812.
3. NMM: LBK/2, Warren to Robert Dundas, Lord Melville, First Lord of the Admiralty, dated Bermuda, 30 December 1813.
4. TNA: ADM 1/502, Vice-Admiral Sawyer to First Secretary of the Admiralty John Croker, dated Halifax, N. S., 5 July 1812, via the packet *Julia*. A letter sent by Warren in Halifax on 26 October 1813 reached the Admiralty on 17 November, in an extraordinarily fast 22 days.
5. TNA: ADM1/4221, Letter from Foreign Secretary, Lord Castlereagh to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, dated Foreign Office, 9 May 1812.
6. TNA: FO:115/22 July 1812. In October 1810, Madison revealed a letter from the Duc de Cadore, French Minister for Foreign Affairs, apparently dated 5 August 1810, ambiguously claiming revocation of the Berlin and Milan decrees and restrictions on neutral American shipping if Britain withdrew its Orders in Council. Failing this, an American Non-Importation law would apply solely to Britain, adding to Anglo-American hostility while French detentions of American vessels continued. The St Cloud decree published in May 1812, apparently dated 28 April 1811, sought to confirm French revocation, and although a transparent fraud, made British revocation of the Orders in Council expedient.
7. NMM: KEI/37/9, 'Private' letter from Admiral George Hope to Admiral Lord Keith, Admiralty, 17 June 1812. Had Madison got early warning of French naval intentions, either through diplomatic or intelligence channels, and planned his inflammatory 'Message to Congress' of 1 June 1812 to coincide with these new British difficulties?
8. AC:12-1, 815, 17 January 1812.
9. AC:12-1, 830-1, 18 January 1812. Republican Representative Adam Seyburt told Congress that, according to Steel's list, in July 1811, the Royal Navy had 3 ships of the line amongst 29 vessels in Halifax and Newfoundland. In the West Indies, comprising the Leeward Islands and Jamaica, it had 2 battleships in a total of 69, while in South America it had 2 ships of the line and 7 frigates in a total of 13 vessels, making a total of 111 in his broadly defined "American seas". Seyburt referred to Steel D. *Original and correct List of the Royal Navy*, published monthly between 1793-1815.
10. Lohnes B. 'British Naval Problems at Halifax During the War of 1812', in *Mariner's Mirror*, LIX, 1973, p.317, citing Albion R., *Forests and Sea Power*, p.365-6.
11. Clowes W. *The Royal Navy – A History from the Earliest Times to the Present*. 6 vols., London, Sampson Low, Marston & Co, 1900, vol.V, p.10. 'The Active List of the Ships of the Royal Navy 1803-1815', which

- had been “compiled chiefly from Appendices in James, checked against Steel, official lists and the *Naval Chronicle*.” Modern scholarship would greatly reduce the British Navy of 1810. Harding R., in *Seapower and Naval Warfare 1650 - 1830*, London UCL, 1999, pp. 294-5, cites Glete J. *Navies and nations: warships navies and state building in Europe and America, 1500 – 1860*, 2 vols., Stockholm, Almqvist & Wiksell, 1993. vol. II, Table A4: ‘The changing structure of selected sailing navies :1805-30’, in suggesting that in 1810, Britain had 152 ‘battleships’, 183 ‘cruisers’, equivalent to frigates, and 63 ‘small ships’, making a total of 398 warships available. Also for 1810, Glete calculates that the United States had no battleships, 9 cruisers, and 3 small ships, giving a total of 12 warships. However calculated, the disparity in naval strength between Britain and the United States is inescapable.
12. Dudley W.ed., *The Naval War of 1812- A Documentary History*, Washington, Naval Historical Center, vol.II, 1992, pp.16-18. ‘Secret’, Croker to Warren, 10 February 1813, citing ADM 2/137673-87.
  13. NMM: WAR/82 p.20, letter from Melville to Warren, 3 December 1812.
  14. Dudley W. op.cit., vol. II, p.78, Croker to Warren 20 March 1813, citing ADM 2/1376, pp.341-67.
  15. NMM: LBK/2, Melville to Warren, 4 June 1813.
  16. Dudley W. op.cit., vol. I, pp.218, 508-9, & vol. II, p.11.
  17. Skaggs D. and Altoff G. *Signal Victory – The Lake Erie Campaign 1812-13*, Annapolis, Md, Naval Institute Press, 1997, p.148. The British squadron comprised 2 ships, 2 brigs, a schooner and a sloop. See also: Stacey C. ‘Another Look at the Battle of Lake Erie’ in *Canadian Historical Review* 39, March 1958, pp. 41-51, suggesting that, at the end of a supply line, the British were poorly equipped.
  18. Dudley W. op.cit., vol. II, p.59, citing Brynmor Jones Lib., Hotham Papers, Univ.of Hull, DDHO/7/98.
  19. Dudley W. op.cit., vol. II, pp.59-60, Warren’s Standing Orders on the North American Station, ‘Genl. Order’, Bermuda, 6 March 1813, citing Brynmor Jones Lib., Hotham Papers, DDHO7/45.
  20. Dudley W. op.cit., vol. II, p.60, note 1. Admiralty circular order 23 March 1813.
  21. Dudley W. op.cit., vol. I, pp. 181,509.
  22. *ibid*, pp.594-5.
  23. Dudley W. op.cit., vol. II, p.11, and Lohnes op.cit., p.319.
  24. Clowes W. op.cit. vol. V, p.9.
  25. *ibid*, actually 66.33%.
  26. Rodger N. *The Command of the Ocean –A Naval History of Britain, 1649-1815*. London, Allen Lane/NMM, 2004, Appendix VI, Manpower, p.639.
  27. Clowes op. cit., p.9.
  28. TNA: ADM 8/100 Ships in Sea Pay 1 July 1812; see also NMM:HUL/18 shown as Appendix A Table 3: Flag Secretary George Hulbert’s ‘List of Ships & Vessels on the West Indies & American Stations’ dated 7 August 1812. When figures for Newfoundland are added to the latter, both arrive at a total of 83, including three receiving ships.
  29. Dudley W. op. cit., vol.I, 1985, p.53-60, Secretary of the Navy Hamilton to Langdon Cheves, Chairman of the Naval Committee, Washington

- Navy Yard, 3 December 1811. For use of 'live' oak in American naval shipbuilding see: Toll I., *Six Frigates*, London, Michael Joseph/Penguin, 2006, pp.58-61.
30. Dudley W. ed., op.cit. vol.I, p.132n.
  31. De Conde A. *The Quasi War: The Politics and Diplomacy of the Undeclared War with France 1797-1801*, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1966.
  32. Clowes W. op.cit. vol.V, p.567. Named losses of the US Navy to December 1812, excluding gunboats.
  33. Knight R. 'The Introduction of Copper Sheathing into the Royal Navy, 1779-86', in *Mariners' Mirror*, vol.LIX, 1973, pp.229-309; see also, Baugh D. 'The Eighteenth Century Navy as a National Institution, 1690-1815' in *The Oxford History of the Royal Navy*, Hill J. ed., 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. Oxford, OUP/BAC, 1995, p.132.
  34. Dudley W. ed., op. cit. vol.II, p.261, citing ADM1/504 pp.417-20, Warren to Croker 16 October 1813, lists *Victorious* 74 and *Nymphe* 38 as refitting, *Orpheus* and *Statira* 38's going for heavy repair, and *Narcissus* 38, on passage, 5 of 25 vessels being unavailable. Melville had earlier written that 50% of a blockading force might be absent in transit or repair.
  35. Baugh D., 'Naval power: what gave the British Navy superiority?' in Escosura L. ed., *Exceptionalism and Industrialisation, Britain and its European Rivals, 1688 – 1815*, Cambridge Univ. Press, 2004, pp.235-257, p.256
  36. *ibid.*
  37. Lavery B. *Nelson's Navy-The Ships Men and Organisation 1793-1815*. London, Conway Maritime Press/Brassey's, 1989. p.242, citing NMM: HAL/E3.
  38. NMM: LBK/2, Warren to Melville, HMS *San Domingo* off Kent Island, Chesapeake. 24 August 1813. See enclosed un-named newspaper cutting dated 29 July 1813, 'Copy of Secretary Wm. Jones Naval General Order', describing the need for Madison's second Embargo, to be rejected by Congress, and imposed by Executive Order on 29 July 1813. Since Warren refers to "the small Extracts from Official Sources... enclosed from the Enemies papers", it was probably taken from the Washington semi-official *National Intelligencer*. See also Whitehill W. ed., *The Journal of Lieutenant Henry Napier in HMS Nymphe – New England Blockaded – 1814*, Salem, Mass., Peabody Museum, 1939, pp.21 & 23; on 5 June 1814, *Nymphe* had taken a cargo of potatoes from the American schooner *Maria*, and on 9 June, "received vegetables and stock of all kinds from Boston."
  39. Dudley W. ed., op.cit., vol.II, p.272, Capt. John Hayes to Warren, undated but included in ADM 1/504, pp.733-6, dated HMS *Majestic* 25 October 1813.
  40. NMM: LBK/2 Intelligence report forwarded by Warren to Melville, 16 March 1813.
  41. Bonnett S. *The Price of Admiralty: An Indictment of the Royal Navy 1805-1960*, London, Hale, 1968, p.16.
  42. NMM: LBK/2, Melville to Warren, 'Private', Admiralty, 4 June 1813.
  43. NMM: Warren Papers, WAR/49/ Letter 12, Warren to Melville; Halifax, 5 October 1812; TNA: ADM 1/502, Sawyer to Croker, 5 July 1812.

- Sawyer's proclamation to pardon deserters in the Maritime Provinces was dated 3 July 1812, and Warren's, 5 October 1812. See also NMM:LBK/2, Warren to Melville, Halifax 7 October 1812.
44. NMM:LBK/2, Warren to Melville, Halifax, 5 November 1812.
  45. Hill R. *The Prizes of War – The Naval Prize System in the Napoleonic Wars 1793 –1815*, Stroud, Sutton/Royal Naval Museum pub., 1998, pp.218, 241.
  46. NMM: Warren Papers: WAR/37, reverse of p.37, 'Vessels Captured and Detained 2 June - 13 September 1813'. Agents were obliged to advertise distributions of prize money, and were supposed to meet provable claims by the dead's dependents. See Hill R. op.cit. p.236.
  47. *Naval Chronicle* vol.XXX, p.42, Broke of the *Shannon* burned prizes "to his own severe loss"; see also; Whitehill W. ed., op.cit. p.18; between 6-7 June 1814, Capt. Epworth of HMS *Nymphe* had burned five prizes in two days.
  48. Niles' *Weekly Register*, Baltimore, vol.V, p.184, and p.316, 8 January & 5 February 1814. See also Niles' vol.VI, p.344; A British 'cockswain' and 10 seamen deserting at Accomack, Virginia, on the Chesapeake, received £50 for their barge, and with certificates of naturalisation, "set off for Baltimore".
  49. Crawford M. ed., *The War of 1812 – A Documentary History*, vol. III, Washington, Naval Historical Center, 2002, p.116. Rear-Adm George Cockburn to Vice-Adm. Alexander Cochrane, HMS *Albion*, Tangier Island, 25 June 1814.
  50. Dudley W. op.cit. vol.II, p.274, citing ADM 1/504, pp. 509-10, Warren to Croker, Halifax, 27 October 1813.
  51. Lohnes B. op.cit. p.328. Note 13. Vice-Adm. Sawyer, for example, is described as lacking energy. No evidence of preparation for war is said to be found in Sawyer's correspondence with his captains in ADM 1/502. See also Goldenberg J. 'The Royal Navy's Blockade in New England Waters, 1812-1815', in *International History Review*, vol. 6, August 1984, p.425, for Admiralty criticism of Sawyer, citing ADM 2/1375. See also: James W. *Naval History of Britain 1783-1822*, 6 vols, London, 1837, vol VI, p.224. James thought Warren "a superannuated admiral, whose services, such as they were, bore a very old date".
  52. Huntington Lib: Melville Papers, reel 1, Cochrane to Melville, Government House, Guadaloupe, 27 April 1812.
  53. Rodger N. op.cit., pp.432-3.
  54. Jervis J., Earl St. Vincent, *Selections of the Correspondence of Admiral John Markham*, London, Navy Records Society, 1904, p.60, St Vincent to Adm.Markham, HMS *Hibernia*, Cawsand Bay 26 October 1806.
  55. *ibid.*, p.49, St. Vincent to Adm. Markham, HMS *Hibernia* near Ushant 16 May 1806. By 'puisne', St Vincent apparently meant any junior officer in his own fleet, superior to Warren's detached squadron. See: *The Concise Oxford Dictionary*, Oxford Univ. Press, 1964.
  56. Grenville T., to his brother the Marquis of Buckingham, Huntington Lib, STG 37(32), 8 November 1806. Grenville had been First Lord of the Admiralty since September 1806. See Sainty J. *Office-Holders in Modern Britain, IV: Admiralty Officials , 1660-1870*, London, 1975, p.33.

57. NMM: Warren Papers: WAR/27 p.66: Castlereagh to Warren, Foreign Office, 17 June 1812 'Most Secret re the Declaration of His Maj's Ministers'. See also, NMM:WAR/82, p.2, Melville to Warren, Admiralty, 30 July 1812. On 30 July 1812, Warren was required by Melville, First Lord since 25 March 1812, to "come up to Town forthwith" to meet Castlereagh. By 8 August 1812, Warren had sought Melville's clarification of some of "the Instructions that Lord Castlereagh did me the Honour of explaining to me the other day." LBK/2: Warren to Melville, Upper Gros'or Street, 8 August 1812.
58. TNA: ADM 2/1376, pp.73-87, Croker to Warren, 'Secret', Admiralty, 10 February 1813.
59. NMM: LBK/2, Warren to Melville, Halifax, 7 October 1812. Warren was not however to learn of Sawyer's replacement as his second in command by Rear Adm. George Cockburn until 3 December 1812. Sawyer was recalled, and given command of Cork, in Ireland.
60. Hulbert to his brother John, 26 January 1813, quoted in Guttridge A. 'Prize Agency 1800-1815 with special reference to the career and work of George Redmond Hulbert', unpublished M Phil dissertation, University of Portsmouth, 1989, p.83, citing Portsmouth City Records Office, 626A1/1/3/21,
61. NMM: LBK/2, Warren to Melville, Lynhaven Bay, 6 September 1813. Yellow fever was endemic on the Chesapeake; see Lohnes B. op. cit., p.73, citing ADM 1/504 14 August 1813.
62. Crawford M. ed., op.cit. p.339, Capt. Robt. Barrie to his mother, dated *Dragon* off Tangier Isle, Chesapeake Bay, 11 November 1814.
63. TNA: ADM 1/4222, SS vol.3, No: 165: 52.25. Foreign Office, August 6 1812, 'Instructions to be given to Admiral Sir John Warren on the Subject of the Relations between this Country & the United States.' These replicated Foreign Office instructions originally intended for the British Minister in Washington, Augustus Foster or charges d'affaires Anthony Baker, and dated 8<sup>th</sup> July 1812, unless a declaration of war had caused their prior departure from the United States.
64. *Naval Chronicle* vol.XXVIII, pp.138-9.
65. Vane C. *Memoirs and Correspondence of Viscount Castlereagh*, London, 1848- 53, H Colburn, in 12 vols., vol. 8, p.289, Castlereagh to Admiralty, 6 August 1812, and 12 August 1812.
66. NMM: Warren Papers: WAR 49.
67. NMM: Warren Papers: WAR 43, Warren to John Baker, British charges d'affaires, dated Halifax, 16 November 1812. Monroe's letter, dated 27 October 1812 is in ASP: Foreign Relations, vol.I, pp.595-7
68. Kert F. *Prize and Prejudice: Privateering and Naval Prize in Atlantic Canada in the War of 1812*, Research in Maritime History No.11, International Maritime Economic History Association, St. John's Newfoundland, 1997. Calculated from Appendix 1, pp.160-203.
69. Guernsey R. *New York City and Vicinity during the War of 1812-15, being a Military, Civic and Financial Local History of that Period*, in 2 vols., New York, Charles Woodward, 1889-95, vol.I, p.387.
70. NMM: LBK/2, Warren to Melville Halifax, 7 October 1812; see also TNA: ADM 1/4222, Foreign Office to Admiralty, Hamilton to Croker, 26 August 1812, for Letters of Protection for neutral vessels sailing with

- American grain and flour for Spain and Portugal, left by Augustus Foster before leaving Washington. Sawyer and Allen's issue of so many licences caused a British agent to complain on 13 March 1813 that dishonoured licences were a breach of faith, causing the ruin of hitherto pro-British 'respectable Merchants'. Warren forwarded the report to Melville on 16 March 1813, see NMM: LBK/2.
71. NMM: LBK/2, Warren to Melville, 'Private', HMS *San Domingo*, Bermuda, 19 February 1813
  72. *Naval Chronicle*, vol. XXVIII, pp.48-51, 12 August 1812. The annual average of British licences issued between 1807-1811 was actually 9,740. The number issued is often given incorrectly, although in 'An Account of the Number of Commercial Licences Granted during the Last Ten Years', in *British Sessional Papers : House of Commons*, 13 February 1812, p.343, and quoted in Seyburt A., *Statistical Annals*, p.70, and Galpin W. 'The American Grain Trade to the Spanish Peninsula 1810-14', in *American Historical Review* vol. XXVIII, pp.24- 44, p.25.
  73. Hickey D. *The War of 1812 - A Forgotten Conflict*, Urbana, Univ. of Illinois Press, 1989, p.117.
  74. JCBL: B & I corr; Box 236, f.2, John Maybin to Brown and Ives, Providence, R.I., dated Philadelphia, 11 September 1812.
  75. NMM: LBK/2, Warren to Melville, Halifax, 24 August 1813.
  76. NMM: LBK/2, Warren to Melville, Halifax, 7 October 1812.
  77. *ibid*, postscript to above.
  78. BL: C, *The Times*, London, 20 March 1813.
  79. Dudley W. *op.cit.* vol.II, p.18, citing ADM 2/1376 pp.73-87, Croker to Warren, Admiralty, 10 February 1813. Most licences to sail without convoy were revoked on 31 July 1812, as published in the *London Gazette*.
  80. Dudley W. *op.cit.* vol.II, p.79, 'Private' Melville to Warren, Admiralty, 26 March 1813.
  81. NMM: LBK/2, 'Private', Warren to Melville, Halifax, 27 September 1813, and 30 November 1813.
  82. Dudley W. *op.cit.* vol II, p.18, ADM 2 1376 pp.73-87, Croker to Warren, Admiralty, 10 February 1813.
  83. Padfield P. *Broke and the Shannon*, London, Hodder & Stoughton, 1968, p.114-5, Capt to Mrs Broke, HMS *Shannon*, 14 December 1812.
  84. NMM: Warren Papers: WAR/82, pp.5-7, 'Secret & Confidential', Melville to Warren, Admiralty, 4 June 1813, and copy marked 'Private' in NMM: LBK/2.
  85. NMM: LBK/2, Halifax, 7 October 1812. In a later NMM: LBK/2 letter to Melville on 29 March 1813, Warren thought that, "Madison is alarmed from not obtaining Cash & being so ill- supported by the French"; the possibility of French intervention clearly continued to cause concern both to Warren and in London.
  86. NMM: Warren Papers: WAR/28: 'Papers Relating to Convoys, Transports & Trade', 1813-14, vol. 2, pp.204-5.
  87. LC: British Royal Navy Logbooks, Log 205, HMS *Spartan*, 38, and Record Book of James Dunn, 1808-18, including Commonplace Book kept between 1811-13, 'Blockade - Book of Regulations and Instructions'. Dunn was later to become a Purser, and in 1819, an



- Admiral's private secretary. *Spartan* made nine major captures and one re-capture while on the North America station in 1813, for which see: Dudley W. op.cit., vol.II, pp.171, 771.
88. Hill R. op.cit. p.56, citing *Naval Chronicle* vol. XXX, p.255 for capture. £4,000 would then have been worth about \$17,760.
  89. Whitehill W. ed., op.cit., p.59, citing *Boston Patriot*, 18 May 1814. Three female passengers from the burned American brig *Three Sisters* were put ashore "with all their trunks, baggage and many presents". "The ladies tendered their grateful acknowledgments to the captain and officers of the *Nymph* for the gentlemanly & polite treatment they received while on board their ship." Similarly, on 2 July 1814, Capt. Thomas Hopkins, "late a prisoner" recorded "his most grateful thanks...for the very polite treatment he received" while aboard *Nymphe*, in Boston's *Columbian Centinel*.
  90. Horsman R. *The War of 1812*, New York, A. Knopf, 1969, p.264.
  91. NMM: LBK/2, Warren to Melville, *San Domingo*, Bermuda, 1 June 1813.
  92. NMM: LBK/2, Warren to Melville, 29 November 1813.
  93. TNA: ADM 1/505, 87-90.
  94. NMM: LBK/2, Warren to Melville, *San Domingo*, River Potomac, 22 July 1813.
  95. Whitehill W. ed., op.cit., pp.29-31. On 3 July 1814, *Nymphe*, "Lost sight of the *Bulwark* in a fog, continuance of which we have had in whatever point of compass the wind blows. Temperature 60 to 62 degrees Fahrenheit."
  96. Hodge G. *George Hodge his Book Consisting of Difrint ports & ships that I have sailed in since the year 1790. Aged 13 years*. London, *The Times*, 15 August 2008, for which I am indebted to Mr R. Stafford-Smith.

### Chapter 3 References

1. ASP: F: vol. II, p.854, Chairman of Ways and Means Committee John Eppes' report on 'State of the Finances', to House of Representatives, 10 October 1814.
2. *London Gazette* 2 July 1783.
3. Holroyd J., first Earl of Sheffield, *Observations on the Commerce of the American States*, London, 1783, re-published 1784.
4. Harlow V. and Madden F. *British Colonial Developments 1774 -1834 Select Documents*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1953, p. 256, footnote 2.
5. Thistlethwaite F. *America and the Atlantic Community: Anglo-American Aspects, 1790 -1850*, Philadelphia, Univ. of Pennsylvania, 1959, p.5.
6. Killick J., 'The Atlantic Economy and Anglo-American Industrialization, 1783 – 1865' in *Liberal Capitalism: Political and Economic Aspects*, Open Univ. Press, Milton Keynes, 1997, p.87.
7. *Historical Statistics*, Washington, United States Bureau of the Census, 1975, p.8, giving an actual average annual increase for 1770-1790 of 4.95% and for 1790-1800, of 3.59%.
8. *Historical Statistics*, op.cit., p.8, and Mitchell B and Deane P., *Abstract of British Historical Statistics*, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1962. p.8. U.S. figure from 1810 census. Mitchell & Deane's figure for Ireland, politically incorporated in 1801, is included in the UK total.
9. Killick J. op.cit., p.88.
10. op.cit., p.94.
11. op.cit., p.93.
12. Seyburt A. *Statistical Annals embracing Views of the Population, Commerce, Navigation, Fisheries etc*, Philadelphia, T. Dobson, 1818, p.255.
13. *ibid.* American visible imports from Britain 1802-4 of \$35737,030, minus visible exports to Britain of \$23,707,988, produces a visible trade deficit for the United States of minus \$12,029,042.
14. Seyburt A. op.cit., p.92, actually 67.8%.
15. Seyburt A op.cit., p.287-8, quoting "the Report of the Inspector General of Exports and Imports to the House of Commons 1812."
16. Seyburt A. op.cit., p.282, footnote 90.
17. Seyburt A. op.cit., p.288.
18. *ibid.*
19. Seyburt A. op.cit., p.89.
20. Nettels C. *The Emergence of a National Economy 1775-1815, The Economic History of the United States*, 10 vols., vol. II. New York, Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1962, p. 232, citing Johnson E., *The History of the Domestic and Foreign Commerce of the United States*, Washington, Columbia, Carnegie Inst., 1915, 2 vols., vol.II, p.20.
21. Nettels C. op.cit., p.399, Table 21, 'Shipping Engaged in the Carrying Trade of the United States 1789-1815', citing Johnson E. op.cit., vol.II, p.28.
22. Hedges J. *The Browns of Providence Plantations – the Nineteenth Century*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., Providence R.I., Brown Univ. Press, 1968, 2 vols., vol. II, p.133.

23. To avoid an over-optimistic evaluation of a country's overseas trading position, it later became customary to calculate 'visible' exports as 'f.o.b', i.e. 'free on board', valued at their price before export, without shipping costs or insurance premiums, on the assumption that each would be 'invisible' imports. Conversely, imports would be calculated as 'c.i.f.', i.e., cost, insurance, freight, on the assumption that the buyer bore the cost of the product, and also paid both shipping and insurance costs. This became regarded as the safest method, with exports probably underestimated and imports over-estimated, although Britain, for example, often supplied goods, shipping and insurance to overseas buyers.
24. Nettels C. op.cit., p.399. Table 21.
25. JCBL: Brown & Ives Corr., Box 160, f.11; see also Nettels C. op.cit., p.314.
26. Nettels C. op.cit., p.396, Table 17, 'Total Foreign Trade of the United States 1790-1815', citing Johnson E. op.cit., vol.II, p.20.
27. Calculated from Nettels C. op. cit., Table 17, actually averaging an adverse annual balance of \$19,846,400.
28. Nettels C. op.cit., p.236, citing Bogart E. *Economic History of the American People*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., New York, Longmans Green and Company, 1939, pp.233-4.
29. Nettels C. op.cit., p.236.
30. Seyburt A. op. cit., p.282, footnote 91, quoting 'Baring's Inquiry Concerning the Orders in Council', i.e. Baring A. *An Inquiry into the causes and consequences of the Orders in Council and an Examination of the Conduct of Great Britain towards the Neutral Commerce of America*, London, 1808.
31. Warden D. *A Statistical Political and Historical Account of the United States of North America from the period of Their First Colonization to the Present Day*, 3 vols., vol.III, Edinburgh, Archibald Constable & Co, 1819, p.286.
32. ASP: C&N: vol.I, p.897.
33. Warden D. op.cit., p.286.
34. Hickey D. *The War of 1812 – A Forgotten Conflict*, Urbana and Chicago, Univ. of Illinois Press, 1989, pp.12-13, quoting Republican Representative Barnabas Bidwell, 8 March 1806, citing AC: 9-1, 653.
35. ASP: FR: vol.I, p.520.
36. Nettels C. op.cit., p.396, Table 17, 'Total Foreign Trade of the United States'.
37. Harlow V. and Madden F. op.cit., p.275, note 1, and p.273, note 3. The authors note that the treaty was concluded on 19 November 1794, but not ratified in London until 28 October 1795, nor proclaimed until 27 February 1796.
38. *ibid.*
39. *ibid*, citing BL: Add Mss 38,310, p.148.
40. Stephen J. *War in Disguise; Or the Frauds of Neutral Flags*, London, October 1805, quoted by Harlow V., and Madden F., op cit. p.284.
41. *ibid*; BL: W48/6609, 4<sup>th</sup> ed., p.250. Although customarily referred to as a 'pamphlet', Stephen's work is a substantial booklet of 250 pages. It was re-published twice more by February 1806, and for a fourth time later that year. The 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. was read in the United States, and by December 1807,

- by Spencer Perceval in Britain. In the United States, by the time Stephen wrote, the succeeding Republican government had repealed the Federalist's interior taxes.
42. Marryat J. *Concessions to America the Bane of Britain; or the Cause of the Present Distressed Situation of the British Colonial and Shipping Interests explained, and the Proper Remedy suggested*, London, 1807, pp.5-10 and 36-41, reprinted in Harlow V., and Madden F., op.cit., pp.280-3, quotation p.282.
  43. Marryat J. op.cit., reprinted in part in Harlow V., and Madden F., quotation p.281. In fact, \$28m was actually £6.31m at the official exchange rate, see Lord Hawkesbury to Anthony Merry, British Minister at Washington, 16 September 1803, in 'Instructions to the British Ministers to the United States 1791- 1812', Mayo B. ed., *Annual Report of the American Historical Association*, Washington, 1936, 3 vols., vol. III, p.200.
  44. Marryat J. op.cit., as reprinted in Harlow V., and Madden F., op.cit., quotation p.282.
  45. Baring A. *An Inquiry into the Causes and Consequences of the Orders i Council: and an Examination of the Conduct of Great Britain towards the Neutral Commerce of America*, London, 1808, reprinted in part in Harlow V., & Hadden F., op.cit. pp.283-4. Napoleon's Berlin decree dated from 21 November 1806, and the Milan decree from 17 December 1807.
  46. Baring A. reprinted in Harlow V., and Madden F., op.cit. p.284, citing 'Bosanquet's Letter on the Causes of the Depression of West Indian Property, London, 1807, p.42.'
  47. Baring A, reprinted in Harlow V., and Madden F., op.cit. p.285.
  48. Hickey D. op.cit. p.18.
  49. Seyburt A. op.cit., p.157.
  50. Smith A. *An Enquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, originally published London, W. Strahan & T. Cadell, 1776; see Everyman ed., London, Dent, 1966, vol.II, Book V, Chapter II, Part II, pp.306-9. The first American edition was published by Th. Dobson of Philadelphia in 1789, although copies of earlier British editions may also have been available in the United States, in the view of the LC's Rare Books & Special Coll's. Div. It was also re-published in Leipzig in 1778, and in Basle by 1791.(BL online cat.) Both Madison and the Swiss educated Albert Gallatin may therefore have been familiar with it.
  51. Dewey D. *Financial History of the United States*, 12<sup>th</sup> ed., reprinted New York, A.Kelly, 1968, pp.113-125. According to Bristed J. *The Resources of the United States of America; or a View of the agricultural, commercial ...moral and religious capacity and character of the American people*, New York, J. Eastburn & Co, 1818, p.77, such re-payments were customarily made a year in arrears.
  52. Nettels C. op. cit., p.396, Table 17 'Total Foreign Trade of the United States'.
  53. North D. *United States Balance of Payments 1790 –1860, Trends in the American Economy in the Nineteenth Century*, National Bureau of Economic Research Conference on Research in Income and Wealth, vol. 24, New York, Princeton Univ. Press, 1960, re-printed New York, Arno Press, 1975, pp. 591-2, Table A-2, Appendix A.

54. Hickey D. op. cit., p.20, quoting Randolph's speech of 14 April 1808, citing AC: 10-1, 2136.
55. AC:11-3,1338-9.
56. Challis C. ed., *A New History of the Royal Mint*, Cambridge, CUP, 1992, Appendix 1, pp.693-4; see also Kelly E. *Spanish Dollars and Silver Tokens: An Account of the Issues of the Bank of England 1797-1816*, London, Spink & Son, 1976, Appendix A, Table IV, p.123 No ordinary silver currency had been minted since 1787, and gold struck annually had not exceeded £0.5m since 1804. Countermarked Spanish dollars, Bank of England and private tokens circulated internally beside worn regal currency.
57. Balinky A. 'Gallatin's Theory of War Finance', *William & Mary Historical Quarterly*, 3<sup>rd</sup> Series, 1959, pp.73-82.
58. Crouzet F. 'Wars, Blockade, and Economic Change in Europe, 1792-1815', in *Journal of Economic History*, vol. XXIV, 1964, pp.567-90, see pp.568, 571-4.
59. ASP: F: vol.II, p.497, Secretary of the Treasury Gallatin's report to the Senate on the 'State of the Finances' dated 22 November, and presented 25 November 1811.
60. JHL:
61. ASP: F: vol.II, pp.495-97,
62. ASP: F: vol.II, p.497.
63. *ibid*
64. ASP: F: vol.II, pp.524-5.
65. ASP: F: vol.II, p.527.
66. AC: 12-1,1099.
67. AC: 12-1,1100.
68. ASP:F: vol.II, p.539.
69. Warden D. op.cit., p.299, for net customs revenue, and De Bow J. *Statistical View of the United States*, Washington, Nicholson, 1854, p.185, for total government receipts.
70. Dewey D. op.cit., p.142.
71. Mitchell B. and Deane P., op.cit., p.487. 'Prices 9, Wheat', contd.
72. Galpin W. 'The American Grain Trade to the Spanish Peninsula 1810-14', in *American Historical Review* vol. XXVIII, pp.24-44, p.24.
73. Mitchell B. and Deane P., op.cit., p.498., calculated from 'Prices 14, Average Price of Bread in London, (in pence per 4lb loaf)', contd.
74. Evans E. *The Forging of the Modern State – Early Industrial Britain 1783-1870*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., London, Longman, 1996, p.89.
75. Mitchell B. and Deane P., op.cit., p.311, 'Overseas Trade 10, Official Values of Imports and of Exports and Re-exports combined, according to Regional Direction – Great Britain 1755-1822', contd.; percentage actually 381.3 %.
76. Mitchell B. and Deane P., op.cit., p.313, 'Overseas Trade 12, Values at Current Prices of Overseas Trade According to Principal Countries - UK 1805 -1938'.
77. French D. *The British Way of Warfare 1688-2000*, London, Unwin Hyman, 1990, pp.106-7, and Kennedy P. *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery*, London, Allen Lane, 1976, p.147.

78. Evans E. op.cit., p.416, citing Davis R., *The Industrial Revolution and British Overseas Trade*, 1<sup>st</sup> ed. Leicester Univ. Press, 1979, pp.96-7,104-5, 114-7.
79. Evans E. op.cit., p.415, citing Davis R op. cit., pp.104-5.
80. Mitchell B. and Deane P. op.cit., p.410, 'Public Finance 7. Produce of the Poor Rates and Expenditure on Relief of the Poor - England and Wales 1748-1885.'
81. Hansard T. *The Parliamentary Debates from 1803 to the Present Times*, 1<sup>st</sup> series,1803-20, vol.XXIII, London, Brougham to House of Lords, p.486.
82. Hansard T. op.cit., vol.XXIII, p.715.
83. Mitchell B. and Deane P. op.cit., p.392, 'Public Finance 3. Gross Public Income-United Kingdom 1801-1939, Principal Constituent Items.'
84. Mitchell B. and Deane P., op.cit., calculated from data in table above.
85. Mitchell B. and Deane P., calculated from table above, p.392. Income Tax was re-imposed in 1803 as 'the property tax', being 10% of incomes greater than £60 per annum, mainly from property. The value of property was assessed, rather than personal incomes. See: Deane P. and Cole W., *British Economic Growth 1688-1957*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., Cambridge Univ. Press, 1967, Appendix II, p.323.
86. Hudson P. *The Industrial Revolution*, London, Arnold, 1993, p.59, citing O'Brien P., 'The Impact of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars on the Long-run Growth of the British Economy', in *Fernand Braudel Centre Review*, XII, 1989.
87. O'Brien P. *War and Economic Progress in Britain and America*, Milton Keynes, Open Univ. Press, 1997, p.182.
88. Hudson P. op cit., p.59, citing O'Brien P., 'The Impact of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars...', p.347.
89. Mitchell B. and Deane P., op.cit., pp.355, 'Wages and Standard of Living 6'; and 'Prices 14' p.498; actually, 32.94%. The British duty on sugar had doubled between 1794-6 - 1814, but consumption per head had increased, see Davis R. op.cit., p.45.
90. Mitchell B. and Deane P., op.cit., p.349, 'Wages and Standard of Living Table 3'.
91. See Chapter 7, p.55, ref. 231.
92. Kennedy P. op. cit., p.141, citing Schumpeter E. 'English Prices and Public Finance 1660-1822', in *Review of Economic Statistics*, 1938, p.27; Silberling N., 'Financial and Monetary Policy of Great Britain during the Napoleonic Wars', in *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, XXXVIII, 1923-4, pp.217-8.
93. *ibid.*
94. Kennedy P. op.cit., p.141, citing Murphy B, *A History of the British Economy 1086 - 1970*, London, 1973, p.490.
95. BL:C: *National Intelligencer*, Washington, 28 March 1814. Some had argued that 70% of stockholders had been foreign, including prominent British politicians, see: Buel R.,*America on the Brink, How the Political Struggle Over the War of 1812 Almost Destroyed the Young Republic*, New York, (pbk ed.), 2006, p.111.
96. James W. *A Full and Correct Account of the Military Occurrences of the Late War between Great Britain and the United States of America*, 2 vols., London, James Richardson, 1818, vol.I, pp.1-2.

97. Hedges J. op.cit. p.131, citing PC,v, A7.
98. Galpin W. op.cit. p.25, citing Pitkin T. *A Statistical View of the Commerce of the United States*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., New Haven, 1835, pp.119-20.
99. Kelly E. op.cit. pp.96-8.100. Shipments of specie had arrived in HMS *Galatea* in November 1812, and in *Foudroyant* and *Brazen* from India, in January 1813. However, as shown by Mitchell B. and Deane P. op.cit. p. 442, Bank of England bullion reserves never fell below £2m.
100. Jefferson T., quoted in Albion R and Pope J. *Sea Lanes in Wartime: The American Experience 1775-1942*, New York, Norton & Co, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., Portland Maine, Archon Books, 1968, p.116.
101. Hedges J. op.cit., p.133, citing PC,v, H4.
102. Hedges J. op.cit., p.134, citing PC,v, A68.
103. Mitchell B and Deane P., op.cit. p.313, 'Overseas Trade 12, Values at Current Prices of Overseas Trade According to Regions and Principal Countries.'
104. Croker J. *A Key to the Orders in Council respecting the French ports, 7 January 1807 to 21 April 1812*, London, Murray, 1812. BL: 8135.e.34.
105. Madison J. Address to Congress, 1 June 1812, in James W., op.cit., vol.I, pp.4-5.
106. AC: 12-1, Supplement 1637-8, 2322-3. Voted for: 79 to 49 in House of Representatives on 4 June, and 19 to 13 in Senate on 17 June 1812.
107. AC:12-1, 1511.
108. BL: Add Mss:38249 f7, letter from James Abernethy to Lord Liverpool, dated Francis Street, Bedford Square, 2<sup>nd</sup> August 1812.
109. *ibid.*
110. BL: Add Mss:38250, f.42, letter to Lord Liverpool from Lord Bathurst, dated Brighton, 3 October 1812.
111. *Naval Chronicle*, vol.28, pp.304-6. In the event, General Reprisals would not be fully implemented until Warren's receipt, on 16 November 1812, of Monroe's negative reply, dated 27 October, to his armistice proposal of 30 September 1812.
112. *Annual Register*, 1812, London, vol.5, Part 2, pp.166.
113. Hedges J. op.cit., p.131.
114. Lyne C. *A Letter to Lord Castlereagh on the North American Export Trade During the War and during any time the Import and Use of our Manufactures are interdicted in the United States*. London, J. Richardson, 1813, p.5.
115. Lyne C. op.cit., pp. 9-10,12.
116. Lyne C. op.cit., p.40.
117. Lyne C. op.cit., p.45.

