Separating the Waters from the Sea: The Place of Islands in Ottoman Maritime Territoriality during the Eighteenth Century

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Abstract • The Ottoman Empire in the eighteenth century faced challenges in the Mediterranean from domestic and above all foreign pirates that forced it to articulate its notions of maritime territoriality, that is, the parts of the sea over which it claimed imperial and legal authority. This article will examine the role of islands in defining that territoriality, examining several cases involving the imperial response to piracy for their articulation of maritime space. The most important distinction was between the open sea and domestic waters, which were above all delineated by the shoreline, apart from exceptional responses to European privateers. Consequently, it is argued that the place of islands in Ottoman maritime territoriality is largely littoral in nature, and that littoralité is an essential component of the Ottoman understanding of insularité.

This article is an attempt to situate islands as a part of Ottoman claims of maritime territoriality, focusing on the Eastern Mediterranean in the eighteenth century. That is, I hope to show that the sorts of ways that officials of the Ottoman state wrote about issues of Ottoman control in certain bodies of water demonstrate that pieces of land denoted as islands—adalar or cezāvir—performed a particular role in territorial delineation. This role, however, was not one of a specific maritime border. Rather, islands acted as one distinct element of a coherent littoral frontier separating the Ottoman Empire from the open sea and its many dangers, and as such were thought of in the same way as ports and coastal fortifications. As with ports and forts, islands were centers of the projection of territoriality and legal authority over surrounding waters, even if they themselves were only loosely subject to the sultan's authority. They created a space both on land and in the surrounding waters over which the Ottoman state claimed practical legal control. More than this, islands were one element of a wider littoral landscape that defined what the Ottoman Empire considered to be its waters in the Mediterranean, making them one incarnation of a
particular set of spaces through which interactions with outsiders were regulated and imperial authority was asserted. Territoriality was therefore a central part of Ottoman insularity, where islands joined coastlines in forming the limits of the Ottoman state.

Using examples of imperial commands from a wider body of over two hundred archival documents concerning Ottoman attempts to maintain peace and order in what they considered as their waters, with regard to both foreigners and their own subjects, I will argue that the idea of coastal protection was central to the Ottoman understanding of the space around their islands. Territoriality was not an abstract claim, but signified the ability of the Ottoman state to assert its law and justice over a particular maritime space that existed between the shore and the open sea.¹ With their extensive coastlines, islands provided a particular sort of space within which this ability was tested, in particular by the actions of local and foreign pirates attacking mercantile shipping in the surrounding sea. The usual Ottoman response to these threats was to seek to protect the islands as a whole, land and sea, as the security of the maritime traffic that passed islands was equally important to the imperial duty of protection as was that to the islands’ inhabitants.

**Foreign Challenges and Extreme Limits**

The Ottoman state faced numerous security threats in the Mediterranean from its own subjects, and combating such challenges involved dispatching ships or garrisons to the affected areas to secure the lives and property of local inhabitants. This is certainly an important aspect of Ottoman maritime territoriality, and of Ottoman imperial authority. In 1183 (1769), the governor of Rhodes made a petition to the Ottoman government requesting a force of galleons to destroy the pirates, and the appointment of a military official to ensure safe travel in the Mediterranean.² Consequently, it was commanded that, in addition to the imperial galleons already patrolling the Ottoman Mediterranean, the galleon Tuhfetü'l-mülük be sent with a full compliment of levends (naval military forces), and that a başbuğ (a military commander) be dispatched to oversee the operation.³ Such expeditions seem to have been a fairly regular occurrence throughout the eighteenth century, despite the effort and cost involved.⁴ In essence, it was as great an imperative that those vessels and officials be dispatched to restore order in the seas around Rhodes as it was for imperial soldiers to be sent to quell rebellion in distant land centers like Baghdad; this was, after all the basis for imperial authority.⁵ As Nicholas Vatin noted in his analysis
of imperial control in sixteenth-century Basra, frontier territories could be ruled in different ways, but territories “conquered but not vassal in no way merit the title ‘well-protected.’” 6 The one word that occurs again and again in documents concerning piracy and maritime matters is muḥāfaẓa; protection or defense. It was this ability to protect, regulate, and control that marked the coastal ṣu (water) from the open bahr (sea), and, as firm features on the maritime landscape, islands were crucial to defining and implementing this distinction.