## Chapter 4. Implementation 1: The United States Blockaded 1812-14.

### The United Command of Sir John Borlase Warren.

#### References:

1. Gardiner R. ed. *The Naval War of 1812*. London. Caxton Editions/NMM.2001, p.34. *President's* main armament was 30 x 24pdrs, with an upper deck armament of 2 x 24pdrs, 1 x 18pdr and 24 x 42pdr carronades, a total of 55 guns.
2. Dudley W. *The Naval War of 1812- A Documentary History*. vol.1 Washington DC. Naval Historical Center. 1985. p.138. Rodgers to Sect. of Navy Paul Hamilton, USS *President*, New York, 19 June 1812.
3. Dudley W. op.cit. p.262. Letter: Rodgers to Hamilton, Boston 1 Sept. 1812. See also BL Add Mss 38248 p.310. Letter from Alexander Howe to his son, dated Halifax, 21 August 1812. See also: James W. *A Full and Correct Account of the Chief Naval Occurrences of the Late War between Great Britain and the United States of America*, London, 1817, republished London, Conway Maritime Press, 2004, p.37. The eighty-five ship convoy was said to be worth £12m., then about \$57.6m.
4. Dudley W. *The Naval War of 1812 - A Documentary History*, vol I. Washington DC. Naval Historical Center. 1985. p. 634, citing Brant I, *James Madison Commander in Chief 1812-36*, New York, 1961, pp.125-6.
5. Dudley W. op.cit. p.138.
6. *ibid.*
7. Dudley W. op. cit. p.157, Capt. Byron to Vice-Ad. Sawyer, HMS *Belvidera* Halifax Harbour, 27 June 1812.
8. Dudley W. op.cit. p.154. Extract from Rodger's Journal, 23 June 1812.
9. Dudley W. op.cit. p.157.
10. Dudley W. op.cit. p.157-60 citing ADM1/ 502 Pt.1, pp.299-302; and *Naval Chronicle* vol. XXVIII, 'Naval History of the Present Year June-July 1812' p.73. Rodgers opened fire "without previous communication with the *Belvidera*".
11. TNA: ADM 1/ 4221 9 May 1812.
12. Dudley W. op.cit. p.138.
13. *Naval Chronicle* vol. XXVIII. p.73-4.
14. *ibid.*
15. *Naval Chronicle* vol. XXVIII. p.426. Letter, Halifax 15 October 1812. Sawyer had intended his blockade to include Boston, New York, Norfolk and Charleston.
16. Hickey D. *The War of 1812- A Forgotten Conflict*. Urbana. Univ. of Illinois Press. 1989. p.93. citing Governor Tompkins to NY legislature, 3 November 1812.
17. See for example, Forester C. in *The Naval War of 1812*. London. Michael Joseph.1957. p.30.
18. Mahan A. *Sea Power in its Relations to the War of 1812*. London, Sampson, Marston Low and Company, 1905. vol. II. p.21-3.
19. Sawyer to Croker, Halifax, 5 July 1812, cited in Lohnes B. 'British Naval



- Problems at Halifax.' *Mariner's Mirror*. LIX, 1973. p.330.
20. Hansard T. *The Parliamentary Debates from 1803 to Present Times*. 1<sup>st</sup> series.vol. XXIII, pp.715-21. See also American State Papers: Foreign Relations.vol. III, pp.593, 594-5.
  21. NMM: Warren Papers: WAR/82. p.2 Letter from Melville to Warren, 30 July 1812. Warren had served in North American waters in 1777-8, and as an ambassador-extraordinary in Russia 1801-4, and then as Vice-Admiral, C in C North America, 1808-10. In the draft of an undated letter to Melville, Warren wrote "having considered the Orders and Instructions Lord Castlereagh read to me the other Day, I am anxious to have...further Information as well as the Determination of His Majesty's Government." WAR/82 p.3. See: ADM 2/1375. pp. 62-3, dated 12 August 1812.
  22. NMM: Warren Papers: WAR/ 82, p.3.
  23. TNA: ADM 2/1375, pp.62-3, & ADM 1/4222, pp.168, Castlereagh to Admiralty, Foreign Office 12 August 1812.
  24. *Naval Chronicle* vol. XXVIII, 'Naval History of the present Year' 1812, July-August, p.157
  25. *London Gazette* no: 16629, 1- 4 August 1812, p.1483,
  26. *Naval Chronicle* vol. XXVIII, p.138, pp.158-9.
  27. Albion R. and Pope J. *Sea Lanes in Wartime*. 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. Portland Maine. Archon Books. 1968. p.115. Libelled ships and brigs alone represent 10.2%, while all vessels detained by 17 September 1812 are less than 13% of Halifax's wartime total.
  28. *London Gazette* no:16630, p.1503.
  29. *ibid*, as reprinted in *Naval Chronicle* vol. XXVIII, p.139.
  30. *Naval Chronicle* vol. XXXI, p.165.
  31. TNA: ADM 2/1375 p.33.
  32. TNA: ADM 1/4222 p.165. 52.25 'Instructions to be given to Sir John Borlase Warren on the subject of the Relations between this Country & the United States. SS vol. 3 No: 165'; 'Mr Foster our Envoy left Washington 14<sup>th</sup> July in *Atalanta* sloop of war', not reaching Portsmouth until 19 August 1812. *Naval Chronicle*, vol. XXVIII, p.157.
  33. Vane C. *Memoirs and Correspondence of Lord Castlereagh*. London, Henry Colburn, 1848-53. vol. 8, pp.289-90.
  34. TNA: ADM 2/1375, pp.48-9, 'Draft Letter' provided by Foreign Office to Admiralty for 'Sir J B Warren to Mr Monroe.' 7 August 1812.
  35. NMM: LBK/2 Warren to Melville, London, 8 August 1812.
  36. TNA: ADM 1/502. Letter, Warren to Croker, dated 11 August 1812.
  37. *Naval Chronicle* vol. XXVIII, p.173, 'Admiralty Office 12 August 1812'.
  38. *Naval Chronicle* vol. XXVIII, p.159.
  39. *ibid*.
  40. Dudley W. *op.cit*. p.263. Letter from Rodgers to Hamilton, USS *President*, Boston, 24 September 1812.
  41. *ibid*. See also letter of Sawyer to Croker 17 September 1812, TNA: ADM 1/502, Part 3, pp.581-6, in Dudley W. *op.cit*. pp.497-8; and James W. *op.cit*., p.39, for reference to scurvy.
  42. Lyons D. *The Sailing Navy List*, London, Conway Maritime Press,1993, p.279. "Brig sloop *Magnet* lost in Atlantic 10.9.1812". See also NMM: HUL/18. On a "list of Ships and Vessels on the West Indies and American stations", dated 7 August 1812, *Magnet* is prophetically

- annotated "Recommended to be employed in the West Indies as not being fit for the American Seas," shown as Appendix A Table 3.
43. ASP: FR vol.III, p.595, Letter from Warren to Sect. of State James Monroe, Halifax N.S., 30 Sept.1812.
  44. NMM: LBK/2, Warren to Melville, Halifax, 7 October 1812.
  45. TNA: ADM 8/100, 'Ships in Sea Pay - 1<sup>st</sup> July 1812', cited by Dudley W. op.cit. pp.180-2. See also Appendix for NMM: HUL/18 for 'List of Ships and Vessels on the West Indies and American Stations', dated 7 August 1812, naming 33 on the North American station, 28 for the Leeward Islands, and 18 for Jamaica, totalling 79. Inclusion of figures for Newfoundland gives a total of 83 vessels from both sources.
  46. NMM: Warren Papers: WAR/49, Letter 13, Warren to Croker, Halifax, 5 October 1812. See also PRO: ADM 1/502, Part 3, pp.613-5, cited Dudley W. op cit. pp.508-9.
  47. TNA: ADM 1/502, Part 4, pp.541-5, Capt. J. Dacres to Vice Ad. Sawyer, Boston, 7 September 1812, and PRO: ADM 1/502, Part 3, pp. 613-5, Warren to Croker, Halifax, 5 October 1812.
  48. *Naval Chronicle* vol. XXVIII, p.420. Warren's Proclamation, 5 October 1812. Warren's offer of pardon for returning deserters appears to have been no more productive than Sawyer's earlier attempt of 3 July 1812.
  49. NMM: LBK/2, Warren to Melville, Halifax, 7 October 1812, see also Gwyn J. *Frigates and Foremasts: The North American Squadron in Nova Scotia Waters, 1745-1815*. Vancouver, Univ. of British Columbia Press, 2003, p.138, citing PRO: ADM 1/502 p.343.
  50. Dudley W. op. cit. p.492, citing ADM 1/502, part 3, p.419, Letter: Sawyer to Andrew Allen, HMS *Centurion* at Halifax, 5 Aug. 1812.
  51. TNA: ADM 1/503, Part 1, pp.51-2 Warren to Melville, 11 November 1812. See also Hickey D. op. cit. p.117, for British licences apparently on open sale in American cities for \$5,000, citing *Morning Chronicle* 12 August and 18 September 1812, and Baker to Castlereagh, 22 March 1813, TNA:FO 5/88.
  52. Hickey D. 'Trade Restrictions during the War of 1812' in *Journal of American History*, vol. 68, no.3, December 1981,p.527. Given an annual average between 1807- 11 of 9,740, Hickey's estimate for two and a half months does not seem excessive.
  53. JCBL: B & I corr. Box 236, f.2. Letter from John Maybin of Philadelphia To Brown & Ives of Providence, Rhode Island, dated 11 September 1812.
  54. NMM: LBK/2, Warren to Melville, Halifax, 7 October 1812.
  55. BL: Add Mss 38250, f.197, Letter: Capt. Robt. Barrie to Rear Ad. George Cockburn, 6 Nov. 1812, and f.198, from Lord Clancarty to Prime Minister, Lord Liverpool, 24 Nov. alleging Allen's improper issue of Protections, also f.193, Liverpool to Castlereagh: 25 Nov. asking for 'answer by return', and f.194, Croker to Lord Chetwynd: 25 Nov., marked 'Immediate' in which the Admiralty seeks the Privy Council's opinion on the issue.
  56. TNA: ADM 1/503 Part 1, pp.52-8, enclosures from Allen dated 21 Oct, in letter from Warren to Melville, dated Halifax, 11 November 1812.
  57. TNA: ADM 1/502 part 4, p.455. Sawyer to Croker. HMS *Centurion*, Halifax, 2 August 1812, cited Dudley W, op. cit. 216.
  58. NMM: Warren Papers, WAR/49: Letter 12, Warren to Croker, dated

- Halifax 5 October 1812.
59. Gwyn J. op.cit. p.182, citing PRO: ADM 1/502 p.249.
  60. NMM: LBK/2, Warren to Melville, Halifax, 7 October 1812.
  61. Mahan A. op. cit. vol.I, p.395, summarising Niles' *Weekly Register*, Baltimore. 1811-49.
  62. *Naval Chronicle* vol.XXIX, p.198, Letter of "Faber"; *Morning Chronicle* 17-18 September 1812, and *Times* 30 December, 1812.
  63. NMM: Hulbert Papers: HUL/1, Warren's Order Book, order No:1 to Capt. John Bastard of HMS *Africa*, 4 October 1812.
  64. NMM: Warren Papers, WAR/49, Letter 12, Warren to Croker, dated Halifax 5 October 1812.
  65. NMM: Hulbert Papers: HUL/1, Warren's Order Book, order No:2, Warren to Capt. Sir John Beresford of HMS *Poictiers*, Halifax, 10 October 1812.
  66. *ibid.*
  67. Dudley W. op.cit. vol. II, pp.80-1, citing PRO: ADM 1/4359, enclosed with Warren's letter to Croker of 28 March 1813.
  68. *London Gazette* 13 October 1812, and re-printed in *Naval Chronicle* vol. XXVIII, p.409.
  69. *London Gazette* no: 16663, p.2183, for 31 October - 3 November 1812.
  70. NMM: Warren Papers, WAR/11, 'Schedule of Orders in Council, Circular Orders, Letters etc delivered by Ad Rt: Hon:ble Sir J B Warren Bart KB to Vice Ad the Hon:ble Sir Alexander Cochrane KB at Bermuda the first day of April 1814.' reverse of p.139.
  71. *ibid.* This spelling of Foster's name probably indicates its current pronunciation. See also Morriss R. *Cockburn and the British Navy in Transition – Admiral Sir George Cockburn, 1772-1853*. Exeter Univ. Press 1997. p.86, citing NMM: Folder 4, Troubridge Papers.
  72. NMM: Hulbert Papers: HUL/1, Warren's Order Book, order no:3, 14 October 1812. Burning or sinking small prizes had been practised by both sides almost from the outset. Padfield calculates that Broke's squadron burned forty American prizes between 5 -19 July 1812, in *Broke and the Shannon*. London. Hodder and Stoughton. 1968. p.90.
  73. *London Gazette* no: 16658, p. 2079.
  74. NMM: Hulbert Papers, HUL/4. Bermuda. 'Copy of Vice-Admiralty Court Records, 25 November 1812- 2 July 1814'.
  75. NMM: Warren Papers, WAR/43. Warren to Anthony Baker, British charges d'affaires, Halifax, 16 November 1812.
  76. NMM: LBK/2, Warren to Melville, Bermuda, 5 November 1812.
  77. Albion R. & Pope J. op.cit. p.115.
  78. NMM: LBK/2 Warren to Melville, Bermuda, 5 November 1812.
  79. TNA: ADM 1/503, Part 1, pp.117-9.
  80. NMM: Hulbert Papers: HUL/1, Warren's Order Book, order no: 2, 10 October 1812. Warren was later ordered to make Bermuda his permanent headquarters. NMM: Warren Papers WAR/82, 23<sup>rd</sup> March 1813. Quotation from Brenton E. *The Naval History of Great Britain*. London. 2 vols. 1837. vol.1, pp. 9-10.
  81. Dudley W. op.cit. p.561, letter from Commodore Tingey to Sec. of Navy Hamilton, Washington Navy Yard, 7 November 1812.

82. TNA: CO 43/49. Bathurst to Lords Commissioners of Admiralty, Downing Street, 21 November 1812, printed, pp.153-4, i.e. handwritten, pp.266-7.
83. TNA: ADM 2/1375, 'Secret Letters and Orders', Admiralty to Warren, Secret, 26 December 1812. pp.337-8; enclosing TNA: CO 43/49, Bathurst to Lords Commissioners of Admiralty, 25 December 1812, pp.280-3.
84. TNA: CO 43/49 pp.280-3.
85. *ibid.*
86. *London Gazette* No: 166684, p.2567. Proclamation of 'Foreign Office, 26 December 1812'.
87. Specifically, Macon's No 2 Bill of 1 May 1810, in AC 10-2, 2582-3, applied to Britain only after 2 March 1811. The American Enemy Trade Act of 6 July 1812, prohibited seaborne trade with the British Empire; see *Annals of Congress: formally The Debates and Proceedings in the Congress of the United States*. New York. D. Appleton ed.1857-61.12<sup>th</sup> Congress, 1<sup>st</sup> session, column 2354;- hereafter AC:12-1, 2354.
88. Oddie G. 'The Circulation of Silver, 1697-1817'. Lecture to London Numismatic Club. Warburg Institute. 6 July 2004. The Bank of England had suspended payment of specie on 27 February 1797, and by 1815, 60% of silver in circulation in Britain was accounted for by the official tokens of the Banks of England and Ireland, and the unofficial, and technically illegal, tokens of individuals. Britain spent £400,000 in gold between 1809-13, on American grain and flour used in Spain and Portugal.
89. AC:12-2, pp.1264-7, and Gallatin to Cheves, Treasury Dept. 18 November 1812, in AC 12-2, pp.1251-2.
90. TNA: FO 5/88. Baker to Castlereagh, 18 December 1812.
91. AC:12-2, p.1252. Gallatin to Cheves.
92. *ibid.*
93. AC:12-2, pp.1252-4. Technically, based on comparative gold content, the £/\$ exchange rate should have been \$4.8665 to £1, see *Maps and Statistical Tables*, Milton Keynes, Open Univ.Press, 1997, p.31, despite which, on 16 September 1803, the British and American governments agreed on an exchange rate of \$4.44 to £. Mayo B. ed., *Instructions to British Ministers in US -1791- 1812*, Washington, *Annual Report of American History Association*, 1936, vol. III, p. 200, Lord Hawkesbury to Anthony Merry. However, for convenient conversion, \$4.80 was sometimes adopted, see Perkins B. *Castlereagh and Adams*. Univ. of California, 1964, p.229, citing Taylor G. *Economic History of US*, New York, 1951, p. 447n.
94. AC:12-2, pp.33-4, 100, 315, 450-1.
95. TNA: ADM 1/ 503, Part 1, pp.99-102. Warren to Croker, Bermuda, 29 December 1812.
96. NMM: LBK/2, 'Private & Confidential' letter from Warren to Melville, dated *San Domingo*, Bermuda, 25 February 1813. Warren's estimation of Stirling was vindicated when, later in 1813, Stirling was recalled on a Court Martial charge of having accepted a bribe of \$2,000 to provide convoy protection for a merchantman, found 'partly proved' in May 1814. Stirling was retired on half-pay without the possibility of further promotion. See Morriss R. *Dictionary of National Biography* entry, vol. 51, pp. 801-2.

97. NMM:LBK/2, Warren to Melville, 25 February 1813.
98. TNA: ADM 1/503, Part 1, pp.99-102. Warren to Croker, dated Bermuda, 29 December 1812. Theoretically reduced from 74 to 58 guns, razees are often recorded as carrying more. *Majestic*'s armament is given as 28 x 42pdr carronades, 28 x 32pdrs, and 2 x12pdrs. Colledge J. rev'd Barlow B, *Ships of the Royal Navy*, London, Greenhill, 1987, p204.
99. TNA: ADM 1/503, p.221.
100. NMM: Warren Papers: WAR/82, Melville to Warren, 3 December 1812.
101. *ibid*, p.19.
102. NMM: COC/11. Cockburn's memoirs. pp.100-1.
103. NMM: LBK/2. Warren to Melville, *San Domingo*, Bermuda.19 February 1813.
104. NMM: LBK/2. Warren to Croker, 21 February 1813. Until 3 March 1813, only *Junon* 38, *Maidstone* and *Belvidera*, each 36, and the 6<sup>th</sup> Rate *Laurestinus* 26, were on station.
105. Dudley W. *The Naval War of 1812- A Documentary History*. vol.II. Washington DC. Naval Historical Center. 1992. p.313. Letter from Secretary of the Navy Jones to Capt. J. Cassin, Commandant of Navy Yard Gosport, dated 'Feb:16. 1813'.
106. NMM: Hulbert Papers, HUL/18. 'Narcissus's List of Ships who composed the Blockading Squadron in the Chesapeake'. This list is annotated in red ink, presumably by Hulbert himself, with "This list kept by Capt. Lumley is the most correct account I have been able to obtain between 4 March and July 1813."
107. Dudley W. *op.cit.* vol.II, p.320, Capt. G. Burdett to Warren, *Maidstone*, Lyn Haven Bay Chesapeake, 9 February 1813. Logwood provided a red dye.
108. NMM: Hulbert Papers, HUL/18. 'Narcissus' List of Ships'.
109. Dudley W. *op. cit.* vol. II, pp.326-7. Cockburn to Warren, *Marlborough*, Hampton Roads, 23 March 1813.
110. *ibid*.
111. Dudley W. *op.cit.* vol.II, p.328.
112. *ibid*.
113. Dudley W. *op.cit.* vol.II, pp.329-30.
114. Dudley.W. *op.cit.* vol.II, p.330.
115. *ibid*.
116. Dudley W. *op.cit.* vol.II, p.331.
117. NMM: Hulbert Papers, HUL/18. 'Narcissus' List of Ships'.
118. Niles H. ed. *Weekly Register*, Baltimore, vol. III, p.383. 13 February 1813.
119. NMM: Hulbert Papers, HUL/18, 'List of Captures 19 December 1812 - 12 June 1813'. Many of these prizes were not condemned or 'paid out' until February 1816.
120. *ibid*.
121. NMM: Hulbert Papers: HUL/1, Warren's Order Book, orders for 27 November 1812, and 8 March 1813.
122. NMM: Hulbert Papers: HUL/1, Warren's Order Book, order dated 2 December 1812. This order also appears to have been given to Broke's squadron, although that would seem to require him to be in two places at once. The mistake may have been in Warren's dictation, or perhaps the clerk misunderstood who the order was for, or even dated it wrongly.

- Nonetheless, it forms significant evidence of the Royal Navy's role in safeguarding Britain's economically and strategically vital trade.
123. Dudley W. op.cit. vol.II, pp.15-16, citing a letter marked "private" and dated "*San Domingo* Off N.York. Janry. 25<sup>th</sup> 1813."
  124. NMM: Hulbert Papers: HUL/1, Warren's Order Book, orders to Bryson of *Belvidera*, dated "Bermuda 2<sup>nd</sup> Jan'y 1813".
  125. Niles H. ed *Weekly Register*. Baltimore. vol. III, 20 February 1813. Niles suggests that the *Emily* was sent back on 5 February, but Warren's reference to 'yesterday's' proclamation, suggests 7 February 1813.
  126. Dudley W. op.cit. pp.15-16. Warren to Croker 25 January 1813.
  127. *ibid*.
  128. Albion and Pope. op.cit. p.120.
  129. NMM: LBK/2, Warren to Melville, *San Domingo*, Bermuda, 19 Feb 1813.
  130. NMM: Warren Papers, WAR/27, 'Papers Relating to Convoys Transports, Commerce and Trade, 1797-1813' .vol.I p.152. Copied in a letter from Andrew Allen, former British Consul in Boston, to Warren, dated 20 November 1812.
  131. NMM: Warren Papers, WAR/28, 'Papers Relating to Convoys, Transports, Commerce and Trade, 1797-1813' . vol.II pp.204-5. Letter from John and Samuel Musson on behalf of Boston merchants, dated 22 December 1812, and not forwarded by Warren until 22 December 1813.
  132. TNA: ADM 2/1375, p.252. Croker to Warren, 18 November 1812.
  133. NMM: Warren Papers, WAR/82. p.18. Melville to Warren, 3 December 1812.
  134. Dudley W. op.cit. vol.II. p.14. Croker to Warren, 9 January 1813.
  135. *ibid*.
  136. BJL: UH: DDHO/7/1. Melville to Capt. Henry Hotham. 1 January 1813.
  137. BJL: UH: DDHO/7/3. Second Secretary to the Admiralty John Barrow to Capt Henry Hotham in Bermuda, e.g. Admiralty Office, 9 July 1813, 8 November 1813, 7 March 1814, 16 April 1814, 7 March 1814, some in duplicate.
  138. Dudley Wade. op.cit. pp.134, 167, citing Hotham Papers.
  139. BJL: UH: DDHO/7/1. Croker to Hotham, Confidential dated Admiralty Office 9 January 1813.
  140. NMM: LBK/2, Private letter, Warren to Melville, *San Domingo*, Bermuda, 19 February 1813.
  141. Dudley W. op.cit. vol II, p.14, Croker to Warren, 9 January 1813, citing ADM /2 1375, pp.365-73.
  142. NMM: LBK/2 Warren to Melville, 19 February 1813.
  143. Dudley W. op.cit. vol.II, pp.80-1, citing TNA: ADM 1/4359, Warren to Croker, enclosed with letter dated 28 March 1813.
  144. *ibid*.
  145. Hickey D. op.cit. p.169, citing report to Gallatin in Treasury Dept, National Archives, Washington. (M175, reel 2)
  146. Dudley W. op.cit. vol II, pp.80-1, Warren to Croker, citing TNA: ADM 1/4359.
  147. Dudley W. op. cit. vol.II p.19, Croker to Warren, citing ADM 2/1376, pp.73-87, 10 Feb. 1813.
  148. NMM: Hulbert Papers: HUL/1, Warren's Order Book, Warren to Broke 3 March 1813.

149. Dudley W. op.cit. vol.II, p76. Croker to Warren 20 March 1813.
150. *ibid.* Clearly, the 'disposal' of Warren's forces of which the Admiralty approved on 20 March, must have been an earlier version than that Dudley notes as enclosed with Warren's letter of 28 March 1813.
151. *ibid.*
152. Dudley W. op.cit. vol.II, p.19, Croker to Warren, 10 February 1813. Warren's proposal had been dated 29 December 1812.
153. NMM: Warren Papers, WAR/82, pp.62-3, dated 23 March 1813. See also Colledge J. *Ships of the Royal Navy*, London, Greenhill, revised ed. 1987, p.152. Launched as early as 1781 as a 74 gun 3<sup>rd</sup> rate three-decker, the now obsolescent *Goliath* was among those razed between 1812-3, cut down to 58 gun two-deckers but retaining their line-of-battle ship scantlings, matching those of the massively built American heavy frigates, and with their reduced draught, potentially useful in blockading ports and estuaries. Others included, the *Majestic* had been launched in 1785, and *Saturn* in 1786. pp.204,289.
154. NMM: Warren Papers, WAR/82, pp.62-3, dated 23 March 1813.
155. Dudley W. op.cit. vol. II, p.78-9. Melville to Warren, 'Private, 26 March 1813', citing War of 1812 Mss. Lilley Library. Univ. of Indiana.
156. Dudley W. op. cit. vol.II, p.79, citing Admiralty to Warren, 26 March 1813, Nat. Lib. of Scotland. Alex. Cochrane Papers, MS2340, fols. 49-50. The order refers to Port Royal, South Carolina.
157. *London Gazette*. No: 16715, 625. Notification to Neutrals, 30 March 1813.
158. Dudley W. op.cit. vol.II, p.57 Letter from Capt. John Dent to Secretary of the Navy William Jones, Charleston, North Carolina, 1 March 1813. Jones had succeeded Hamilton as Sect. of the Navy in December 1812.
159. NMM:LBK/2, Warren to Melville, HMS *San Domingo*, Lynhaven Bay, 29 March 1813.
160. Dudley W. op.cit. vol.II, p.347, Secretary of the Navy Jones, to Capt. Charles Stewart, Commanding Naval Officer, Norfolk Harbour. April 8. 1813.
161. Dudley W. op.cit. vol.II, pp.359-60, Warren to Croker, *San Domingo*, Hampton Roads, June 24 1813.
162. Dudley W. op.cit. vol.II, pp.362-4, Colonel T. Beckwith to Warren, *San Domingo*, Hampton Roads, 28 June, and July 5 1813.
163. Dudley W op.cit. vol.II, p.97. Capt. J. Dent to Sect. of the Navy Jones, May 8 1813.
164. Dudley W. op.cit. vol.II. p.114. Letter from Capt. Hugh Pigot, HMS *Orpheus* Off Block Island, April 29 1813, to Capt. Sir Thomas Hardy, citing ADM 1/503, pp.629-31.
165. Guernsey R. *New York and its Vicinity during the War of 1812-'15 being a Military, Civil and Financial Local History of that Period*. New York. C Woodward. 1889. 2 vols; vol.I,p.393. Letter to John Bogert, Russian vice-consul in New York from Thomas Barclay, former British consul. 2 July 1813.
166. Dudley W. op.cit. vol.II, p.184. Cockburn to Warren, *Sceptre* off Ocracoke Bar, 12 July 1813.
167. Dudley W. op.cit. vol.II, pp.364-5, Cockburn to Warren, *Sceptre*, 19 July 1813. Dudley notes that Cockburn had transferred his flag from *Marlborough* to *Sceptre*, 74.

168. NMM: Hulbert Papers: HUL/18, Copy of Warren's Bermuda proclamation of the blockade of 'New York, Charleston, Port Royal, Savannah and of the River Mississippi,' dated 26 May 1813, with extension from 1 September 1813. 'To the Respective Flag Officers' from 'HMS *San Domingo*, Chesapeake, 1<sup>st</sup> Sept. 1813', and sent to 'John Dougan Esq.re, Agent to the Commissioners for American Property Condemned as Droits to the Crown.'
169. Minor D. *World Canals 1810-1819*, New York, Facts on File, 1986, citing Nashville, Tennessee Archives Library. Among the 'Original Stockholders of the Dismal Swamp Canal', James Madison 'of Williamsburg, Virginia' had contributed \$500 for two shares.
170. Lambert J. *Travels through Canada and the United States of North America in the Years 1806, 1807 and 1808*, vol. II, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed., London, Baldwin Cradock and Joy, 1816, as quoted in *New York from Harper's Magazine*, New York, Gallery Books, 1991, p.221.
171. Dudley W. op.cit. vol.II. pp.80-1, citing TNA: ADM 1/4359, Warren to Croker, enclosed with letter of 28 March 1813.
172. *Naval Chronicle*. vol. XXX. pp.250-55. *List of Captures made by the Squadron under the Orders of...Sir John Borlase Warren...between 30<sup>th</sup> March and 22<sup>nd</sup> July, 1813.*
173. NMM: Warren Papers: WAR/37. passim.
174. Calculated from data in *Naval Chronicle*, vol. XXX, pp. 250-55, covering 30 March to 22 July 1813. The destinations to which thirty-eight captures were sent, mainly those of *Statira*, *Spartan* and *Martin*, but including some taken by *Marlborough*, *Victorious*, *Ramillies* and *Narcissus*, are not recorded in *Naval Chronicle*.
175. *Naval Chronicle*. vol. XXX, p.254.
176. *Naval Chronicle*. vol. XXX, p.255, and TNA: ADM1/504, p.703-11. Warren to Croker, 11 November 1813. Details of lists vary; NC gives *Star* as from Norfolk, Virginia, at which it possibly called after leaving Alexandria. Similarly, Warren lists *Protectress* as bound for Halifax rather than Lisbon.
177. *Naval Chronicle*. vol. XXX, p.252, and NMM: Warren Papers: WAR/37, p3.
178. NMM: Warren Papers: WAR/37.
179. *ibid.* p.3.
180. *ibid.* p.33.
181. *Naval Chronicle*. vol. XXX, p.251.
182. *ibid.* p.252.
183. NMM: Warren Papers: WAR/37, p.22.
184. *ibid.*
185. *ibid.* Warren's pencilled note on inside cover.
186. TNA: ADM 1/504, pp.703-11. 'Captures, 20<sup>th</sup> April to 20<sup>th</sup> September 1813.' This list was sent to London enclosed with ADM 1/504, p.699, Warren to Croker, dated 11 November 1813, reproduced in Dudley W. op. cit. vol.II, p.277. Warren's apparent delay in reporting to London may be that, since duplicate copies were often sent in different vessels, this may not have been the first dispatched, or indeed received at the Admiralty.
187. NMM: Hulbert Papers: HUL/18, 'List of Captures', pp.3,4.



188. Dunne W. 'The Inglorious First of June: Commodore Stephen Decatur on Long Island Sound, 1813.' in *Long Island Sound Historical Journal*, vol. 2 Spring 1990, excerpt published New York, Naval Scribe Inc., p.24, citing Decatur to Sect. of Navy Jones, 3 June 1813, Washington, Nat. Archives, M125, roll 29.
189. Dudley W. op.cit. vol. II, pp.137-8, citing TNA: ADM 1/504 pp.179-81, 223-6, Capt. Robt. Oliver to Warren, *Valiant at Sea*, 13 June 1813.
190. NMM: LBK/2, Warren to Melville, 19 February 1813.
191. Padfield P. *Broke and The Shannon*. London. Hodder and Stoughton.1968.p.130.
192. NMM: LBK/2, Warren to Melville, 1 June 1813.
193. NMM: LBK/2, Melville to Warren, 4 June 1813.
194. *ibid.* Referring to such 'fir frigates' as *Leander* and *Newcastle*, Melville remarked in the same letter, "I am unwilling at present to introduce a new & cumbersome Description of Ships into our Navy to any considerable extent; simply because the Americans have three of them. We may more easily supply Line of Battle Ships." Perhaps surprisingly, this seems to overlook the frigates' relative advantages in draught and manoeuvrability as well as cost.
195. NMM: LBK/2, Warren to Melville, 1 June, and 22 July 1813.
196. NMM: LBK/2, Warren to Melville, Halifax, 27 September 1813.
197. NMM. Warren Papers: WAR/82, p.63, Melville to Warren, 23 March 1813.
198. TNA: ADM 1/502, 22 February 1813.
199. Knight R. Review in *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, vol.32, No 3, September 2004. pp.132-3. Knight notes that Halifax had only a careening wharf, and although capable of refitting the West Indies squadron in both 1802 and 1807, still sent larger ships back to England for major maintenance and repair.
200. Rodger N. *The Command of the Oceans*. London, Penguin/Allen Lane, 2004, p.570, citing Broadley A. and Bartelot R. *Nelson's Hardy*, London, 1909, p.162, letter to Hardy's brother Joseph, 1 May 1813. See also Dudley W. op.cit. vol.II. p.272, Capt. Hayes to Warren, encl., 25 October 1813.
201. NMM: LBK/2, Warren to Melville 1 June 1813.
202. Dudley W. op.cit. vol.II, p.137, citing ADM 1/504, pp.223-6, Oliver to Warren, *Valiant at Sea*, 13 June 1813.
203. NMM: LBK/2, Warren to Melville, 'Hampton Roads, Chesapeake, 6 July 1813'.
204. NMM: LBK/2, Annotated press cutting forwarded by Warren to Melville, headed 'Naval General Order of Wm Jones, Navy Dept, July 29 1813. Warren's annotation reads "Now this has been adopted and several small [American] vessels have been chased."
205. *ibid.*
206. FCO: Brannan J. Letter of Cmdr. Stephen Decatur to Sect.of Navy Jones, 20 December 1813, *Official Letters of Military and Naval Officers of the United States during the War with Great Britain 1812-14, Collected and Arranged by John Brannan*. Washington City. 1823. p.287.
207. NMM: LBK/2, Warren to Melville, '*San Domingo*, In the River Potomac 40 miles below Washington. 22<sup>nd</sup> July, 1813'; side 6.

208. Dudley W. op.cit. vol.II, pp.168-178. citing ADM 8/100, Extract of 'Ships in Sea Pay - The present disposition of His Majesty's Ships and Vessels in Sea Pay. Admiralty Office, 1<sup>st</sup> July 1813'.
209. Dudley W. op.cit. vol.II, p.178. 'General Abstract'. Warren's United Command was part of what the General Abstract for the Royal Navy gave as 624 ships and 135,889 men on 1<sup>st</sup> July 1813, not the '1,000 ship navy' so often referred to, in for example, Friendly A, *Beaufort*. London. 1977, citing letter of Francis Beaufort to his bother-in-law Richard. 9 December 1809. "There are 1000 King's Ships". See also Lloyd C. 'Armed Forces and the Art of War' in *The New Cambridge Modern History IX War and Peace in an Age of Upheaval 1793-1815*, Cambridge, CUP, 1974. p.90. (By 1815), "1168 warships, 240 of them ships of the line."
210. NMM: LBK/2, Warren to Melville, *San Domingo*, Potomac. 22 July 1813.
211. NMM: LBK/2 Warren to Melville, *San Domingo*, River Potomac, 22 July 1813. As a postscript, Warren added; "the following ships are in Port & blockaded viz:  
 In the Chesapeake *Constellation* 36 & *Adams* 36  
 New London *United States* 44 *Macedonian* 38 & *Hornet* 18  
 Boston *Constitution* 44  
 At Sea *President* 44 *Congress* 36 having escaped our Squadron off Boston in a fog  
 Brazil stated to be Blockaded St Salvador *Essex* 36  
 Halifax Harbour *Chesapeake* 36 guns".  
 By December 1813, a total of 16 named American vessels, 10 of more than 20 guns, had been blockaded, captured or destroyed, as shown in Appendix A as Table 2(a).
212. Dudley W. op.cit. vol.II, p.270-1, citing ADM 1/504, p.523. 25 October 1813.
213. NMM: LBK/2, Warren to Melville, 'Private' dated *San Domingo*, Lynhaven Bay, Chesapeake, 6 September 1813.
214. *ibid*.
215. NMM: LBK/2, Warren to Melville, 27 September 1813.
216. Dudley W. op.cit. vol.II, p.250; p.261, citing ADM 1/504, pp.417-20. USS's *President* and *Congress* had escaped from Boston on 30 April 1813.
217. NMM: LBK/2, Warren to Melville, 26<sup>th</sup> October 1813. In another, less well-written copy of this letter, Warren says 'not by 30 sail as many as proposed in your Lordship's former letter'. This letter is noted as being received at the Admiralty on 17 November 1813, in a remarkable 22 days.
218. Dudley W. op.cit.vol.II, pp.284, citing TNA: ADM 1/504, pp.713-5. Warren to Croker, Halifax, 13 November 1813. Later local accounts recalled "nearly 100 sail of vessels were drove onshore and not one escaped some damage" adding that "a number of lives were lost...the following day never was witnessed in Halifax such a scene of destruction and devastation." Ferguson C. ed. *Glimpses of Nova Scotia 1807-24*. Public Archives of NS Bulletin No:12, pp.22-3, quoted in Lohnes B. 'British Naval Problems in Halifax During the War of 1812.' in *Mariner's Mirror* LIX, p.326.

219. *ibid.*
220. Dudley W. *op.cit.* vol.II. pp.262-3, citing TNA: ADM 1/504, pp.551-3.
221. *ibid.*
222. *ibid.*
223. Nile H. ed. *Weekly Register*, Baltimore, pp.264-5. 18 December 1813.
224. Guernsey R. *op.cit.* p.393.
225. *ibid.* quoting letter from Capt. Robert Oliver, to Don Thomas Stoughton, Spanish consul in New York, dated 'HMS *Valiant*, Off New London, December 2 1813'.
226. NMM: LBK/2, Warren to Melville, 9 November 1813.
227. NMM: LBK/2, Warren to Melville 30 November 1813.
228. TNA: ADM 1/505, Warren to Croker, Bermuda, 30 December 1813, pp.44-5.
229. NMM: LBK/2, Warren to Melville 30 December 1813.
230. *ibid.*
231. TNA: ADM 8/100, 1 July 1813, and ADM 1/505, pp.320-2.
232. See Appendix A, Table 2 (a) p.456, excluding the *Essex* which had escaped in July 1813, but including the *President*, which was to escape on 4 December 1813.
233. NMM: LBK/2, Warren to Melville, 30 December 1813.
234. Mahan A. *op.cit.* vol.II, p.330.
235. NMM: LBK/2, Copy letter Melville to Warren, 'Private', dated Admiralty, 24 November 1813, referring to letter Croker to Warren, dated 4 November 1813, TNA: ADM 2/1378, pp.146-51.
236. *ibid.*
237. TNA: ADM 1/505, Warren to Croker, Bermuda, 30 December 1813, pp.87-90.
238. NMM: LBK/2, Melville to Warren, dated Admiralty, 24 November 1813.
239. *ibid.*
240. NMM: LBK/2, Warren to Melville, 'Private' dated Bermuda, 3 February 1814.
241. *ibid.*
242. TNA: ADM 2/1378, pp.58 and 146, Croker to Warren 4 November 1813.
243. Hume E. ed., 'Letters Written During the War of 1812 by the British Naval Commander in American Waters – Admiral Sir David Milne.' in *William and Mary College Quarterly Historical Magazine*, vol. X, 2<sup>nd</sup> Series, October 1930, No: 4, pp.279-96, p.290. Letter from Capt. David Milne to George Hume, HM Ship *Bulwark*, Portsmouth, 2 January 1814. The title of the edited letters is disingenuous since Milne was not appointed C in C North America, nor knighted, until 1816, post-war, not taking up his appointment until 1817. 'The Prince' referred to is the Prince Regent, to become George IV in 1820.
244. *ibid.*
245. NMM: Warren Papers: WAR/37, note in Warren's hand on the back of p.37. Although pencilled on the cover of a record of prizes between March and 13 September 1813, the totals appear to be for the whole term of his command up to 1 April 1814, when Warren would have ceased to share in new prize money. The figure of '60' prizes for

Jamaica is puzzling since Warren had noted that 70 cases there were “unaccounted for” in September 1813. Some had possibly arrived there before Warren’s appointment on 3 August 1812. Warren appears to have taken a close interest in the entries of captures and detentions, and the adjudication of prizes, even after his recall and retirement.

246. *Annual Register* for 1822, London 1823. pp.272-3.

247. Marshall J. *Royal Naval Biography* vol.I, London, Longman et al., 1823. Warren had died on 27 February 1822, while visiting Sir Richard Keats, former commander on the Newfoundland station, and Governor of the Royal Naval Hospital at Greenwich.