Ensuring that the Well-Protected Domains remained well-protected meant not just tackling local pirates and brigands, but dealing with troublesome foreigners. Of course, this meant utilizing coastal fortifications, the imperial fleet, and corsairs to protect Ottoman seas and ports from assault by outright enemies, be they Venetian, Habsburg, or Russian. Yet, the waters of the Eastern Mediterranean also played host to the warships and privateers of Ottoman friends engaged in conflict throughout the eighteenth century. These visitors—generally British and French—were neither welcome, nor well-behaved, fighting under Ottoman fortresses and blockading harbors, not to mention causing great damage to the Ottoman economy by assaulting the ships used to freight goods between Ottoman ports, hitting staples such as wheat, coffee, and soap particularly hard. The attacks on shipping in particular posed a major challenge to Ottoman authority in the Eastern Mediterranean, and required firm action from the state. Of course, military action was not an option, as the offending parties were states holding ʿahdnāmes (Capitulations) from the sultan and whose subjects were müsteʿmin, protected foreigners. Thus, from the first major attacks in the Aegean in the late 1690s, which saw naval battles around Izmir and prizes taken within island harbors, the Ottoman state instituted what it later called the şurū-t-u deryā, the sea or maritime regulations. 7 In 1696 in order to stop these assaults, an imperial decree was issued forbidding armed ships of European powers to pass a line going from Andros to Kos and ending at Foça (near Izmir), and ruling that offending parties would be obliged to pay compensation for any prizes taken beyond that maritime border. This was reinstituted in 1703, going from the Anatolian coast to Samos, Ikaria, Andros, and ending at Euboea. During the greater violence of the mid-eighteenth century, these maritime regulations were extended and reinforced in 1744, 1758, and 1779 on an enlarged scale. In 1744 and 1758, the limits of the Ottoman maritime territory were given as from the south of Morea to the Gulf of Sirte in Libya, and in 1779 as being a line between the Morea, Crete, and the western border of Egypt. There is no
explanation as to why Crete was included in the 1779 regulations, and not the earlier ones. Perhaps European accusations that the maritime border was “chimerical” necessitated a more fixed position, thus giving Crete as an island a very important role at this stage in defining Ottoman maritime territoriality. Regardless, these regulations, which are mapped in Figure 1 below, saw the Ottoman state extend its maritime borders out of the Aegean, cutting off the entire Eastern Mediterranean from foreign privateering. What is more, the Ottomans successfully enforced these new boundaries, securing compensation for Ottoman merchants who lost their goods on board ships attacked by the French and British privateers who broke the regulations.

FIGURE 1

Little has been written about how the Ottomans thought about the sea in a legal sense, yet from the orders and regulations drawn up to curb attacks by foreign and technically friendly privateers we can get a real sense as to the thought process behind Ottoman policy. One example of such an imperial command issued to governors and naval officials on 20 Safer 1193 (9 March 1779) was aimed at nipping the situation in the bud. With Britain and France once again at blows due to the war in North America, the privateers of those two nations returned to the Mediterranean in force. Following complaints by French merchant captains of attacks on their ships, the command was issued to bring back the regulations with a slightly modified geographical route, but with the same principle:

Enmity and contention having arisen among the European states, and in consequence of the faithful observance of the former sea regulations being neglected in various ways by the ships of the said states, a line is to be imagined going from the realm of Morea to the island of Crete.8

This hatt-i mefrüz, the “imagined line,” marked the outer limits of Ottoman maritime territoriality, within which European ships could not attack each other or others. It is no coincidence that islands helped to form this boundary in the north, between the
large island of Crete and the Morea, which could also, as will be seen, be referred to as a cezīre, an island. Islands clearly played some part in forming the Ottoman idea of the limits of its liquid territory.

These regulations introduced notions about maritime space and law that contemporaries assumed the Ottomans to be lacking, with one notable maritime scholar of the early nineteenth century, Domenico Alberto Azuni, writing that he knew of no maritime law in the Ottoman Empire except that which had been introduced by the Europeans. It is clear that this is patently false, with the 1193/1779 regulation making explicit reference on several occasions to an Ottoman understanding of kavāʻid-i bahriye or kavāʻid-i deryā (maritime rules or rules of the sea), and even of kavāʻid-i mer`īye-i deryā (rules of respect at sea). They set territorial limits, stating that, in normal circumstances, British and French ships could not make attacks inside the ports or under or in front of the cannon of fortresses (limānlari derānlarında ve kilâ` ṭopu altlarinda ve pîşgâhinda), nor within three leagues of the coast (sevâhilinden). Thus, in the case of the 1193/1779 regulation, it was repeated violations of Ottoman ports, fortresses, and coastlines that led to the introduction of a blanket ban on violence in the Ottoman Mediterranean, extending the limits of Ottoman authority out to sea, with the aim of protecting land and maritime territory.

The origins of this particular incarnation of the maritime limits can be found in the violence that plagued the Eastern Mediterranean during the War of the Austrian Succession (1740–48). Here, the main culprits were British privateers attacking French shipping carrying the goods and persons of Ottoman subjects. Such traffic was crucial to the internal activity of Ottoman merchants freighting goods around the Mediterranean, and above all in the lucrative routes between Egypt and the North African Regencies, and the Levant and Aegean. Mapping out the attacks that occurred between 1744 and 1747 reveals to what extent the islands under Ottoman control were areas around which this privateering violence occurred, partly because they formed important landmarks for commercial traffic. From the petitions made by Ottoman subjects to both the British embassy and the Ottoman authorities, and the commands issued by the Ottoman government, it is possible to track the rampages of a number of British ships that took French ships with Ottoman goods, with two in particular—The Ruby and The Fame—being the worst perpetrators. In 1744, The Ruby made at least four captures involving Ottoman subjects, off Kythera, Crete, Rhodes, and Zakynthos. In 1746 and 1747, The Fame made attacks off Crete, and along the Syrian coast and
Cyprus. Both ships, in targeting French ships, managed to take cloth, soap, and—most damningly from the Ottoman perspective—much-needed shipments of rice and coffee being sent to Cyprus and Syria from Egypt. In both cases, the attacks centered on islands, in the west around Crete and the entrance to the Aegean, and in the east around Cyprus. In issuing maritime regulations that made the Mediterranean east of the imaginary line between Morea and Sirte not just a *mare clausum* but, in essence, an extension of the land in which Ottoman laws would be in full force, the Ottoman state was able to exert enough legal and diplomatic pressure to secure compensation or restitution for their wronged subjects from the British authorities, amounting to over 80,000 gurus.\(^{10}\)

The Ottoman commands issued during this period give us an excellent sense of the state’s understanding of its maritime space. It was at this time that the Europeans were first forbidden from sending armed ships beyond an imagined line from Mora to Sirte in Libya. A command issued to the governors and commanders in the Ottoman islands, as well as to Ottoman naval commanders at the end of Muḥarram 1157 (mid-March 1744) reported complaints of the French that one of their ships had been taken by pirates cruising around the islands of Cephalonia and Aya Mavro (Lefkada), and elsewhere in “the waters of the island of Morea” (*Mora cezîresi șularında*).\(^{11}\) As Kahraman Şakul illustrates in this volume, the Morean peninsula was almost an island, with only a narrow joint at Corinth connecting it to the rest of Greece.\(^{12}\) By emphasizing the insular nature of the Morea, it was placed on the same level as both large islands like Crete and smaller ones like Lefkada. In other words, the recipients of the order—who comprised various ranks of Ottoman official throughout the Mediterranean islands—were being asked to think of all sorts of ports, islands, and coastal landmasses as a common frontier under threat. Thus, when the command spoke of forbidding European ships from coming within “a number of leagues” (*birkaç mîl baʿīd*) of Ottoman territory in accordance with the “ancient regulations of the sea” (*kāʿide-i  kadîme-i deryâ*), the islands and ports (*cezâyir ve limânlar*) that had been attacked and would now be protected, formed a homogenous space together that defined Ottoman territorial waters proper (*şular*).

This creation of a united insular and litoral territory helps us to understand what was perhaps the most important of the surviving orders from this period, issued at the end of Şaban 1157 (beginning of October 1744) to Ottoman governors and judges around the Mediterranean coast and islands.\(^{13}\) The opening narrative described
the attacks by friendly foreign states against Ottoman subjects and their goods. The
solution was, as in the earlier conflicts, to draw a line. But here, the language is quite
different to the later decree, which, as we have seen used the term ḥaṭṭ-i mefrāż, the
imagined line, to describe the new maritime border. Here, something more fixed is
described that would deter any further raids (aḵin) against Ottoman waters (Devlet-i ʿAliyem ʿulārīnda), specifically commanding that “a boundary be fixed in the sea”
(deryāda bir ḥadd taʿyin olunub). The purpose of this boundary (ḥadd) was to stop
European ships fighting each other “in the waters of my Sublime State and in the open
oceans, on the shores of Rumelia and Arabia [i.e. Europe and Asia]” (Devlet-i ʿAliyem ʿulārīnda ve açık enginlerinde ve Rūm-īli ve ʿArabistān ḵiyilerinde). This command
makes several mentions of the protected spaces from foreign attack, such as “the
waters of my Well-Protected Domains, under the guns of the castles, and around the
islands” (memālīk-i mahrīsem ʿulārīnda ve ṭal’e ṭopu altında ve cezāyīr civārinda).
Once again, we find divisions between different sorts of maritime space, separating
the shores and territorial waters from the open sea, with islands forming a distinct part
of this maritime frontier. Yet, all of these spaces—coastal waters, harbors, coastal
fortresses, the waters around islands—are littoral features, and it is perhaps what helped to define territoriality across the maritime frontier.

**Borders and Frontiers, Solidity, and Fluidity**

Defining the physical limits of early modern empires is often a difficult and
problematic task. It has often been the case in recent years for the terms “fluid borders”
or “fluid frontiers” to be employed in seeking to understand what Palmira Brummett
termed as the “large and porous” frontiers of the Sublime State.14 Describing a border
as “fluid” is to describe it precisely as it should not be in geopolitics, that is, changing
and changeable. Thus, the images invoked by the concept of fluidity in the borders of
the state are perhaps problematic in their assumptions when speaking about certain
periods.15 An n-gram query for “fluid borders” in one major online scholarly
repository reveals that usage of that term skyrocketed from precisely 1989. The
implication that this was a specific reaction to the fall of the Soviet Union, and the
idea that borders had been broken down and new opportunities for interactions had
opened up, remains a powerful one in scholarship on that period.16 If the (re)gaining
of fluidity could indicate the situation of post-Soviet Europe, then the loss of fluidity
through the fixing of permanent borders following the treaty of Carlowitz and
subsequent agreements has certainly been employed to explain changes in the nature of the Ottoman Empire from the beginning of the eighteenth century. If part of the parameters of our historical enquiry is to define the space of our subject, then the solidification of borders must surely be a pivotal moment.