## Chapter 5. Implementation 2: The United States Blockaded 1814-15.

### The North America Command of Sir Alexander Cochrane.

#### References:

1. Adams H. ed., *The Writings of Albert Gallatin*, Philadelphia, Lippincott & Co, 1879, 3 Adams H vols., vol.1, p.627, Gallatin to Monroe, 13 June 1814.
2. TNA: ADM 1/505, p.434, 1 April 1814. Letter of appointment from Lords of Admiralty to Cochrane, dated 25 January 1814, TNA: ADM 2/933, pp.91-5.
3. Markham Sir C. ed., Lord Keith to Adm. Markham, 23 February 1804, in *Selections from Correspondence of Adm. John Markham During the Years 1801-4 and 1806-7*. London. Navy Records Society. vol. 28.1904. p.153.
4. Cordingley D. *Cochrane the Dauntless – The Life and Adventures of Thomas Cochrane*, London, 2007, and London, Bloomsbury, 2008, pp. 82/384.
5. *The Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, vol.12. Oxford Univ. Press.2004. p.301.
6. Cordingley D. op.cit., p.13. Colonel Charles Cochrane, second son of the eighth earl, was killed at Yorktown in the autumn of 1781 while serving as aide-de-camp to General Cornwallis. Clearly a close family, Vice-Adm. Sir Alexander had invited his nephew Capt. Lord Thomas RN, to be his flag captain, and to prepare HMS *Tonnant*, 80, for sea as his flagship, while it was moored at Chatham. See Cordingley D., op. cit. p.237.
7. BJL:UH, Hotham Papers, DDHO/7/4, on a letter dated 25 July 1814.
8. TNA: ADM 1/506 p.46, Cochrane to Croker, 27 April 1814.
9. Hume E. ed. 'Letters Written During the War of 1812 by the British Naval Commander in American Waters – Admiral Sir David Milne' in *William and Mary College Quarterly Historical Magazine*. vol.X. 2<sup>nd</sup> Series, October 1930.No: 4. pp. 279-96, p.291. Letter from Capt David Milne to George Hume, Portsmouth, 30 January 1814. Milne was not in fact appointed C in C North America, nor knighted , until 1816.
10. *ibid.* p.292. Letter to George Hume, HMS *Bulwark*, Bermuda, 26 April 1814 Milne was most concerned over USS *Independence*, 74, to be launched in 1814.
11. *ibid.*
12. Crawford M. *The Naval War of 1812- A Documentary History*. Washington. Naval Historical Center. 2002. vol.III, p.17, Capt. Robt. Barrie to his mother, from "HMS *Dragon* off Mockjack Bay the Chesapeake. Feby.4<sup>th</sup> 1814." Crawford notes that the Bay is now known as Mobjack Bay.
13. Crawford M. op.cit. p.18. Capt. Robt. Barrie to his half-sister, dated *Dragon* Hampton Roads. March 14 [1814].
14. Crawford M. op.cit. p.36-7. Act. Master Commandant Joshua Barney to Secretary of the Navy Jones, Baltimore. 25 March 1814.

15. *Naval Chronicle*. vol.XXXII. p.256, ‘vessels captured, recaptured, detained or destroyed by Squadron commanded by Sir A. Cochrane...return received at Bermuda June 17<sup>th</sup> 1814.’
16. TNA: ADM 1/506, pp.273-7, and p.280, and *Naval Chronicle* vol.XXXII, p.171.
17. TNA: ADM 1/506, pp.47-8, 27 April 1814. and p.203, 10 May 1814.
18. Crawford M. op.cit. pp.46-7, Cockburn to Warren, HMS *Albion*, Tangier Bay, Chesapeake, 13 April 1814. Despite having written to congratulate Cochrane on his appointment on 2 April 1814, Cockburn addressed this to Warren who had already left Bermuda for England. Cockburn was later to insist that he did not know of Cochrane’s command until 28 April 1814.
19. Crawford M. op. cit. p.60. and p.340 re: training on Tangier Island, Chesapeake.
20. National Library of Scotland. Alex F.I. Cochrane Papers. MS2333 f.59. Letter to Vice-Adm. Cochrane to Rear Adm. Cockburn, dated *Albion* in Tangier Bay Chesapeake, 9 May 1814.
21. Hickey D. *The War of 1812- A Forgotten Conflict*. University of Illinois Press. Urbana. 1989. p.124, citing General Order of the Secretary of the Navy. July 29 1813, in Navy Department (M149) reel 11.
22. Annals of Congress: 13<sup>th</sup> Congress, Session 1, columns 98-101, hereafter AC: 13-1, 98-101, 500-4; and AC: 13-2, 741.
23. TNA: ADM 1/506, p.42. See also Crawford M. op.cit. p.134, Cochrane to Melville, *Tonnant*, Bermuda, 17 July 1814.
24. TNA: ADM 1/506, pp.40-1. Cochrane to Croker, 25 April 1814.
25. *ibid*.
26. TNA: ADM 1/506, pp.40-1, Cochrane to Croker, 25 April 1814.
27. NMM: WAR/11, reverse p.139.
28. TNA: ADM 2/1376, pp.320-2, Croker to Warren, “Secret”. Admiralty, 28 April 1813.
29. TNA: ADM 1/506, p.44, 25<sup>th</sup> April 1814.
30. *London Gazette*, 31<sup>st</sup> May 1814.
31. NC. vol. 31. p.63, footnote.
32. TNA: ADM 2/1380, p.98. Croker, 30<sup>th</sup> April 1814.
33. NC. vol.31. p.475. ‘State Papers’, re-print of *London Gazette*’s Foreign Office notification to neutrals, published Tuesday, 31 May 1814, referring to Cochrane’s Proclamation of 25 April 1814.
34. *London Gazette*, 31 May 1814.
35. Whitehill E.ed. *Journal of Lieut. Henry Napier in HMS Nympe: New England Blockaded 1814*. Salem. Peabody Museum.1939. p.17.
36. Crawford M. op.cit. p.67. Cochrane to Cockburn, Bermuda, 26 May 1814.
37. Crawford M. op.cit. p.69, *Disposition of His Majestys Ships upon the Coast of America* -, enclosed in the above letter from Cochrane to Cockburn, 26 May 1814.
38. TNA: ADM 2/1380, p.178. Croker to James Buller, Council Officer, 31 May 1814. Warren had reached Spithead on 22 May 1814, see Crawford op.cit. p.135, note 1. Captain Broke was still recovering from the head wound received in concluding his capture of USS Chesapeake off Boston on 1 June 1813.
39. TNA: ADM 1/506, pp.478-88. 5 July 1814.

40. Niles H. ed. *Weekly Register* Baltimore. vol. VI, p.317, 9 July 1814.
41. Albion R. and Pope J. *Sea Lanes in Wartime* p.121. Albion and Pope calculated that the average tonnage of prizes taken into Halifax fell from 139 tons between 1812-13, to only 73 tons during the last year of the war, but this disguises a more complete analysis of the type and size of Halifax prizes, more fully discussed in Chapter 7, p.19.
42. Whitehill E. op.cit. pp.17, 29-30. *Nymphe* had been undergoing repair in Halifax since “the violent storm” of 12 November 1813, delayed by shortage of dockyard resources.
43. Whitehill E.op.cit.p.17.
44. Whitehill E.op.cit.p.20.
45. Whitehill E. op.cit. pp.22, 31, June-July 1814.
46. Whitehill E. op.cit. p.18. Napier’s opinions on the American character include; “Begin with a dollar and proceed to any amount; you can always buy a Yankee in almost any rank and station.”
47. Whitehill E. op.cit. p.21. By ‘notions’, contemporary Americans meant vegetables.
48. Whitehill E. op.cit. pp.15-28.
49. Whitehill E. op.cit. p.26
50. Whitehill E. op.cit. p.23 and p.26.
51. Whitehill E. op.cit. p24.
52. *ibid.*
53. *ibid.*
54. B JL.,UH, Hotham Papers, DDHO/7/4, ‘Description of the Ships on the North American Station 26<sup>th</sup> July 1814’, shown as Appendix A, Table 4. The totals do not include *La Hogue*, 74, *Orpheus*, 38, or *Martin*, 18, “to go home”, and avoids some double-counting, and pencil notes of potential re-distributions. ‘Ships in Sea Pay’ for 1 July 1814,comparable to those for 1812 and 1813, does not seem to have survived
55. Crawford M. op.cit. p.40 note 1, and p.69, enclosure in Cochrane to Cockburn, Bermuda, 26<sup>th</sup> May 1814, ‘Disposition of HM Ships upon the Coast of America’; also p.115 note 1, citing Cochrane to Troubridge, 24 May 1814, Washington. Lib. of Congress, Cockburn Papers, vol. 38, pp. 311-2.
56. Hall H. *American Navigation*. New York, Appletons,1880. p.46; Crawford M. op.cit. p.97 note 6, citing Washington. Nat. Archives and Records, Gordon to Jones, 21 July 1814. M125 Roll 38.
57. B JL., UH, Hotham Papers, DDHO/7/4 No.6, Cochrane to Hotham, Bermuda, 28 July 1814. Hotham was promoted to flag rank on 4 June 1814, to Rear Admiral of the White, but news of his promotion was delayed.
58. *ibid.*
59. One of three enclosures in above letter, dated ‘Nantucket 11<sup>th</sup> April 1814’.
60. TNA: ADM 1/507, 12 –13 August 1814.
61. Morriss R. *Guide to British naval papers in North America*, London, NMM/Mansell, 1994, p.181, citing letter in Nantucket Hist. Ass’s Peter Foulger Museum, Nantucket, Mass.
62. B JL., UH, Hotham Papers, DDHO/7/4 30 August 1814 to *Surprise* on Patuxent.
63. Hickey D. *The War of 1812- A Forgotten Conflict*, Urbana, Univ.of

- Illinois Press, 1989, p.214, citing Byers E. *The Nation of Nantucket: Society and Politics in an Early American Commercial Center 1660-1820*, Boston, 1987, pp. 277-89. See TNA: ADM 1/507, pp. 24-28, 12-13 August 1814, 249-61, 453-9, 464; WO 1/142, pp. 415, 419-21, 427-9.
64. TNA: ADM 1/506, pp.242, 244-7, Cochrane to Sherbrooke, 30 May 1814.
65. Hickey D. op.cit. p194. citing Lohnes B. *The Invasion of Eastern Maine*, p.9.
66. TNA: ADM 1/506, pp. 539-40; ADM 1 507, pp.128-37, 304-7; ADM 1/508, pp.28-32. Griffith to Croker, 27 September 1814.
67. Hertslet E. and L. eds., *British and Foreign State Papers 1812-14*, vol 1, part II, London, J. Ridgway & Sons, 1841, pp.1369-71. See also Niles H. ed., *Weekly Register*, Baltimore. vol.7, pp.117-8, 29 October 1814.
68. Niles H. ed. op. cit. vol. VII, p.270, and vol. VIII, Supplement, p.149.
69. Crawford M. op.cit. p.131, Cochrane to Earl Bathurst, Secretary of State for War and the Colonies, HMS *Tonnant*, Bermuda, 14 July 1814.
70. Crawford M. op.cit. p.133, Cochrane to Melville, First Lord of the Admiralty, HMS *Tonnant*, Bermuda, 17 July 1814.
71. NMM: COC/11, pp.105-6. This undertaking had first been made during Cockburn's first raids in the Chesapeake in 1813, but still applied.
72. Crawford M. op. cit. pp.229-30. Stock prices authorised by Rr Adm. Sir Ed.Codrington Capt of the Fleet. *Iphigenia*, 22 August 1814, citing NMM: COD 6/4.
73. Crawford M. op.cit. p.131, Cochrane to Bathurst, *Tonnant*, 14 July 1814.
74. *ibid.*
75. Crawford M. op.cit. p.133, Cochrane to Melville, *Tonnant*, 17 July 1814.
76. This number of American warships counted as hors d'combat excludes the *Hornet*, which escaped in January 1814. See Appendix A Table 2(b), 'Named American Vessels Blockaded, Captured or Destroyed by July 1814.'
77. Crawford M. op.cit. p.786.
78. Crawford M. op.cit. p.196. Cockburn to Cochrane, 22 August 1814. Barney's flotilla had comprised one large sloop and sixteen gunboats; all were destroyed but for one gunboat captured by Cockburn's boats.
79. Crawford M. op.cit. pp.222-3, Cockburn to Cochrane, HM Sloop *Manly*, Nottingham, Patuxent, 27 August 1814. Crawford's note p.223 identifies the vessels. See also Crawford pp.226-8, Cochrane to Croker, *Tonnant*, in the Patuxent 2 September, 1814. The American frigates *Boston* and *New York*, decayed beyond economical repair, were also burned.
80. Crawford M. op.cit. p.786, Appendix, Enclosure E, 'Report on the State of the US Navy', Secretary of the Navy Jones to President James Madison, Navy Department. June 6 1814. *Columbia* was intended "to mount 53 guns to be launched in August", and *Argus* was "ready to receive a Crew".
81. JCBL: B & I corr. Box 160, f.10, Charles Greene to B & I, 12 March and 3 August 1814; *National Intelligencer*, Washington, 22 July 1814; Niles H. *Weekly Register*. Baltimore. vol. VI, p.353; Hickey D. op.cit. p.224.
82. Crawford M. op.cit. pp.237-42, citing ADM 1/507, pp.160-8. Capt. James Gordon to Cochrane. *Seahorse*, Chesapeake, 9 September 1814.
83. Crawford M. op.cit. p.289. Cochrane to Melville. 'Private', *Tonnant*, off Baltimore, 17 September 1814.



84. Crawford M. p.269. Cochrane to Melville, *Tonnant*, Patuxent River, 3 Sept. 1814
85. Crawford M. op.cit. p.270. Cochrane to Melville, *Tonnant* Patuxent River 3 Sept. 1814.
86. Crawford M. op.cit.p.277-8. Cochrane to Cockburn, *Tonnant*, off Baltimore, 13 Sept. 1814.
87. Crawford M. op.cit.p.279. Colonel Brooke to Cochrane, 14 September Brooke had assumed command of British land forces at Baltimore on Ross's death.
88. Crawford M. op.cit. p.287, citing ADM 1/507pp.171-5. Cochrane to Croker *Tonnant*, Chesapeake. 17 Sept. 1814.
89. Crawford M. op.cit. p.289, Cochrane to Melville. 'Private', *Tonnant*, off Baltimore, 17 Sept. 1814.
90. Crawford M. op.cit. pp.269-70. Cochrane to Melville. *Tonnant*, Patuxent River, 3 Sept. 1814.
91. Crawford M. op.cit. p.71. Croker to Cochrane. Admiralty Office, 4 April 1814, and 19 May 1814, latter referring to Croker to Warren 20 March 1813 giving him discretion on objectives for land forces under his command. See also *ibid*, p.72, Bathurst to Major General E. Barnes, 'Copy, Secret, Downing Street, 20 May 1814', enclosed in Croker to Cochrane 21 May 1814.
92. Crawford M. op.cit. p.132, citing TNA: ADM 1/506, pp.390-3, Cochrane to Croker, 20 June 1814.
93. Crawford M. op.cit.p.131, citing TNA: WO 1/141, pp 7-14. Cochrane to Bathurst, HMS *Tonnant*, Bermuda 14 July 1814.
94. Crawford M. op.cit. p.269-70, Cochrane to Melville, *Tonnant*, Patuxent River 3 Sept. 1814, and p.140. Cochrane to Commanding Officers of the North American Station, 18 July 1814. Sir George Prevost, Governor-General of British North America, had reported to Cochrane on 2 June 1814, that "the American troops in Upper Canada have committed the most wanton and unjustifiable outrages on the unoffending inhabitants" of Dover, on Lake Erie in May 1814. See also Crawford op.cit. p.489.
95. Crawford M. op.cit. pp.286-91, and p.329-30, note 2 citing Melville to Cochrane, 29 July 1814 in NLS: Cochrane Papers MS 2574, p.146-8,
96. Crawford M. op.cit. p.330, note 3, Cochrane to Melville, 17 September 1814, citing Lilley Library, University of Indiana, War of 1812 MS.
97. Crawford M. op.cit. p.335, note 1, and p.339 note 5.
98. Crawford M. op.cit. p.335, note 2, citing Cochrane to Cockburn, 1 October 1814, NLS. MS 2346 p.13-4, and p.350, note 1.
99. Crawford M. op.cit. p.340. Barrie to his half-sister, from 'Dragon, off Tangier Isle, Chesapeake Bay, Novr. 11<sup>th</sup> 1814'.
100. Crawford M. op.cit. p.344-5. Cockburn to Capt. John Clavell, 13 Dec. 1814.
101. *Naval Chronicle*. vol. XXXIII, pp.258-9, Calculated from: 'A List of Vessels captured, burnt, and destroyed by the Squadron under the Orders of Rear Admiral the Honourable Henry Hotham, as reported to him between the 6<sup>th</sup> August and 9<sup>th</sup> October 1814.'
102. Colledge J. op.cit. p. HMS *Forth* was one of the 'fir-frigates' built for North American waters in 1813, which proved satisfactory, although expected to last only six or seven years. The *Forth* was to be broken-up in 1819.

103. *Naval Chronicle*. vol. XXXIII, p.258. 'From Captain Pym of HMS *Niemen*, off the River Delaware, 30<sup>th</sup> September 1814' and from Captain Lumley of HMS *Narcissus*, off Negro Head, 13<sup>th</sup> October 1814.'
104. *Naval Chronicle*. vol. XXXIII, pp.345-6.
105. *Historical Statistics of the United States from Colonial Times to 1957*, Washington, Bureau of the Census, 1960, Series Q,178-82, 'Merchant Vessels Built & Documented by Type: 1797-1957, p.448.
106. Mahan A. *Sea Power in its Relation to the War of 1812*. 2 vols. London, Sampson, Marston Low & Co,1905. vol. II, p.388.
107. Crawford M. op.cit. p.331, note 3.
108. Mahan A. op.cit. vol. II, p.386. Mahan adds that *Hermes*' Capt. Percy was exonerated at Court Martial, citing *Naval Chronicle* vol. XXXIII, p.429.
109. Mahan A. op.cit. p.388.
110. *Naval Chronicle*. vol. XXXIII, p.337-341; and Crawford M. op.cit. p.134. Cochrane to Melville, HMS *Tonnant*, Bermuda 17 July 1814. "Send me flat bottomed Vessels that will act as Gun Vessels to cover landings and carry at least 100 Soldiers for a short distance, this Coast requires them".
111. *Naval Chronicle*. vol. XXXIII, p.341. Cochrane's Report.
112. Crawford M. op.cit. p.786, 'State and Stations of Vessels of War' 6<sup>th</sup> June 1814; and Mahan A op.cit.pp.391-2. Mahan mistakenly refers to the schooner as the *Caroline*.
113. Hickey D. 'American Trade Restrictions During the War of 1812' in *Journal of American History* vol.68, no.3, December 1981, p.520, citing Walters R. *Albert Gallatin: Jeffersonian Financier and Diplomat*, New York, 1957, p.259. Albert Gallatin had resigned in March 1813, and left for Europe as a Peace Commissioner on 9 May 1813.
114. NLS: Cochrane Papers: Admiralty letters 1813 –15, 2343, 30 December 1814; and Niles H. ed. op.cit. vol.VII, p.361 Cochrane to Croker 14 February 1815.
115. NMM: HUL/5B, Hulbert to Fraser, 14 March 1815, quoted by Guttridge T., 'Prize Agency 1800-1815 with special reference to the career and work of George Redmond Hulbert', unpublished thesis, University of Portsmouth, 1989, p.85.
116. TNA: ADM 2/1381, pp.96-7, and Senate Journal 2: 618-20.

## Chapter 6:

### The Impact of the British Blockades under Admiral Warren:

August 1812- April 1814.

#### References.

1. Davenant C. *An Essay Upon the Ways and Means of Supplying War*. London 1695, quoted in French D. *The British Way of Warfare*. London. Unwin/ Hyman.1990. p.24, citing Dickinson H. *Liberty and Property: Political Ideology in Eighteenth Century Britain*. London. Methuen. 1977. p.85.
2. Morriss R. *Cockburn and the British Navy in Transition: Admiral Sir George Cockburn 1772-1853*. Univ of Exeter Press.1997. p.87; and Dudley, Wade. PhD dissertation; *Without Some Risk: A Reassessment of the British Blockade of the United States 1812-15*. Univ.of Alabama,1999. e.g. p.106. "Though the British missed the opportunity to cripple the American merchant marine, by December [1812] the Royal Navy had established a tentative military blockade – little more than a patrol – of New York and Boston." In fact, Warren had not received Monroe's rejection, dated 27 October 1812, of Britain's armistice proposal, until 16 November 1812; 'crippling' the 1m ton US merchant marine might be expected to take more than a fortnight. See also pp. 111, 119, 125, 131-2, & passim.
3. Hansard T. *Parliamentary Debates from the Year 1803 to the Present Time*. London.1813. vol.XXIII, pp.21, 71-5 for British revocation of Orders in Council 23 June 1812. For British hopes, see ASP:FR, vol.III, pp.593-5, Jonathan Russell to Monroe.
4. Toll I. *Six Frigates*. London. Michael Joseph. 2006. p.372. Canning quoted from Adams H. *History of the United States during the Administration of James Madison*. Library of America ed. Washington, 1986. p.627.
5. Hansard T.op.cit., vol. XXIV, p.70. Canning to House of Commons,\*
6. *ibid* p.72.
7. *ibid* p.74.
8. Hickey D. *The War of 1812 – A Forgotten Conflict*. Urbana, University of Illinois Press,1989, p.93, quoting Governor Tompkins to New York legislature 3 November 1812. The American ports Sawyer had intended to blockade included Boston, New York, Norfolk and Charleston.
9. BL: Add Mss:38250 f.42, letters to Prime Minister Lord Liverpool from Secretary of State for War and Colonies, Lord Bathurst, dated 3 October 1812; and Add Mss: 8299 cc 20(4) from Mr C. Lyne, to Ld. Liverpool, representing cotton manufactures outlining stocks held and blockading possibilities, dated 2 March 1813.
10. Albion R. and Pope J. *Sea Lanes in Wartime*. 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. Portland, Maine. Archon Books.1968. p.115. These 46 vessels represented no less than 57% of the full-rigged ships and 26.5% of the brigs detained in Halifax during the war.

11. *Naval Chronicle*. vol. XXVIII, p.494. 'American Memorial against the War by 1500 Inhabitants of the County of Rockingham in New Hampshire, 5<sup>th</sup> August 1812.'
12. JCBL: Brown & Ives Papers, Box 236 f2, letter from Thomas Poynton Ives of Providence, Rhode Island, to John Maybin of Philadelphia, 12 November 1812.
13. Kert F. *Prize and Prejudice: Privateering and Naval Prize in Atlantic Canada in the War of 1812*. Research in Maritime History No11, International Maritime Economic History Ass. St John's Newfoundland. 1997. pp.159-169.
14. JCBL: Brown & Ives Papers, Box 236 f3, letter, Ives to Maybin, Providence Rhode Island, 15 January 1813.
15. Arthur B. unpublished MA dissertation. University of Greenwich. 2002. Appendix 4.1. page ii. p.94.
16. actually 59.86%.
17. AC 9-1,1259-62, and AC 10-1, 2814-15.
18. AC 10-1, 2582-3 for Macon's No: 2 Bill. In a document allegedly dated 5 August 1810, Napoleon's Foreign Minister, the Duc de Cadore had reworded Napoleon's ambiguously written instructions, and implied that French detention of American vessels would end when the American government, "caused their rights to be respected by the English". Madison's apparent acceptance of French manipulation, on 2 November 1810, resulted in the implementation of Macon's No: 2 Bill, and caused heated debate in Congress. See Mahan A. op.cit. vol.I p.237, for translation.
19. actually 35.2%.
20. Seyburt A. *Statistical Annals*. Philadelphia, T. Dodson. 1818, part of 'A Statement Exhibiting the gross and net amount of ad valorem and specific duties on Goods, Wares and Merchandise imported into the United States from 1<sup>st</sup> January 1794 to 31<sup>st</sup> December 1814' p.454. The evident time-lag between one year's net customs revenue and the following year's government income is explained by Bristed J., *Resources of the United States of America...*, New York, James Eastburn & Co, 1818, p.77, "The amount is secured to government by bonds payable at different periods according to the term of credit given to the importer", often a year.
21. actually 21.58%
22. Hickey D. 'American Trade Restrictions during the War of 1812' in *Journal of American History*, vol.38, No.3, December 1981, p.525. The goods were worth \$30m on the American market.
23. AC 12-1, p.2046. 25 November 1811.
24. *Annual Register* vol.5, part 2. pp.317-8, London, 1813, Madison to Congress, 4 November 1812, and in *State Papers and Publick Documents of the United States...Exhibiting a Complete View of our Foreign Relations.*, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed. vol.IX. 1812. Boston. Thomas Wait. 1819. p.54. Although not to be repealed until 14 April 1814, until then, the number of laden American merchant ships attempting to reach American ports suggests that the Non-Importation Act was widely evaded, see: AC 13-2, pp.1946-8, 2830.
25. *ibid.* Madison had included in his revenues to 30 September 1812, the

- \$5.8m so far lent to the government as part of the \$11m loan authorised in March and anticipated that the remainder would follow. Only \$6m of the \$11m was lent.
26. Dudley W. *The Naval War of 1812: A Documentary History*. Washington, Naval Historical Center, 1989, vol.1, p.561, Commodore Tingey to Sect. of Navy Hamilton, 7 November 1812; and PRO CO43/49, pp.153-4. Earl Bathurst to Lords Commissioners of Admiralty, dated Downing Street, 21 November 1812.
  27. North D. 'United States Balance of Payments 1790-1860. Trends in the American Economy in the Nineteenth Century.' National Bureau of Economic Research Conference on Research in Income and Wealth. vol.24. New York, Princeton Univ. Press, 1960, re-printed Arno Press, 1975. pp.591-2 Table A-2, Appendix A. North's figures produce 36.1%. Earlier, uncorrected figures, such as those in De Bow J.D.B. in *A Statistical View of the United States*. Washington. A.O.P. Nicholson. Public Printer, 1854, Table CCV. p.185; suggest a larger increase, of 43.25%. Madison and Congress may have been led to believe the increase to be larger than it now appears.
  28. American State Papers: Finance, Washington, Gales and Seaton, 1832-61, 58 vols., Class III, Finance, vol. 2, hereafter ASP:F II, p.539. Gallatin to Bacon, 24 June 1812. Only \$6.5m of this \$11m had been subscribed by June 1812, and even eventually, only \$8.1m. The immediate shortfall was met by the first issue of Treasury notes.
  29. Pitkin T. *A Statistical View of the United States of America*. 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. New Haven, Durrie and Peck, 1835. p.307; see also Bristed J. *Resources of the United States of America*, New York, James Eastbourn & Co, 1818, p. 77. The total 'accrued' net customs revenue includes some becoming due in 1812, but according to Bristed, not necessarily collected until up to a year later. As well as doubling customs duties, a 10% surcharge on goods imported in foreign vessels was imposed, and the tonnage duty on foreign ships of 50 cents per ton was raised to \$2 per ton. Even adjusted figures are therefore still too high.
  30. In the absence of actual net customs revenue figures for the six months of January-July 1812, assuming a constant rate of imports during 1812, and ceteris paribus, a halved raw accrued total gives an adjusted first-half yield of \$6,665,733, to which 50% for July-December is added, producing an overall adjusted annual total at the original rates of duty of \$9,998,600, i.e.>25% less than the raw data.
  31. Some imports were duty free. This could explain the disparity between the 36.1% increase in imports, and the 21.6% rise in net customs revenue adjusted for the changed rates of duty, between 1811 and 1812.
  32. AC 12-1, imports: 186-7, 189, 1598, 1612-14, 2262-4; exports: AC12-1, 203.
  33. Speech of John Cahoun, 24 June 1812, in AC 12-1,1541.
  34. AC 12-1,1543-6. Speaker Clay refused to resolve a tied vote to end restrictions.
  35. See Appendix B, Table 2(b) 'Named American Vessels Blockaded and Destroyed by July 1814'.
  36. See for example, Niles' *Weekly Register*, 12 April 1812. Baltimore. vol.II, p.101-4.

37. Seyburt A. op.cit. p.454.
38. Dewey D. *Financial History of the United States*. 1903, 12<sup>th</sup> ed. 1934. reprinted 1968, New York A. Kelly. p.142.
39. Dewey D. op.cit. p.141.
40. ASP: Finance vol.II, p.539. Loan originally proposed by the Ways and Means Committee on 17 February 1812, Bacon's Report to the House, see also Gallatin to Bacon, 24 June 1812.
41. ASP: Finance vol.II, p.839, 'Revised Statement of the Public Debt, 14<sup>th</sup> April 1814', also, 'Receipts and Expenditures from March 1789 to 15<sup>th</sup> December 1815.', p.920.
42. ASP: Finance vol.II, Gallatin on 'State of the Finances', 7 December 1812, p.580. Gallatin had first suggested the careful use of Treasury notes in wartime as early as February 1810, and advocated them again in a letter to Bacon on 10 January 1812, see ASP: Finance II, pp. 512-16.
43. Seyburt A. op.cit. p.454.
44. Warden D. *A Statistical Political and Historical Account of the United States of North America from the Period of their First Colonization to the Present Day*. Edinburgh, Archibald & Constable & Co, 1819. vol. III, p.309.
45. Seyburt A. op.cit. p.93. American total exports fall 1811-12 by 37.17%. North's corrected export and re-export figures are almost identical.
46. North D. op.cit. pp.591-2. American re-exports between 1811-12 actually fell 46.979% when calculated from North's figures.
47. *ibid.*
48. Mahan A. Letter from Isaac Hull, USS *Constitution*, New York, 29 October 1812, cited in *Sea Power in its Relation to the War of 1812*. London, Sampson Low, Marston & Company, 1905, vol.II. p.12.
49. NMM: WAR 43. pages unnumbered; Warren's entry for 16 November 1812.
50. TNA: CO 43/49. Bathurst to Admiralty, Downing Street, London, 21 November 1812; ADM 2/1375 Secret Orders and Letters to Warren 25 November 1812. A month later Warren was sent a duplicate of the orders and a copy of Bathurst's letter.
51. London Gazette, 26 December 1812.
52. TNA: ADM 1/503. p.221.
53. NMM: LBK/2 Private letter from Warren to Melville, 19 February 1813, and officially, Warren to Croker, First Secretary of Admiralty, 21 February 1813, referred to TNA: ADM 2/1376 pp.341-67. 20 March 1813.
54. Hall C. *British Strategy in the Napoleonic Wars 1803-15*. Manchester Univ. Press, 1992, p.61. citing ADM 109/105. American grain and flour sent to the British Peninsula army comprised 835,000 barrels of a total 1,385,000 exported in 1811, equal to 60.28%.
55. TNA: FO 5/88 Ld. Castlereagh to Anthony Baker, 3 February 1813.
56. Wellesley A. Duke of Wellington. *Despatches, Correspondence and Memoranda... edited by his son, A.R. Wellington*. London, John Murray, 1867-80. vol. X, pp.371-3. Wellington to Bathurst, 11<sup>th</sup> May 1813. Bathurst had earlier sought supplies from Morocco, Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli. Thompson N. *Earl Bathurst and the British Empire*. Pen and Sword, Barnsley, 1999. p.61. Bathurst to Thomas A'Court, 27 March

1813. citing BL Add Mss 41512. Nevertheless, while American grain exports to Britain fell 90.5% between 1812-13, and those to Portugal in the same period fell by 2.7%, those to Spain actually rose by 12.7%.
- Galpin W.F. 'The American Grain Trade to the Spanish Peninsula 1810-14', in *American Historical Review* vol. XXVIII, 1922. pp.24-44; citing British Parliamentary Papers 1825-6, No 227, and Pitkin T. op.cit. 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., New Haven, 1835. pp.119-20.
57. Mahan A. op.cit. vol.I, p.411.
58. Extending from Charleston to St. Mary's, Georgia, including Savannah, this blockade was complained of by Commodore Tingey to Sect. of Navy Hamilton. 7 November 1812, reproduced in Dudley W. op.cit. p.561.
59. Dudley W. op. cit. vol.II, pp.15-16, Warren to First Secretary of the Admiralty John Croker. 25 January 1813.
60. TNA: ADM 1/4359. Warren included his detailed 'Coast of America, Proposed Division of Ships and Their Stations' with letter 104 to Croker, dated 28 March 1813, naming vessels to be stationed 'Off New York, Charleston, Savannah and St Augustine', before he could have received either Melville's letter or Admiralty orders to this effect. Niles maintains that it was already happening. Warren's earlier outline proposals had gained Admiralty approval on 20<sup>th</sup> March 1813.
61. Niles H. *Weekly Register*. vol. III. Baltimore. 20 February 1813.
62. Dudley W. op.cit. vol.II, pp.78-9. Private letter, Melville to Warren 26 March 1813.
63. National Lib. of Scotland. Cochrane Papers: MS 2340, pp. 49-50. First Sect. of Admiralty Croker to Warren, 26 March 1813.
64. *London Gazette*. No:16715, p.625. 'Notification to Neutrals'. 30 March 1813.
65. Niles H. ed. *Weekly Register* vol.III p.383, vol.IV p.159, and vol.V pp.76, 264.
66. JCBL: Brown & Ives correspondence. Box 172, f.9. Letter from Thomas Poynton Ives of Providence, Rhode Island, New England, to Joseph Head of Boston, dated Providence, April 5 1813.
67. JCBL: Brown & Ives correspondence. Box 160, f.9. letter from Thomas Ives, to Charles Greene, B & I's commission agent in Boston, 15 June 1813. Greene's reply, dated 'Tuesday afternoon 15<sup>th</sup> June 1813', appears in Box 160, f.11.
68. NMM: LBK/2 Copy of a letter dated 'Good Friday 1813', forwarded by Warren with others, to Melville, 5 June 1813.
69. NMM: LBK/2 "From a Federalist"; letter enclosed with others, by Warren to Melville, 5 June 1813.
70. Warden D. op.cit. p.299.
71. Seyburt A. op.cit. pp.697-80.
72. Seyburt A. op.cit. p.680.
73. Johnson E. et al. *The History of the Domestic and Foreign Commerce of the United States*. Washington, Columbia, Carnegie Inst. 2 vols. 1915. vol.1. p.335.
74. Johnson E.op.cit. vol.1 p.210.
75. Johnson E. op.cit. calc. from data, vol.1, p.204, and p.210, citing McMaster J. *History of the People of the United States*. New York, D. Appleton & Co, 1902. 7 vols. vol. III, pp.463-4.

76. NMM: LBK/2 Warren to Melville 5 June 1813.
77. Seyburt A. op.cit. pp. 144-5, 680.
78. NMM: HUL/18 Copy of Warren's Bermuda Proclamation dated May 1813, sent to John Dougan, Agent for Commissioners for American Property Condemned as Droits of the Crown, adding interdiction of ports linked with inland navigation to be effective from 1 September 1813, *San Domingo*, Chesapeake, 26 May 1813.
79. TNA: ADM 1/504, pp.551-3, and ADM 1/505, pp.277-8, Warren to Croker, enclosing a copy of Warren's Proclamation of 16 November 1813.
80. Niles H. ed. *Weekly Register*. Baltimore. vol. 5. p.264. December 1813.
81. Kert F. op.cit. p.151, citing Public Archives of Canada, RG 8, IV, vol.118. *Pilgrim*, Vincent Nolte to Alexander Baring, 6 April 1813.
82. ibid. p.150, citing *Nova Scotia Royal Gazette*, 19 May 1813.
83. Dudley W. op.cit. vol. II, pp.341-4, citing Cockburn to Warren, 3 May 1813, ADM1/503, pp.334-8.
84. Nettels C. *The Emergence of a National Economy 1775-1815*. The Economic History of the United States. vol. II. New York. Holt, Rinehart & Winston. 1962. pp.339-40; see also Hickey D. op.cit. p.80, citing ASP: MA, vol 1.p.303.
85. Hickey D. op.cit. pp.202-3, citing Smith Papers, LC., reels 2 & 3.
86. Seyburt A. op.cit. pp.11-12.
87. Lambert J. *Travels through Canada and the United States of North America in the Years 1806,1807 and 1808*. vol. II, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed. London, Baldwin Cradock and Joy,1816; calculated from data, pp.86-7. New York city's population in 1810 of 96,373, had increased 15.4% since 1808. De Bow J. *Compendium of 7<sup>th</sup> Census*, Washington, US Bureau of the Census, Senate Printer,1854, p.192.
88. ibid. pp.74-5. Lambert notes that in 1806 New York had collected \$6.5m, and paid in \$4.5m net.
89. JCBL: B & I corr: Box 236,f.3. John Maybin to B & I, Providence R.I., Dated Philadelphia, 5 May 1813; and B & I to Maybin, 13 May 1813.
90. JCBL: B & I corr. Box 236,f.3. Thomas Ives to John Maybin, dated Providence 16 June1813.
91. JCBL: B & I corr. Box 236,f.3. John Maybin to B & I, dated Philadelphia 21 June 1813, and Box 236,f.4, B & I to Maybin, 14 September 1813, and Maybin to B & I, 18 September 1813.
92. ASP: Commerce and Navigation, vol.I, pp.998,1018.
93. Guernsey R. *New York City and its Vicinity during the War of 1812-'15 being a Military, Civic and Financial Local History of that Period*. New York, C Woodward, 1889, 2 vols., vol. I, p.383.
94. AC: 13-1,166. House of Representatives, Maritime Defence. June 1813.
95. Seyburt A. op.cit. *Statement of the Gross and Net amount of the Customs contd., 1<sup>st</sup> January to 31<sup>st</sup> December annually*, pp.434-7. Actually, 34.73% and 52.56% respectively.
96. actually 68.38%, 1812 adjusted to \$2,163826.5 and 1813 to \$684,309.
97. Cole A. *Wholesale Commodity Prices in the United States 1700-1861*. Cambridge Mass., Harvard Univ. Press, 1938, Appendix B, Table 45, p.135. All Commodity Index of Wholesale Prices with Variable Group Weights at New York, Monthly 1797-1861.



98. Cole A. op.cit. Appendix B, Table 46, p.136, 30 Basic Commodity Index of Wholesale Prices with Constant Weights at New York, Monthly 1797-1861. The 30 basic commodities included were: beef, butter, coal, codfish, coffee, copper, corn, cotton, hemp, hides, indigo, iron (bar and pig), lard, lead, leather, linseed oil, molasses, pork, salt, cotton sheeting, sugar, tallow, tar, tin, tobacco, turpentine, whale oil, wheat, white lead.
99. Guernsey R. op. cit. vol. I, Appendix Note 1, p.417. The 1 June 1810 Census gave New York city's population as 96,373; inferred by Guernsey as 98,000 for 1812; it had fallen by December 1813, to 92,448.
100. Dudley W. op.cit. vol. II, pp.384-5. Letter from Capt. Robt. Barrie to his mother, Mrs George Clayton, dated HMS *Dragon*, September 14 1813, Chesapeake Bay. Barrie's underlining of 'any trade whatever' seems significant.
101. TNA: ADM 1/505,139-43, cited in Crawford M. op cit. vol. III, p.15; *Naval Chronicle* vol. XXXI, pp.246-9. Since 22% of this list omits tonnage, the total probably approaches 5,000 tons. Several of the prizes are privateers.
102. Dudley W. op.cit. vol. II, pp.85-6. Letter from Master Commandant James Biddle, to Sect. of the Navy Jones, Philadelphia, April 28 1813.
103. JCBL: Brown & Ives corr. Box 236, f.3. John Maybin, Philadelphia, to Thomas Ives of B & I, Providence R.I., 5 May 1813.
104. JCLB: Brown & Ives corr. Box 236, f.3. Ives to Maybin, 16 June 1813. The italics are mine.
105. JCBL: Brown & Ives corr. Box 236, f.4. John Maybin to Thomas Ives, dated Philadelphia, 21 June 1813.
106. Wright C. *Economic History of the United States*. 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. New York. McGraw-Hill. 1949. p.221. Fig.11. 'Index numbers of wholesale prices of domestic and imported commodities in Philadelphia, 1784-1820, 100 = average 1821-25. Based on Bezanson, Gray and Hussey, 'Wholesale Prices in Philadelphia, 1784-1861'. See also graph on frontispiece.
107. Nettels C. op. cit. p.389, Table 9 'Wages of Farm Labor and Prices of Farm Products 1801-1816', citing Bidwell and Falconer 'History of Agriculture in the Northern United States', p.495.
108. Seyburt A. op.cit. pp.434-7.
109. *ibid.*
110. Adams H. *History of the United States during the Administrations of Thomas Jefferson and James Madison*. New York. Charles Scribner's Sons. 1889-96.9 vols. vol. VII, p.264. Adams does not appear to have made any allowance for the change in the rate of custom duties in July 1812. His citation of Pitkin T. for customs revenue is incorrect, the data appears in neither edition of Pitkin, but can be found in Seyburt A. op.cit. pp.434-7.
111. Dewey D. op. cit. p.142.
112. ASP: Finance, vol. II, pp.580-1, 1 December 1812; see also Dewey D. op.cit. p.132. Until now, government stock had been sold only at par, at its face value.
113. AC: 12-2, 32-4,100,198-9, 450-1, 855,1126, 1251-5,1316,1321-2,1334-5.
114. ASP: Commerce and Navigation, vol. I, p.931. Gallatin to Langdon Cheves, 10<sup>th</sup> June 1812, and AC 12-2, 1063, 9 February 1813.

115. AC 12-2, 870, 23 January 1813.
116. LC: Madison Papers, reel 15, Gallatin to Madison, 5 March 1813.
117. AC 12-2; 75, 97, 907-8, 919-20, 1062-5, 1091-1100, 1105-9, 1111-3, 1326-8, 1330-3.
118. ASP: Finance, vol. II. pp.625-6.
119. JCBL: B & I corr. Box 236, f.3. Thomas Ives to John Maybin of Philadelphia dated, Providence, March 19 1813.
120. Walters R. *Albert Gallatin, Jeffersonian Financier and Diplomat*. New York. Macmillan. 1957. p.258, citing Library of Congress, Madison Papers, April 19 1816. After an apparent personal approach by Gallatin, David Parish and Stephen Girard together lent \$7,055,800, and John Jacob Astor \$2,056,000, for 6% stock at 88; "that amount...did much to embarrass" the latter. US Accounts for 1814 show that Parish and Girard between them received \$17,639 50c in commission, Astor \$5,140. at 1/8<sup>th</sup> of 1%. See also ASP: Fin.vol.II, pp.646-7. Report of Sect. of Treasury, 28 July 1813.
121. ASP: Foreign Relations, vol. III, pp.623-7. In return for mediation, which Britain rejected, the Russians sought a commercial treaty with the United States. Despite declaring his intention to leave the Treasury, Gallatin was apparently still attending there on 22 March 1813, to oppose the payment of \$200,000 in prize money to Decatur and his crew for the capture of HMS *Macedonian* on 25 October 1812. De Kay J. *Chronicles of the Macedonian: 1809-1922*. New York, Norton & Company, 1995, pp.100-8.
122. Dangerfield G. *The Era of Good Feelings*. London, Methuen, 1953, p.54, citing Adams H. *Life of Albert Gallatin*. 1879, p.493.
123. ASP: Miscellaneous vol. II, p.206. In ASP: Finance vol. II, p.264, Jones is first described as Acting Secretary of the Treasury on 2 June 1813. See also AC 13-1, 85-6 Executive Proceedings. Gallatin's successors in office were to be either as pre-occupied as Jones, aware of being out of his depth like Campbell, or, like Dallas, very able, but appointed too late to avert financial disaster.
124. ASP: Misc.vol.II, p.240, and Senate Journal 2, 355.
125. Adams H. *The Education of Henry Adams*, originally published 1907; revised, Saveth N. ed. London. New English Library. 1966. p.1. According to Adams, Gallatin's "combination of ability, integrity, knowledge, unselfishness and social fitness...has no equal". *ibid*.
126. AC: 13-1, 499-500. Madison was to call on Congress to enact another embargo on 20 July, and when unsuccessful, was to issue an Executive Order to that effect on 29 July 1813.
127. Hickey D. *op.cit.* p.171. Gallatin had earlier recommended the easing of restrictions on fur trading with Canada, as a favour to John Jacob Astor.
128. ASP: C&N, vol. I, p.931. Gallatin to Langdon Chieves 10 June 1812. Gallatin suggested repeal of Non-Importation Act, increased tonnage duties, and decreased draw-backs as alternatives to internal excise duties and 'direct' taxes, for which however Congress passed legislation in July and August 1813, but not to be implemented before January 1814.
129. NMM: LBK/2, letter from Warren to Melville, HMS *San Domingo*, Bermuda, 9 March 1813.

130. NMM: LBK/2, Confidential letter from Warren to Melville dated HMS *San Domingo*, Lynhaven Bay, 29 March 1813.
131. NMM: LBK/2, Copy of a letter to Warren, dated 24 February 1813, forwarded to Ld. Melville on 5 June 1813. The well-informed letter writer may have been the former British Consul to Boston, Andrew Allen, one of Warren's earlier correspondents, still apparently resident in America despite a threat in 1812 to prosecute him for selling trading licences to Americans, later reduced to an order to leave the country. On 28 June 1813, a British Mr Allen, "an unruly man", was ordered to be removed to Worcester. Listed under 'Dispositions of requests for indulgence by suspected persons' in Scott K, *British Aliens in the United States during the War of 1812*, Baltimore, Genealogical Pub. Co., 1979, p.384. Allen is not reported to have left America until September 4 1813 in Niles' *Weekly Register*, vol. V, p.4.
132. AC:13-1,17.
133. NMM: LBK/2, 24 February 1813.
134. actually 71.85%.
135. actually 48.29%.
136. actually 65.53%.
137. AC:13-1, 46. Senate Proceedings, 9 July 1813.
138. AC:13-1,149-50. Report of Ways and Means Committee, 10 June 1813. Banks could choose either a stamp duty on their notes, or a 1.5% tax on their dividends. The House approved laws for internal excise duties between 24 and 29 July, and those for 'direct' taxes by 2 August 1813.
139. AC:13-1, 2717-73.
140. AC:13-1, 63-4. Senate debate of Jones' Treasury letter of 19 July 1813.
141. *ibid.*
142. ASP: Finance vol. II, p.644.
143. See reference 136 for Chapter 7.
144. LBK/2 Warren to Melville, 26 October 1813. Although almost certainly mistaken in believing that Baring had found large-scale finance for the wartime American government, Warren's fears were not entirely groundless. In 1808, Baring had written *An Inquiry into the Causes and Consequences of the Orders in Council*, and supported Brougham's calls for the repeal of the Orders in the Commons. Baring had certainly helped the Americans borrow more than \$11m for the Louisiana Purchase in 1803, and as a Whig, would not have been admired by Warren. See: Hidy R. *The House of Baring in American Trade and Finance*, New York, Russell & Russell, 1949, re-printed 1970, pp. 33-4, 46.
145. BL: Add Mss 38255, ff.43-4, Liverpool Papers, Warren to Prime Minister Lord Liverpool, 'Private', Halifax Nova Scotia, 16 November 1813.
146. Adams H. ed., *The Writings of Albert Gallatin*, Philadelphia, J.P. Lippincott, 1879, 3 vols., vol.1, pp.551-2, Baring to Gallatin, London 22 July 1813. Gallatin was waiting in St Petersburg for a British reply to the Russian offer of mediation. He later left the Russian capital for London via Amsterdam.
147. *ibid.*
148. *ibid.* No evidence has so far been found that Baring lent the American

- government any money in this war until 1814, as will be seen in Chapter 7, and then only the relatively small amount of \$133,300 to meet the overlooked \$128,000 interest due on the Louisiana Loan Stock held by their Dutch bankers, due on 1 January 1815, together with the American Peace Commissioner's incidental expenses. A letter recalling Warren, having already been written by the Admiralty on 4 November 1813, although not yet received, may partly explain why no Prime Ministerial reply to Warren's letter has yet been found.
149. actually 27.69%, calculated from data of Seyburt A. op.cit. p.93.
  150. North D. op.cit. pp.591-2, Table A-2.
  151. Domestic exports alone had fallen by only 16.7% during 1812-13, compared with 34% between 1811-12. Calculated from Nettels C. *National Economy 1775-1815*, New York, Holt Rinehart & Winston, 1962, vol. II, p.396, Table 17, citing Johnson E. et al., *History of the Domestic and Foreign Commerce of the United States*, Washington, Carnegie Inst., 1915, vol. II, p.20, which cites Seyburt A. op. cit. p.93.
  152. Crouzet F. 'America and the Crisis of the British Imperial Economy 1803-7' p.283, in McCusker J. and Morgan K. *The Early Modern Atlantic Economy*, Cambridge Univ. Press, 2000, pp. 278-315.
  153. Seyburt A. op.cit.p.93.
  154. ASP: Commerce & Navigation, vol. I p.992. For the year ending 30 September 1813, American grain and flour worth \$15.5m was exported to the Peninsula alone.
  155. AC:13-1, 499-500. Madison to Congress, 20 July 1813.
  156. Dudley W. op.cit. vol II. p.272. Undated report to Warren from Capt. Hayes, HMS *Majestic*, enclosed with letter dated 25 October 1813. Water, firewood, fish, fruit and vegetables supplied "on reasonable terms". See also Hickey D. op.cit. p.171. "some sixty [American] vessels were reportedly engaged in this traffic in Long Island Sound alone".
  157. AC:13-2, 554-5, 2053, 2781-8;
  158. Dudley W. op.cit. vol.II, p.244. Letter to Sect. of Navy Jones from District Attorney's Office, Newport, Rhode Island, 14 September 1813; and Mahan A. op.cit. vol.II, p.197.
  159. Hickey D. op.cit. pp.167-71; and Dudley W. op.cit. p.272, Undated report to Warren from Capt. J Haynes, of HMS *Majestic* enclosed in his letter dated 25 October 1813, "I have given a note to several Owners of Schooners going for a Cargo stating the assistance afforded the *Majestic* and recommending their being permitted to pass -".
  160. Adams H. *History of the United States during the Administration of James Madison*. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1889-96. vol.VII. pp. 262-4.
  161. *Columbian Centinal*. Boston, 7 September 1813.
  162. *ibid.* 25 September 1813.
  163. *ibid.* 18 December 1813.
  164. AC:13-1, 48-9.
  165. Niles H. ed., op.cit. 'Prices Current'. vol.V, p.41, 18 September 1813.
  166. Adams H. op.cit. vol.VII. p.263.
  167. Mahan A. op.cit. vol.II, p.179
  168. *ibid.*
  169. actually 44.74%.

170. *ibid.*
171. ASP: IV, C&N vol.I.p.969. Sheldon presumably included Madison's second embargo, imposed by Executive Order on 29 July, banning American exports, ratified by Congress only five days earlier, on 17 December 1813, suspended on 30 March, and repealed on 14 April 1814.
172. Brannan J. ed. *Official Letters of the Military and Naval Officers of the United States during the War with Great Britain in the Years 1812, 13,14, & 15.* Washington City. 1823. p.287. Cmdr Stephen Decatur to Wm. Jones, Sect. of the Navy, 20 December 1813.
173. Dudley W. *op.cit.*, vol.II, p.710-11, citing ADM2/1380, pp.370-5, Admiralty to Capt. J. Hillyar, 12 March 1813.
174. Dudley W. *op.cit.*, vol.II, pp. 155-7, Astor to Secretary of the Navy Jones, New York, 17 June 1813; and Jones to Astor, Navy Dept. 22 June 1813. Astor had first written to Jones on 6 June 1813, but Jones' reply was probably delayed by Madison's illness.
175. Dudley W. *op.cit.*, vol. II, p.711, Rear-Admiral Manley Dixon to Croker, dated HM Ship *Montagu*, rio de Janeiro, 21 June 1813.
176. Latimer J. *1812: War with America*, Cambridge, Mass., Belknap Press of Harvard Univ., 2007, p.240. North West's partner was Donald McTavish.
177. Dudley W. *op.cit.* vol.II, p.714, citing ADM1/21, p.464.
178. *Boston Looks Seaward*, US Works Progress Administration, Boston, 1941, reprinted, London, MacDonald and Jane's, 1974. p.89.
179. Calculated from data in Mahan A. *op.cit.* vol.II. p.181. From \$5,944,121 in 1811, New England's re-exports had fallen to \$302,781 by 1813.
180. Mahan A. *op.cit.* vol.II. p.182, citing *The Columbian Centinel*, for 7 September and 15 December 1813.
181. Mahan A. *op.cit.* vol.II. p.181, citing Niles' *Register*, vol.V, p.311.
182. TNA: ADM 1/506, pp.40-1, Cochrane to Croker, 25 April 1814.
183. Guttridge A. 'Prize Agency 1800-1815 with special reference to the career and work of George Redmond Hulbert', unpublished M Phil dissertation, University of Portsmouth, 1989, pp.78 and 137, and in personal correspondence. Warren seems to have gained about £97,500. See also: Hill R., *The Prizes of War – The Naval Prize System in the Napoleonic Wars 1793-1815*, Stroud, Sutton Pub/ Royal Naval Museum, 1998, pp.151, and 207, citing Guttridge while comparing Warren's earning to those of others. Hill estimated £100,000 in 1815, to be equivalent to approximately £20m in 1998.
184. Guttridge A. *op.cit.*, pp.86-7, citing Portsmouth City Record Office, 626A1/1/3/21, Hulbert to his brother John, 11 November 1813, and p.161.
185. JCBL: Brown & Ives correspondence, Box 236, f.3, John Maybin to Thomas Ives, Providence RI, dated Philadelphia, 21 June 1813.

## Chapter 7: References.

1. Adams H. Agar H (ed.) *The History of the United States during the Administrations of Jefferson and Madison: The Formative Years*. London, Collins, 1948. 2 vols. vol. II, p.860, Mrs D Madison to Mrs H Gallatin, Washington, 7 January 1814.
2. AC:13-1, 149.
3. AC:13-1, 63-4.
4. AC: 13-2, 1453.
5. Dewey D. *Financial History of the United States*, first published 1903. 12<sup>th</sup> ed. New York, A. Kelly, 1934, reprinted 1968, pp.111,124,141.
6. Dewey D. op.cit. p.125, and AC: 13-2,1453.
7. *ibid.*
8. AC:13-2, 1451.
9. *ibid.*
10. AC:13-2, 1451-2.
11. AC:13-2, 1452.
18. Hickey D. *The War of 1812 – A Forgotten Conflict*. Urbana, Univ. of Illinois Press, 1989. p.160, citing Klein. *Memoirs of John Roberts*. p.366. This opinion, of Campbell, voiced by Republican Jonathan Roberts of Pennsylvania, seems widely held.
19. *ibid*, p.165, citing ASP: Finance II, pp.651-3. Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, 8 January 1814.
14. *ibid*, p.166, citing AC:13-2,1374, 14 February 1814.
15. AC:13-2, p1689, House of Representatives, Loan Bill, 25 February 1814, John Calhoun.
16. Hickey D. op.cit. p.166, quoting *The National Intelligencer*, Washington, 12 March 1814.
17. Crawford M. (ed.) *The War of 1812: A Documentary History*. Washington Naval Historical Center, 2002, vol. III. p.7. Secretary of the Navy, Wm. Jones to Capt.Gordon, USS *Constellation*, Washington, 5 January 1814.
20. Dudley W. (ed.) *The War of 1812: A Documentary History*. vol. II, pp.294-5. Jones to G. Parker, o/c USS *Siren*, Navy Dept. 8 Dec 1813. Jones was also concerned that allocating prize crews would dangerously deplete American manning levels.
19. Crawford M. op.cit. pp. 412, 515.
20. Russell J. *The history of the war between the United States and Great-Britain To which is added... a list of vessels taken from Great-Britain during the war*. 2<sup>nd</sup> ed, Hartford, Connecticut, B.& J. Russell, 1815. pp. 377- 402.
21. Horsman R. *The War of 1812*. New York, A. Knopf. 1969. p.142.
22. Russell J. op.cit. ‘List of Vessels taken from Great Britain...’, in *the history of the war...* pp.401-2. Captures 1520-1, and 1581-2. On these occasions, the *Constitution* appears to have taken two brigs, one burnt and the other successfully sent into New York. The *President* appears to have succeeded in sending a brig and a schooner into French ports.
23. Mahan A. vol. II, p.232, citing Niles VI, pp.69-71.
24. Kert F. *Prize and Prejudice: Privateering and Naval Prize in Atlantic*

- Canada in the War of 1812*. St John's, Newfoundland. Research in Maritime History No.11, International Maritime Economic History Ass., 1997. Calculated from data in Appendix 1 'Prize Cases Appearing in the Vice-Admiralty Court of Halifax from June 1812 to May 1815.' pp.159-203. For Halifax alone, when re-captures by British and Canadian privateers are included, the recovery rate falls to 18.8%. For figures supplied by Lloyd's to the House of Commons, see Kert F., 'The Fortunes of War: Commercial Warfare and Maritime Risk in the War of 1812' in *Northern Mariner* VIII, No.4, October 1998, pp.1-16, p.2. The recovery rate is actually 31.74%.
25. Hickey D. op.cit. p.124, citing National. Archives, Washington, M149, reel 11. Similar orders for the army from the Secretary of War were published in Niles H.op. cit. vol. IV, p.386.
  26. JCBL: Boston commodity prices at auction are taken from the Brown & Ives correspondence, Box 160 folios 9 and 10 onwards; sugar fell from 31cents per lb on 5 August 1813, to 18 cents per lb on 29 January 1814, actually, 41.94%.
  27. AC:13-2, 2781-88.
  28. JCBL: Brown & Ives corr., Box 160, f.9, from Charles Greene, Brown & Ives Boston agent, to B & I, Providence, R.I., 23 December 1813.
  29. JCBL: B & I corr. Box 160, f.10, Charles Greene, Boston to B & I, Providence, 29 January 1814.
  30. JCBL: B & I corr., from Box 160, ff. 9 and 10 onwards. See Appendix B, Tables 10-13. Coffee fell 30.3%, from a maximum 33 cents per lb on 23 December 1813, six days after Congressional ratification, to 23 cents per lb on 27 January 1814. Molasses fell 11.6% from \$1.47on 23 December 1813, to \$1.30 on 29 January 1814.
  31. BL: C *The National Intelligencer*. Washington. 1 April 1814, (A204) Despite his having complained to Madison on 24 July 1813 that being Secretary of both Treasury and Navy was "absolutely impracticable", Jones had only "declared his seat at the Treasury vacant" on 9 February 1814 and been replaced as Secretary of the Treasury by George Campbell on that day, although remaining Sect. of the Navy until December 1814.
  32. NYHS: *The American & Commercial Daily Advertiser – Extra*, for 31 March 1814 reported that Madison's decision "was yesterday transmitted to both Houses of Congress". AC: 13-2, 1986-2001, see also *Journal of the House*. p.410, for Thurs. April 14 1814.
  33. JCBL: Brown & Ives corr., Box 160, folio 10. Letters from Charles Greene, January 29 and March 12 1814. "Your letter for London will be forwarded in a day or two by a private opportunity, & I shall frequently be enabled to send your letters without inspection." The earlier letter confirms the sending of a letter via Lisbon in the Swedish brig *Hadjen*.
  34. *ibid*, Tho Ives of Providence to Charles Greene, Boston, 25 April 1814.
  35. JCBL: B & I corr., Box 160, f.10, p.671, Charles Greene of Boston, to Thomas Ives in Providence, Rhode Island. American 'short' hundredweights were of 100lbs, unlike British cwt's of 112lbs.
  36. Calculated from 'current prices' in B & I correspondence, and actually 30.96%
  37. See Appendix B Tables 7-13, up to and including Boston sale of 16 May 1814.

38. JCBL: B & I corr., Charles Greene to Thomas Ives, dated Boston, 15 March 1814.
39. TNA: ADM 1/506, pp.40-4, 25 April 1814.
40. JCBL: B & I corr., Box 160, letter 6, Ives to Greene, Providence 4 May 1814.
41. actually 45.16%.
42. JCBL: B & I corr. Box 160, letter 7, Greene to Ives, Boston, 5 May 1814. Always more expensive than other sugars, from an average \$16.12 on 5 May 1814, Havannah brown sugar rose to \$23.00 on 29 September 1814, a rise of 42.68%. Average Boston coffee prices were briefly higher under Embargo than blockade, but had fallen so far on the Embargo's suspension that the proportional increase is then greater under the British blockade.
43. Hickey D. op.cit. pp.170-1, citing Nat. Archives Washington. 'Letters Received by Sect. of War', (M222 r.10), 'Marcellus' to Armstrong, 'early 1814'.
44. Whitehill W. *The Journal of Lieutenant Henry Napier in HMS Nympe - New England Blockaded - 1814*. Salem. Peabody Museum. 1939. pp. 22, 31 for June and July 1814. NMM: 355.49.
45. JCBL: B & I corr., Box 160, letter 14, f.11. Thomas Ives to Charles Greene, Boston, 24 May 1814. Ives actually meant Capt. David Milne of HMS *Bulwark*.
46. *ibid.* Charles Greene, Boston to B & I, Providence, letter 15, 26 May 1814. It seems probable that a cargo of cotton from Amelia Island would be taken directly to Liverpool for the Lancashire mills, rather than to Gothenburg for possible re-export.
47. *ibid.* Charles Greene Boston, to B & I Providence, 18 July 1814. While the privateer *Shannon* took the sloop *John*, sailing in ballast from Salem to Wells, Mass., on 18 May 1814, all of the *Bulwark's* captures for this period carried cargoes, it is therefore reasonable to assume that the *Nicholas Paulowitch* was not in fact, in ballast. By August 1814, the British blockading squadrons were routinely taking prizes in ballast, including the *Anita* and *Fermina* from Boston to Havana and Amelia Island respectively. see Kert F. op.cit. p.189- 94, 200.
48. *London Gazette* 31 May 1814, reprinted in *Naval Chronicle*, vol. XXXI, p.475.
49. Niles H. *Weekly Register*, vol. VI, p.182-3, Baltimore, 14 May 1814.
50. *ibid.* p.317, 9 July 1814.
51. JCBL: B & I corr., Box 160, letter 18, f.11. Charles Greene, Boston to B & I, Providence, 20 July 1814.
52. Kert F. op.cit. Appendix 1, pp.189-203. The foreign ports included Amsterdam, Bahia, Demarera, Haiti, Halifax NS, Havana, Lisbon, San Domingo, San Salvador, and St Iago de Cuba. Cargoes included, coffee, hides, meats, metals, molasses, sugar and textiles.
53. Hume E. ed. 'Letters Written During the War of 1812 by the British Commander in American Waters - Admiral Sir David Milne.' *William & Mary Quarterly Historical Magazine*, vol. X, 2<sup>nd</sup> Series. October 1930. p.293. Capt. David Milne to George Hume, HM Ship *Bulwark*, 30 May 1814. The article's title is disingenuous since Milne was neither knighted nor C in C during the war. He was appointed C in C North America in



- May 1816, and knighted in September 1816 for services off Algeria.
54. Warren G. and Pearson F. *Wholesale Prices for 213 Years, 1720 to 1932, Part 1, Wholesale Prices in the United States for 135 Years from 1797 to 1932*. Ithica, New York, Cornell Univ., Agricultural Experimental Station, 1932. p.8. Table 2. 'Index Numbers of the Wholesale Prices of All Commodities with Variable Group Weights 1720 to 1932. Monthly, 1800-1820. (1910=100)'
  55. Niles H. op.cit. vol.V, pp.228-9, Baltimore, 4 December 1813.
  56. North D. 'United States Balance of Payments 1790-1860. Trends in the American Economy in the Nineteenth Century. National Bureau of Economic Research Conference on Research into Income and Wealth. vol. 24. New York, Princeton Univ. Press, 1960, re-printed New York, Arno Press, 1975. pp.591-2, Table A-2, Appendix A. Calculated from this data, the figure is actually 71.85%.
  57. *ibid*, actually 41.53%.
  58. *ibid*, actually 83.54%.
  59. Seyburt A. *Statistical Annals*. Philadelphia, T. Dobson, 1818, part of 'A Statement Exhibiting the gross and net amount of ad valorem and specific duties on Goods Wares and Merchandise imported into the United States from 1<sup>st</sup> January 1794 to 31<sup>st</sup> December 1814', p.454. The decrease in net customs revenue adjusted for the doubling of rate from 1 July 1812, calculated from this data is actually 65.53%. For a summary of the method of adjustment, see end notes 29 and 30 for Chapter 6.
  60. actually 31.90%.
  61. actually 76.53%
  62. Arthur B. *The Role of Blockade in the Anglo-American Naval War of 1812-14*, unpublished MA dissertation, Greenwich Maritime Institute, University of Greenwich, 2002, p.52.
  63. Ratner S. *American Taxation* cited by Nettels C. *The Emergence of a National Economy 1775-1815 - The Economic History of the United States*, vol. II, New York, Harper & Row, 1969, for Gallatin's surplus. Revenue decrease calculated from data actually 54.39%.
  64. Madison's first 90-Day Embargo, between 4 April - 3 July 1812, and second Embargo, of 260 days, from 29 July 1813 to repeal on 14 April 1814, together comprise a total of 350 days of American embargo, of which only 275 were in force during wartime after 18 June 1812, concurrently with British maritime commercial blockades, i.e. 27.75% of 991 days of war, significantly less than one third.
  65. Seyburt. A. op.cit. pp.301, 381.
  66. *ibid*. p.93; decrease actually 75.13%.
  67. Kert F. op.cit. extracted from Appendix 1, pp.157-201.
  68. Pitkin T. *A Statistical View of the United States of America*, 1<sup>st</sup> ed., Hartford, 1816, BL: 1391g 6., and 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. New Haven Conn., Durrie and Peck, 1835. BL:1137 k 22. Inclusion of exports of the last 3 months of 1814, and continuation until 31 December 1815 may account for Congressman Pitkin's exaggerated figure for the American post war recovery of exports in 1815.
  69. Hickey D. op.cit. p.117.
  70. Galpin W. 'The American Grain Trade to the Spanish Peninsula 1810-14', *American Historical Review*. vol. XXVIII, pp. 24-44. Early in 1812.

Augustus Foster, British Minister in Washington, had been given over £304,000, then worth \$1,337,600, to spend on American corn and flour for Wellington's Peninsular Army.

71. Niles H. op.cit. vol. IV, p.168. May 8 1813 "It is said that 300,000 barrels of flour remain unsold at Cadiz March 23<sup>rd</sup>," also p.280 "At Cadiz 7<sup>th</sup> May, afloat & in store 160,000 bls of American flour, 20,000 tierces of rice &c". Once the market had been flooded, Congress' License Act, at the third attempt on 29 July 1813, prohibited the use of British licences for export to the Peninsula, previous Bills having been blocked by the 'agriculturalists'. See House Journal, 16-29 July 1813.
72. Pitkin T. op. cit. 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. 1835. pp.119-20. 'American exports of flour in barrels to Spain and Portugal', combined. If Pitkin's figure for 1813 is accepted, a decrease of 99.55% is found. Since prices there began to fall in March 1813, his total for sales of American flour to the Peninsula may have been exaggerated to minimise the apparent impact of the British commercial blockade. The *Providence Gazette* for 29 June 1813, notes a "decided decrease from the previous year" in American vessels at Lisbon in "the first half of 1813". Galpin W. op.cit. p.44, note 81.
73. Nettels C. *The Emergence of a National Economy 1775-1815*. New York, Harper & Row, 1969, p.393, Table 13, citing Bidwell and Falconer *History of Agriculture in the United States*. p.493, actually 85.41%; and Pitkin T. op.cit. 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. p.102, actually 90.75%
74. Nettels C. op.cit. Table 13, p.393.
75. actually 94.91%.
76. calculated from data in Warden D. op.cit. p.309.
77. calculated from data in Seyburt A op.cit. p.149, actually 93.57%.
78. actually 68.1%.
79. actually 40.6%
80. North D. op.cit. pp.591-2 for imports, and Seyburt A. op.cit. p.93 for exports, combined as Appendix 7, Table 7.8.
81. actually 57.4%
82. actually 60.2%
83. actually 83.04%
84. Gardiner R. *The Naval War of 1812*. London, Caxton Editions /NMM, 2001. p.76.
85. *ibid.* p.28.
86. Toll I. *Six Frigates*. London, Michael Joseph/Penguin, 2006. pp.271-2, citing Tucker and Reuter, *Injured Honor*, pp.62-66.
87. Pitkin T. op.cit. p.363.
88. *ibid.* actually 29.55%.
89. *ibid.* actually 64.47%.
90. Hickey D. op.cit. pp.169-71.
91. actually 74.47%.
92. Pitkin T. op.cit. 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. p.387-91. Coastal vessels under 20 tons, 'licensed' separately before 1811, were then included in 'enrolled and licensed tonnage.'
93. ASP: Class IV, Commerce and Navigation. Washington, Gales and Seaton, 1832. vol. I, p.1017, and vol.II, 1834, p.12; calculated as 37.4% of 674,853 registered tonnage.
94. Mahan A. op.cit. vol.II. p.205.

95. calculated from data in ASP as 8.7% of 674,632 registered tons.
96. ASP: Class IV, vol. I. p.1017; actually 39.3%.
97. *ibid*; actually 53.6% and 41.7% respectively.
98. ASP: Class IV, C & N, vol.II. p.12, 354. and Mahan A. *op.cit.* vol.II. p.205.
99. Marvin W. 'Tonnage in Whaling Fisheries' in *Registered & Enrolled Tonnage, 1800-1901*. U.S. Bureau of Navigation, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1902, p.172. The actual decrease is 80.9%.
100. Kert F. *op.cit.* Calculated from Kert's figures, augmented by reference to other contemporary sources, these average sizes differ from those found by Albion and Pope using the prize totals of *American Vessels Captured by the British during the Revolution and War of 1812: The Record of the Vice Admiralty Court at Halifax N.S.* Essex/Peabody Institute, 1911.
101. Wright C. *Economic History of the United States*. 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. New York. McGraw-Hill. 1949. pp. 314-5. Among such alternative investments was Francis Lowell's initially water-powered cotton carding, spinning and weaving mill at Waltham, Massachusetts, opened in 1814, the first integrated textile mass-production in America. The 'Waltham Plan' was to be widely imitated in New England and elsewhere.
102. Kert F. *op.cit.*, calculated from augmented Halifax Vice Adm. Court records. In addition to that of Halifax N.S., Vice Adm. Courts were also operated in St George's Bermuda, Nassau in the Bahamas, Port Royal Jamaica and in Antigua, for all of which complete records appear to be unavailable. The Bahamian *Royal Gazette* for 14 January and 17 March 1814 asserts that 246 vessels, not all American, had been condemned during the war so far.
103. Dewey D. *op.cit.* p.142; and Bristed J., *The Resources of the United States of America...*, New York, James Eastburn & Co, 1818, p.77. Bristed explains that "the amount is secured to government by bonds payable at different periods according to the term of credit given to the importer", often a year, and that therefore Seyburt's accrued net customs revenue for each year became the government's cash-flow revenue for the following year, successively between 1811 and 1815. Dewey's customs revenue figure for 1812 slightly exceeds Seyburt's net customs revenue for 1811, probably because of costs and late payments. Seyburt's net customs revenue, accrued in 1812, becomes Dewey's government income for 1813, a pattern followed by net customs revenues for 1813 and 1814. The apparent discrepancy for 1814-15 could be explained by a later end to the government's income accounting year.
104. Bristed J., *op.cit.* p.82, using figures from the Ways & Means Committee Report dated 9 December 1817. Using Bristed's figures, the cost is actually 8.46% of net receipts in 1814, and 5.94% in 1815. Dewey calculated the cost as between 4.8% and 7.8% of *gross* receipts. For comparison, collection costs of customs duties in 1812 are calculated as 3.62% of net receipts and 3.49% of gross receipts.
105. Total US tax revenue as a proportion of expenditure is actually; 1812, 43.84%, 1813, 41.77%, 1814, 28.24%, 1815, 42.86%
106. Federalist Congressman Timothy Pitkin appears to have sought to demonstrate the damage of both embargoes and the war to his

- constituent's interests, by emphasising the post-war recovery of American overseas trade, particularly exports, and to have included trade figures up to 31 December for 1815, when previous accounting years ended on 30 September.
107. North D. op.cit. pp.591-2, and Seyburt A. op.cit. p.93.
  108. Nettels C. op.cit. p.334, citing Johnson vol.II, p.20. By 1815, New England's specie holdings had been reduced to \$3,915,000.
  109. Niles H. op.cit. vol.7, p.195.
  110. JCBL: B & I corr., Box 160, folio 10, Charles Greene of Boston to Brown & Ives Providence R.I. 12 March 1814.
  111. Jones P. *An Economic History of the United States*. London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1956, reprinted 1969. pp.36-7. Lowell's textile mill at Waltham, Mass., was financed by the new Boston Manufacturing Company, with an initial paid-up capital of \$300,000, to be doubled within a decade. Many of the financial surpluses described in Greene's letter seem likely to have been contributed.
  112. JCBL: B & I corr., Box 160, folio 10, Charles Greene of Boston, to Brown & Ives, Providence R.I., 12 March 1814.
  113. *ibid.*
  114. AC: 13-2, 2012-3.
  115. JCBL: B & I corr., Box 160, folio 10, Charles Greene of Boston to Brown & Ives, Providence R.I., 12 March 1814. 5% would yield £750.00 net p.a., then worth about \$3,300. This correspondence appears to refute the claim that references to a drain of American specie, "lack provenance or even logical support, quite probably because no such drain of specie existed." See Dudley, Wade. *Without Some Risk: A Reassessment of the British Blockade of the United States, 1812 -1815*. Ph D dissertation, Tuscaloosa, Univ. of Alabama, 1999, p.240.
  116. AC: 13-2, 1526; 1534-6. John Jackson was Madison's step-son in law.
  117. JCBL: B & I corr., Box 161, folio 1, Charles Greene, Boston, to Brown & Ives, Providence R.I., 3 August 1814.
  118. Hickey D. op.cit. p.224. See note 40, p.409.
  119. Crawford M. op cit. p.786-7; p.321, *Columbia*, 53 guns, was ready for launch, *Argus* had received its crew in June. Net costs after reclamation operations, citing Commodore Tingey to Secretary of the Navy Jones, 9 Nov. 1814. Nat. Archives Washington, (M125/40)
  120. Niles H. op.cit. vol.VII, Supplement, p.176. 'Proclamation to the Public, Philadelphia, August 31 1814', signed by the Presidents of the Pennsylvania, North America, Philadelphia, Farmer's and Mechanic's, Commercial, and Merchant's banks.
  121. TNA: ADM 1/507, pp. 160-8. Capt. James Gordon's squadron escaped downriver.
  122. JCBL: B & I corr., Box 161, folio 2, Charles Greene to Brown & Ives, Boston, 6 September, and 12 September 1814.
  123. AC: 13-3, 1, and Appendix, 'State of the Finances' 1486-7. G Campbell, Treasury Department, September 23 1814.
  124. JCBL: B & I corr., Box 236, f.6. T. P. Ives of Providence to J. Maybin of Philadelphia, 5 October 1814.
  125. JCBL: B & I corr., Box 236, f.6. J. Maybin to T. Ives, 12 October 1814.
  126. Nettels C. op.cit. pp.333, and 338.

127. Gallatin A. *The Writings of Albert Gallatin*, Adams H. ed., 3 vols. Philadelphia, J. P. Lippincott & Co., 1879, vol. III, p.283, 285-6; and Campbell G. AC:13-3, 1486-7, 23 September 1814.
128. ASP: Finance vol. II, p.878
129. Seyburt A. op.cit. p.749; and Niles H. op.cit. vol. VII, Supplement, p. 176
130. JCBL: OS/04577. *An Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of the United States for the Year 1813...* Washington, A & G Way Printers, November 1814.
131. The government accounts total the nominal value of stock issued at \$18,109,377, possibly net of commission.
132. ASP: Finance II, pp.644, 661-2.
133. JCBL: B & I corr., Box 236, f.6. John Maybin to B & I in Providence RI, dated Philadelphia, 26 April 1814. Maybin previously mentions a shipowner's failure, and "losses made on sugar, and no sales in Tea."
134. JCBL: B & I corr., Box 236, f.6. Thomas Ives to John Maybin, dated Providence R.I. 4 May 1814.
135. AC: 13-3 Appendix. 'State of the Finances', p.1493; Jones to Madison, dated Navy Department, 6 May 1814, Crawford M. op. cit. p.462; and Gilchrist D. (ed.) *The Growth of the Seaport Cities, 1790 -1825*. Charlottesville, Univ. of Virginia Press, 1967, pp. 106-7. Jacob Barker's New York Exchange Bank was to fail in 1819, his petitions for loan commissions at a quarter of 1%, continued until 1821; see also, ASP: Claims, p. 828, 21 December 1821.
136. JCBL: *An account of the Receipts & Expenditures of the United States for the Year 1814...* Washington, A & G Way, Printers, 27-28 November 1815. These accounts also show that the February 1813 issue of \$5m of Treasury notes brought in only \$1,070,000; and of the \$7.5m Loan sought on 2 August 1813, only \$3,907,335 had been received by 1815, no mention being made of the still outstanding balance. This contradicts earlier and subsequent claims that the \$7.5m loan was met, although at a discount. See also: ASP: Finance vol. II, p.845. Of the first \$10m of the \$25m sought in March 1814, the Treasury only ever received \$7,935,581. By November 1815, loan subscriptions may have been recorded in specie values only, excluding discounted paper money, although this is not specified.
137. Crawford M. op.cit. p.462, Sect. of Navy Jones to Madison, dated Navy Dept. May 6 1814. Jones had also been Secretary of the Treasury until 9 February 1814.
138. Guernsey R. *New York City & Vicinity during the War of 1812-15, being a Military, Civic & Financial Local History of that Period*, New York, Charles Woodward, 1889-95, 2 vols, vol. II, p.270, Jacob Barker to General John Armstrong, Sect. of War, 17 May 1814.
139. Brant I. *James Madison, Commander in Chief 1812-36*, New York, Bobbs- Merrill, 1961, 6 vols., vol.6, p.259, Madison to Campbell, 25 May 1814.
140. JCBL: *Receipts & Expenditures of the United States for the Year 1814*. Washington, A & G Way, 1815. Of \$6m, subscribers actually offered only \$3,452,300 and paid only \$2,520,300. For the \$6m call, see also: AC: 13-3, 1484-6.