Yet, if we frame our notion of space in terms of states being solid or fluid, how do we deal with borders that actually possess those physical properties? Does a mountain range restrict fluidity compared to a river? Is a woodland particularly porous as a border? And then, what about the sea? Is it even possible to speak of the sea as having any part in defining the borders of a state? In fact, understanding attitudes towards the sea is crucial to understanding notions of territoriality. In his extended discussion of the history of international relations in East Asia, David Kang opened a chapter on nomads and islands with the assertion that “the difference between a border and a frontier is the difference between a line and a space.” For Kang, a border was a fixed dividing line between two polities, whereas a frontier represented a state of political fluidity, which could be turned solid through the expansion of fixed authority into the area. The term “frontier,” however, has its own problems, not least when thinking about Ottoman history with its connotations of perpetual warfare and lack of imperial control. To briefly reclaim the term for the purposes of this paper may well prove problematic, but it deserves some consideration, based on the work of Hugh Clark on ideas of the frontier in Chinese history, in which he defined the frontier as a space of cultural division. In his discussion on frontier discourse, Clark gave a most eloquent articulation of the sea as a border:

For all its mystery, however, the maritime frontier was real, and the reality of this frontier was different from that of land frontiers. Because at first glance they are so precisely demarcated, they are both a frontier and a boundary. They appear to offer no abstraction. When one reaches the shore, that is the boundary, and the boundary is the frontier. There is no immediate “other side.” What is there is the empty ocean. Thus the maritime frontier appears to be unlike any land frontier; where the latter are imprecise, the maritime frontier presents a frontier that is very clearly defined.

This, in Clark’s argument, gave a maritime frontier a very particular set of properties. If a land frontier was a place of cultural mingling, then the maritime frontier was an “interface,” a space where two cultures could meet, but where the interaction could be
controlled and regulated. From this, we have an intriguing framework within which to think about the sea as a means of defining territoriality: a clear border at the shore; and a means by which to regulate interactions with others.

Thinking about the Ottoman case, and islands in particular, requires reworking this framework somewhat. The idea of the interface is useful, as the maritime frontier was a place that housed the docks, customs houses, and defense networks that marked that space as Ottoman. However, in the Ottoman understanding of territoriality—as with many others in Europe at the same time—the shore and its institutions did not form the border in itself, but were a marker for the actual limits of territorial authority, the territorial waters that occupied the space between the shore and the sea. That is, the borders of the Ottoman Empire in this case were quite literally fluid. Placing islands within this framework complicates the assumption of the idea of interface in this regard. Islands, of course, are pieces of land entirely surrounded by the sea; this is, as Michel Fontenay reminded us, what makes islands specifically different from other sorts of land.

This definition renders islands as distinctly littoral entities. The shores of the islands cannot be separated from their waters nor their hinterland, defined as much by their liquidity as by their solid state. Histories of coasts and littoral spaces have started to make important contributions to conceptual notions of maritime space in general, and the engagement of scholars such as Isaac Land and David Worthington in developing the field has led to interesting collaborative work. One of the questions that Land raises in his writing is the utility of coastal history as a sub-field, and in a review essay from 2007 he provides a compelling and rather beautiful argument in its favor:

“Oceanic” history was always a metaphor: how many historians ever wrote about salt water? Coastal history is a more productive, and instructive, metaphor. Coastlines would not exist without their proximity to the ocean, but their character is not determined solely by the ocean’s action. Coasts may form bulwarks of resistance to the waves, as in the case of coral reefs or towering cliffs. Yet there are messy, intermediate places like tidal flats and brackish estuaries. There are also quite coves and inlets, connected to the ocean but only gently shaped by it. […] In their diversity, and in their ever changing nature, coasts parallel the diverse experiences of human beings in their confrontation with water, and each other.
The variety and diversity of the coastline, its permanence and transience, is an important factor in accounting for and interpreting its role in human politics and society. The transience of permanence is an important idea, one which the geographer David Harvey defines as a perpetually perishing space dependent on processes, usually capital flows. The relationship between coastal space and human is therefore contingent, and translates the space beyond a mere border between the blue ocean and the green grass beyond. John Gillis has argued for a complication in our understanding of littoral spaces, borrowing an ecological term to describe the coast as an ecotone, where “land and water constitute and ecological continuum.” In thinking about coasts not as forming a border between land and sea, but as a discrete space in which the two are merged into something distinct, then the character of islands becomes rather interesting, particularly in terms of their territoriality.

As points of land surrounded by sea, one way of thinking about islands is as nodes of territoriality, extending the authority of the state out into the open sea. This is achieved, in part, through their ecotonal nature, merging and forging a new space from water and land. In this sense, the Ottoman imperial commands that we often find islands and territorial waters together almost as synonyms, an demonstration perhaps of the deep significance of what Gillis calls “brown water history”. In a command to the Kapudan-ı Derya in 1758, representative of a number of similar commands issued in the second half of the eighteenth century, the admiral was instructed to patrol “around the islands and other waters of my Sublime State” (adalar aralarında ve să`ir develet-i ‘aliyem sularında). The spatial implication here is that islands are a distinct but connected part of Ottoman territorial waters. What, then, of archipelagos or other clusters of islands? For instance, in the Eastern Mediterranean, Cyprus is a lone island between Anatolia and the Levant surrounded by hundreds of miles of open sea. Crete, however, sits at the entrance to the Aegean, which is broken up by dozens of islands, each one acting as a small node of imperial authority in their surrounding waters, assisted by what Cyprian Broodbank has termed “a high degree of inter-visibility.” Does this intensification of territoriality through the presence of many islands then indicate a stronger Ottoman claim to territorial authority in the Aegean than it could make in the Levant? In other words, how far did Ottoman maritime territoriality depend on islands separating Ottoman waters from the sea beyond?