141. Dewey D. op.cit. p.134.
142. ASP: Finance vol.II. pp. 845-7.
143. JCBL: *Receipts & Expenditures of the United States for the Year 1814*. Washington, A & G Way, 1815. The 4 March issue of \$10m of Treasury notes actually brought in only \$7,227,280.
144. NLS. Alex. F.I. Cochrane Papers: MS 2333, f.54-9. Rear- Adm. Cockburn to Vice-Adm. Cochrane, dated *Albion* in Tangier Bay, Chesapeake, 9 May 1814.
145. Brant I. op.cit., p.268, quoting Louis Serurier, French Minister at Washington, to Leforest, 27 June 1814.
146. LC: James Madison Papers online. 'James Madison to Cabinet, June 23, 1814. Includes note from June 27, 1814.' p.94.
147. LC: Madison Papers online. 'James Madison to Cabinet, June 23, 1814. Includes note from June 27, 1814.' pp. 94-5, 141. See also: Hunt G. ed. *The Writings of James Madison*. New York, Putnam's Sons, 1908, vol. 8, p.281.
148. LC: Madison Papers online. 'James Madison to Cabinet, June 23, 1814. Includes note from June 27, 1814.' pp. 94-5; 141 of 1911. On 23 June, the Cabinet was also asked "Shall a treaty be authorised comprising an article referring the subject of impressment along with that of commerce to a separate negotiation?" "Monroe, Campbell, Armstrong & Jones aye - Rush for awaiting further information from Europe." Monroe wrote to the U.S. PC's on 25 June 1814 with this proposal, to be superceded by that of 27 June. See JHL: Jonathan Russell Corr: Sect of State Monroe to PC's. Richard Rush was the newly appointed Attorney General.
149. JHL: Jonathan Russell Corr; Secretary of State Monroe to Peace Commissioner Jonathan Russell, Washington, 27 June 1814, annotated as received 10 August 1814; also ASP: Foreign Relations vol. III, p.704. Letter from Sect.of State Monroe to American Peace Commissioners, 27 June 1814.
150. NLS: MS 2333 f.54, Cochrane Papers, Letter No 3, from Rear-Adm. Cockburn to Vice-Adm. Cochrane dated Tangier Bay, Chesapeake, 9 May 1814.
151. Hunt G. ed. op. cit. pp.244-7, 'Madison's Message to a Special Session of Congress, Washington, 25 May 1813.'
152. Hunt G. ed. op. cit. p.278. Letter from Madison to Campbell, 'Private, Montpelier, 25 May 1814.' Campbell had succeeded Jones as Secretary of the Treasury on 9 February 1814.
153. NYHS: Gallatin Papers, reel 9, letter 115, p.1.Campbell to Wilhelm and Jan Willink of Amsterdam, dated August 1, 1814. This letter does not specify the amount sought, but authorises Gallatin, Adams and Crawford, "ministers of the United States in Europe or either of them" to "negociate" a loan, for which 6% stock worth \$6m "has been constituted", and made out to the Willinks. Crawford claimed, in a post-script to his letter to Gallatin in Ghent, dated Paris, 26 September 1814, that he had checked the stock, and found it "substantially correct", but by 16 November, Gallatin complained that only \$3m worth of US stock had reached Europe, and no funds to pay either the interest on Louisiana stock, due on January 1, or 'diplomatic advances' on which to live. Both of the last two difficulties were later resolved by the

- British banker Alexander Baring, via the Willinks. See also NYHS: GP, letters 161/1-2, 168/4, and 175/1.
154. AC:13-3,1.
  155. Bioren J., Duane W., and Weightman R. *Laws of the United States of America, from 4<sup>th</sup> March 1789 to 4<sup>th</sup> March 1815*. 5 vols., Philadelphia and Washington City, 1816, vol IV, p.761.
  156. AC: 13-3, 14. Madison's Presidential Message to Congress, 20 September 1814.
  157. Hickey D. op.cit. p.222, Jones to Dallas, 15 September 1814.
  158. AC: 13-3, 1479. Appendix, 'State of the Finances', September 23 1814.
  159. AC: 13-3, 14.
  160. AC: 13-3, 1482-6.
  161. AC: 13-3, 1486; and ASP: Finance vol.II, p.842.
  162. AC: 13-3, 1488.
  163. AC: 13-3, 1487.
  164. NYHS: GP, reel 9,141/1, Gallatin to W. and J. Willink, dated Ghent, 3 October 1814.
  165. NYHS: GP, reel 9,144/1, Crawford, dated Paris, 6 October 1814, to Gallatin in Ghent; and 144/3, referring to a comment, presumably made in either Paris or Vienna, by 'the Prince of Benerent'? The name is practically indecipherable.
  166. NYHS: GP, reel 9,146/1, Wilhelm Willink and Nicholas van Staphorst, dated 'Amsterdam 11 October 1814' to Gallatin and Adams in Ghent. Some, e.g. Walters R. *Albert Gallatin*. London & New York. 1957, cite this letter as dated 14 October 1814. In comparison with the 5% interest rate charged on loans to Russia and Prussia, 4% to Denmark and 2.5% on 25m guilders for the Dutch government, the 6% offered by the US was high, especially in view of Russia's failure to pay either interest or principal since 1812. See GP146/3.
  167. NYHS: GP, reel 9, 146/3. Since Gallatin's original approach, Britain had signed a peace treaty with Holland on 13 August 1814, which may well have affected Dutch willingness to lend any money to the United States while it was at war with Britain. For date of treaty see: Crawley C. ed., *The New Cambridge Modern History, IX,. War & Peace in an Age of Upheaval 1793- 1830*. Cambridge Univ. Press, 1965, reprinted 1974. pp. 672n.
  168. NYHS:GP, reel 9, 152/1, Crawford, dated Paris 25 October 1814, to Gallatin and Adams in Ghent. The letter is partially decoded, other parts respond to scrutiny.
  169. NYHS: GP, reel.9, 153, Gallatin and Adams, dated Ghent 26 October 1814, to Campbell, Secretary of the Treasury, Washington.
  170. NYHS: GP, reel 9, 154/1-3, Gallatin, dated Ghent, 26 October 1814, to Campbell, Secretary of the Treasury, Washington.
  171. NYHS: Gallatin Papers II, Letterbook II, pp.215-9, p.218, Gallatin, dated Ghent, 26 October 1814, to Monroe, Sect. of State.
  172. Stagg J. *Mr Madison's War: Politics, Diplomacy, and Warfare in the Early American Republic 1783-1830*. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1983. p.432, citing Campbell to Madison, September 28 1814, LC: Madison Papers.
  173. ASP: Finance vol. II, p.868.

174. JCBL: B & I corr., Box 161, f.3, Greene to Ives, dated Boston, 29 October 1814. On 16 October 1814, Jones had written to Madison, "Seamen unpaid & not a dollar to move them." See Brandt I. op.cit. vol.6, p.345.
175. ASP: Finance vol. II, p.866.
176. Technically, insolvency rather than bankruptcy, which applies only to individuals actually declared so. For political reasons, domestic and international, few administrations would actually admit to being unable to pay their creditors, preferring an apparently short-term explanation such as Dallas's alleged shortage of available specie.
177. Niles H. op.cit. vol. VII, p.270. 24 December 1814.
178. ASP: Finance, vol. II, p.872, Dallas to Lowndes, 27 November 1814.
179. NYHS: GP, reel 9, 168/4 and 175/1, Baring to Gallatin, dated London, 29 November 1814 ; and Gallatin to W.& J. Willink, and N, J, & R van Staphorst, dated Ghent, 9 December 1814. Baring provided, via the Willinks, 300,000 guilders, then about £30,000 or \$132,000 for the Louisiana loan stock interest, and another 100,000 guilders, then about £10,000 or \$44,000 for 'diplomatic advances' for the envoy's living costs. See also Adams H. ed., *The Writings of Albert Gallatin*, Philadelphia J.P. Lippincott & Co, 1879, 3 vols., vol. I, p.644, Gallatin to Dallas, Ghent, 24 December 1814.
180. ASP: Finance vol. II, p.878.
181. AC: 13-3, Appendix, 1501-2, 'Statement of A.J. Dallas Sect. of Treas. Feb.6 1815', British and Foreign State Papers 1816-17, p.512; see also *Receipts and Expenditures of the United States for the Year 1814*. Boston State Bank was not to be repaid until 30 September 1816, and then only \$130,000 were drafts for cash, the remaining \$370,000 was in interest-bearing Treasury notes.
182. *ibid.*
183. JCBL: B & I corr., Box 161, f.4, Greene to Ives, Boston, 14 December 1814.
184. JCBL: B & I corr., Box 161, f.4, Greene to Ives, Boston, 29 December 1814.
185. NYHS: GP, reel 9, 182/1-2, W. Willink and N. van Staphorst to A.Gallatin and J.Bayard at Ghent, dated Amsterdam 14 December 1814. A note under the address reads 'should be Gallatin & Adams'. The exchange rate was fixed at 50 stuivers to the dollar; there appear to have been 20 stuivers to the guilder in 1814/15. The £ was officially \$4.44 to the \$. Speculation on the buyer's identity centres on the family firm of Parish of Hamburg, and its associates; see Perkins E. Columbus, 1994, pp. 334-5, cited below.
186. Dudley Wade. op.cit. p.229, footnote 25; see also: Perkins E. *American Public Finance & Financial Services 1700 -1815*. Columbus, Ohio State Univ. Press, 1994, pp.334-5.
187. NYHS: GP, reel 9, 189. Gallatin and Adams to A.J. Dallas, Secretary. of the Treasury, dated Ghent 25 December 1814.
188. Hickey D. op.cit. p.194, citing Lohnes B. *The Invasion of Eastern Maine*. Sir John Sherbrooke had been ordered in June 1814 to occupy "that part of the District of Maine which at present intercepts the communication between Halifax and Quebec."



189. Hertslet L. and E. *British & Foreign State Papers 1812-14*, London, J. Ridgway & Sons, vol. I, part II, 1841, pp.1396-71, 'Proclamation of C in C British Military and Naval Forces, North America, 21 September 1814.'
190. Niles H. op. cit. vol.7, pp.117-8.
191. Mitchell B. & Deane P. *Abstract of British Historical Statistics*. Cambridge Univ. Press, 1962, Table 12, 'Values at Current Prices of UK Overseas Trade According to Region', p.313. Sadly, the figure for 1813, for comparison, is unavailable.
192. Hickey D. op.cit. p.227.
193. Crawford M. op.cit. p.66. Rear-Adm. Cockburn to Vice-Adm. Cochrane, dated *Albion* in Tangier Bay, Chesapeake, 10 May 1814.
194. Crawford M. op.cit. p.136. Cockburn to Cochrane, dated *Albion* Off Jerome's Point Patuxent 17 July 1814.
195. Crawford M. op.cit. p.351, note; Joshua Barney to Secretary of the Navy Jones, Baltimore, 10 and 26 October 1814.
196. Crawford M. op. cit. p.668. Secretary of the Navy Jones to Navy Agent John Bullus, dated Navy Department, November 20 1814.
197. Crawford M. op.cit. p.686-7 note; Adam and Noah Brown to Secretary of the Navy Benjamin Crowningshield, dated New York, Jan 15 1815. Requisitions of Navy agents, going back over three months, totalling \$800,000, had had to be "laid over again". See Brandt I., op.cit. vol 6, p.345.
198. JCBL: *Receipts & Expenditures of the United States 1814*. Washington, A & G Way Printers, 1815, p.61.
199. Seybert A. op.cit. p.549. The US Mint struck \$3,578 30c in cents in 1814, and none in 1815; see also, Smith P. *America's Copper Coinage 1783-1857*. pp.149-74.
200. JCBL: B & I corr., Box 236, f.6, B & I to John Maybin, 6 July 1814.
201. ASP: IV, Commerce & Navigation vol.1, p.1018; Mahan A. op.cit. vol.II, pp.179-83.
202. Hickey D. op.cit. p.230, citing *Synopsis of Debates in the Massachusetts Legislature*, Boston, October 11 1814.
203. JCBL: B & I corr., Box 236, f.6, John Maybin of Philadelphia to B & I in Providence, RI, 12 October 1814.
204. JCBL: B & I corr., Box 236, f.6, B & I to John Maybin, 6 July 1814.
205. JCBL: B & I corr., Box 236, f.6, John Maybin to Thomas Ives, of Providence RI, dated Philadelphia, 22 August, 5 September and 12<sup>th</sup> October 1814.
206. Hickey D. op.cit. p.269, quoting *Salem Gazette*, 23 September 1814.
207. Adams H. *The History of the United States during the Administration of James Madison*. New York, Scribner's Sons, 1889-96, 9 vols, vol.VIII, p.225.
208. BL: C. *Columbian Centinel*, Boston, 9 November 1814.
209. AC:13-3, 612. 17 November 1814.
210. Adams H. op.cit. p.1070, 1986 ed., citing Kennedy's *Life of Wirt*, vol.1, p.339, Wirt to Mrs Wirt, dated October 14 1814; Hickey D. op.cit. p.231, citing Wm.Wirt Papers Maryland Hist. Soc., r.2, dated October 25 1814, reading 'revolt' in place of 'sedition'.
211. NYHS: Gallatin Papers II, Letterbook II, Gallatin to Monroe, June 14

1814. Gallatin warns of a British intention to attack coastal towns; see also Stagg J. op.cit. p.473.
212. JCBL: B & I corr. Box 236, f.7, Thomas Ives to John Maybin 20 January 1815. The Convention had ended on 5 January 1815.
213. AC:13-3, H of R, pp.381-3, 393; Senate, pp.24, 28. Madison first mentioned the Cabinet instructions to the Peace Commissioners of 25 and 27 June in messages to Congress, on 10 October as to be “the subject of another communication”. They were read to a closed session of the Senate on 13 October 1814. On 14 October, copies were read to a House emptied of strangers, and, with certain omissions, ordered to be printed for “transmission to Congress”, and recorded in ASP: Foreign Relations, vol. III, p.695. The suggestion that Congress was first told of them on 1 December 1814, (e.g. Stagg J. op.cit. p.462), is mistaken, since they were discussed by the House Ways and Means Committee during October 1813. See AC: 13-3, pp. 429-38
214. AC: 13-3, p.383.
215. JHL: Jonathan Russell Correspondence, Monroe to American Peace Commissioners at Ghent, Washington, 25 June 1814.
216. JHL: J.R Corr. Monroe to Peace Commissioners, postscript to above.
217. Adams H. ed., *The Writings of Albert Gallatin*, Philadelphia and London, J.P.Lippincott & Co, 3 vols., vol. I, p.602, Gallatin to Crawford, American Minister at Paris, London, 21 April 1814.
218. Adams H. ed., *Writings of Gallatin*, vol. I, pp.606-7. Gallatin to Clay, dated London, 22 April 1814.
219. Brant I. op.cit. p.267, citing LC: Madison Papers. Beasley to Jones, dated London, 18 May 1814. Reuben Beasley was the London agent for American prisoners of war held in Britain.
220. Adams H. ed., *Writings of Gallatin*, p.612. Gallatin and Bayard to Monroe, dated London, 6 May 1814
221. DNB: vol. 21, pp.352-4. Gambier had been C-in-C Newfoundland, and commanded at Copenhagen in 1807.
222. Brant I. op.cit. p.267.
223. JHL: J.R. Corr. Monroe to Peace Commissioners, Washington, 27 June 1814.
224. Adams H. ed., *Writings of Gallatin*, pp.627-8, Gallatin to Monroe, London, 13 June 1814.
225. AC: 13-3, p.383. 10 October 1814.
226. AC:13-3, 877-81, Appendix, p.1481, actually \$47,270,172; ASP: Finance vol. II p.885, actual expenditure \$57,694,590, receipts \$40,007,661; Dewey’s figure for 1814’s expenditure is that for only the 9 months ending 30 June 1814; for proposed income tax, see ASP: Finance vol. II, p.873.
227. Seyburt A. op.cit. p.464.
228. ASP: Finance vol.II, p. 879, ‘Schedule of Treasury Notes, which have already fallen due & remain unpaid, this 2<sup>nd</sup> day of December 1814.’ See Appendix B 25, Treasury notes outstanding at year’s end, 1811-17.
229. Hickey D. op.cit. p.247-8, citing ASP: Finance vol. III, p.121.
230. JCBL: B & I corr., Box 236, f.6, Ives to Maybin, 29 November 1814. A second United States Bank had been proposed to the Ways and Means

- Committee on 10 October 1814 by its chairman, John Eppes of Virginia, a son-in-law of Jefferson's.
231. ASP: Finance vol. II, p.867. Congress had failed to renew the first US Bank's charter in 1811.
  232. Niles H. op.cit. vol.VII, Supplement p.176; and Seyburt A. *Statistical Annals*, p.749 'A Statement of the Prices quoted in Philadelphia for the evidence of the public Debt', prices of new and old US 6% stock during 1813-15.
  233. JCBL: B & I corr., Box 236, f.7, Ives to Maybin, 21 January 1815.
  234. ASP: Finance vol. II, pp.885-9.
  235. Hickey D. op.cit. p.247, quoting George Tickner to Edward Channing, 22 January 1815, in Hillard S. et al, *Life Letters and Journals of George Tickner*. 2 vols, Boston, 1876, vol.1, pp.30-31.
  236. Dewey D. op.cit.p.136
  237. Adams H. Agar H. ed., op.cit. vol. II, p.943.
  238. TNA: ADM 1/506, 30 December 1814.
  239. McCusker J. *Historical Price Index: Money Values in the Economy of the United States*. Worcester, American Antiquarian Society, 1992,p.326. Reprinted from *Proceedings of the American Antiquarian Society*, vol.101, Part 2, October 1991.
  240. Rockoff H. 'Banking and Finance 1789-1914', in Engerman S. and Gallman R. eds., *The Cambridge Economic History of the United States, - The Long Nineteenth Century*, Cambridge Univ. Press, 2000, 3 vols., vol. II, pp.654-5, inc. Table 14.1, 'Money & Prices in the War of 1812'
  241. JCBL: B & I corr., Box 236, f.7, Maybin to Ives, 5 January 1815.
  242. North D. *The Economic Growth of the United States 1790 -1860*. first published by Prentice-Hall Inc,1961; 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. New York, W. Norton & Co Inc, 1966. Export Price Index, p.221, Table C-III; Import Price Index, p.229, Table F-III; Terms of Trade, p.229, Table G-III. The terms of trade shown in the 1966 edition employed, use the method of calculation generally adopted after 1963, i.e. an index of export prices divided by a comparable index of import prices, multiplied, for the convenience of whole numbers, by 100,which gives a *rising* favourable index, and *falling* adverse terms of trade.
  243. Davis L. and Engerman S. *Naval Blockades in Peace and War – An Economic History since 1750*, Cambridge Univ. Press, 2006, p.91, citing Adams D.'American Neutrality and Prosperity 1793 – 1808', in *Journal of American History*, 40, December 1980, p.718.
  244. Davis L. and Engerman S. op.cit. pp.80-1, citing Adams D., op.cit. p.736-7.
  245. North D. *Economic Growth of the United States 1790 –1860*, New York, Prentice Hall, 1961, republished New York, Norton, 1966. p.31.
  246. Pitkin T. op.cit. p.363. The actual fall between 1811-14 is 94.03%.
  247. North D. op.cit. p.249, an actual fall of 93.6%.
  248. Lipsey R. 'U.S. Trade and the Balance of Payments 1800 –1913' in Engerman S. and Gallman R. eds., op.cit., Table 15.21, p.718.
  249. Dangerfield G. *The Era of Good Feelings*, London, Methuen, 1953, p.12.
  250. JCBL: B & I corr., Box 236, f.7, 6 February 1815.
  251. Hickey D. op.cit. p.298. Ratifications were exchanged between Secretary

- of State James Monroe and Anthony Baker, newly arrived in Washington, citing Hansard T. *Parliamentary Debates*, vol. 30, p.218.
252. JCBL: B & I corr., Box 236, f.7, 15 February 1815.
253. BL: *Parliamentary Papers*: vol.IX, No's 3 & 4, pp.481-8, 'Papers Relating to War with America, Admiralty Office, Ordered by the House of Commons to be Printed 9 & 10 February 1815.'
254. BL: *Parl. Papers*: vol.IX, p.489. No: 5. Admiralty Office, 1 February 1815.
255. Russell J. *The History of the War between the United States and Great Britain...and a list of vessels taken from Great Britain during the war*. Hartford, Conn, B.& J. Russell, 1815, pp.377- 402, in US Coast Guard Academy Lib. New London, Conn. A copy of Russell's list in the John Hay Library, Providence, R.I., gives 1,607 British prizes; the extra five may have been added to later editions. However, Lloyd's of London calculated British wartime losses as 1,175 vessels, of which 373, i.e. 31.74%, were later re-captured. Many of the captures recorded in Russell's list were probably uninsured by owners deterred by high insurance premiums, although apparently no higher between 1812-14 than in 1810-11. See: Rodger N. *The Command of the Ocean – A Naval History of Britain 1649-1815*, London, Penguin/Allen Lane/NMM, 2004, p.569.
256. Mitchell B. and Deane P. *Abstract of British Historical Statistics*, Cambridge,1962, calculated from Table: Transport 1, 'Shipping Registered in the United Kingdom 1788-1938', p.217.
257. Kert F. 'The Fortunes of War: Commercial Warfare and Maritime Risk in the War of 1812', in *Northern Mariner*, No 4, October 1998, pp.1-16, p.2, citing Maclay E.; and Mitchell B and Deane P. op.cit. calculated from Table: Overseas Trade 2, 'Official Values and Values at Current Prices of Overseas Trade United Kingdom 1796-1853, Computed or Declared Values', p.282. Conversion at the then official \$4.44 to £1.
258. James W. *Warden Refuted, being a Defence of the British Navy Against the Misrepresentations of a Work Recently Published at Edinburgh – a letter to D. B. Warden Esq., Late Consul to the United States at Paris.*, London, J.Richardson, 1819, p.42, see also FCO: Colonial Papers, House of Commons, No: 4, 1813-15, and No: 7, Admiralty Office, 1 February 1815.
259. BL: *Parl. Papers*: vol.IX, p.490, No: 7, Adm. Office, 1 February 1815.
260. TNA: ADM 1/504, p.341, Cmdr. Rich. Coote, HMS *Borer*, 12, off Martha's Vineyard, 22 October 1813, to Capt. Robt. Oliver, HMS *Valiant*, 74.
261. Whitehill W. ed. op.cit., pp.22-36, June – July 1814. The American *Welcome Return* for example, had been ransomed by HMS *Nymphe* in June 1814, for \$3,500.
262. BL: *Parl. Papers*: vol.IX, p.490, No: 7, Adm. Office, 1 February 1815.
263. BL: *Parl. Papers*: calc from data in: vol.IX, p.490, & Nettels C., op.cit., Table 21, p.399. The Royal Navy had taken or destroyed 546 American merchant vessels of known tonnage, totalling 77,625 tons, an average of 142.17 tons. Therefore, the 59,626 tons of American merchant shipping still engaged in the foreign trade of the U.S. by 1814, according to Nettels, represents only 419 vessels of average size.

264. *ibid*, actually 28.56%.
265. Guttridge A. 'Prize Agency 1800-1815 with special reference to the career and work of George Redmond Hulbert', unpublished M Phil dissertation, Portsmouth Univ., 1989, p.137. Warren had gained personally just over £51,400, less than the £100,000 earned by Pellew and Keith in other theatres. Another £46,000 had been shared by Warren's junior flag officers. I am grateful to Tony Guttridge for his very helpful correspondence in 2008.
266. Nettels C. *op.cit.* Table 21, p.399.
267. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Dept. of Commerce and Social Sciences Research Council, supplement to *Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1957*, Washington 1960, Series Q192-4, p.415.
268. North D. *The Economic Growth of the United States 1790 -1860*, New York, Prentice Hall, 1961, republished, New York, Norton, 1966, Chart III-IV, p.42, and Appendix I, Table C-IV, p.231, originally North D., 'Balance of Payments' *op.cit.* Appendix A, Table A3.
269. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Dept. of Commerce and Social Sciences Research Council, supplement to *Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1957*, Washington 1960, Series Q192-4, p.415.
270. Mahon J. *The War of 1812*, Gainesville, Univ. of Florida Press, 1972, re-published De Capo Press, 1991, p.385; and Hickey D. *op.cit.* p.303.
271. Hickey D. *op.cit.* p.303, citing, *Historical Statistics of the United States*, Washington, 1975, US Bureau of the Census, vol.2, p.1140; and U.S. Dept. of the Treasury, *Report of the Secretary of the Treasury for 1866*, p.304; Report of the Ways and Means Committee, 13 April 1830 in *Register of Debates in Congress*, 29 vols., 1825-37, 21-1, Appendix 115.
272. Dewey D. *op.cit.* p.141.
273. U.S. Bureau of the Census *Historical Statistics of the United States*, Washington, 1975, Part 2, p.1140.
274. Wellington, 2<sup>nd</sup> Duke, ed., *Supplementary Despatches, Correspondence and Memoranda of Field Marshall Arthur Duke of Wellington*, London, 1858-72, 15 vols, vol.IX, p.240, Liverpool to Bathurst, 11 September 1814.
275. Hickey D. *op.cit.* p.303; and BL: PP: vol. IX, p.490, No: 6.
276. Haines M. 'The Population of the United States, 1790-1920' in Engerman S and Gallman R. *op.cit.*, Table 4.2, p156; see also North D. *op.cit.* pp.48 and 62. Both estimate that in 1810, the US urban population stood at 7.3%, and by 1820, 7.2%.
277. Adams H. *op.cit.* vol.VIII, p.1087, Jefferson to Short, 28 November 1814, citing *Works of Thomas Jefferson*, vol.VI, p.398.
278. AC: 13-2, 1442,1497; and *National Advocate*, New York, 20 February 1815, quoted by Hickey D. *op.cit.* p.437.
279. Gurwood J. ed., *The Dispatches of Field Marshall the Duke of Wellington, 1799- 1818*, London, 1834-39, 12 vols., vol.9, p.495. Liverpool to Castlereagh, 23 December 1814.
280. Stagg J. *op.cit.* p.481-2. Apparently believing that New England was in a position to defy the Union, Monroe briefly allocated volunteers and funds towards resisting its possible secession.

281. BL: Add Mss 38365 ff.153-4, Liverpool Papers, 'Headings of Negotiation to Commissioners at Ghent'.
282. James W. *The Military Occurrences of the Late War between Great Britain and the United States of America*. 2 vols. London, J. Richardson, 1819, vol.2, includes the complete text of the Treaty of Ghent. It is also included in Russell J.,op.cit. *The history of the war...to which is added the treaty of peace*.
283. NYHS: Gallatin Papers: Letterbook II, pp.215-19, Letter 10, Gallatin to Monroe, Ghent, 25 December 1814.
284. BL:C, *National Intelligencer*, Washington, 17 January 1815, probably written by Joseph Gales, co-proprietor and editor.
285. AC:12-1, 831. Adam Seyburt, Republican Representative for Philadelphia, to Congress, 18 January 1812.

## Conclusions: References

1. *American State Papers: Finance*: vol. II, p.867.
2. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Dept. of Commerce and Social Sciences Research Council, supplement to *Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1957*, Washington, n.d., Series Q192-4, p.415.
3. Davis L and Engerman S. *Naval Blockades in Peace and War – An Economic History Since 1750*, Cambridge Univ. Press, 2006, p.79, Table 3.5, citing U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970*, Washington, Government Printing Office, 2 vols.,1975. Series Q 425-432, p.750.
4. Mahon J. *The War of 1812*, Gainesville, Florida, Da Capa, 1972, p.385.
5. Hammond M. *The Cotton Culture and the Cotton Trade*, New York, Macmillan/American Economic Ass., 1897, p.242; actually 91.78%.
6. Zevin R. *The Growth of Manufacturing in Early 19<sup>th</sup> Century New England: Dissertations in American Economic History*, New York, Arno, 1975, Table 1, ‘Cotton Industry Output 1805-1860’ p.8. Output actually fell by 64.38% in 1816. For lost military demand, see Mahon J. op.cit., p.227. Before c. 1820, power-looms were generally water driven.
7. Wright C. *Economic History of the United States*, New York, McGraw Hill, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed.,1949, pp.320-1.
8. Habakkuk H. ‘Britain and America: the economic effects of labour scarcity’, p.62, in *Britain & America: Studies in Comparative History 1760-1970*, Englander D. ed., New York and Milton Keynes, Yale Univ. Press/Open Univ., 1997, pp.51-81.
9. ASP: Finance: vol. II, ‘Revised Statement of the Public Debt’, p.839, and ‘Receipts and Expenditure’, p.920; and *Annals of Congress: Debates and Proceeding in the Congress of the United States*, Washington, Gales and Seaton, 1854, 12<sup>th</sup> Congress, 3rd session, col.1493, and Seyburt A. *Statistical Annals*, ‘A Statement of Loans Authorised by Acts of Congress’ p.535; and Dewey D. *Financial History of the United States*, 12<sup>th</sup> ed.1934, re-printed New York, A. Kelly, pp.141- 2. Only \$0.6m of \$3m authorised on 15 November 1814 was raised. ASP: F:vol. III, p.121. Tax revenue and expenditure for 1815, including a loan of \$18.5m, authorised by Congress on 3 March 1815 is omitted here as being called for after the Treaty of Ghent was ratified, on 17 February 1815.
10. Osborne E. *Britain’s Economic Blockade of Germany 1914-1919*, London, Cass, 2004, pp.8-9. Osborne notes that in March 1854, Britain eased its policy towards enemy property in neutral vessels, and in 1856 signed the Declaration of Paris which protected neutral goods, except contraband, under an enemy flag, enemy goods except contraband under a neutral flag and banned privateering. Osborne argues that the British Foreign Office advocated its acceptance, seeing Britain as a trading neutral in future major wars. The US did not sign the Declaration which, by the early 20<sup>th</sup> century was largely discredited; blockade remained as Britain’s strongest potential weapon.
11. Keble Chatterton E. *The Big Blockade*, London, Hurst & Blackett Ltd, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed.,1938, p.148-9.

12. NMM: LBK/2 Report of Col. Barclay dated April 1813 in Warren to Melville, 5 June 1813.
13. Berens Matzke R. 'Britain Gets Its Way: Power and Peace in Anglo-American Relations, 1838-1846' in *War in History*, 2001, 8(1) pp.24-5, citing 'Defenceless Condition of the Southern Coast of the United States and Gulf of Mexico: Statement Submitted by the Chairman of the Committee on Naval Affairs to the House of Representatives, 27<sup>th</sup> Congress, 2<sup>nd</sup> session, 12<sup>th</sup> May 1842', published in Cooling B. ed., Wilmington, DE., *The New American State Papers: Military Affairs*, vol. II, 1979, pp. 180-5.



## Appendix A

Appendix A; Table 1,

Royal Naval Prizes sent into Halifax Nova Scotia between 18 June 1812 and 26 March 1815.

Date of Capture	Prize Name	Rigged	Captors
24/06/1812	<i>Malcolm</i>	brig	HMS <i>Belvidera</i>
25/06/1812	<i>Fortune</i>	ship	HMS <i>Belvidera</i>
06/07/1812	<i>Minerva</i>	brig	HMS <i>Africa</i>
07/07/1812	<i>Enterprise</i>	brig	HMS <i>Ring Dove</i>
08/07/1812	<i>George</i>	brig	HMS <i>Guerriere</i>
08/07/1812	<i>Mary Elizabeth</i>	brig	HMS <i>Indian</i>
09/07/1812	<i>William</i> (recap)	barque	HMS <i>Indian</i>
10/07/1812	<i>Marquis de Someruelas</i>	ship	HMS <i>Atalante</i>
11/07/1812	<i>Oroonoko</i>	ship	HMS <i>Shannon</i>
11/07/1812	<i>Illuminator</i>	brig	HMS <i>Emulous</i>
12/07/1812	<i>Lively</i>	schooner	HMS <i>Emulous</i>
12/07/1812	<i>Traveller</i>	schooner	HMS <i>Emulous</i>
13/07/1812	<i>Maria</i>	ship	HMS <i>Emulous</i>
15/07/1812	<i>Start</i> (recap)	brig	HMS <i>Spartan</i>
15/07/1812	<i>Belleisle</i>	brig	HMS <i>Emulous</i>
16/07/1812	<i>Cordelia</i>	brig	HMS <i>Emulous</i>
16/07/1812	<i>USS Nautilus</i>	US brig	HMS <i>Shannon</i>
16/07/1812	<i>Fair Trader</i>	brig	HMS <i>Indian</i>
16/07/1812	<i>Active</i>	schooner	HMS <i>Spartan</i>
17/07/1812	<i>Nimrod</i> (recap)	schooner	HMS <i>Paz</i>
17/07/1812	<i>George</i>	schooner	HMS <i>Emulous</i>
17/07/1812	<i>Argus</i>	brig	HMS <i>Indian</i>
17/07/1812	<i>Mary</i>	schooner	HMS <i>Spartan</i>
18/07/1812	<i>Hiram</i>	brig	HMS <i>Spartan</i>
18/07/1812	<i>Actress</i>	schooner	HMS <i>Spartan</i>
18/07/1812	<i>Magnet</i> (became H M prison ship)	sloop	HMS <i>Ring Dove</i>
18/07/1812	<i>Martha</i> (recap)	ship	HMS <i>Paz</i>
18/07/1812	<i>Eliza</i> (recap)	schooner	HMS <i>Chubb</i>
18/07/1812	<i>Ann</i> (recap)	schooner	HMS <i>Chubb</i>
19/07/1812	<i>Fanny</i> (recap)	brig	HMS <i>Colibri</i>
19/07/1812	<i>Rover</i> (recap)	ship	HMS <i>Ring Dove</i>
19/07/1812	<i>Four Sisters</i>	schooner	HMS <i>Ring Dove</i>
19/07/1812	<i>Friendship</i>	ship	HMS <i>Indian</i>
20/07/1812	<i>Hesper</i> (recap)	schooner	HMS <i>Ring Dove</i>
22/07/1812	<i>George</i> (recap)	brig	HMS <i>Maidstone</i>
22/07/1812	<i>Mariner</i> (recap)	brig	HMS <i>Colibri</i>
23/07/1812	<i>Mary-Ann</i> (recap)	ship	HMS <i>Maidstone</i>
23/07/1812	<i>Gleanor</i>	schooner	HMS <i>Colibri</i>
24/07/1812	<i>Curlew</i>	sloop	HMS <i>Acasta</i>
26/07/1812	<i>Catherine</i>	brig	HMS <i>Colibri</i>
30/07/1812	<i>Gossamer</i>	brig	HMS <i>Emulous</i>
31/07/1812	<i>Eleanor</i>	schooner	HMS <i>Shannon</i>
31/07/1812	<i>Prevoyante</i>	schooner	HMS <i>Emulous</i>
01/08/1812	<i>Zodiac</i>	ship	HMS <i>Alphea</i>
01/08/1812	<i>Polly</i>	schooner	HMS <i>Maidstone</i>

01/08/1812	<i>Morning Star</i>	schooner	HMS <i>Maidstone</i>
03/08/1812	<i>Commodore Barry</i>	sloop	HMS <i>Maidstone</i>
03/08/1812	<i>Madison</i>	schooner	HMS <i>Maidstone</i>
04/08/1812	<i>Concordia</i>	ship	HMS <i>Shannon</i>
07/08/1812	<i>Grace</i> (recap)	brig	HMS <i>Chubb</i>
08/08/1812	<i>Buckskin</i>	schooner	HMS <i>Statira</i>
09/08/1812	<i>Pythagoras</i>	sloop	HMS <i>Bream</i>
10/08/1812	<i>Bolina</i>	ship	HMS <i>Morgiana</i>
10/08/1812	<i>Union Lass</i> (recap)	schooner	HMS <i>Chubb</i>
10/08/1812	<i>Sally</i> (recap)	brig	HMS <i>Morgiana</i>
11/08/1812	<i>Henry</i> (recap)	ship	HMS <i>Emulous</i>
11/08/1812	<i>Polly</i>	schooner	HMS <i>Acasta</i>
11/08/1812	<i>Prudence</i>	brig	HMS <i>Morgiana</i>
11/08/1812	<i>Regulator</i>	schooner	HMS <i>Colibri</i>
12/08/1812	<i>Dolphin</i>	schooner	HMS <i>Earl of Moria</i>
13/08/1812	<i>Dolphin</i>	schooner	HMS <i>Maidstone</i>
13/08/1812	<i>John</i>	brig	HMS <i>Maidstone</i>
13/08/1812	<i>Apollo</i> (recap)	ship	HMS <i>Statira</i>
14/08/1812	<i>Union</i> (recap)	brig	HMS <i>Morgiana</i>
14/08/1812	<i>Lewis</i>	schooner	HMS <i>Hope</i>
16/08/1812	<i>Union</i>	ship	HMS <i>Emulous</i>
17/08/1812	<i>Bainbridge</i>	ship	HMS <i>Belvidera</i>
17/08/1812	<i>William</i> (recap)	snow	HMS <i>Statira</i>
17/08/1812	<i>Nancy</i> (recap)	ship	HMS <i>Statira</i>
17/08/1812	<i>Eastern Star</i>	ship	HMS <i>Africa</i>
18/08/1812	<i>Russel</i> (recap)	brig	HMS <i>Statira</i>
19/08/1812	<i>Osbourne</i> (recap)	ship	HMS <i>Emulous</i>
19/08/1812	<i>Phoebe</i>	brig	HMS <i>Aeolus</i>
21/08/1812	<i>Dolphin</i>	schooner	HMS <i>Colibri</i>
21/08/1812	<i>Hare</i>	brig	HMS <i>Belvidera</i>
22/08/1812	<i>Monsoon</i>	schooner	HMS <i>Aeolus</i>
23/08/1812	<i>Adeline</i> (recap)	ship	HMS <i>Statira</i>
23/08/1812	<i>Monk</i>	brig	HMS <i>Colibri</i>
24/08/1812	<i>Honestas</i>	ship	HMS <i>Nymph</i>
25/08/1812	<i>Science</i>	ship	HMS <i>Emulous</i>
25/08/1812	<i>Henrietta</i> (recap)	sloop	HMS <i>Emulous</i>
26/08/1812	<i>Patriot</i>	barque	HMS <i>Acasta</i>
27/08/1812	<i>Jane</i>	schooner	HMS <i>Nymph</i>
28/08/1812	<i>Merchant</i>	ship	HMS <i>Nymph</i>
28/08/1812	<i>Georgiana</i>	ship	HMS <i>Nymph</i>
28/08/1812	<i>Doris</i>	ship	HMS <i>Nymph</i>
29/08/1812	<i>Merchant</i>	ship	HMS <i>Statira</i>
30/08/1812	<i>Betsy</i>	ship	HMS <i>Acasta</i>
30/08/1812	<i>Sophia</i>	schooner	HMS <i>Plumper</i>
	<i>Prince of Asturias</i>		
30/08/1812	(recap)	brig	HMS <i>Statira</i>
31/08/1812	<i>Ceres</i>	brig	
02/09/1812	<i>Stockholm</i>	ship	HMS <i>Maidstone</i>
02/09/1812	<i>Planter</i> (recap)	schooner	HMS <i>Shannon</i>
03/09/1812	<i>Argo</i> (recap)	ship	HMS <i>Plumper</i>
04/09/1812	<i>Aristomenes</i>	snow brig	HMS <i>Shannon</i>
04/09/1812	<i>Britannia</i> (recap)	ship	HMS <i>Junon</i>
05/09/1812	<i>Howe</i> (recap)	ship	HMS <i>Plumper</i>
06/09/1812	<i>Hector</i> (recap)	snow brig	HMS <i>Plumper</i>
06/09/1812	<i>Charles Faucett</i>	brig	HMS <i>Emulous</i>