Sultan of the Two Seas?
From examining a number of imperial commands concerning piracy and maritime violence in the Mediterranean Sea in the seventeenth and eighteenth century from the perspective of the Ottoman state in Istanbul, it seems that the sea was divided into two parts. The first was rūy-u deryā, literally “the face of the sea.” This term was used to describe the open sea, the waters considered outside of direct imperial control. To give an example, at the beginning of Rebiülevvel 1122 (beginning of May 1710), a command was issued to İbrahim Pasha, one of the Ottoman galleon commanders in the Mediterranean.31 It reported that on 11 Muharrem of that year (March 12, 1710) a pirate galleon and two saitees appeared from the open sea (rūy-u deryā...zuhūr), and began targeting shipping between the Egyptian commercial hub of Damietta and the Syrian ports such as Sidon, Tripoli, and Payas. The Ottoman solution was to send two galleons under the command of İbrahim Pasha to patrol between Payas and the straits of Damietta, and this was really all they could do to pursue their aim of protecting Muslim ships from pirate attacks (müsülümân sefinelerini ḳorsan eşkiyası muţurîndan emîn ve sâlim eydûb). The open sea between Egypt and Syria was just that; open, featureless, ungovernable. The language used in this report, that the pirates appeared or emerged (zuhūr) from out of this vast expanse, perhaps gives a sense of how this space was perceived. These ships were only comprehensible when sighted, and more often than not such an encounter would happen in or around coastal waters rather than in the open sea, as projections of power and control emanated from the coastal defenses and ports.32

Mounting these defense operations was an essential duty, as the claim to territory, both rhetorically and practically, was crucial to the legitimation of the Ottoman state. Among the various grandiose titles claimed by the House of Osman, one of the more frequently employed phrases in monumental epigraphy and diplomatic correspondence was sultānu'l-berreyn ve ḥakānu'l-bahreyn, the Sultan of the two lands and ruler of the two seas. Histories of the Ottoman Empire have focused extensively on the first element of this title, exploring the theories, methods, successes, and problems of the assertion of Istanbul’s authority over the urban and rural space of the imperial dominions in Europe and Asia. Indeed, much of our understanding of what made the Ottoman Empire what it was has been shaped by its great landmass. However, great strides have certainly been made in understanding the Ottoman relationship to the sea, upon which the assertions of this present study are entirely dependent.33 The second part of that grand imperial title is crucial in developing our
understanding Ottoman state and society, its place in the world, and its self-image. As well as claiming its two great seas—the Black and the White (the Mediterranean)—rhetorically, at various different times the Ottoman state also attempted to exert various levels of imperial control over them. Beyond this, we need to consider imperial influence in the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, and the Indian Ocean, not to mention the innumerable bodies of water inland, the rivers, and lakes. Moreover, with so much of the population of the Ottoman Empire being riverine, lacustrine, or littoral, and with the sea playing such a central role in trade and travel, we simply must consider the Ottoman relationship with liquid space in order to fully appreciate the nature of imperial authority.

One of the reasons, I suspect, that the sea is often passed over in analyzing the Ottomans as an Empire, is because it is difficult to envisage authority over something that is, quite literally, intangible. Unlike rivers and other inland bodies of water, the open sea, as the early modern European theorists of international law posited, cannot be so easily physically occupied. A warship can only control a limited part of a vast and ever-shifting expanse, and then only temporarily, dependent on finite supplies and fickle weather. Maritime powers could use their naval might to project such control over sea-lanes, but these lanes were not physical highways, but ill-defined and temporary passages from one landmass to another, the very essence of Harvey’s permanences. Perhaps the only analogous space to that of the abstract sea in terms of imperial authority is the abstract desert, which is also a large and largely featureless space, with human habitation temporary or transitory. Taking this analogy further, we might begin to think about the old cliché of oases being islands of life in the desert, and consider islands to be oases of the sea, without which control would be impossible. Yet, did the Ottoman claim of maritime sovereignty and territoriality rest on authority over the islands in the seas it sought to control? Was Ottoman maritime territoriality, in effect, insular?

This leads me to the parts of the Mediterranean immediately adjacent to Ottoman shores that formed the second element of that sea, generally referred to simply as şular, the Ottoman “waters.” These were controllable and crucial, the waters extending “bırkaç mil,” a certain number of miles (usually up to three) from the shore mentioned in maritime regulations. Over half a century after the attacks on the Egypt-Syria shipping, a command was given in the middle of Şeval 1179 (end of March 1766) to the Kapudan-ı Derya Hüseyin Pasha concerning the security of trade
in the Mediterranean.35 The order complained of the banditry of pirates (eşkiya-yı ḳorşan) in attacking merchants and protected foreigners (tüccâr ve müste‘mîn  тâ’îfesiniñ), who were going to Egypt and travelling in the “waters of my Well-Protected Domains in the Mediterranean Sea” (bah-r-ı sefidîn memâlik-i mahrüsem  şularında). The complaints had been made by the governors and commanders resident in the islands and on the coasts (cezàyir ve sevâhilde), who were evidently concerned at the effect this maritime violence would have on their territories. What was important in this case was that the violence on this occasion was happening in and around coastal and island waters, and not the open sea. The Ottoman solution was to dispatch the imperial fleet that summer to Morea, “around the islands and the other waters of my Sublime State” (aḍalar aralarında ve sâ`ir devlet-i ʿaliyem  şularında). Here, in a verbatim repetition of the command of 1758, the islands form a particular element of the maritime landscape, a specific part of the “waters” under Ottoman control, not separate legally or territorially, but important practically as markers for defining liquid imperial authority, an ecotone of territoriality and maritoriality. Yet it is, as the command also tells us, it was the cezîreler  sâhilleri, the coasts of the islands, and the populations living there, that made their protection so important, and we might also see those coasts as providing the islands’ ecotonality.

Given the importance of islands in defining these territorial waters, we should not discount the relationship between Ottoman maritime territoriality and insularity per se. To consider one extreme that largely removes islands from the equation, the maritime border imposed by the line drawn between Greece and Libya, intended to block the Eastern Mediterranean in its entirety was a successful assertion of maritime authority when the violence of European allies proved a significant security challenge and a profound threat to Ottoman shipping. This demonstrates, quite conclusively, that in the eighteenth century the Ottomans refused to be passive observers of violence in their claimed waters, and were capable of dealing with these threats (when posed by nominal allies) without recourse to violence themselves. In her pioneering study on the Ottoman sixteenth century, Palmira Brummett demonstrated that imperial space was relative: it could be practical through the collection of taxes or levying of troops; rhetorical, in that there was no guarantee that authority in a particular region would be respected; or imagined as a means to intimidate opponents.36 Based on this, we could well say that the Ottoman maritime lines comprised a bit of all three categories. They created a maritime space that was largely
imagined because of a lack of ability to physically control or divide the sea, employed the maritime regulations as a rhetorical device to dissuade foreign warships from making attacks, but ultimately that was practical because of the successful prosecutions made against foreign privateers. In other words, Ottoman maritime territoriality in the Mediterranean was not necessarily as abstract as the boast “Sultan of the two seas” sultanü’l-bahreyn initially suggests.

These limits were, however, also entirely divorced from the island and littoral landscape. As with many pieces of historical evidence, we only find out about Ottoman attitudes towards their maritime space when things went wrong. The maritime limits were a temporary measure. The imagined line was a legal ploy for a specific and challenging context, not a permanent assertion of Ottoman legal authority over the entire sea; once the trouble abated, the regulations were discarded until the next conflict. As such, the maritime limits, whether they were fixed or imagined, lines or borders, were not comparable to the fixing of land borders in the same period. Ultimately, the Ottoman state in the eighteenth century was not interested in asserting a universalist claim over the Mediterranean. The rūy-u deryā or açık engin—the open sea—remained a non-territorial space. When imperial commands do refer to açıklar, open waters, in the context of territorial waters, this refers almost exclusively to the maintenance of shipping lanes. Therefore, to consider maritime territoriality aside from this extreme regulation, we need to return to a more literal landscape.

That the fixing of land borders and the articulation of maritime space occurred in the same period is not a coincidence. The processes, however, were entirely different; this might be a trite statement, but it is necessary to articulate these differences. The Ottoman archives are full of little sketches, maps, and textual descriptions of border commissions and negotiations. To take one example, after the Treaty of Sistova (1791) it was necessary to settle the route of the Ottoman-Habsburg border. One of the few places transferred from the Ottomans to the Habsburgs was a parcel of land in between the Una and Gлина rivers (today the northwest border between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina). A standard map was drawn up as per the treaty to show the new frontier; it provides a number of features used to define the border, including rivers, streams, mountains, villages, and castles. In this case, a line could be drawn on a map, agreed by both parties, marked by set features, and henceforth it would be understood that on one side of the line was Habsburg territory, and that on the other was Ottoman. Thus, when foreign merchants crossed into the
Ottoman Empire by land, there was, at least on a geopolitical level, a moment when they could say for certain that they had set foot upon Ottoman territory.

The processes of defining the Ottoman land borders occurred largely in the context of treaty negotiations with belligerent neighbors, something that cannot be said for territorial waters in the Mediterranean. However, for merchants coming by sea, there was also such a moment when they could be said to have reached Ottoman territory at sea. On first consideration, it might appear that their experience of being in Ottoman territory, enjoying their freedoms as müsteʿmin and becoming subject to the consequent financial and legal regime, began only on their arrival in port. From another perspective, it could be understood that islands formed natural physical boundaries marking the start of Ottoman waters, at least in the minds of these historical actors. Passing Kythera, Crete, or Rhodes would take merchants into a sea bounded by Ottoman territory on all sides and filled with Ottoman islands. Perhaps, then, the Aegean islands could be understood as equivalent to forests or rivers on land in marking Ottoman territory. This, however, does not seem to be the Ottoman understanding of their territoriality as expressed in the documents I have examined: after all, as a number of the commands demonstrated, they considered their authority to stretch just beyond the coast, a number of leagues—bırkac miľ—out into the sea.