06/09/1812	<i>Fabius</i>		ship	HMS <i>Shannon</i>
11/09/1812	<i>Friendship</i>		schooner	HMS <i>Belvidera</i>
12/09/1812	<i>Ambition</i>		brig	HMS <i>Orpheus</i>
12/09/1812	<i>Hiram</i>		schooner	HMS <i>Belvidera</i>
16/09/1812	<i>Sally Ann</i>		schooner	HMS <i>Statira</i>
17/09/1812	<i>Melantho</i>		ship	HMS <i>Spartan</i>
17/09/1812	<i>Federal</i>		brig	HMS <i>Acasta</i>
21/09/1812	<i>Diana</i>	(recap)	ship	
21/09/1812	<i>Abigail</i>	(recap)	ship	HMS <i>Poictiers</i>
24/09/1812	<i>Packet</i>		ship	HMS <i>Orpheus</i>
01/10/1812	<i>Elisia</i>		brig	HMS <i>Aeolus</i>
05/10/1812	<i>Pitt</i>	(recap)	brig	HMS <i>Nymph</i>
05/10/1812	<i>El Rayo</i>		brig	HMS <i>Maidstone</i>
11/10/1812	<i>Wily Reynard</i>		schooner	HMS <i>Shannon</i>
17/10/1812	<i>Blonde</i>	(recap)	schooner	HMS <i>Acasta</i>
	<i>Rapid</i> (became HMS			
18/10/1812	<i>Nova Scotia</i>		brig	HMS <i>Maidstone</i>
19/10/1812	<i>Union</i>		schooner	HMS <i>Maidstone</i>
31/10/1812	<i>Thom</i>		brig	HMS <i>Tenedos</i>
04/12/1812	<i>Revenge</i>		schooner	HMS <i>Paz</i>
"	" <i>Tulip</i>		brig	HMS <i>Atalante</i>
	<i>Highflyer</i> (became			
09/01/1813	HMS <i>High Flyer</i> )		schooner	HMS <i>Acasta</i>
17/02/1813	<i>Sarah</i>		brig	HMS <i>Tenedos</i>
13/03/1813	<i>Lucy</i>		schooner	HMS <i>Rattler</i>
26/03/1813	<i>Volant</i>		ship	HMS <i>Curlew</i>
04/04/1813	<i>Cossack</i>		schooner	HMS <i>Emulous</i>
04/04/1813	<i>Traveller</i>		sloop	HMS <i>Rattler</i>
05/04/1813	<i>Favorite</i>		schooner	HMS <i>Valiant</i>
08/03/1813	<i>Specie</i>		schooner	HMS <i>Nymph</i>
10/04/1813	<i>Packet</i>		sloop	HMS <i>Valiant</i>
11/04/1813	<i>Expedition</i>		schooner	HMS <i>Rattler</i>
12/04/1813	<i>Jennet</i>		brig	HMS <i>Junon</i>
12/04/1813	<i>Flight</i>		schooner	HMS <i>Spartan</i>
12/04/1813	<i>Caroline</i>		brig	HMS <i>La Hogue</i>
16/04/1813	<i>Dispatch</i>		brig	HMS <i>La Hogue</i>
16/04/1813	<i>Plough Boy</i>		schooner	HMS <i>Orpheus</i>
16/04/1813	<i>Sally</i>		ship	HMS <i>La Hoge</i>
18/04/1813	<i>Bird</i>		schooner	HMS <i>Emulous</i>
19/04/1813	<i>Lark</i>		sloop	HMS <i>Bream</i>
20/04/1813	<i>Vivid</i>		brig	HMS <i>Nymph</i>
20/04/1813	<i>Ulysses</i>		brig	HMS <i>Orpheus</i>
20/04/1813	<i>Susannah</i>		sloop	HMS <i>Bream</i>
23/04/1813	<i>Sibae</i>		brig	HMS <i>Atalante</i>
23/04/1813	<i>Semiramis</i>		sloop	HMS <i>Bream</i>
23/04/1813	<i>Victorious</i>		schooner	HMS <i>Rattler</i>
24/04/1813	<i>Sally</i>		brig	HMS <i>Curlew</i>
26/04/1813	<i>Branch</i>		schooner	HMS <i>Bream</i>
28/04/1813	<i>Henry</i>		ship	HMS <i>La Hogue</i>
28/04/1813	<i>Aoelus</i>	(recap)	brig	HMS <i>La Hogue</i>
30/04/1813	<i>Hector</i>		brig	HMS <i>Spartan</i>
01/05/1813	<i>Juana</i>		sloop	HMS <i>Spartan</i>
02/05/1813	<i>Catherine</i>	(recap)	brig	HMS <i>La Hogue</i>
05/05/1813	<i>Montgomery</i>		brig	HMS <i>Nymph</i>

05/05/1813	<i>Ann</i>	(recap)	schooner	HMS <i>Nymph</i>
09/05/1813	<i>Young Pheonix</i>	(recap)	ship	HMS <i>Orpheus</i>
10/05/1813	<i>Diomede</i>		brig	HMS <i>Nymph</i>
10/05/1813	<i>Emperor</i>	(recap)	schooner	HMS <i>Ramilies</i>
10/05/1813	<i>Juliet</i>		sloop	HMS <i>Paz</i>
10/05/1813	<i>Columbia</i>	(recap)	schooner	HMS <i>Rattler</i>
11/05/1813	<i>Juliana Smith</i>		schooner	HMS <i>Nymph</i>
13/05/1813	<i>Sally</i>		schooner	HMS <i>Bream</i>
16/05/1813	<i>Orion</i>		brig	HMS <i>La Hogue</i>
18/05/1813	<i>Duck</i>	(recap)	ship	HMS <i>Bold</i>
18/05/1813	<i>Pilgrim</i>		brig	HMS <i>La Hogue</i>
19/05/1813	<i>Alexander</i>		ship	HMS <i>Rattler</i>
19/05/1813	<i>Dolphin</i>		brig	HMS <i>La Hogue</i>
19/05/1813	<i>Fidelia</i>		ship	HMS <i>Orpheus</i>
20/05/1813	<i>Finland</i>		ship	HMS <i>Chesapeake's</i> squadron
20/05/1813	<i>Volador</i>		brig	HMS <i>Statira</i>
21/05/1813	<i>Enterprize</i>		schooner	HMS <i>Tenedos</i>
24/05/1813	<i>Post Boy</i>		schooner	HMS <i>Rattler</i>
26/05/1813	<i>Paragon</i>	(recap)	ship	HMS <i>Tenedos</i>
26/05/1813	<i>Lucy</i>	(recap)	brig	HMS <i>Shannon</i>
28/05/1813	<i>Harriet</i>		brig	HMS <i>Victorious</i>
28/05/1813	<i>Nancy</i>		schooner	HMS <i>Victorious</i>
30/05/1813	<i>Plough Boy</i>		sloop	HMS <i>Statira</i>
30/05/1813	<i>Commerce</i>		brig	HMS <i>Spartan</i>
31/05/1813	<i>William</i>		brig	HMS <i>Shannon</i>
01/06/1813	USS <i>Chesapeake</i>		US frigate	HMS <i>Shannon</i>
01/06/1813	<i>Fanny</i>		brig	HMS <i>Statira</i>
02/06/1813	<i>Flor de Lisboa</i>		brig	HMS <i>Spartan</i>
02/06/1813	<i>Carlotta</i>		brig	HMS <i>Spartan</i>
08/06/1813	<i>Belle</i>		brigantine	HMS <i>Spartan</i>
08/06/1813	<i>Hetty</i>		schooner	HMS <i>Statira</i>
12/06/1813	<i>Hero</i>	(recap)	brig	HMS <i>Martin</i>
13/06/1813	<i>Morning Star</i>		brig	HMS <i>Spartan</i>
14/06/1813	<i>Del Carmen</i>		sloop	HMS <i>Spartan</i>
14/06/1813	<i>Star</i>		schooner	HMS <i>Victorious</i>
15/06/1813	<i>Lark</i>	(recap)	ship	HMS <i>Borer</i>
16/06/1813	<i>Christiana</i>	(recap)	schooner	HMS <i>Borer</i>
16/06/1813	<i>Roscio</i>		brig	HMS <i>Dover</i>
17/06/1813	<i>Porcupine</i>		brig	HMS <i>Valiant</i>
18/06/1813	<i>Eunice</i>		brig	HMS <i>Wasp</i>
18/06/1813	<i>Protectress</i>		schooner	HMS <i>Victorious</i>
22/06/1813	<i>Gustava</i>		ship	HMS <i>Sylph</i>
22/06/1813	<i>Thomas</i>		brig	HMS <i>Wasp</i>
24/06/1813	<i>Norht Star</i>		brig	HMS <i>Tenedos</i>
24/06/1813	<i>Carl Gustaf</i>		brig	HMS <i>Martin</i>
24/06/1813	<i>H erman</i>	(recap)	ship	HMS <i>Atalante</i>
24/06/1813	<i>Maria</i>		ship	HMS <i>Bold</i>
26/06/1813	<i>Camarvon</i>		brig	HMS <i>Woolwich</i>
27/06/1813	<i>Young Teazer</i>		brig	HMS <i>La Hogue</i>
27/06/1813	<i>Little Bill</i>		schooner	
27/06/1813	<i>Rebecca</i>		schooner	HMS <i>Boxer</i>
28/06/1813	<i>Nancy</i>		schooner	HMS <i>Boxer</i>
28/06/1813	<i>Harriet</i>	(recap)	schooner	HMS <i>Dover</i>
30/06/1813	<i>Minerva</i>		brig	HMS <i>La Hogue</i>

30/06/1813	<i>Thomas</i>		schooner	HMS <i>Nymph</i>
30/06/1813	<i>Liverpool Packet</i>		ship	HMS <i>Dover</i>
30/06/1813	<i>Ulysses</i>		brig	HMS <i>Majestic</i>
06/07/1813	<i>Two Brothers</i>		schooner	HMS <i>Boxer</i>
07/07/1813	<i>Swift</i>		schooner	HMS <i>Curlew</i>
07/07/1813	<i>Two Brothers</i>		schooner	HMS <i>Curlew</i>
07/07/1813	<i>Ellen</i>		brig	HMS <i>La Hogue</i>
07/07/1813	<i>Prudentia</i>		ship	HMS <i>Rattler</i>
07/07/1813	<i>Eunice</i>		sloop	HMS <i>Curlew</i>
07/07/1813	<i>Friendship</i>		sloop	HMS <i>Boxer</i>
08/07/1813	<i>Fanny</i>		brig	HMS <i>La Hogue</i>
08/07/1813	<i>Sea Flower</i>	(recap)	brig	HMS <i>Fantome</i>
09/07/1813	<i>Pricilla</i>		schooner	HMS <i>Curlew</i>
10/07/1813	<i>Roxanna</i>		ship	HMS <i>La Hogue</i>
11/07/1813	<i>Republican</i>		ship	HMS <i>Nimrod</i>
11/07/1813	<i>John Adams</i>		brig	HMS <i>Rattler</i>
11/07/1813	<i>Mentor</i>		sloop	HMS <i>La Hogue</i>
11/07/1813	<i>Jerusha</i>		sloop	HMS <i>La Hogue</i>
11/07/1813	<i>Friendship</i>		sloop	HMS <i>La Hogue</i>
12/07/1813	<i>Ohio</i>		brig	HMS <i>Manly</i>
12/07/1813	<i>Jefferson</i>		schooner	HMS <i>Bream</i>
13/07/1813	<i>Anna</i>		brigantine	HMS <i>Poictiers</i>
14/07/1813	<i>Betsey</i>		schooner	HMS <i>Bream</i>
14/07/1813	<i>Triton</i>		schooner	HMS <i>Bream</i>
14/07/1813	<i>Malaren</i>		brig	HMS <i>La Hogue</i>
17/07/1813	<i>YorkTown</i>		ship	HMS <i>Maidstone</i>
18/07/1813	<i>Lavinia</i>	(recap)	ship	HMS <i>Recruit</i>
18/07/1813	<i>Machester</i>	(recap)	brig	HMS <i>Maidstone</i>
20/07/1813	<i>Lively</i>		schooner	HMS <i>L'Epervier</i>
22/07/1813	<i>Isabella</i>		brig	HMS <i>Pictou</i>
22/07/1813	<i>Fanny</i>		brig	HMS <i>Statira</i>
25/07/1813	<i>Fair Play</i>		sloop	HMS <i>Boxer</i>
25/07/1813	<i>Providence</i>	(recap)	schooner	HMS <i>Nymphe</i>
27/07/1813	<i>Stamper</i>	(recap)	brig	HMS <i>Ring Dove</i>
29/07/1813	<i>Mary</i>	(recap)	sloop	HMS <i>Nimrod</i>
31/07/1813	<i>Flor de Tejo</i>		brig	HMS <i>Manly</i>
31/07/1813	<i>Porpoise</i>		schooner	HMS <i>Rattler</i>
31/07/1813	<i>William &amp; Ann</i>	(recap)	sloop	HMS <i>Nimrod</i>
31/07/1813	<i>Anaconda</i>		brig	HMS <i>Sceptre</i>
02/08/1813	<i>Hope</i>	(recap)	ship	HMS <i>Manly</i>
03/08/1813	<i>Luisa</i>		schooner	HMS <i>Martin</i>
03/08/1813	<i>Hannah</i>		schooner	HMS <i>Boxer</i>
03/08/1813	<i>Rebecca</i>		schooner	HMS <i>Boxer</i>
04/08/1813	<i>Four Brothers</i>	(recap)	schooner	HMS <i>Emulous</i>
08/08/1813	<i>Wasp</i>		sloop	HMS <i>Bream</i>
12/08/1813	<i>Gannet</i>		schooner	HMS <i>Curlew</i>
13/08/1813	<i>Paragon</i>		schooner	HMS <i>Curlew</i>
13/08/1813	<i>Polly</i>	(recap)	schooner	HMS <i>Statira</i>
16/08/1813	<i>Flor de Mar</i>		ship	HMS <i>La Hogue</i>
17/08/1813	<i>Endeavour</i>		sloop	HMS <i>Curlew</i>
18/08/1813	<i>Morning Star</i>		schooner	HMS <i>Curlew</i>
18/08/1813	<i>Chance</i>	(recap)	brig	HMS <i>La Hogue</i>
18/08/1813	<i>King George</i>	(recap)	schooner	HMS <i>Recruit</i>
24/08/1813	<i>Espozy y Mina</i>		schooner	HMS <i>Statira</i>

25/08/1813	<i>Raven</i>		schooner	HMS <i>Manly</i>
26/08/1813	<i>Elizabeth</i>	(recap)	brig	HMS <i>Shelburne</i>
27/08/1813	<i>Euphemia</i>		schooner	HMS <i>Majestic</i>
28/08/1813	<i>Hope</i>		ship	
29/08/1813	<i>Mariner</i>	(recap)	brig	HMS <i>Poictiers</i>
31/08/1813	<i>Fortune</i>		schooner	HMS <i>Boxer</i>
31/08/1813	<i>Divina Pastora</i>		ship	HMS <i>Statira</i>
02/09/1813	<i>Jerusalem</i>		ship	HMS <i>Majestic</i>
02/09/1813	<i>Drake</i>		sloop	HMS <i>Belvidera</i>
03/09/1813	<i>Watson</i>	(recap)	brig	HMS <i>Poictiers</i>
11/09/1813	<i>Torpedo</i>		schooner	HMS <i>Plantagenet</i>
11/09/1813	<i>Massachusetts</i>		ship	HMS <i>Canso</i>
11/09/1813	<i>Ocean</i>	(recap)	brig	HMS <i>Borer</i>
13/09/1813	<i>Elvira</i>		sloop	HMS <i>Orpheus</i>
13/09/1813	<i>Mary</i>	(recap)	schooner	HMS <i>Sylph</i>
14/09/1813	<i>Santa Cecilia</i>		ship	HMS <i>Wasp</i>
16/09/1813	<i>Catalana Patriota</i>			HMS <i>Shannon</i>
16/09/1813	<i>Alianza</i>			HMS <i>Shannon</i>
17/09/1813	<i>Queen Charlotte</i>	(recap)	schooner	HMS <i>Shannon</i>
18/09/1813	<i>Little Sisters</i>		schooner	HMS <i>Belvidera</i>
19/09/1813	<i>Gamla Lodelse</i>		brig	HMS <i>High Flyer</i>
20/09/1813	<i>Active</i>		ship	HMS <i>L'Epervier</i>
22/09/1813	<i>Ambition</i>		sloop	HMS <i>Statira</i>
24/09/1813	<i>Venus</i>		ship	HMS <i>Borer</i>
25/09/1813	<i>Resolution</i>		ship	HMS <i>Majestic</i>
27/09/1813	<i>Shannon</i>	(recap)	brig	HMS <i>Manly</i>
29/09/1813	<i>Margarett</i>	(recap)	sloop	HMS <i>Martin</i>
30/09/1813	<i>Montezuma</i>		ship	HMS <i>La Hogue</i>
30/09/1813	<i>Edward</i>	(recap)	brig	HMS <i>Fantome</i>
04/10/1813	<i>Charles</i>		ship	HMS <i>Paz</i>
05/10/1813	<i>Medel padria</i>		brig	HMS <i>Conflict</i>
05/10/1813	<i>Portsmouth Packet</i>		schooner	HMS <i>Fantome</i>
11/10/1813	<i>Charlotte</i>		ship	HMS <i>Comet</i>
11/10/1813	<i>Richard de Stanley</i>		schooner	HMS <i>Paz</i>
11/10/1813	<i>Atlantic</i>	(recap)	brig	HMS <i>Maidstone</i>
14/10/1813	<i>Randolph</i>		schooner	HMS <i>Paz</i>
16/10/1813	<i>Baltic</i>		ship	HMS <i>La Hogue</i>
16/10/1813	<i>Sally</i>		schooner	HMS <i>Loire</i>
19/10/1813	<i>Alert</i>		sloop	HMS <i>Borer</i>
20/10/1813	<i>Dispatch</i>	(recap)	brig	HMS <i>Albion</i>
21/10/1813	<i>Betsey &amp; Jane</i>		schooner	HMS <i>Majestic</i>
25/10/1813	<i>Hoppett</i>		brig	HMS <i>Emulous</i>
25/10/1813	<i>Telemachus</i>	(recap)	brig	HMS <i>Narcissus</i>
27/10/1813	<i>William</i>		schooner	HMS <i>Paz</i>
28/10/1813	<i>Paris</i>	(recap)	bark	HMS <i>Ring Dove</i>
29/10/1813	<i>John &amp; Mary</i>	(recap)	brig	
03/11/1813	<i>Industry</i>		schooner	
03/11/1813	<i>Peggy</i>		sloop	
04/11/1813	<i>Ann</i>	(recap)	brig	HMS <i>Jaseur</i>
11/11/1813	<i>Huntress</i>		sloop	HMS <i>Boxer</i>
14/11/1813	<i>Husaren</i>		brig	HMS <i>Jaseur</i>
14/11/1813	<i>Hero</i>		schooner	HMS <i>Belvidera</i>
23/11/1813	<i>Franklin</i>		sloop	HMS <i>Belvidera</i>
24/11/1813	<i>Venus</i>	(recap)	schooner	HMS <i>Rifleman</i>

27/11/1813	<i>Dove</i>	schooner	HMS <i>Martin</i>
01/12/1813	<i>General Marion</i>	schooner	HMS <i>Ramilies</i>
01/12/1813	<i>Rising Sun</i>	sloop	HMS <i>Loire</i>
02/12/1813	<i>Chili</i>	ship	HMS <i>Nimrod</i>
03/12/1813	<i>Manhattan</i>	sloop	HMS <i>Nimrod</i>
04/12/1813	<i>Gardner</i>	ship	HMS <i>Loire</i>
04/12/1813	<i>Catharine</i>	sloop	HMS <i>Majestic</i>
04/12/1813	<i>Policy</i> (recap)	ship	HMS <i>Loire</i>
06/12/1813	<i>Jane</i>	sloop	HMS <i>Junon</i>
08/12/1813	<i>West Indian</i>	schooner	HMS <i>Loire</i>
08/12/1813	<i>Julian</i>	schooner	HMS <i>Martin</i>
10/12/1813	<i>Rolla</i>	schooner	HMS <i>Loire</i>
11/12/1813	<i>Erie</i>	schooner	HMS <i>Sophie</i>
13/12/1813	<i>Emeline</i>	sloop	HMS <i>Boxer</i>
17/12/1813	<i>Calmar</i>	sloop	HMS <i>Curlew</i>

23/02/1814	<i>Alfred</i>	brig	HMS <i>L'Epervier</i>
05/03/1814	<i>Lizard</i>	schooner	HMS <i>Prometheus</i>
16/03/1814	<i>Margaret</i> (recap)	schooner	HMS <i>Maidstone</i>
23/03/1814	<i>San Joaquin</i>	brig	HMS <i>Albion</i>
28/03/1814	<i>Holstein</i>	schooner	HMS <i>Belvidera</i>
29/03/1814	<i>Esperanza</i>	schooner	HMS <i>Belvidera</i>
30/03/1814	<i>Union</i> (recap)	ship	HMS <i>Curlew</i>
09/04/1814	<i>Plutus</i> (recap)	ship	HMS <i>Curlew</i>
18/04/1814	<i>Sarah</i>	schooner	HMS <i>La Hogue</i>
21/04/1814	<i>New Zealander</i> (recap)	ship	HMS <i>Belvidera</i>
21/04/1814	<i>Minerva</i>	brig	HMS <i>La Hogue</i>
27/04/1814	<i>Pilgrim</i>	schooner	HMS <i>Bream</i>
30/04/1814	<i>Hannah</i> (recap)	brig	HMS <i>Martin</i>
04/05/1814	<i>Maria Francisca</i> (recap)	brig	HMS <i>Curlew</i>
09/05/1814	<i>Dantzig</i>	brig	HMS <i>Fantome</i>
13/05/1814	<i>Catalina</i>	brig	HMS <i>Superb</i>
13/05/1813	<i>Victor</i>	brig	HMS <i>La Hogue</i>
13/05/1814	<i>Experiment</i>	schooner	HMS <i>Bulwark</i>
15/05/1814	<i>Amelia</i>	sloop	HMS <i>Bulwark</i>
15/05/1814	<i>Tejo</i>	ship	HMS <i>La Hogue</i>
19/05/1814	<i>Candelaria</i>	sloop	HMS <i>Superb</i>
22/05/1814	<i>Dominica</i>	schooner	HMS <i>Majestic</i>
23/05/1814	<i>Quiz</i>	schooner	HMS <i>Nieman</i>
23/05/1814	<i>Model</i>	schooner	HMS <i>Nieman</i>
23/05/1814	<i>Clara</i>	schooner	HMS <i>Nieman</i>
25/05/1814	<i>Two Brothers</i> (recap)	ship	HMS <i>Curlew</i>
25/05/1814	<i>Ontario</i> (recap)	ship	HMS <i>Curlew</i>
25/05/1814	<i>Hussar</i>	schooner	HMS <i>Satum</i>
26/05/1814	<i>Thomas &amp; Sally</i> (recap)	brig	HMS <i>Curlew</i>
28/05/1814	<i>Diomede</i>	schooner	HMS <i>Rifleman</i>
29/05/1814	<i>Success</i> (recap)	brig	HMS <i>Charybdis</i>
31/05/1814	<i>Fame</i>	sloop	HMS <i>Endymion</i>
01/06/1814	<i>Mary</i> (recap)	ship	HMS <i>Martin</i>
04/06/1814	<i>Francisa de Paula</i>	brig	HMS <i>Nimrod</i>
04/06/1814	<i>Betsy</i>	schooner	HMS <i>Recruit</i>
05/06/1814	<i>Magdalena</i>	schooner	HMS <i>Martin</i>



06/06/1814	<i>Herculaneum</i>	brig	HMS <i>La Hogue</i>
07/06/1814	<i>Flash</i>	sloop	HMS <i>Nieman</i>
11/06/1814	<i>Orient</i>	schooner	HMS <i>Bulwark</i>
14/06/1814	<i>Tickler</i>	sloop	HMS <i>Satum</i>
16/06/1814	<i>Voador</i>	brig	HMS <i>La Hogue</i>
19/06/1814	<i>William</i> (recap)	schooner	HMS <i>Wasp</i>
22/06/1814	<i>Delesdemier</i>	schooner	HMS <i>Tenedos</i>
23/06/1814	<i>Ex-Bashaw</i>	sloop	HMS <i>Bulwark</i>
23/06/1814	<i>Commerce</i> (recap)	brig	HMS <i>Superb</i>
28/06/1814	<i>Voador</i>	brig	HMS <i>Nymphe</i>
30/06/1814	<i>Snap Dragon</i>	schooner	HMS <i>Martin</i>
30/06/1814	<i>Nighthawk</i>	schooner	HMS <i>Superb</i>
02/07/1814	<i>Morning Star</i>	sloop	HMS <i>Dragon</i>
02/07/1814	<i>Robust</i>	sloop	HMS <i>Dragon</i>
02/07/1814	<i>Eclipse</i>	sloop	HMS <i>Dragon</i>
01/07/1814	<i>Eliza</i>	schooner	HMS <i>Armide</i>
03/07/1814	<i>Eliza</i>	schooner	HMS <i>Rifleman</i>
03/07/1814	<i>Bee</i>	schooner	HMS <i>Nymphe</i>
10/07/1814	<i>Nelly</i> (recap)	schooner	HMS <i>Bulwark</i>
10/07/1814	<i>Prudence</i>	schooner	HMS <i>Acasta</i>
11/07/1814	<i>Rattlesnake</i>	brig	HMS <i>Leander</i>
11/07/1814	<i>Thom</i>	schooner	HMS <i>Bulwark</i>
12/07/1814	<i>Henry Gilder</i>	brig	HMS <i>Nieman</i>
13/07/1814	<i>Governor Shelby</i>	schooner	HMS <i>Narcissus</i>
13/07/1814	<i>Ranger</i>	schooner	HMS <i>Superb</i>
13/07/1814	<i>Union</i>	schooner	HMS <i>Rifleman</i>
14/07/1814	<i>Maria Frederica</i>	ship	HMS <i>Seahorse</i>
15/07/1814	<i>Sir Alexander Ball</i> (recap)	ship	HMS <i>Nieman</i>
16/07/1814	<i>Stephanie</i>	schooner	HMS <i>Acasta</i>
18/07/1814	<i>Antelope</i>	schooner	HMS <i>Tenedos</i>
19/07/1814	<i>Diana</i>	sloop	HMS <i>Acasta</i>
19/07/1814	<i>Brizi</i>	schooner	HMS <i>Dragon</i>
21/07/1814	<i>Tyger</i>	brig	HMS <i>Bulwark</i>
23/07/1814	<i>Fame</i>	sloop	HMS <i>Spencer</i>
23/07/1814	<i>Unity</i>	sloop	HMS <i>Asia</i>
24/07/1814	<i>Hazard</i>	schooner	HMS <i>Acasta</i>
26/07/1814	<i>Cidade de Leira</i>	brig	HMS <i>Fantome</i>
31/07/1814	<i>Defiance</i>	sloop	HMS <i>Superb</i>
02/08/1814	<i>Delaware</i>	schooner	HMS <i>Acasta</i>
02/08/1814	<i>Jane</i>	sloop	HMS <i>Acasta</i>
03/08/1814	<i>Victory</i>	schooner	HMS <i>Leander</i>
03/08/1814	<i>Hibemia</i>	schooner	HMS <i>Nieman</i>
05/08/1814	<i>Dalkarten</i>	brig	HMS <i>Leander</i>
06/08/1814	<i>Julian</i>	schooner	HMS <i>Borer</i>
07/08/1814	<i>Old Carpenter</i>	schooner	HMS <i>Spencer</i>
07/08/1814	<i>Enigheton</i>	brig	HMS <i>Nieman</i>
09/08/1814	<i>Anita</i>	brig	HMS <i>Leander</i>
09/08/1814	<i>Ida</i>	brig	HMS <i>Newcastle</i>
15/08/1814	<i>Herald</i>	schooner	HMS <i>Armide</i>
16/08/1814	<i>Invincible</i> (recap)	ship	HMS <i>Armide</i>
16/08/1814	<i>Helen</i> (recap)	ship	HMS <i>Wasp</i>
19/08/1814	<i>Wanderer</i>	snow	HMS <i>Tenedos</i>
20/08/1814	<i>Conde dos Arcos</i>	ship	HMS <i>Superb</i>
21/08/1814	<i>Judith</i>	sloop	HMS <i>L'Espoir</i>

24/08/1814	<i>Landrail</i>	(recap)	sloop	HMS <i>Wasp</i>
28/08/1814	<i>Bee</i>		schooner	HMS <i>Rifleman</i>
30/08/1814	<i>Enterprize</i>		schooner	HMS <i>Nieman</i>
31/08/1814	<i>Charlotte</i>	(recap)	brig	HMS <i>Wasp</i>
02/09/1814	<i>Favorite</i>	(recap)	brig	HMS <i>Albion</i>
03/09/1814	<i>William</i>		schooner	HMS <i>Albion</i>
03/09/1814	<i>Caledonian</i>	(recap)	ship	HMS <i>Nymph</i>
04/09/1814	<i>Two Brothers</i>		schooner	HMS <i>Nieman</i>
04/09/1814	<i>Maria</i>		schooner	HMS <i>Nimrod</i>
05/09/1814	<i>James</i>		schooner	HMS <i>Nieman</i>
06/09/1814	<i>Alexander</i>	(recap)	brig	HMS <i>Wasp</i>
07/09/1814	<i>Betsy</i>	(recap)	ship	HMS <i>Pylades</i>
08/09/1814	<i>Fox</i>		schooner	HMS <i>Bacchante</i>
10/09/1814	<i>Betsy</i>		schooner	HMS <i>Albion</i>
13/09/1814	<i>Nancy</i>	(recap)	brig	HMS <i>Pylades</i>
15/09/1814	<i>Vestal</i>		ship	HMS <i>Dragon</i>
18/09/1814	<i>Daedalus</i>		schooner	HMS <i>Nieman</i>
18/09/1814	<i>Perserverance</i>		sloop	HMS <i>Bacchante</i>
21/09/1814	<i>Albion</i>	(recap)	brig	HMS <i>Jaseur</i>
26/09/1814	<i>Good Hope</i>		schooner	HMS <i>Loire</i>
28/09/1814	<i>Sarah</i>	(recap)	schooner	HMS <i>Maidstone</i>
30/09/1814	<i>Cod Hook</i>	(recap)	ship	HMS <i>Spencer</i>
04/10/1814	<i>Tickler</i>		schooner	HMS <i>Neiman</i>
06/10/1814	<i>Mary</i>	(recap)	schooner	HMS <i>Wasp</i>
11/10/1814	<i>William</i>	(recap)	brig	HMS <i>Armide</i>
20/10/1814	<i>Saucy Jack</i>		schooner	HMS <i>Saracen</i>
22/10/1814	<i>Amazon</i>	(recap)	ship	HMS <i>Bulwark</i>
23/10/1814	<i>Eagle</i>		schooner	HMS <i>Narcissus</i>
23/10/1814	<i>Harlequin</i>		schooner	HMS <i>Bulwark</i>
24/10/1814	<i>Black Swan</i>		brig	HMS <i>Maidstone</i>
26/10/1814	<i>Lively</i>		sloop	HMS <i>St Lawrence</i>
27/10/1814	<i>Mentor</i>	(recap)	ship	HMS <i>Maidstone</i>
30/10/1814	<i>Halifax Packet</i>	(recap)	brig	HMS <i>Bulwark</i>
01/11/1814	<i>Macdonough</i>		brig	HMS <i>Bacchante</i>
05/11/1814	<i>Charles</i>	(recap)	brig	HMS <i>Satum</i>
05/11/1814	<i>Theodore</i>		brig	HMS <i>Satum</i>
08/11/1814	<i>General Putnam</i>		schooner	HMS <i>Leander</i>
09/11/1814	<i>Jane</i>	(recap)	brig	HMS <i>Maidstone</i>
19/11/1814	<i>Hero</i>		sloop	HMS <i>Tenedos</i>
23/11/1814	<i>Fermina</i>		ship	HMS <i>Maidstone</i>
24/11/1814	<i>Superb</i>		brig	HMS <i>Spencer</i>
01/12/1814	<i>Three Williams</i>	(recap)	brig	HMS <i>Arab</i>
08/12/1814	<i>Lady Prevost</i>	(recap)	brig	HMS <i>Nimrod</i>
24/12/1814	<i>Armistice</i>		schooner	HMS <i>Junon</i>
03/01/1815	<i>Guerriere</i>		brig	HMS <i>Junon</i>
22/01/1815	<i>Tomahawk</i>		schooner	HMS <i>Bulwark</i>
24/01/1815	<i>Joseph &amp; Mary</i>		brig	HMS <i>Bulwark</i>
23/02/1815	<i>Margaret</i>	(recap)	brig	HMS <i>Bulwark</i>
26/02/1815	<i>Rhoda</i>		schooner	HMS <i>Bulwark</i>
07/03/1815	<i>Legal Tender</i>	(recap)	brig	HMS <i>Spencer</i>
19/03/1815	<i>Thistle</i>	(recap)	schooner	HMS <i>Cossack</i>
26/03/1815	<i>Louisa</i>	(recap)	brig	HMS <i>Maidstone</i>

Source: Kert F. *Prize and Prejudice: Privateering and Naval Prize in Atlantic Canada in the War of 1812*, Research in Maritime History No.11, International Maritime Economic History Association, St John's, Newfoundland, 1997. Adapted from Appendix 1, pp.160-203.

Appendix A: Table 2(a).

Named American Vessels Blockaded, Taken or Destroyed by Dec.1813.

<i>Adams</i>	36	blockaded July 1813, burned Hampden, Penobscot, Sept.1814
<i>Argus</i> - brig	16	captured 14/8/13 by HMS <i>Pelican</i> .
<i>Chesapeake</i>	38	captured off Boston 1/6/13 by HMS <i>Shannon</i>
<i>Congress</i>	38	blockaded from Dec.1813, Portsmouth, New Hampshire.
<i>Constellation</i>	38	blockaded from 4/2/13 in Elizabeth River, Norfolk, Virginia.
<i>Constitution</i>	44	blockaded in Boston July 1813, escaped January 1814
<i>Essex</i>	32	escaped into Pacific July 1813 , destroyed March 1814 off Valparaiso.
<i>Hornet</i>	18	blockaded from 1/6/13, escaped January 1814.
<i>Nautilus</i>	14	captured 16/7/12 by HMS <i>Shannon</i> .
<i>Macedonian</i>	38	blockaded from 1/6/13 in New London
<i>Ontario</i>	22	blockaded at Baltimore for duration, ship-sloop.
<i>President</i>	44	escaped April 1813, re-blockaded until 4/12/13,
<i>Siren</i>	--	blockaded at Boston from 17/6/13
<i>United States</i>	44	blockaded from 1/6/13 in New London.
<i>Vixen</i>	14	captured 22/11/12 by HMS <i>Southampton</i> , lost 27/11/12.
<i>Vixen</i>	18	captured 25/12/13 by HMS <i>Belvidera</i> .

Appendix A: Table: 2(b).

Named American Vessels Blockaded, Taken or Destroyed \* by July 1814.

<i>*Constellation</i>	38	blockaded from 4 Feb. 1813 in Norfolk/Elizabeth River.
<i>*United States</i>	44	blockaded from 1 June 1813 in New London.
<i>*Macedonian</i>	38	blockaded from 1 June 1813 in New London
<i>Hornet</i>	18	blockaded from 1 June 1813, but escaped January 1814
<i>*President</i>	44	blockaded Dec 1813 New Yk, escaped 4 Dec 1814, and re-taken 15 Jan 1815.
<i>*Congress</i>	38	blockaded from Dec 1813, Portsmouth, New Hampshire.
<i>*Constitution</i>	44	blockaded in Boston in July 1813.
<i>*Essex</i>	32	blockaded in July 1813 - March 1814, destroyed off Valparaiso.
<i>*Adams</i>	36	blockaded July 1813, burned at Hampden, Penobscot Sept '14.
<i>*Chesapeake</i>	38	captured 1 June 1813 by HMS <i>Shannon</i> , (Capt. Broke).
<i>Columbia</i>	55	under construction when burned in Washington Navy Yard 24/25 August 1814.
<i>*Argus - brig</i>	16	captured 14 August 1813 by HMS Pelican.
<i>Argus - sloop</i>		under construction when burned in Washington Navy Yard.
<i>Boston</i>		decayed beyond economic repair, burned at Washington NYd.
<i>New York</i>		decayed beyond economic repair burned at Washington NYd.
<i>*Ontario</i>	22	blockaded at Baltimore for duration, ship sloop.
<i>*Erie</i>	22	blockaded at Annapolis March 1814, ship sloop.
<i>*Nautilus</i>	14	16 July 1812, taken by Broke of <i>Shannon</i> .
<i>*Vixen</i>	14	captured 22 Nov 1812, taken by <i>Southampton</i> , lost 27 Nov 1812
<i>John Adams</i>	22	undergoing major refit, crew sent to Lakes, late 1813.
<i>Independence</i>	74	launched Charlestown July 1814. Uncompleted at end of war.

Source: NMM:LBK/2, Warren to Melville, *San Domingo*, River Potomac 22<sup>nd</sup> July 1813.

Appendix A Table 3: Admiralty Office 7 August 1812

A list of Ships and Vessels on the West Indian and American Stations

Rate	Names	No of Guns	Commanders
On the North American Station			
3	<i>St Domingo</i>	74	Captain Gill, Charles.
3	<i>Africa</i>	64	Captain Bastard, John.
5	<i>Acasta</i>	44	Captain Kerrs, Th Robert.
5	<i>Guerriere</i>	38	Captain Dacres, Jas R.
5	<i>Spartan</i>	38	Captain Brenton, Ed'd Pelham
5	<i>Shannon</i>	38	Captain Broke, J B Vere
5	<i>Nymphe</i>	38	Captain Epworth, T Pr
5	<i>Junon</i>	38	Captain Sanders, James
5	<i>Belvidera</i>	36	Captain Byron, Rich'd.
5	<i>Maidstone</i>	36	Captain Burdett, Geo.
5	<i>Rolus</i>	32	Captain Townsend, Lord Jas.6
5	<i>Tartarus</i>	20	Captain Pasco, John
Sloop	<i>Indian</i>	16	Captain Jane, Henry
Sloop	<i>Emulous</i>	16	Captain Godfrey, Wm Howe
Sloop	<i>Atalante</i>	16	Captain Hickey, Fred'k
Sloop	<i>Rattler</i>	16	Captain Gordon, Alex'r
Sloop	<i>Goree</i>	16	Captain Byng, H'n Dilkes
Sloop	<i>Recruit</i>	16	Captain Senhouse, Humph F.
Sloop	<i>Morgiana</i>	16	Captain Scott, David
Sloop	<i>Sylph</i>	16	Lieut. Eneyd
Sloop	<i>Magnet</i>	14	Recommended to be employed in the West Indies as not being fit for the American Seas.
Sloop	<i>Martin</i>	16	Captain Evans, John
Sloop	<i>Coquette</i>	18	Captain Simpson, John
Sloop	<i>Colibre</i>	14	Captain Thompson, John
Sloop	<i>Martine</i>	16	Captain Debourcy, Nerion
Gunbrig	<i>Plumper</i>	12	Lieut Dray, J.
Gunbrig	<i>Paz</i>	12	Lieut Dumaresq, Perry
Gunbrig	<i>Juniper</i>	10	Lieut Napal Nath'l
Gunbrig	<i>Cuttle</i>	4	Lieut Saunders K.
Gunbrig	<i>Chub</i>	4	Lieut Nisbett Sam'l
Gunbrig	<i>Bream</i>	4	Lieut Simpson
Stre Vess	<i>Ruby</i>	18	Commodore Evans A.J.
Stre Vess	<i>Centurion</i>	14	Lieut Kinsman
Leeward Islands			
3	<i>Dragon</i>	74	Captain J.A. Collier.
5	<i>Statira</i>	38	Captain Stackpole H
5	<i>Tribune</i>	36	Captain Reynolds, George.
5	<i>Orpheus</i>	36	Captain Pigot, Hugh.

6	<i>Cherub</i>	20	Captain Tucker, Tho's Tudor
6	<i>Lightning</i>	20	Captain Doyle B.C.
Sloops	<i>Demarara</i>	16	Captain Smith Wm. H.
Sloops	<i>Amaranthe</i>	16	Captain Pringle Geo.
Sloops	<i>Surinam</i>	16	Captain Hath S.E.
Sloops	<i>Scorpion</i>	16	Captain Giles, Robert.
Sloops	<i>Peruvian</i>	16	Captain Dickinson
Sloops	<i>Ringdove</i>	16	Captain Dowes William
Sloops	<i>Charybdis</i>	16	Captain Dephane Jas
Sloops	<i>Arachne</i>	16	Captain Chambers, Samuel
Sloops	<i>Spider</i>	14	Captain Willock, Tim'y Geo.
Sloops	<i>Dominica</i>	14	Captain Hocking, Robert.
Sloops	<i>Opossum</i>	10	Captain Holrige, Thos.
Schooner	<i>Swaggerer</i>	14	Lieut. Evelyn, George J.
Schooner	<i>Elizabeth</i>	12	Lieut. Dwyer, Edw. J.
Schooner	<i>Netley</i>	12	Lieut. Jackson.
Schooner	<i>Laura</i>	10	Lieut. Hunter Chas. Newton
Schooner	<i>Morning</i>	10	Lieut. Steele J.
Schooner	<i>Maria</i>	10	Lieut. Kippen
Schooner	<i>Subtle</i>	10	Lieut. Browne Chas.
Schooner	<i>Dallahoo</i>	4	Lieut. King, Norfolk
Guards'p	<i>Liberty</i>	-	Lieut Guise G.
Troop-	<i>Vestal</i>	14	Capt. Decker
Ships	<i>Mercury</i>	16	Capt. Milbrand

#### Jamaica

3	<i>Polyphemus</i>	64	ordered home	Capt Douglas
5	<i>Thetis</i>	38		Capt Byam Wm. Hon.
5	<i>Arethusa</i>	38	Expected	Capt Coffin.
5	<i>Southampton</i>	32		Capt Yeo, Sir J.L.
6	<i>Barbados</i>	28		Capt Rushbrook Edw'd
6	<i>Garland</i>	22		Capt Huskisson, Tho's
6	<i>Cyane</i>	22		Capt Forrest, Thomas.
6	<i>Herald</i>	20		Capt Jackson, Geo.
6	<i>Fawn</i>	20		Capt Fellowes Tho.
Sloops	<i>Moselle</i>	16		Capt Mowbray, Geo.
Sloops	<i>Sappho</i>	16		Capt O'Grady, Hayes.
Sloops	<i>Brazen</i>	18		Capt Davies R. Plummer
Sloops	<i>Saphire</i>	16		Capt Haynes Hon. J.
Sloops	<i>Frolic</i>	16		Capt Whingates Thos.
Sloops	<i>Rhodian</i>	10		Capt Ross, John.
Schooner	<i>Decouveste</i>	12		Lieut Williams R'd
Schooner	<i>Variable</i>	8		Lieut Yates R.B.
Rec'g Ship	<i>Shark</i>	16	(deleted)	Capt. Roberts

Totals

Total at Halifax.....	33
Leeward Islands.....	28
Jamaica .....	18
	79

Source: NMM: Hulbert Papers: HUL/18.





Chesapeake

<i>Albion</i>	74
<i>Asia</i>	74
<i>Severn</i>	40
<i>Hebrus</i>	36
<i>Iasire</i>	18
<i>Manly</i>	14
<i>Thistle</i>	14
<i>Borer</i>	[12]
<i>Etna</i>	bomb

Cape Hatteras

<i>Lacedemonian</i>	[38]
<i>Peacock</i>	18
<i>Morgeana</i>	18
<i>Primrose</i>	18
<i>Dotal</i>	18
1 Frigate	
2 Sloops	to be added

Bahamas & Gulf of Mexico

<i>Chesapeake</i>	38
<i>Hermes</i>	20
<i>Sophie</i>	18
<i>Childers</i>	18
<i>Shelburne</i>	12
<i>Cockchafer</i>	4

Quebec

<i>Indian</i>	[14] *
<i>le Corne</i>	to Halifax
To go home	
<i>La Hogue</i>	[74]
<i>Orpheus</i>	[38]

Halifax for Repair

<i>Martin</i>	[14] *
---------------	--------

St Lawrence

Source: BJL: UH: Hotham Papers DDHO/7/4, IV. Spelling of original retained. \* indicates double counting, each included once.

## Appendix B

Appendix B: Table 1.


United States Imports 1800 – 1815 in \$'s

1800	93,252,768	1808	58,101,023
1801	113,363,511	1809	61,029,726
1802	78,333,333	1810	89,366,069
1803	65,666,666	1811	57,887,952
1804	87,000,000	1812	78,788,540
1805	125,525,175	1813	22,177,812
1806	136,561,730	1814	12,967,859
1807	144,740,342	1815	85,356,680

Source: North D. *United States Balance of Payments 1790–1860. Trends in the American Economy in the Nineteenth Century*. National Bureau of Economic Research Conference on Research in Income and Wealth, vol. 24. New York, Princeton Univ. Press, 1960, re-printed New York, Arno Press, 1975. pp. 591-2, Table A-2, Appendix A.

Appendix B: Graph 1.

United States Imports 1800 – 1815 in \$'s



Source: North D. *United States Balance of Payments 1790–1860. Trends in the American Economy in the Nineteenth Century*. National Bureau of Economic Research Conference on Research in Income and Wealth, vol. 24. New York, Princeton Univ. Press, 1960, re-printed New York, Arno Press, 1975. pp. 591-2, Table A-2, Appendix A.

## Appendix B: Table 2

### Availability of United States Import Statistics:

No complete import figures were compiled in the United States before 1821. No value figures, only quantities, were kept on imports subject to specific rates of duty ranging from 2.5 to 40%, nor was information gathered on duty free imports. Value figures were gathered only on imports subject to ad valorem rates of duty, such as wines, spirits, tea, coffee, sugar and cocoa. Allen and Ely describe total figures for 1802-1820 as, "although apparently accurate...estimated many years later"(1) North notes that total import figures for 1789-1820 were officially overhauled and published in the Secretary of the Treasury's Report on Finance in 1835, although apparently unseen by Pitkin.(2) Not until 1854 did De Bow tabulate complete import figures, still published by the United States Bureau of the Census in 1975, reduced to one decimal place, probably to avoid charges of spurious accuracy, and puzzlingly described there as "revealing, and despite their deficiencies, reliable."(3) Variations notwithstanding, import figures indicate the pace and change in America's foreign trade during the war of 1812-15, and invite causal analysis. North's definitive American import statistics for 1812-14 crucially show that British maritime commercial blockade, protected by British naval blockade and intermittently compounded by poorly enforced and widely evaded American legislative trade restrictions, deprived Madison's administration of crucial customs duties, almost its sole source of revenue until January 1814.(4)

### Sources:

1. Allen G. and Ely J. *International Trade Statistics*. New York. John Wiley and Sons. 1953. p.269.
2. North D. *United States Balance of Payments 1790-1860: Trends in the American Economy in the 19<sup>th</sup> Century*.p.588. Conference on Research in Income and Wealth. vol. 24. National Bureau of Economic Research. New York. Princeton Univ. Press 1960, re-printed New York. Arno Press 1975.
3. De Bow J. *Statistical View of the United States*. Washington, A Nicholson, 1854, Table CCV, p.185, re-printed in *Historical Statistics of the United States from Colonial Times to 1970*. Washington. Bureau of the Census. 1975. p.876.
4. North D. op.cit. Table A-2, pp.591-2.

Note: This appendix is based on Appendix 4.1, p.ii, in Arthur B. "The Role of Blockade in the Anglo-American Naval War of 1812-14", unpublished MA dissertation, University of Greenwich, October 2002, p.94.

Appendix B: Table 3


Computed or Declared Values of United Kingdom Overseas Trade  
1796 – 1814, in £m.

	Imports	Domestic Exports	+ Re-exports	= Total Exports
1796	39.6	30.1	8.5	38.6
1800	62.3	37.7	14.7	52.4
1806	53.3	40.9	9.2	50.1
1807	53.8	37.2	8.3	45.5
1808	51.5	37.3	6.5	43.8
1809	73.7	47.4	14.3	61.7
1810	88.5	48.4	12.5	60.9
1811	50.7	32.9	6.7	39.6
1812	56.0	41.7	9.1	50.8
1813	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
1814	80.8	45.5	24.8	70.3

Source: Mitchell B. and Deane P. *Abstract of British Historical Statistics*. Camb. Univ. Press 1962. Table: Overseas Trade 2, current Prices of Overseas Trade UK 1796 – 1853.

Appendix B: Graph 3

Computed or Declared Values of U.K. Overseas Trade  
1796-1814



Source: Mitchell B. and Deane P. *Abstract of British Historical Statistics*. Camb. Univ. Press 1962. Table: Overseas Trade 2, current Prices of Overseas Trade UK 1796 – 1853.

**Appendix B: Table 4.**

**United States Net Customs Revenue in \$'s 1809-14 to 31 December annually.  
(1)**


1809	6,852,577
1810	12,722,920
1811	8,223,715
1812	13,331,467
1813	6,892,925
1814	4,694,318

Source: Seybert A. *Statistical Annals*. Philadelphia, T. Dobson, 1818, part of 'A Statement Exhibiting the gross and net amount of ad valorem and specific duties on Goods, Wares and Merchandise imported into the United States from 1<sup>st</sup> January 1794 to 31<sup>st</sup> December 1814', p.494.

Note 1: When allowance is made for the doubled rate of duty after 1 July 1812, the net customs revenue figures of both Pitkin and North follow closely those of Seybert.

Appendix B: Graph 4.

United States Net Customs Revenue in \$'s 1809-14 to 31 December annually.  
(1)



Source: Seybert A. *Statistical Annals*. Philadelphia, T. Dobson, 1818, part of 'A Statement Exhibiting the gross and net amount of ad valorem and specific duties on Goods, Wares and Merchandise imported into the United States from 1<sup>st</sup> January 1794 to 31<sup>st</sup> December 1814', p.494.

Note 1: When allowance is made for the doubled rate of duty after 1 July 1812, the net customs revenue figures of both Pitkin and North follow closely those of Seybert.



## Appendix B: Table 5

### United States National Debt 1805 – 1815 in \$'s


1805	86,400,000	
1806	82,300,000	
1807	75,700,000	
1808	69,200,000	
1809	65,100,000	
1810	57,000,000	
1811	53,000,000	
1812	48,000,000	
1813	45,200,000	
1814	63,545,831 (1)	Estimated by Jos Peason NC to be \$105m by end of 1814
1815	119,635,000 (2)	

Source: Dewey D. *Financial History of the United States*. 12<sup>th</sup> ed. New York. A.M. Kelly 1968. pp.113, 125.

1. Calculated from additions since 1813. Seybert A. op.cit. p. 772.
2. \$127,334,000 by end of calendar year. *Historical Statistics of the United States* Washington. US Bureau of the Census. 1975. vol.2, p.1140.

## Appendix B: Graph 5

### United States National Debt 1805-1815 in \$'s



Source: Dewey D. *Financial History of the United States*. 12<sup>th</sup> ed. New York. A.M. Kelly 1968. pp.113, 125.

Appendix B: Table 6.

United States Receipts and Expenditure 1812-13 in \$m.

	Customs Revenue	Internal Revenue	Total Tax Revenue	Misc. Receipts	Total Recpts (1)	Expen -diture	Deficit
1812	8.9	-	8.9	0.8	9.7	20.3	10.6(2)
1813	13.2	-	13.2	1.1	14.3	31.6	17.3

Source: Dewey D. *Financial History of the United States*. first pub. 1903. 12<sup>th</sup> ed. pub. 1934, re-printed 1968. New York. A. Kelly. pp.141-2.

1. Excluding borrowing.

2. Clearly \$10.6m by subtraction, although given by Dewey as \$10.4m.

Appendix B: Table 7

Boston Sugar Prices 1813-1815 in \$ per cwt of 100lbs.

Date			Price	
<b>First Period: New England subject to Embargo but not British commercial Blockade.</b>				
5	August	1813	31.00	
7	August	1813	31.00	
15	December	1813	24.50	
17	December	1813		Madison's Second Embargo endorsed by Congress
29	January	1814	18.00	
2	February	1814	19.50	
7	March	1814	18.50	
15	March	1814	18.50	40.3% price fall since introduction of 2 <sup>nd</sup> Embargo
19	March	1814	22.50	
30	March	1814		Madison calls in Congress for suspension of Embargo
<b>Second Period: New England subject to neither Embargo nor British commercial Blockade</b>				
2	April	1814		Suspension of Embargo learned of in Boston
14	April	1814		Repeal by Congress of Embargo and Non Importation Acts
16	April	1814	15.32	31.9 % price fall since 19 March 1814
25	April	1814		British commercial blockade extended to New England
26	April	1814	15.75	
<b>Third Period: New England subject to British commercial Blockade only</b>				
5	May	1814		British commercial blockade of NE known of in Boston
9	May	1814	15.50	
16	May	1814	16.00	
14	July	1814	17.50	Credit sale price still available
16	August	1814	18.00	Cash price
22	August	1814	18.00	
23	August	1814	18.00	
6	October	1814	19.50	Cash price only quoted from this point
19	October	1814	19.50	
20	October	1814	20.00	
22	October	1814	20.00	
27	October	1814	22.50	45.2% price rise since commercial blockade known of in NE
17	February	1815		Treaty of Ghent ratified in Washington
24	February	1815	15.00	

Source: JCBL: Prices from Brown & Ives Corr: Box 160, ff.9-10, from Charles Greene, Brown & Ives Boston agent to Thomas Poynton Ives, of Brown & Ives, Providence, R. I., on dates given.

## Appendix B: Table 8

Boston Molasses Prices 1813-1814 in \$'s per gallon.

First Period: New England subject to Embargo but not British commercial Blockade

Date			Price	
20	November	1813	1.20	
13	December	1813	1.24	
17	December	1813		Madison's Second Embargo endorsed by Congress
23	December	1813	1.47	
29	January	1814	1.30	
2	February	1814	0.96	
3	March	1814	0.86.5	
12	March	1814	0.92.5	
19	March	1814	0.94.5	
25	March	1814	0.98	
30	March	1814		Madison calls in Congress for suspension of Embargo

Second Period: New England subject to neither Embargo nor British commercial Blockade

2	April	1814		Suspension of Embargo learned of in Boston
14	April	1814		Repeal of Embargo and Non Importation Acts by Congress
16	April	1814	0.77	47.6% price fall since 2 <sup>nd</sup> Embargo passed in Congress
25	April	1814	0.63.5	British commercial blockade extended to New England
26	April	1814	0.60.5	

Third Period: New England subject to British commercial Blockade only

5	May	1814	0.68	cash price, British commercial blockade known of in Boston
21	May	1814	0.74.5	
9	July	1814	0.89	
14	July	1814	0.95	cash price only quoted from this point
12	August	1814	0.91.25	
1	September	1814	1.00	
14	November	1814	1.43	110.3% price rise since commercial blockade of NE applied
22	November	1814	1.40.5	
29	November	1814	1.40	
19	December	1814	1.28	
29	December	1814	1.32	94.1 % price rise since commercial blockade of NE

Source: JCBL: Prices from Brown & Ives Corr: Box 160, ff.9-10, from Charles Greene, Brown & Ives Boston agent to Thomas Poynton Ives, of Brown & Ives, Providence, R. I., on dates given.

Appendix B: Table 9

Boston Prices of Muscovado Sugar 1813 - 1814, in \$'s per cwt of 100lbs.

First Period: New England subject to Embargo but not British commercial Blockade

Date			Price	
17	December	1813		Madison's Second Embargo endorsed by Congress
23	December	1813	28.50	Credit sales available
1	March	1814	16.88	
25	March	1814	18.82	34% price fall since Embargo ratified in Congress
30	March	1814		Madison calls in Congress for suspension of Embargo

Second Period: New England subject to neither Embargo nor British commercial Blockade

2	April	1814		Suspension of Embargo learned of in Boston
14	April	1814		Repeal by Congress of Embargo and Non Importation Acts
25	April	1814		British commercial blockade extended to New England

Third Period: New England subject to British commercial Blockade only

5	May	1814		British commercial blockade of NE known of in Boston
19	May	1814	16.13	43.4 % price fall since Embargo ratified in Congress
21	May	1814	15.75	
9	July	1814	17.00	
19	August	1814	18.00	
17	October	1814	26.50	64.3% price rise since British commercial blockade of NE
20	October	1814	19.94	
3	November	1814	18.00	
9	November	1814	19.63	
15	November	1814	22.44	39.1% price rise since British commercial blockade of NE
16	November	1814	20.00	
22	November	1814	19.38	
23	November	1814	19.00	Cash sales available only
29	November	1814	16.63	
29	December	1814	18.13	

Source: JCBL: Prices from Brown & Ives Corr: Box 160, ff.9 -10, from Charles Greene, Brown & Ives Boston agent to Thomas Poynton Ives, of Brown & Ives, Providence, R. I., on dates given.

Appendix B: Table 10

Boston Average Coffee Prices in cents per lb

29	July	1813		Embargo imposed by Executive Order
11	November	1813	0.25	
20	November	1813	0.27	
15	December	1813	0.31	
17	December	1813		Embargo passed in Congress
23	December	1813	0.33	Av. Prices raised 32% by Embargo
27	January	1814	0.28	
29	January	1814	0.23	
2	February	1814	0.25	
25	March	1814	0.23	Av. Prices fall 30.3% before suspension.
30	March	1814		Embargo suspended
14	April	1814		Embargo repealed
16	April	1814	0.22	
26	April	1814	0.21	
29	April	1814	0.19	
3	May	1814		British Blockade of New England known in Boston.
26	May	1814	0.21	
9	July	1814	0.23	
3	August	1814	0.25	
1	September	1814	0.24	
29	September	1814	0.23	
6	October	1814	0.26	Av. Prices raised 36.8% by British blockade
16	November	1814	0.22	Cash prices after this date
23	November	1814	0.20	
29	November	1814	0.20	
19	December	1814	0.20	
29	December	1814	0.21	

Source: JCBL: Prices from Brown & Ives Corr: Box 160, ff.9- 10, from Charles Greene, Brown & Ives Boston agent to Thomas Poynton Ives, Providence, R.I., on dates given.

Appendix B: Table 11

Boston Average Hyson Tea Prices in \$

20	November	1812		
26	November	1812		
8	January	1813		
14	May	1813	1.74	
26	May	1813		
29	May	1813		
29	July	1813		Embargo by Executive Order
7	October	1813		
17	November	1813		
30	November	1813		
8	December	1813	1.80	
15	December	1813	2.00	15% price rise since Embargo imposed
17	December	1813		Congress passed Embargo
4	January	1814		
1	February	1814		
2	February	1814		
30	March	1814		Embargo suspended
14	April	1814		Embargo repealed
16	April	1814		
29	April	1814	1.60	20% price fall since Embargo suspended
3	May	1814		British Blockade of New England known in Boston.
1	September	1814		
29	September	1814	2.25	
6	October	1814	2.15	
20	October	1814	2.27	
1	November	1814	2.26	
8	November	1814	2.20	
9	November	1814	2.80	75% price rise under Blockade of NE.
16	November	1814	2.06	Cash prices only after this date.
23	November	1814	2.00	
29	November	1814	2.16	
1	December	1814		

Source: JCBL: Prices from Brown & Ives Corr: Box 160, ff.9- 10, from Charles Greene, Brown & Ives Boston agent to Thomas Poynton Ives, Providence, R.I., on dates given.

Appendix B: Table 12

Boston Average Souchon Tea Prices in \$

20	November	1812	0.88	
26	November	1812		
8	January	1813		
14	May	1813	1.15	
26	May	1813	1.13	
29	May	1813	1.15	
29	July	1813		Embargo imposed by Executive Order
7	October	1813	1.50	
17	November	1813	1.50	
30	November	1813	1.50	
8	December	1813	1.50	
15	December	1813		
17	December	1813		Embargo passed by Congress. Av prices raised 42.6% by Embargo
4	January	1814	1.64	
1	February	1814		
2	February	1814		
30	March	1814		Embargo suspended
14	April	1814		Embargo & Non-Importation Act repealed.
16	April	1814	1.06	
29	April	1814	1.07	Av. Prices fall 34.8% as Embargo lifted.
3	May	1814		British Blockade of New England known in Boston.
1	September	1814	1.60	
29	September	1814		
6	October	1814	1.60	
20	October	1814		
1	November	1814		
8	November	1814	1.60	Blockade raises av. prices by 49.5%
9	November	1814	1.50	Cash price only after this date
16	November	1814		
23	November	1814		
29	November	1814		
1	December	1814		

Source: JCBL: Prices from Brown & Ives Corr: Box 160, ff.9- 10, from Charles Greene, Brown & Ives Boston agent to Thomas Poynton Ives, Providence, R.I., on dates given.



Appendix B: Table 13

Boston Average Other Tea Prices in \$

20	November	1812		
26	November	1812	0.75	
8	January	1813	0.83	
14	May	1813	1.14	
26	May	1813		
29	May	1813		
29	July	1813		Embargo
7	October	1813		
17	November	1813		
30	November	1813		
8	December	1813		
15	December	1813		
17	December	1813		Congress passed Embargo
4	January	1814	1.71	
1	February	1814	1.32	
2	February	1814	1.40	
30	March	1814		Embargo suspended
14	April	1814		Embargo repealed
16	April	1814		
29	April	1814		27.5% fall since embargo suspended
3	May	1814		British Blockade of New England known in Boston.
1	September	1814		
29	September	1814	1.28	
6	October	1814		
20	October	1814		
1	November	1814		
8	November	1814	1.60	
9	November	1814	1.59	Cash price only after this date
16	November	1814		
23	November	1814		
29	November	1814	2.00	61% price rise under Blockade of NE.
1	December	1814	1.47	

Source: JCBL: Prices from Brown & Ives Corr: Box 160, ff.9- 10, from Charles Greene, Brown & Ives Boston agent to Thomas Poynton Ives, Providence, R.I., on dates given.

Appendix B: Table 14

Index Numbers of 116 United States Wholesale Commodity Prices,

Monthly: 1807-1819. 1910 = 100.


Year	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June	July	Aug	Sept	Oct	Nov	Dec
1807	131	133	132	130	131	130	129	129	128	127	126	
1808	124	119	115	112	112	112	112	113	113	113	117	121
1809	124	126	135	133	132	132	129	129	130	127	129	128
1810	128	130	128	129	131	130	133	132	134	133	133	131
1811	132	128	127	127	128	124	124	126	124	125	124	122
1812	127	129	128	126	122	125	128	133	135	137	142	144
1813	150	152	153	157	160	158	159	<b>161</b>	<b>164</b>	<b>171</b>	<b>178</b>	<b>186</b>
<b>1814</b>	<b>186</b>	<b>184</b>	<b>182</b>	<b>182</b>	<b>179</b>	<b>179</b>	<b>178</b>	<b>177</b>	<b>177</b>	<b>183</b>	<b>187</b>	<b>193</b>
<b>1815</b>	<b>193</b>	<b>185</b>	<b>176</b>	<b>166</b>	<b>164</b>	165	163	165	166	166	168	163
1816	160	160	158	151	150	150	150	149	148	144	145	149
1817	152	155	156	156	157	154	149	153	147	145	144	146
1818	149	151	149	144	142	144	142	147	146	151	149	145
1819	141	137	134	130	125	124	121	119	119	120	117	114

Source: Warren G and Pearson F. *Wholesale Prices for 213 Years, 1720 to 1932, Part 1; Wholesale Prices in the United States for 135 Years 1797 to 1932*. Ithica, New York, Cornell Univ. Agricultural Experimental Station, 1932. Table 2, p.8, Monthly Index Numbers of the Wholesale Prices of all Commodities.

Appendix B: Graph 14

Index Numbers of 116 United States Wholesale Commodity Prices,

Monthly: 1807-1819. 1910 = 100.



Source: Warren G and Pearson F. *Wholesale Prices for 213 Years, 1720 to 1932, Part 1; Wholesale Prices in the United States for 135 Years 1797 to 1932*. Ithica, New York, Cornell Univ Agricultural Experimental Station, 1932. Table 2, p.8, Monthly Index Numbers of the Wholesale Prices of all Commodities.

Appendix B: Table 15

Index Numbers of United States Wholesale Prices of All Commodities

with Variable Group Weights, 1720 to 1932.

1910 = 100


Whole Years 1800 –1820

1800	129	1811	126
1801	142	1812	131
1802	117	1813	162
1803	118	1814	182
1804	126	1815	170
1805	141	1816	151
1806	134	1817	151
1807	130	1818	147
1808	115	1819	125
1809	130	1820	106
1810	131		

Source: Warren G. and Pearson F. *Wholesale Prices for 213 Years, 1720 to 1932, Part 1, Wholesale Prices in the United States for 135 Years 1797 to 1932*. Ithica, New York, Cornell Univ. Agricultural Experimental Station, 1932. Table 1, p.6

Appendix B: Graph 15

Index Numbers of United States Wholesale Prices of All Commodities with Variable Group Weights, 1720 to 1932, 1910 = 100



Source: Warren G. and Pearson F. *Wholesale Prices for 213 Years, 1720 to 1932, Part 1, Wholesale Prices in the United States for 135 Years 1797 to 1932*. Ithica, New York, Cornell Univ. Agricultural Experimental Station, 1932. Table 1, p.6

Appendix B: Table 16

United States Exports 1805 – 15 in \$'s, from 1<sup>st</sup> October to 30<sup>th</sup> September annually.

	Total Exports	Re-exports
1805	95,566,021	53,179,000
1806	101,536,963	60,283,000
1807	108,343,150	108,343,150
1808	22,430,960	12,997,000
1809	52,203,233	20,797,000
1810	66,757,970	24,391,000
1811	61,316,833	16,022,000
1812	38,527,236	8,495, 000
1813	27,855,997	2,847,000
1814	6,927,441	145,000
1815	52,557,753	6,583,000

Source: Seyburt A. *Statistical Annals*. Philadelphia, T.Dobson, 1818, p.93.

Appendix B: Table 17

Total Foreign Trade: United States Imports and Exports Combined, 1805-15  
in \$'s.

	Imports (1)	+ Exports (2)	= Total
1805	125,525,000	95,566,021	221,091,021
1806	136,562,000	101,536,963	238,098,963
1807	144,740,000	108,343,150	253,083,150
1808	58,101,000	22,430,960	80,531,960
1809	61,030,000	52,203,233	113,233,233
1810	89,366,000	66,757,970	156,123,970
1811	57,888,000	61,316,833	119,204,833
1812	78,789,000	38,527,000	117,316,236
1813	22,178,000	27,855,997	50,033,997
1814	12,968,000	6,927,441	19,895,441
1815	85,357,000	52,557,753	137,914,753

Sources:-

1. North D. op.cit. pp. 591-2.
2. Seybert A. op.cit. p.93. North's export figures are almost identical to those of Seybert

Appendix B: Table 18.

Merchant Shipping Tonnage in United States Foreign Trade 1807-15.

	Total Tonnage in US Foreign Trade (1)	Tonnage of US Vessels in US Foreign Trade (2)	%age of US Vessels
1807	1,176,198	1,089,876	92.7
1809		910,059 (3)	
1810	986,750	906,434	91.9
1811	981,450	948,247	96.6
1812	715,098	667,999	93.4
1813	351,175	237,348	67.6
1814	107,928	56,626	53.3
1815	917,227	700,500	76.4

Sources:

1. Seybert A. *Statistical Annals* p.318
2. Pitkin T. *A Statistical View* p.363. Pitkin's figures are clearly based on duty paid tonnage.
3. ASP: Class IV, Commerce & navigation, vol. I; p.897.



Appendix B: Table 19.

Tonnage of United States Merchant Shipping, Registered, Enrolled and Employed on 31 December Annually 1813-14.

	Registered Tonnage	Reg. Tons Duty Paid	%age	Enrolled tonnage	Enr.tons Duty Paid	%age	Fishing Vessels Duty Paid
1813	674,853	233,966	37.4	471,109	252,440	53.6	18,522
1814	674,632	58,756	8.7	466,159	189,662	41.7	16,453

Source: American State Papers, Class IV, Commerce and Navigation. Washington, Gales and Seaton, vol. 1. p.1017. and vol. II, p.12.

Appendix B: Table 20.

United States Tax Revenue, Miscellaneous Receipts and Expenditure 1812-15  
in \$m.

	Customs Revenue	Internal Revenue	Direct Tax	Total Tax Revenue	Misc. Receipts	Total Receipts	Expen- diture	Deficit
1812	8.9	-	-	8.9	0.8	9.7	20.3	10.6 (2)
1813	13.2	-	-	13.2	1.1	14.3	31.6	17.3
1814	6.0	1.6	2.2	9.8	1.3	11.1	34.7	23.6
1815	7.3	4.7	2.1	14.1	1.5	15.6	32.9	17.3

Source: Dewey D. *Financial History of the United States*. first pub. 1903. 12<sup>th</sup> ed. pub. 1934, re-printed 1968. New York. A. Kelly. pp.141-2.

1. Excluding borrowing.
2. Clearly \$10.6m by subtraction, although given by Dewey as \$10.4m.

Appendix B: Table 21

Yields of U.S. Direct Tax and Internal Excise Duties 1814-15 in \$'s and %ages.

	Direct tax Imposed	Collected	%age	Internal Excise Duties Accrued	Collected	%age
1814	3m	2,219,497	73.98	3,262,197	1,910,995	58.57
1815	6m	2,162,673	36.04	6,242,504	4,976,530	79.76
Totals	9m	4,382,170	av.55.01	9,504,701	8,798,520	av.69.1

Source: adapted from Dewey D. op.cit. p.140, citing Ways & Means Comm. Rpt. 9 December 1817.

Appendix B: Table 22

US Total Revenue and Total Receipts as %age of Total Expenditure 1812-15.

	Total Tax Revenue as %age of Expenditure	Total Receipts as %age of Expenditure
1812	43.84	47.78
1813	41.77	45.25
1814	28.24	31.99
1815	42.86	47.42

Source: calculated from data in Dewey D. op.cit. p.142.

Appendix B: Table 23

Prices of United States New and Old 6% Stock in Philadelphia, 1812- 15, as  
%ages

New 6% Stock			Old 6% Stock		
1813	July	91 to 92	1813	July	95 to 96
1814	January	92.5 to 93	1814	January	95 to 96
1814	July	85 to 88.5	1814	July	88 to 90
1815	January	76 to 77	1815	January	78 to 80
1815	July	97.5	1815	July	98.5

Source: Seyburt A. *Statistical Annals* p.749. 'A Statement of the Prices quoted in Philadelphia for the evidence of the Public Debt.'

Appendix B: Table 24.


Composite Consumer Price Index 1800-1820, (1860=100)

1800	151	1806	147	1812	160	1818	153
1801	153	1807	139	1813	192	1819	153
1802	129	1808	151	1814	211	1820	141
1803	136	1809	148	1815	185		
1804	142	1810	148	1816	169		
1805	141	1811	158	1817	160		

Source: McCusker J. *Historical Price Index: Money Values in the Economy of the United States*. Worcester, American Antiquarian Society, 1992, p.326. Reprinted from *Proceedings of the American Antiquarian Society*, vol. 101, Part 2, October 1991.

Appendix B: Graph 24

Composite Consumer Price Index 1800-1820, (1860=100)



Source: McCusker J. *Historical Price Index: Money Values in the Economy of the United States*. Worcester, American Antiquarian Society, 1992, p.326. Reprinted from *Proceedings of the American Antiquarian Society*, vol. 101, Part 2, October 1991.

Appendix B: Table 25

Money Supply and Prices: 1811 – 1817

	Govt.curr. Issues (in \$m) <sup>1</sup>	Banknote issue (in \$m)	Index of Wholesale Prices (1811 = 100)
1811	0.0	32.5	100
1812	2.8	36.8	104
1813	4.9	41.2	129
1814	10.6	45.5	145
1815	17.6	68.0	135
1816	3.4	62.6	120
1817	0.0	56.4	120

Note 1. Treasury notes outstanding at year's end

Source: Rockoff H. 'Banking and Finance 1789- 1914, in Engerman S. and Gallman R. eds., *The Cambridge Economic History of the United States – The Long Nineteenth Century*, Cambridge Univ. Press, 2000, 3 vols., vol. II, p.655 , Table 14.1, 'Money and Prices in the War of 1812'.

Appendix B: Table 26

United States Import Price Index: 1807-15. 1790 = 100

1807	124.7
1808	124.3
1809	129.1
1810	129.8
1811	121.1
1812	131.7
1813	179.7
1814	232.3
1815	191.3

Source: North D. *The Economic Growth of the United States 1790-1860*. first published Prentice-Hall Inc. 1961, republished New York, W. Norton & Co Inc., 1966. Import Price Index, p.229, Table F-III.



Appendix B: Table 27

United States Export Price Index: 1807-15. 1790 = 100

1807	136.2
1808	115.3
1809	116.2
1810	128.6
1811	128.6 also
1812	127.1
1813	126.5
1814	127.3
1815	182.9

Source: North D. *The Economic Growth of the United States 1790-1860*. first published Prentice-Hall Inc. 1961, republished New York, W. Norton & Co Inc., 1966. Export Price Index, p.221, Table CIII.

Appendix B: Table 28

United States Terms of Trade: 1807-15. 1790 = 100

1807	109.2
1808	92.8
1809	90.0
1810	99.1
1811	106.2
1812	96.5
1813	70.4
1814	54.8
1815	95.6

Source: North D. *The Economic Growth of the United States 1790-1860*. first published Prentice-Hall Inc. 1961, republished New York, W. Norton & Co Inc., 1966. Export Price Index, p221, Table CIII; Import Price Index, p229, Table F-III; Terms of Trade, p.229, Table G-III.

Appendix B: Table 29

Aspects of American Exports: 1811-1815.

	Export Price Index	Real Exports \$m	Real Domestic Exports \$m	Real Exports Per Head \$m	Real Domestic Exports Per Head \$m
1811	61.3	47.7	35.2	6.39	4.27
1812	38.5	30.3	23.6	3.94	3.07
1813	27.9	22.0	19.8	2.77	2.49
1814	6.9	5.4	5.3	0.67	0.65
1815	52.6	28.7	25.2	3.41	2.97

Source: Davis L. and Engerman S. *Naval Blockades in Peace and War – An Economic History since 1750*, Cambridge Univ. Press. pp. 80-1, Tables 3.6 and 3.7, citing Adams D. ‘American Neutrality and Prosperity 1793-1808 – A Reconsideration’, *Journal of Economic History*, 40, December 1980, pp.736.

Appendix B: Table 30

Aspects of American Imports: 1811-1815.

	Total \$m	Import Price Index	Real Imports \$m	Real Domestic Imports	Real Imports Per Head \$m	Real Domestic Imports Per Head \$m
1811	57.9	121.1	47.8	27.0	4.27	3.62
1812	78.8	131.7	59.8	39.8	3.07	5.18
1813	22.2	179.7	12.4	9.3	2.49	1.17
1814	13.0	232.3	5.6	5.2	0.65	0.63
1815	85.4	191.3	44.6	37.0	2.97	4.51

Source: Davis L. and Engerman S. *Naval Blockades in Peace and War – An Economic History since 1750*, Cambridge Univ. Press. pp. 80-1, Tables 3.6 and 3.7, citing Adams D. ‘American Neutrality and Prosperity 1793-1808 – A Reconsideration’, *Journal of Economic History*, 40, December 1980, pp.736.

Appendix B: Table 31.

Net Freight Earnings of the United States Carrying Trade, 1807-1815, in \$m.

1807	42.1
1808	23.0
1809	26.2
1810	39.5
1811	40.8
1812	29.0
1813	10.2
1814	2.6
1815	20.6

Source: North D. *Economic Growth of the United States 1790-1860*. First published New York, Prentice Hall, 1961, re-published W. Norton & Co Inc 1966. Table A III, p.249.

Appendix B: Table 32.

Terms of Trade of the United States: 1913 = 100 (1)

Period	Terms of Trade Index.
1789 –1798	58
1799 –1808	66
1809 –1818	60
1819 –1828	65
1829 –1838	79
1839 –1848	77
1849 –1858	90
1859 –1868	80
1869 –1878	87
1879 –1888	97
1889 –1898	90
1899 –1908	97
1904 –1913	99

Note (1) Export Price Index divided by Import Price Index.

Source: Lipsey R. 'U.S. Trade and Balance of Payments' in Engerman S. and Gallman R. *The Cambridge Economic History of the United States*. 3 vols. vol II, *The Long Nineteenth Century*, Cambridge Univ. Press, 2000, Table 15.21., p.718.


Appendix B: Table 33.

British Merchant Marine 1811-14, in Numbers and Tonnages

	Number	Tonnage
1811	20,478	2,247,000
1812	20,637	2,263,000
1813	20,951	2,349,000
1814	21,449	2,414,000

Source: Mitchell B. and Deane P. *Abstract of British Historical Statistics*, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1962, p.217, Table: 'Transport 1, Shipping Registered in the United Kingdom 1788 -1938'

British Merchant Marine 1811-14, in Numbers and Tonnage



Source: Mitchell B. and Deane P. *Abstract of British Historical Statistics*, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1962, p.217, Table: 'Transport 1, Shipping Registered in the United Kingdom 1788 -1938'

Appendix B: Table 34.

Loan Interest Paid by US Government 1812-15. in \$'s.


1812	2,451,000
1813	3,599,000
1814	4,593,000
1815	5,990,000

Total: 16,633,000.

Source: Dewey D. *Financial History of the United States*, first published 1903. 12<sup>th</sup> ed. New York, A. Kelly, 1934, reprinted 1968, p.141, citing Ways and Means Committee Report, Washington, 9 December 1817.

Appendix B: Graph 34

Loan Interest Paid by US Government 1812-15 in \$'s



Source: Dewey D. *Financial History of the United States*, first published 1903. 12<sup>th</sup> ed. New York, A. Kelly, 1934, reprinted 1968, p.141, citing Ways and Means Committee Report, Washington, 9 December 1817.



Appendix B: Table 35

Treasury Note Debt, December 1814, in \$'s.

Where payable	When Payable	Principal	Interest	Total
Philadelphia	1814 Nov 1	269,000	14,526	238,526
Ditto	1814 Dec 1	366,200	19,774	385,974
New York	“ “	570,000	30,780	600,780
Boston	“ “	600,000	32,400	632,400
Totals		1,805,200	97,480	1,902,680

Source: ASP: Finance vol. II, p.879, 'Schedule of Treasury Notes which have already fallen due & remain unpaid this 2<sup>nd</sup> day of December 1814.'

Appendix B: Table 36.

United Kingdom Tax Revenues 1812-15, in £m, and Average for 1812-5.