The part of the sea that required protection was the su, the territorial waters, and violations there called for action from the state. There was, therefore, a tangible moment when a ship came into the Ottoman Empire’s territory on the water and was entitled to receive Ottoman protection, and the coasts of both islands and the main landmasses helped to define this, not least because of the authority they projected through their nature as concurrently liquid and solid space.

Conclusions
Was there something particular about the place of islands in Ottoman territoriality? Gilles Veinstein said that in studying Ottoman insularity, we are attempting “to discern what specific place and role this state reserved to its possessions of a certain kind that distinguishes them from all its other provinces, themselves diverse in nature.”39 Does the Ottoman approach to maritime territoriality in the eighteenth century distinguish islands from other spaces, such as coasts, castles, or ports? I would argue, in this case, that this was a territoriality defined by things littoral rather
than particularly insular. Islands were a crucial part of defining this liquid territory, but this did not make the Ottoman claim to the Aegean all encompassing; in terms of territory, it was not an Ottoman lake, nor an engorged river populated by islets. Just a few leagues beyond an island’s shores, territorial waters became open sea once again, outside of imperial control and legal authority. However, whilst the maritory of the Aegean islands was defined by their coastal waters and not simply by virtue of their being in the Aegean, their role in defining space within that open sea was crucial.

Most importantly of all, that definition of space had a purpose beyond the bluster of official rhetoric. If we return to one of the cases examined earlier, that of the Ottoman attempt to stop pirate attacks between Syria and Egypt in 1710, we can see the rationale behind claims of maritime territoriality and their articulation. In justifying the deployment of the imperial fleet in force—with galleons, galleys, and frigates—to patrol the open waters between Damietta and Payas as we saw above, the command explained that it was aimed at securing justice for “the poor subjects and people of the realm residing on the coasts of all the isles and islands” (bilcümle adalar ve cezâyir sâhilinin sâkin olan fuqarâ-yı ra’îyyet ve ehl-i memleketîn). More than this, it detailed that “the merchant galleons coming to Egypt and other major cities, the small and large caïques travelling among the islands, and the ships of the protected foreigners in the waters of my Sublime State, are [to receive] the endeavor and exertion of protection and security from the snares and damages of pirates.” As Gillis reminds us, coasts are where the majority of fishing and shipping takes place, where populations benefit from the rich ecological systems produced by the shore’s ecotone. This is where the spatial distinctions that defined the Ottoman maritime territory make some sense; in order to secure Ottoman waters, temporary assertions over the sea were occasionally necessary, all with the aim of protecting the people living on the coasts in Europe, Asia, and the islands, as well as those trading or sailing in what the Ottomans considered to be their waters, more often than not centered on the coast.

As has been demonstrated in the responses to both domestic and foreign pirates, these waters were clearly defined, and the Ottoman state was able to use both force and legal measures to assert its authority. However, for the most part, with the exception of the maritime regulations, Ottoman claims over the sea were not total, but relied on specific features, especially ports and forts. Islands were different in providing clear landmarks in the open sea for Ottoman control, and bases for the
exertion of that control. However, maritime territoriality was not defined by insularité, but rather by littoralité; the coasts of an island, and coasts in general, defined what separated su from bahr, making Crete no different in that sense from Anatolia. What is important in considering Ottoman insularities based on the state’s attempt to define and enforce its rule against pirates and other maritime violence is therefore to think about islands as coastal entities with their own territorial waters. Further investigation needs to be done into Ottoman notions of authority at sea across time and space. However, it seems reasonable to conclude from this brief study that islands as a group did not provide a maritime border defining the limits of Ottoman control by virtue of being islands, but rather the coasts of each island projected its own maritime territory out to sea, for which liquid space the Ottoman state was responsible for ensuring security and peace, much as it was on land.

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1 The work of Colin Heywood has been particularly important for me in framing an understanding of Ottoman maritime territoriality, especially, Colin Heywood, “Ottoman Territoriality Versus Maritime Usage: The Ottoman Islands and English Privateering in the Wars with France (1689–1714),” in Insularités ottomanes, eds. Nicolas Vatin and Gilles Veinstein (Paris: Maisonneuve & Larose, 2004), 145–176. More generally, see Robert David
My ongoing research into Ottoman efforts to protect their Mediterranean waters charts regular and significant naval operations that used both corsairing and anti-piracy missions between the 1730s and 70s, and demonstrates the importance to the Ottoman state of ensuring maritime protection and security in the eighteenth century.


I have given some initial thoughts about these maritime regulations, and continue to research their implications for Ottoman maritime territoriality and foreign relations. See Michael Talbot, “Ottoman Seas and British Privateers: Defining Maritime Territoriality in the Eighteenth-Century Levant,” in Well-Connected Domains: Towards and Entangled Ottoman History, eds. Pascal Firges, Tobias Graf, Christian Roth, and Gülay Tulasoğlu (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 54–70.

BOA C.HR 118/5877, middle of Safer 1193 (beginning of March 1779). “Düvel-i Avrupa miyânlerinin ḥuṣūmet ve şıkâk taḥaddus ve sâbikûl-beyân şûrût-u deryû ṣurâda dâvel-i mérkûme gemilerinden baʿzi gûne tehâvûn ve kuw ′ ata bînâ en nehîyet ḥûdûd-u İslâmîye olan memleket-i Moraʾînî ve velâсудnand cezîrê-i Gîrîdê kıldncâ bir Ḥaṭî farz olunub.” A subsequent command in November clarified that the borders would go from the Morea, to Crete, to the extreme western borders of Egypt.

Domenico Alberto Azuni, Origine et progrès du droit et de la législation maritime, avec des observations sur le consulat de la mer (Paris: Cérioux, 1810), 227.


BOA C.HR 140/6968, end of Muḥarram 1157 (middle of March 1744).

Certainly the term cezîrê could be taken as a form of peninsula, much as the Arabian Peninsula is often referred to as al-jâzîrah al-ʿarabiyyah. However, that the Ottomans occasionally considered Morea to be an island, or at least island-like, and that Morea could be said to share a number of features with other large islands, means that it would be extremely interesting to examine Morea within the wider framework of insularity. If we are to understand insularity as being more than “a body of land surrounded by a body of water,” then the insularity of peninsulas must be taken into consideration. For an interesting framing of such an analysis, in the same place but a rather different time, see Christy Constantakopolou, The Dance of the Islands: Insularity, Networks, the Athenian Empire, and the Aegean World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), especially chapters 1, 4, and 5.

C.HR 121/6030, end of Şaban 1157 (beginning of October 1744).


15 An excellent critique of “fluidity” was given by Antonis Hadjikyriacou and Daphne Lappa in their paper entitled “Exploring the Conceptual Boundaries of the Concept of Fluidity: Early Modern Contact Zones in the Adriatic and the Eastern Mediterranean,” at the International Conference *Well-Connected Domains: Intersections of Asia and Europe in the Ottoman Empire*, University of Heidelberg, November 10–12, 2011.


22 Ibid., 20


24 A useful resource for the discussions in coastal history is the [Coastal History Blog](http://porttowns.port.ac.uk/coastal-history-blog/). Two of Isaac Land’s early posts on this site give an interesting introduction to the subject: ‘Blog 2: What Makes Coastal History Distinct? Part One of Two’, 4 November 2013; and ‘Blog 3: What Makes Coastal History Distinct? Part Two of Two’, 20 November 2013. David Worthington has also contributed to this site – ‘Blog 33: Firths and Fjords’, 10 November 2015 – and also maintains his own blogsite via the University of the Highlands and Islands, thinking about coastal history and adjacent coasts, [Firths and Fjords: Comparative Historical Perspectives on Adjacent Coasts](https://firthsandfjords.com/). My own contribution to the *Firths and Fjords* blog is a reflection on two outstanding conferences on island and coastal history, Worthington’s ‘Firths and Fjords’ (University of the Highlands and Islands, 31 March to 2 April 2016), and Antonis Hadjikyriacou’s ‘Insularities Connected’ (Institute for Mediterranean Studies, FORTH, 10–12 June 2016), both of which have been instrumental in shaping my ideas on these subjects:


28 ibid., 164.

29 BOA C.BH 254/11749, 1 Muharrem 1172 (5 September 1758).


31 BOA C.BH 91/4391, beginning of Rebiülevvel 1122 (beginning of May 1710).


34 The discussions over mare liberum and mare clausum in the seventeenth century set the principles for much of our understanding of maritime territoriality, in particular Hugo Grotius’s assertion that “what cannot be occupied cannot be the property of anyone, for all property has arisen from occupation.” For a brief discussion of these debates, see Talbot, “Ottoman Seas,” 55–57. On Ottoman authority over rivers, a subject that requires more attention, see Ayşe Kayapınar, “Les Îles ottomanes du Danube au XVIIe siècle,” in Insularités ottomanes, eds. Nicolas Vatin and Gilles Veinstein, 177–202.

35 BOA, C.BH 13/627, middle of Şeval 1179 (end of March 1766).

36 Brummett, Ottoman Seapower, 12.


38 BOA, HAT 241/13504, undated (1791/2).

genre particulier qui les distingue de toutes ses autres provinces, elles-mêmes de natures diverses.”

40 BOA C.BH 91/4391.

41 Ibid. Miṣr ve emşar-ı sâ’îreye zehâb ve iyâb eden tüccâr kalyonlarını ve aḍalar aralarında gezan sağîr ve kebîr kayıkleri ve devlet-i āliyem şularında müste’min sefinelerini keyd ve mużîrîn korsandan vîkâye ve muḥâfażaya şarf-i himmet ve iḳdam.

42 Gillis, ‘Not continents’, 164.

43 For a consideration of forts as markers of power, see Palmira Brummett, “The Fortress: Defining and Mapping the Ottoman Frontier in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries,” in Peakcock (ed.), Frontiers, 31–56. More comparative work needs to be done on Ottoman coastal fortifications, on the mainland, and in the islands.