	Total Gross Income	Customs	Excise	Stamp Duty	Land	Property & Inc	Post Office
1812	71.0	13.0	27.9	6.0	7.4	13.2	1.9
1813	70.3	14.0	25.9	6.0	7.5	13.1	2.0
1814	74.3	14.4	27.5	6.3	7.9	14.3	2.1
1815	77.9	14.8	29.5	6.5	8.0	14.5	2.2
Average 1812-15	73.5	14.1	27.7	6.2	7.7	14.0	2.1
%age	100.0	19.2	37.7	8.4	10.5	19.1	2.9

Source: Mitchell B. and Deane P., *Abstract of British Historical Statistics*, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1962, Table 3, 'Public Finance 3, Gross Public Income – United Kingdom 1801-1939, Principal Constituent Items'; average 1812-15 calculated to one decimal place.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

### Primary Sources.

#### 1. Manuscript Sources.

##### British Archives and Libraries.

###### British Library: Additional Manuscripts.

Add Mss: 3464, ff. 28-31, Leeds Papers, English Minister at Copenhagen to Ld Holderness, Sect. of State for Northern Dept. February 1757. vol. CXLI, Egerton Papers.

Add Mss: 38250, ff.193-8, Correspondence of Ld. Castlereagh.

Add Mss: 38248-9, Official Correspondence of 2<sup>nd</sup> Earl.

Add Mss: 38255, ff. 43-4, Liverpool Papers, Warren to Prime Minister 16 November 1813.

Add Mss: 38365, ff.153-4, Liverpool Papers, 'Headings of Negotiation to Commissioners at Ghent'.

Add Mss: 38572, Liverpool Papers.

###### Brynmor Jones Library: University of Hull.

Hotham Papers: Correspondence of Rear Adm. Hotham with Lords Commissioners of Admiralty and others, 1812-14.

DDHO 7/1: Melville and Croker to Hotham, January 1813.

DDHO 7/3: 2<sup>nd</sup> Sect. Barrow to Hotham, 1813-14.

DDHO 7/4: Letter head, Bermuda, April 1814. 'Description of the Ships on the North American Station 26 July 1814'. Cochrane to Hotham, 28 July 1814, and routine orders.

DDHO 7/45: Warren's Standing Orders North America Station, General Order, Bermuda, March 1813.

DDHO 7/98.

###### National Library of Scotland: Edinburgh.

NLS: Alexander F.I. Cochrane Papers:

MS 2333, ff.54-9, Rear-Adm.Cockburn to Vice Adm. Cochrane, May 1814.

MS 2343, Admiralty Letters 1813-1815, to Cochrane 30 December 1814.

###### National Maritime Museum: London: Caird Library:

NMM: Hulbert Papers: Correspondence of George Redmond Hulbert, Secretary and Prize Agent of Adm. Sir J.B. Warren, 1807-14.

HUL/ 1: Warren's Order Book.

HUL/ 4: 'Copy of Vice-Admiralty Court Records, 25 November 1812 – 2 July 1814'.

- HUL/ 5B: Hulbert to Fraser, 14 March 1815.  
HUL/14:  
HUL/18: Appendix: 'List of Ships & Vessels on West Indies and American Stations, 7 August 1812'.  
NMM: Keith Papers: Private Correspondence of Adm. Lord Keith  
KEI/37/9: from Adm. George Hope, June 1812.  
NMM: Warren Papers:  
LBK/2 Correspondence of Adm. John Borlase Warren, C in C North America and West India Stations 1812-14 to Robert Saunders Dundas, 2<sup>nd</sup> Viscount, Lord Melville, First Lord of the Admiralty, 1812-1827.  
WAR/11: 'Schedule of Orders in Council, Circular Orders, Letters etc delivered by Ad Rt: Hon:ble Sir J B Warren Bart KB to Vice Ad the Hon:ble Sir Alexander Cochrane KB at Bermuda the first day of April 1814.'  
WAR/27: 'Papers Relating to Convoys, Transports, Commerce & Trade, vol.1.,1797-1813', inc. Castlereagh, and Andrew Allen to Warren, 1812.  
WAR/28: 'Papers Relating to Convoys, Transports & Trade, vol., 2, 1813-14.  
WAR/37: 'Vessels captured & detained 2 June – 13 Sept 1813'.  
WAR/43: Warren to Anthony Baker, British charges d'affaires, Halifax.  
WAR/49:  
WAR/82: Melville/ Warren correspondence, December 1812.

The National Archives: TNA, London.

- ADM 1/501: January 1811  
ADM 1/502: Routine Letters and Orders, Vice Adm. Sawyer to First Sect of the Adm. John Croker 5 July, 18 July, 5, 11 August, 16 September, 5 October, 4 November 1812.  
ADM 1/503  
ADM 1/504  
ADM 1/505  
ADM 1/506: 2, 25, 28 April 1814, 30 May 1814.  
ADM 1/507: 12,13 August 1812.  
ADM 1/1374: 26 December 1812.  
ADM 1/4220: Foreign Secretary Marquis Wellesley to Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, January 1812.  
ADM 1/4221: Foreign Secretary Castlereagh to Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, May 1812.  
ADM 1/4222: Foreign Secretary Castlereagh to Admiralty, August 1812.  
ADM 1/4359: 26-28 March 1813.  
ADM 2/933:  
ADM 2/1375: Secret Orders and Letters, 3 & 12 August, 18 November, 26 December 1812, and 9 January 1812.  
ADM 2/1376: 20, 26 March 1813.  
ADM 2/1378 4 November 1814.  
ADM 2/1380 20 March 1813, 30 April 1814, 31 May 1814.  
ADM 2/1381  
ADM 8/100: Ships in Sea Pay, 1 July 1814.

ADM 12/154: Digest, 12 August 1812, 25 November 1814.  
CO: 43/49: Secretary of State for War Lord Bathurst to Admiralty  
November 1812.  
COC: /11: Cockburn's Memoirs.  
FO:115/22: British Minister or charges d'affaires, Washington, January –  
April 1811 to Foreign Office or Foreign Secretary Wellesley,  
January – March 1812.  
FO: 115/23 Foreign Secretary Castlereagh to British Minister Washington,  
April 1812.  
FO: 5/88 Baker to Castlereagh 18 December 1812, 3 February 1813.

**United States Archives and Libraries.**

Huntington Library: San Marino, California.

Melville Papers: reels 1 and 2, April 1812.

John Carter Brown Library: Brown University, Providence R.I.

Brown & Ives Correspondence:

Box 160: ff.6-7, ff.9-11, Correspondence of Thomas Poyton Ives of  
Providence, with Charles Greene, B & I agent in Boston.  
Box 161: ff.1-4, Greene to T.P. Ives, of B & I, Providence  
Box 172: f.9, T.P.Ives to Joseph Head, of Boston, June 1813.  
Box 236: ff.2-3, 6-7, Correspondence of T.P. Ives with John Maybin of  
Philadelphia.

John Hay Library: Providence R.I.

A30899: (1) Jonathan Russell Correspondence:  
A30901:

Library of Congress, Washington DC:

Papers of James Madison: reel 15, Gallatin to Madison, 5 March 1813, and  
online: to Cabinet, 23-27 June 1814.  
Journal and Commonplace Book of James Dunn, 1811-13  
'Blockade – Book of Regulations and Instructions'  
Royal Navy Logbooks – HMS *Spartan*, 38.

New York Historical Society:

NYHS: Gallatin Papers I, reel 9, April 1813 - January 1815.  
Gallatin Papers II, Letterbook II, 1814-1815.

## 2. Printed Primary Sources.

Adams H. ed., *Memoirs of John Quincy Adams*, 4 vols., Philadelphia, J.P. Lippincott, 1874.

Adams H. ed., *The Writings of Albert Gallatin*, 3 vols., Philadelphia, J.P. Lippincott, 1879.

*American State Papers: Documents, Legislative and Executive, of the Congress of the United States*, 38 vols. Washington D.C. Gales and Seaton 1832-61:

ASP: Part I : Foreign Relations, vols. 1-3,  
Part III: Finance, vols.1-2,  
Part IV: Commerce & Navigation, vols 1-2  
Part VI : Naval Affairs,  
Part IX : Claims,  
Part X : Miscellaneous

Online at <http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lwsp.html>

*An Account of the Receipts & Expenditures of the United States for the Year 1813*, Washington, A & G Way, November 1814.

*An Account of the Receipts & Expenditures of the United States for the Year 1814*, Washington, A & G Way, 27-28 November 1815.

*Annals of Congress: formally The Debates and Proceedings in the Congress of the United States*. New York. D. Appleton ed.1857-61.  
e.g. 12<sup>th</sup> Congress, 1<sup>st</sup> session, column 2354;- hereafter AC:12-1, 2354.

Online at <http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lwac.html>

Bioran J. Duane W. and Weightman R., *Laws of the United States of America from 4<sup>th</sup> March 1789 to 4<sup>th</sup> March 1815*, Philadelphia and Washington, 5 vols., 1<sup>st</sup> ed., 1815, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed.,1816. vol. 5.

Brannan J. *Official Letters of the Military & Naval Officers of the United States during the War with Great Britain in the years 1812,13,14 &15*, Washington, 1823.

Bristed J. *The Resources of the United States of America; or a View of the agricultural, commercial ...moral and religious capacity and character of the American people*, New York, J. Eastburn & Co, 1818.

*British Parliamentary Papers: Parliamentary Reports: Diplomatic Correspondence between the American and British governments:*

1810-1812: 4 parts.1815: 3 parts. London, J. Ridgway & Sons Ltd, 1838-41

*Cobbett's Parliamentary Debates/Hansard:*

- vol. 21 January 1812 – March 1812.
- vol. 22 March 1812 – May 1812.
- vol. 23 May 1812 – 30 July 1812.

Colonial Papers, House of Commons, London, FCO:

- vol. 3, 1809-1812,
- vol. 4, 1813-1815, No's 6 and 7.

Crawford M. ed., *The Naval War of 1812 – A Documentary History*, vol.III, 1814-1815, Washington DC, Naval Historical Center, 2002.

Croker J.W.

*The Correspondence and Diaries of the late Right Hon. John Wilson Croker, Secretary to the Admiralty 1809-1830*, 2<sup>nd</sup> revised ed., 3 vols., London, John Murray, 1885.

*A Key to the Orders in Council respecting Trade with the French ports etc., 7<sup>th</sup> January 1807 to 21<sup>st</sup> April 1812*, London, John Murray, 1812.

De Bow J. *Statistical View of the United States*, Washington, A. Nicholson, 1854.

Fenning D. *A New Spelling Dictionary and Grammar of the English Language*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., London, S.Crowther, 1773.

Dudley W. ed., *The Naval War of 1812- A Documentary History*, vol.I Washington DC, Naval Historical Center, 1985, and vol.II, 1992.

Gurwood J. ed., *The Dispatches of Field Marshall the Duke of Wellington, 1799 - 1818*, London, 1834-39, 12 vols.

Hansard T. *The Parliamentary Debates from 1803 to Present Times*. 1<sup>st</sup> series 1803-20, vols.21-29, 1812-14/15.

Hertslet E. and L. eds., *British and Foreign State Papers - Compiled by the Librarian and Keeper of Papers for the Foreign Office*, London, J. Ridgway & Sons Ltd, 1841, vol.I, 1812-14, vol II, 1814-16.

Holroyd J., first Earl of Sheffield, *Observations on the Commerce of the American States*, London, 1783, re-published J Debrett 1784.

Hopkins J. ed., *The Papers of Henry Clay*, 10 vols., Lexington, Univ. of Kentucky Press, 1959, vol.I, *The Rising Statesman*, 1794-1814.

Hunt G. *The Writings of James Madison comprising his public and private papers and his private correspondence*, 9 vols., New York, G. Putnam's Sons, 1900-1910, vol.VIII, 1808-1819, 1908.

James W.

*Naval Occurrences of the War of 1812 – A Full and Correct Account of the Naval War between Great Britain and the United States of America, 1812-1815*, with an introduction by Andrew Lambert, London, Conway Maritime Press, 2004.

*The Military Occurrences of the Late War between Great Britain and the United States of America*, 2 vols. London, J. Richardson, 1819.

*Warden Refuted; being a Defence of the British Navy Against the Misrepresentations of a Work Recently published at Edinburgh – a letter to D. B. Warden Esq, Late Consul to the United States at Paris*, London, J. Richardson, 1819.

Lambert J. *Travels through Canada, & the United States of North America in the years 1806, 07 & 08*, London, Baldock, Craddock & Joy, 1816, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed.

Londonderry Marquis, ed., *Memoirs and Correspondence of Viscount Castlereagh*, London, 1848-53 in 12 vols, vols, IX-XI.

Lyne C. *A Letter to Lord Castlereagh on the North American Export Trade During the War*, J. Richardson, London, 1813.

Marshall J. *Royal Naval Biography*, vol.1, London, Longman et al., 1823.

Mayo B. ed., *Instructions to British Ministers to the United States 1791-1812*, Washington DC, Annual Report of the American History Association, 1936, 3 vols., vol 3.

*Naval Chronicle*: vol. XXVIII July – December 1812  
vol. XXIX January – June 1813  
vol. XXX July – December 1813  
vol. XXXI January – June 1814  
vol. XXXII July – December 1814  
vol. XXXIII January – June 1815

*Parliamentary Papers*, vol. IX, ‘Papers Relating to War with America, Ordered by the House of Commons to be Printed, 9 & 10 February 1815’.

*Parliamentary Papers of Interest to the Foreign Office 4, 1810-1815*, No’s 1-31, London, Foreign Office.

Peters R. ed., *The Public Statutes at Large of the United States from the Origin of the Government in 1789 to March 3<sup>rd</sup> 1845*, 8 vols., Boston, Little & Brown, 1846-67.

Pitkin T. *A Statistical View of the Commerce of the United States of America*, 1<sup>st</sup> ed., Hartford, Charles Hosmer, 1816, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., New York, James Eastburn & Co, 1817. 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., New Haven, Durrie & Peck, Connecticut, 1835.



Richardson J. *A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 1789 – 1897*, Washington, Govt. Printing Office, 1896, vol.I.

Russell J. *The history of the war between the United States and Great-Britain To which is added... a list of vessels taken from Great-Britain during the war.* 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., Hartford, Connecticut, B.& J. Russell, 1815.

Seyburt A. *Statistical Annals*, Philadelphia, T. Dobson, 1818. BL: 579 i 24.

Smith A. *An Enquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, first published London, W Strahan & T. Cadell, 1776, see 'Everyman ed.', London, Dent, 1966.

Stephen J. *War in Disguise; Or the Frauds of Neutral Flags*, London, 1806.

Vane C. *Memoirs and Correspondence of Lord Castlereagh*. London, Henry Colburn, 1848-53.

Warden D. *A Statistical, Political and Historical Account of the United States of North America, from the Period of their first Colonization to the Present Day*, 3 vols., Edinburgh, Archibald Constable & Co, 1819, vol.III.

Wellington, 2<sup>nd</sup> Duke, ed., *Supplementary Despatches, Correspondence and Memoranda of Field Marshall Arthur Duke of Wellington*, London, 1858-72, 15 vols., vol.III.

Whitehill W. ed., *The Journal of Lieutenant Henry Napier in HMS Nympe, New England Blockaded – 1814*, Salem, Peabody Museum. 1939.

### **3. Newspapers and Periodicals.**

Newspapers: British Library Newspaper Collection, Colindale, London, Institute of Historical Research, University of London and New York Historical Society.

*The American & Commercial Daily Advertiser.*

*The Boston Gazette*, Boston, 1812-15, BL:A263

*The Columbian Centinel*, Boston, 1812-15, BL:A259

*The London Gazette* 1807 –1815.

*The National Intelligencer*, Washington 1812-15, BL:A204

*The Hampshire Chronicle*, Winchester, 1812.

*The Times*, London, 1812-15.

*The Morning Post*, London, 6 August 1807.

Periodicals: British Library, Euston, London, and Institute of Historical Research, University of London.

*The Annual Register*, London 1812-15.

*The Edinburgh Review*, 1813.

*The Weekly Register*, Niles H., Baltimore, vols. II to VIII, 1812-15:

vol. II, 1811-12,

vols. III & IV, 1812-13,

vols. V & VI, 1813-14,

vols. VII & VIII, 1814-15.

#### **4. Secondary Sources.**

##### **(i) Articles**

Balinky A. 'Gallatin's Theory of War Finance' in *William & Mary Historical Quarterly*, 3<sup>rd</sup> Series, 1959, pp.73-82.

Baugh D. 'The Politics of British Naval Failure, 1775-7', in *American Neptune*, LII, Fall 1992, pp.221-246.

Berens Matzke R. 'Britain Gets its Way: Power and Peace in Anglo-American Relations, 1838-1846' in *War in History*, 2001 8 (1) pp.19-46.

Clark G. 'War Trade and Trade War 1701-1713', in *Economic History Review*, 1, 1929, pp.262-280.

Crouzet F. 'War, Blockade and Economic Change in Europe 1792-1815' in *Journal of Economic History*, XXIV, (1964), pp.567-90.

Dunne W. 'The Inglorious First of June: Commodore Stephen Decatur in Long Island Sound, 1813', in *The Long Island Historical Journal*, 2, Spring 1990, pp.1-32.

Galpin W. 'The American Grain Trade to the Spanish Peninsula 1810-14', in *American Historical Review*, XXVIII, 1922, pp. 24-44.

Goldenburg J.

(i) 'Blue Lights and Infernal Machines – The British Blockade of New London' in *Mariners' Mirror* LXI, 1975, p.385.

(ii) 'The Royal Navy's Blockade in New England Waters 1812-1815', in *International History Review*, vol.6, August 1984, pp.424-39.

Graham G. 'Considerations on the American War of Independence' in *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research*, XXII, (1949), p.23.

Hickey D. 'American Trade Restrictions during the War of 1812' in *The Journal of American History*, vol.68, No3, December 1981, pp.517-38.

Hume E. ed. 'Letters Written During the War of 1812 by the British Commander in American Waters – Admiral Sir David Milne.' *William & Mary Quarterly Historical Magazine*, vol. X, 2<sup>nd</sup> Series. October 1930. p.293.

Kert F. 'The Fortunes of War: Commercial Warfare and Maritime Risk in the War of 1812', in *Northern Mariner*, No 4, October 1998, pp.1-16.

Knight R. 'The Introduction of Copper Sheathing into the Royal Navy, 1779-86', in *Mariners' Mirror*, LIX, 1973, pp.209-309.

Knight R. Review in *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, vol.32, No 3, September 2004, pp.132-3.

Lohnes B. 'British Naval Problems at Halifax During the War of 1812' in *Mariners' Mirror* LIX, 1973, pp.328-35.

North D. 'United States Balance of Payments 1790-1860 Trends in the American Economy in the Nineteenth Century', Conference on Research in Income and Wealth, vol.24, National Bureau of Economic Research, New York, Princeton Univ. Press, 1960, reprinted New York, Arno Press, 1975.

Silberling N. 'The financial and monetary policy of Great Britain during the Napoleonic Wars', in *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 38, 1924, pp.215-27.

Watson G. 'The United States and the Peninsula War, 1802-12', in *Historical Journal*, vol. XIX, 1976, pp.870-9.

## **(ii) Unpublished Dissertations.**

Arthur B. *The Role of Blockade in the Anglo-American Naval War of 1812-14* unpublished MA dissertation, Greenwich Maritime Institute, University of Greenwich, 2002.

Gutridge A. 'Prize Agency 1800-1815 with special reference to the career and work of George Redmond Hulbert', unpublished M Phil dissertation, University of Portsmouth, 1989.

**(iii) Books and Chapters in Books.**

Albion R. and Pope J. *Sea Lanes in Wartime – The American Experience 1775 – 1945*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., New York, Archon Books, 1968.

Adams H. *History of the United States during the Administrations of Jefferson and Madison*, 9 vols., New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1889-96.

Adams H. and Agar H ed., *The History of the United States during the Administrations of Jefferson and Madison: The Formative Years*. London, Collins, 1948. 2 vols.

Adams H. ed., *The Writings of Albert Gallatin*, 3 vols. Philadelphia, J. P. Lippincott & Co., 1879.

Adams H. *The Education of Henry Adams*, first pub. New York 1907, revised Saveth N. ed., London, New English Library, 1966.

Anderson F. *The Crucible of War: The Seven Years War and the Fate of Empire in British North America, 1754 -1766*, London, Faber and Faber, 2000.

Balinky A. *Albert Gallatin: Fiscal Theories and Policies*, New Brunswick, New Jersey, Rutgers Univ. Press, 1958.

Barnes G. and Owen J. eds., *The Private Papers of John Montague Earl of Sandwich, First Lord of the Admiralty 1771-1782*, London, Navy Records Society, 4 vols. vol.I, 1932.

Baugh D. 'The Eighteenth Century Navy as a National Institution, 1690-1815', in *The Oxford History of the Royal Navy*, Hill J. ed., 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., Oxford, OUP/BAC, 1995.

Baugh D. 'Naval power: what gave the British Navy superiority?' in Escosura L. ed., *Exceptionalism and Industrialisation, Britain and its European Rivals, 1688-1815*, Cambridge Univ. Press, 2004, pp.235-257.

Baumber M. *General at Sea – Robert Blake and the Revolution in Naval Warfare*, London, John Murray, 1989.

Black J., in 'Naval Power, Strategy and Foreign Policy 1775-1791', in Duffy M., ed., *Parameters of British Naval Power 1650-1850*. Univ. of Exeter Press, 1992.

Black J. *Britain as a Military Power - 1688-1815*, London, UCL Press, 1988.

Black J. *The British Way in Warfare 1688-2000*, London, Unwin/Hyman, 1990.

Blaug M. *Economic Theory in Retrospect*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., London, Heinemann, 1970.

- Bonnett S. *The Price of Admiralty: An Indictment of the Royal Navy 1805-1966*, London, Hale, 1968.
- Borden M. *Parties and Politics in the Early Republic 1789-1815*, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1968.
- Brandt I. *James Madison, Commander in Chief 1812-36*, New York, Bobbs-Merrill & Co Inc, in 6 vols., 1961.
- Buel R. *In Irons: Britain's Naval Supremacy and the American Revolutionary Economy*, New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1998.
- Buel R. *America on the Brink: How the Political Struggle Over the War of 1812 Almost Destroyed the Young Republic*, New York, Palgrave/Macmillan, 2005.
- Burt A. *The United States, Great Britain and British North America from the Revolution to the Establishment of Peace after the War of 1812*, New Haven, Yale Univ. Press, 1940.
- Challis C. *A New History of the Royal Mint*, Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1992.
- Cipolla C. *Between History and Economics: An Introduction to Economic History*, London, Blackwell, 1991.
- Clowes W. *The Royal Navy – A History from the Earliest Times to the Present*, 6 vols., London, Sampson Low, Marston & Co, 1900.
- Cockton P. *Subject Index of the House of Commons Parliamentary Papers 1801-1900*, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1988.
- Cole A. *Wholesale Commodity Prices in the United States 1700-1861*, 2 vols., Cambridge Mass., 1938.
- Colledge J. *Ships of the Royal Navy*, London, Greenhill, revised ed., 1987.
- Corbett J. *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy*, London, Longman, Green, 1911.
- Cordingly D. *Cochrane the Dauntless – The Life and Adventures of Thomas Cochrane*, London, Bloomsbury, 2008.
- Crawley C. ed., *The New Cambridge Modern History Volume IX War and Peace in the Age of Upheaval 1793-1830*, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1974.
- Crouzet F., 'America and the crisis of the British imperial economy, 1803-1807' in McCusker J. and Morgan K. eds., *The Early Modern Atlantic Economy*, Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press, 2002. pp.278-315.

- Dangerfield G. *The Era of Good Feelings*, London, Methuen, 1953.
- Davies D. *A Brief History of Fighting Ships*, London, Constable, 1996.
- Davis R. *The Industrial Revolution and British Overseas Trade*, 1<sup>st</sup> ed., Leicester Univ. Press, 1979, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., London, Pinter, 1979.
- Davis L. and Engerman S. *Naval Blockades in Peace and War – An Economic History since 1750*. Cambridge Univ. Press, 2006.
- Deane P. and Cole W. *British Economic Growth 1688-1959*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., Cambridge Univ. Press, 1969.
- Decker L. and Seager R. eds., *America's Major Wars: Crusaders, Critics and Scholars 1775-1972*, 2 vols., vol.1, 1775-1865, Reading, Mass., Addison-Wesley, 1973.
- De Conde A. *The Quasi War: The Politics and Diplomacy of the Undeclared War with France 1797-1801*, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1966.
- Dewey D. *Financial History of the United States*, 1<sup>st</sup> published 1903, 12<sup>th</sup> ed., New York, Kelly, 1934, reprinted 1968.
- Dudley W. 'Without some Risk: A Reassessment of the British Blockade of the United States, 1812-1815', Ph D dissertation, Tuscaloosa, University of Alabama, 1999, published as *Splintering the Wooden Wall – The British Blockade of the United States, 1812-1815*, Annapolis, Naval Institute Press, 2003.
- Duffy M. ed., 'The Establishment of the Western Squadron as the Linchpin of British Naval Strategy' in *Parameters of British Naval Power 1650-1850*, Exeter, Univ.of Exeter Press, 1992.
- Duffy M. ed., 'Devon and the Naval Strategy of the French Wars, 1689 - 1815', in *The New Maritime History of Devon*, Exeter, Conway/Univ.of Exeter, 1992, vol.I.
- Ellerman B. and Paine S. *Naval Blockades and Seapower: strategies and counter-strategies 1805 2005*, London, Routledge, 2006.
- Engerman S. and Gallman R. eds., *The Cambridge Economic History of the United States, vol.II, The Long Nineteenth Century*, 3 vols., Cambridge Univ. Press, 2000.
- Escosura L. ed., *Exceptionalism and Industrialisation, Britain and its European Rivals, 1688 -1815*, Cambridge Univ. Press, 2004.
- Evans E. *The Forging of the Modern State – Early Industrial Britain 1783-1870*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. London, Longman, 1996.

- Forester C. *The Naval War of 1812*, London, Michael Joseph, 1957, re-published as *The Age of Fighting Sail*, London, New English Library, 1968.
- French D. *The British Way in Warfare 1688-2000*, London, Hyman/Unwin, 1990.
- Galpin W. *The Grain Supply of England during the Napoleonic period*, New York, 1925, reprinted 1977.
- Gardiner R. *The Naval War of 1812*. London, Caxton Editions /NMM, 2001.
- Glete J., *Navies and Nations: Warships, Navies and Statebuilding in Europe and America 1500-1860*, Stockholm, Almqvist & Wiksell, 1993, vol.2.
- Gray C. *The Leverage of Sea Power – The Strategic Advantage of Navies in War*, New York, MacMillan, 1992.
- Guernsey R. *New York City & Vicinity during the War of 1812-15, being a Military, Civic & Financial Local History of that Period*, 2 vols., New York, Charles Woodward, 1889-95.
- Gwyn J. *Frigates and Foremasts – The North America Squadron in Nova Scotia Waters 1745-1815*, Vancouver and Toronto, Univ. of British Columbia Press, 2003.
- Gwyn J. *Ashore and Afloat: the British Navy and the Halifax Naval Yard before 1820*. Ottawa, Univ. of Ottawa Press, 2004.
- Habakkuk H. 'Britain and America: the economic effects of labour scarcity', p.62, in *Britain & America: Studies in Comparative History 1760-1970*, Englander D. ed., New York and Milton Keynes, Yale Univ. Press/Open Univ., 1997, pp.51-81.
- Haines M. 'The Population of the United States, 1790-1920' in Engerman S. and Gallman R. eds., *The Cambridge Economic History of the United States, Volume II – The Long Nineteenth Century*, 3 vols., Cambridge Univ. Press, 2000.
- Hall C. *British Strategy in the Napoleonic Wars 1803-1815*, Manchester Univ. Press, 1992.
- Hall H. *American Navigation*, New York, Appletons, 1880.
- Hammond M. *The Cotton Culture and the Cotton Trade*, New York, Macmillan, 1897.
- Harding R. *Seapower & Naval Warfare 1650-1830*, London, UCL Press 1999.
- Harding R. *The Evolution of the Sailing Navy, 1509-1815*, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1995.

Harlow V. and Madden F. eds., *British Colonial Developments 1774-1834 Select Documents*, Oxford Clarendon Press, 1953.

Hattendorf J. 'The Struggle with France, 1689-1815', in *The Oxford History of the Royal Navy*, Hill J. ed., 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., Oxford, OUP/BAC, 1995.

Hattendorf J. *The Boundless Deep: The European Conquest of the Oceans, 1450 -1840*. John Carter Brown Library, Providence RI, 2003.

Hawkins N. *The Starvation Blockades – Naval Blockades of WWI*, Barnsley, Leo Cooper, 2002.

Hedges J. *The Browns of Providence Plantations*, vol.I - *The Colonial Years*, and vol.II - *The Nineteenth Century*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard Univ. Press, 1952, reprinted Providence R.I., Brown Univ. Press, 1968.

Hickey D. *The War of 1812 – A Forgotten Conflict*, Urbana, Univ. of Illinois Press, 1989.

Hidy R. *The House of Baring in American Trade and Finance*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard Univ. Press, 1949.

Hill R. *The Prizes of War – The Naval Prize System in the Napoleonic Wars 1793-1815*, Stroud, Sutton/Royal Naval Museum pubs., 1998.

*Historical Statistics of the United States from Colonial Times to 1970*, Washington, Bureau of the Census, 1975, and Supplement, 1957.

Hodges H. and Hughes E., *Select Naval Documents*, Cambridge Univ. Press 1922.

Hope R. *A New History of British Shipping*, London, Murray, 1990.

Horsman R. *The War of 1812*, London Eyre & Spottiswood, 1969.

Hudson P. *The Industrial Revolution*, London ,Arnold, 1993.

Hutchins J. *The American Maritime Industries and Public Policy 1789-1914 - An Economic History*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard Univ. Press, 1941.

Jackson J. ed., *The Oxford Book of Money*, Oxford Univ. Press, 1995.

Jones P. *An Economic History of the United States*. London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1956, reprinted 1969.

Johnson E. *The History of the Domestic and Foreign Commerce of the United States*, 2 vols., Washington, Columbia, Carnegie Institute, 1915.

Johnson P. *A History of the American People*, London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1997.



Kay de J. *Chronicles of the Frigate Macedonian 1809-1922*, New York, W. Norton & Co, 1995.

Keble-Chatterton E. *The Big Blockade*, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed., London, Hurst & Blackett Ltd, 1938.

Kelly E. *Spanish Dollars and Silver Tokens: An Account of the Issues of the Bank of England 1797-1816*, London, Spink & Son, 1976.

Kennedy P. *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery*, London, Allen Lane, 1976.

Kert F. *Prize and Prejudice – Privateering and Naval Prize in Atlantic Canada in the War of 1812*. Research in Maritime History No:11, International Maritime Economic History Association, St. John's, Newfoundland, 1997.

Kert F. 'Cruising in Colonial Waters: The Organisation of North American Privateering in the War of 1812', in Starkey D. et al, eds., *Pirates & Privateers: New Perspectives on the War on Trade in the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> Centuries*, Univ. of Exeter Press, 1997.

Killick J. 'The Atlantic Economy and Anglo-American Industrialization, 1783-1865', in *Liberal Capitalism: Political and Economic Aspects*, Open Univ. Press, Milton Keynes, 1997.

Langford P. *Modern British Foreign Policy- The Eighteenth Century 1688-1815*, London, A & C Black, 1976.

Latimer J. *1812 – War with America*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard Univ. Press, 2007.

Lavery B. *Nelson's Navy-The Ships Men and Organisation 1793-1815*. London, Conway Maritime Press/Brassey's, 1989.

Lipsey R. 'U.S. Trade and Balance of Payments 1800-1913' in Engerman S. and Gallman R. eds., *The Cambridge Economic History of the United States, vol. II, The Long Nineteenth Century*, 3 vols., Cambridge Univ. Press, 2000.

Lloyd C. 'Armed Forces and the Art of War: Navies' in *The New Cambridge Modern History Volume IX War and Peace in the Age of Upheaval 1793-1830*, Cambridge Univ. Press 1974, pp.76-90.

Lyons D. *The Sailing Navy List*, London, Conway Maritime Press, 1993.

Mackesy P. *The War for America 1775-1783*, London, Longman, 1964.

Mahan A. *The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire*, 2 vols., London, Sampson Low, Marston & Co, 1892.

- Mahan A. *Sea Power in its Relation to the War of 1812*, 2 vols., London, Sampson Low, Marston & Co, 1905.
- Mahon J. *The War of 1812*, Gainesville, Univ. of Florida Press, 1972.
- Markam C ed., *Selections from the Correspondence of Admiral John Markam During the Years 1801-4 and 1806-7*, vol., 28, Navy Records Society, 1904.
- Marvin W. *Registered & Enrolled Tonnage – 1800 –1901- U.S. Bureau of Navigation*, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1902.
- Marvin W. *The American Merchant Marine*, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1902.
- Mayo B. ed., *Instructions to British Ministers to the United States 1791-1812*, Washington, Annual Report to the American History Association, 1936, 3 vols., vol.III.
- McCusker J. *Historical Price Index: Money Values in the Economy of the United States*, Worcester, American Antiquarian Society, 1992.
- McCusker J. *How much is that in real money? A Historical Price Index for use as a deflator of Money Values in the Economy of the United States*. Providence R.I., Oak Knoll Press, 2001.
- McCusker J. and Morgan K. eds., *The Early Modern Atlantic Economy*, Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press, 2002.
- McMaster J. *A History of the People of the United States*, 7 vols., New York D. Appleton & Co, 1902, vol. IV, 1812-21.
- Minor D. *World Canals 1810-19*, New York, Facts on File, 1986.
- Mitchell B. & Deane P. *Abstract of British Historical Statistics*, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1962.
- Morison S. *The Life and Letters of Harrison Gray Otis, Federalist, 1765-1848*, 2 vols., Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co, 1913.
- Morriss R. *Guide to British naval papers in North America*, London and New York, NMM/Mansell, 1994.
- Morriss R. *Cockburn and the British Navy in Transition - Admiral Sir George Cockburn 1772-1853*, Exeter, University of Exeter Press, 1997.
- North D. *The Economic Growth of the United States 1790-1860*, New York, Prentice Hall Inc., 1961, reprinted W. Norton & Co, 1966.

North D. and Thomas R. eds., *The Growth of the American Economy to 1860 – Documentary History of the United States*, New York, Harper & Row, 1968.

Nettels C. *The Emergence of a National Economy 1775-1815. The Economic History of the United States*, vol. II, New York, Harper & Row, 1969.

O'Brien P. *War and Economic Progress in Britain and America*, Milton Keynes, Open Univ. Press, 1997.

O'Connell D. *The Influence of Law on Sea Power*, Manchester Univ. Press, 1975.

Osborne E. *Britain's Economic Blockade of Germany 1914-1919*. London, Frank Cass, 2004.

Pack J. *The Man who Burned the White House – Admiral Sir George Cockburn 1772-1853*, Emsworth, Kenneth Mason, 1987.

Padfield P. *Broke & The Shannon*, London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1968.

Pares R. *Colonial Blockade and Neutral Rights 1739-1763*. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1938.

Perkins B. *Prologue to War – England & the United States 1805-12*, Berkeley, Univ. of California, 1961.

Perkins B. *Castlereagh & Adams – England and the United States 1812-23*, Berkeley, Univ. of California Press, 1964.

Perkins E. *American Public Finance and Public Services 1700-1815*, Columbus, Ohio State Univ. Press, 1994.

Plumb J. *England in the Eighteenth Century -1714 –1815*, Harmondsworth, Pelican, 1950.

Prados L. ed., *Exceptionalism & Industrialisation: Britain and its European Rivals 1688-1815*, Cambridge Univ. Press, 2004.

Richardson J. *A Compilation of Messages and Papers of Presidents of the United States*, Washington, Govt. Printing Office, 10 vols., 1896-99.

Richmond H. *Statesmen and Seapower*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1946.

Rockoff H. 'Banking and Finance 1789-1914' in Engerman S. and Gallman R. eds., *The Cambridge Economic History of the United States*, 3 vols., vol. II, *The Long Nineteenth Century*, Cambridge Univ. Press, 2000.

Rodger N. *The Command of the Ocean – A Naval History of Britain 1649-1815*, London, Allen Lane/Penguin/NMM, 2004.

Roosevelt T. 'The Naval War of 1812', in Clowes W. *The Royal Navy - A History from the Earliest Times to the Present*, 7 vols, London, Sampson Low, Marston & Co, 1897-1903, vol. VI, 1901, Chapter 1.

- Roskill S. *The Strategy of Sea Power – Its Development & Application*, first published London, Collins, 1962, repub. Aylesbury, John Goodchild, 1986.
- Sainty J. *Admiralty Officials 1660-1870*, London, 1975.
- Schroeder P. *Oxford History of Modern Europe: The Transformation of European Politics 1763-1848*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1994.
- Scott K. *British aliens in the United States during the War of 1812*, Baltimore, Genealogical Publishing, 1979.
- Skaggs D. and Altoff G. *Signal Victory – The Lake Erie Campaign 1812-13*, Annapolis, Md, Naval Institute Press, 1997.
- Stagg J. *Mr Madison's War: Politics, Diplomacy and Warfare in the Early American Republic 1783-1830*, Princeton Univ. Press, 1983.
- Stephen J., and Piggott F. ed., *War in Disguise: or the frauds of neutral flags reprinted for this edition*, London, Univ. of London Press, 1917.
- Syrett D. *The Royal Navy in American Waters, 1775-1783*, Aldershot, Scolar, 1989.
- The Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Oxford Univ. Press, 2004.
- Thistlethwaite F. 'The United States and the Old World, 1794-1828', Chapter XXII in *The New Cambridge Modern History Volume IX War and Peace in the Age of Upheaval 1793-1830*, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1974.
- Thompson N. *Earl Bathurst and the British Empire*, Barnsley, Leo Cooper, 1999.
- Toll I, *Six Frigates -How Piracy, War and British Supremacy at Sea gave Birth to the World's Most Powerful Navy*, London, Penguin/Michael Joseph, 2006.
- Tracy N. *Attack on Maritime Trade*, Toronto, Univ of Toronto Press, 1991.
- Tracy N. ed., *The Naval Chronicle: The Contemporary Record of the Royal Navy at War*, Consolidated Edition, 5 vols., London, Chatham Publishing, 1999.
- Updyke F. *The Diplomacy of the War of 1812 – The Albert Shaw Lectures on Diplomatic History 1914*, Baltimore , John Hopkins Univ. Press, 1915.
- U.S. Works Progress Administration, *Boston Looks Seaward*, Boston, 1941, re-published London, MacDonald and Jane's, 1974.
- Vane C. *Memoirs and Correspondence of Viscount Castlereagh edited by his brother Charles Vane*, 12 vols., London, H. Colburn, 1848-53.

Walters R. *Albert Gallatin, Jeffersonian Financier and Diplomat*, New York, MacMillan, 1957.

Warren G. and Pearson F. *Wholesale Prices for 213 Years, 1720 to 1932, Part 1, Wholesale Prices in the United States for 135 Years from 1797 to 1932*. Ithica, New York, Cornell Univ., Agricultural Experimental Station, 1932.

Webster C. *The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, vol.1, 1812-15, Britain and the Reconstruction of Europe*, London, Bell & Sons, 1950.

Wright C. *Economic History of the United States*. 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. New York. McGraw-Hill, 1949.

Yonge C. *The Life and Administration of Robert Banks Jenkinson 2<sup>nd</sup> Earl of Liverpool*, 3 vols., London, MacMillan and Co, 1868.

Zevin R. *The Growth of Manufacturing in Early 19<sup>th</sup> Century New England*, New York, Arno, 1975.

