Water Management in Latin America:
Political Resistance Strategies and Types of Community. Comparative
Case Studies of Argentina, Brazil and Colombia

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DECLARATION

I certify that this work has not been accepted in substance for any degree, and is not concurrently being submitted for any degree other than that of Master of Philosophy being studied at the University of Greenwich. I also declare that this work is the result of my own investigations except where otherwise identified by references and that I have not plagiarised the work of others.

Camilla Capotorto
London
September 2015
Acknowledgements

“The likelihood that your acts of resistance cannot stop the injustice does not exempt you from acting in what you sincerely and reflectively hold to be the best interest of your community”.
Susan Sontag.

“Let there be work, bread, water and salt for all”. Nelson Mandela.

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Abstract

This research investigates the causal relation between resistance to water management strategies and types of community in Latin America, and establishes whether communitarianism, communicative community or post-modern community are merely ideal-types or if they coexist in real-life communities. Most prior studies rarely address the correlation between water management approaches and the economic mainstream represented by Washington Consensus and Post-Washington Consensus which, in turn, are the driving forces of political resistance. This study examines resistance movements in this context. By examining three case studies, namely Argentina, Brazil and Colombia, this project highlights the reason why some economic models have been supported around the world, particularly in developing countries. Under the over-arching approach of a desk-based research, several analytical tools are used to undertake this multi-level study. These are: a meta-policy and policy process analysis to establish the analytical framework at global and national levels; case studies of three Latin American countries to establish more specific national policies and issues in water management; the analysis of community theories to understand different community structures and to identify the theoretical explanations of different resistance strategies used by communities; and the analysis of data on websites of organisations and social groups to understand the different strategies adopted by these communities and social movements.

This research shows that different types of community and different levels of relative deprivation influence strategies, which are country-specific, and that communities are a determinant for political resistance. This may direct future research on the specifics of community responses to water management strategies. Significant findings include the fact that traits of communitarianism, communicative community and post-modern community coexist in the three countries analysed. However, they do not offer a neatly defined categorisation of real-life communities. This research contributes to the fields of community research and water policy by examining the relation between types of community and political resistance and by analysing water management strategies.
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Glossary

AATR – Associacao de Advogados de Trabalhadores Rurais (Association of Solicitors for the Rural Workers), Brazil
ALAI – America Latina en Movimiento (Latin America on the Move)
ANOCP – National Workers’, Peasants’ and Popular Assembly (Mexico)
APOINME – Articulacao dos Povos e Organizacoes de Nordeste, Minas Gerais e Espirito Santo (Artication of Indigenous People and Organizations of North-East, Minas Gerais and Espirito Santo), Brazil
ASPROCIG – Asociacion de Productores para el Desarrollo Comunitario de la Cienaga Grande del bajo Sinu’ (Association of Producers for the Communitarian Development of the low Sinu’ River basin area), Colombia
BOT – Build-Operate-Transfer contracts
CDCA – Centro di Documentazione Conflitti Ambientali (Documentation Centre on Environmental Conflicts), Italy
CDDPH – Council for the Defence of Human Rights (Brazil)
CGII – General Coordination Unit of Uncontacted Indians (Brazil)
CIMI – Conselho Indegenista Missionario (Missionary Council for Indigenous People), Brazil
CNA – Coordinador Nacional Agrario (National Rural Coordinating Group), Colombia
CNBB – National Conference of Brazilian Bishops (Brazil)
CONAIE – Confederacion de Nacionalidades Indigenas de Ecuador (Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador), Ecuador
CONAMUP – National Coordinator of Urban Popular Movements (Mexico)
CPT – Commissao Pastoral da Terra (Earth Pastoral Commission), Brazil
CUT – Central Unitaria de Trabajadores de Colombia (Central Union of Colombian Workers), Colombia
ECOSOC – United Nations Economic and Social Council
ERP – People Revolutionary Army (Argentina)
EZLN – Ejercito Zapatista de Liberacion Nacional (Zapatista Army of National Liberation), Mexico
FARC-EP – Fuerza Armada Revolucionaria de Colombia-Ejercito Popular (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People’s Army), Colombia
FIAN International – formerly FoodFirst International and Action Network
FNDSAC – National Front in the Defence of Salaries and Against Austerity and Need (Mexico)
FOCO – Foro Ciudadano de Partecipacion por la Justicia y los Derechos Humanos (Citizens Forum for Justice and Human Rights), Argentina
FUNAI – National Indian Foundation (Brazil)
FUNAM – Environment Defence Foundation, Argentina
FZLN – Frente Zapatista de Liberacion Nacional (Zapatista Nacional Liberation Front), Mexico
GAM – Grupo de Apoyo Mutuo (Mutual Support Group), Guatemala
GDP – Gross Domestic Product
GRR – Grupo de Reflexion Rural (Group of Rural Consideration), Argentina
IFC – International Finance Corporation
IFI(s) – International Financial Organisation(s)
IMF – International Monetary Fund
INPADE – Institute for Participation and Development
ISI – Import-Substitution Industrialisation strategy
MAB – Movimento de Atingidos por Barragens (Movement of People Affected by Dams), Brazil
MPM – Montoneros Guerrilla (Argentina)
MST – Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra, Brazil (Rural Landless Workers Movement)
NAFTA – North America Free Trade Agreements
NECTAS – Nucleo de Estudio em Povos e Comunidade Tradicionais e Acoes Sociambientais (Centre for the Study on People and Traditional Communities and Socio-environmental Actions), Brazil
NGO – Non Governmental Organization
ODG – Observatory on the Debt in Globalisation (Spain)
OLCA – Latin American Observatory on Environmental Conflicts
ONIC – Organizacion Nacional Indigena de Colombia (Nazional Indigenous Organisation of Colombia), Colombia
PPIAF – Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility
PPP – Public-Private Partnership
PRGF – Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility
PRI – Partido Revolucionario Institucional (Institutional Revolutionary Party), Mexico
PRSC – Poverty Reduction Support Credit
PRSP(s) – Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper(s)
PAN – Partido Accion Nacional (National Action Party), Mexico
PT – Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers’ Party, Brazil)
PUP – Public-Public Partnership
RENACE – Red Nacional de Accion Ecologista (National Network of Ecological Action), Argentina
SAP – Structural Adjustment Policy
SINTRAELECOL – Sindicato de Trabajadres de la Energia de Colombia (Colombian Union of Energy Workers), Colombia
SIPAA – Sindicato de Profesionales de Acueductos y Alcantarillados (Water Workers’ Union), Costa Rica
UCIZONI – Northern Isthmus Zone Union of Indigenous Communities
UNEP – United Nations Environmental Programme
UNSGAB – United Nations Secretary General’s Advisory Board on Water and Sanitation
UP – Union Patriotica (Patriotic Union), Colombia
USO(s) – Universal Service Obligation(s)
WOP(s) – Water Operator Partnership(s)
WTO – World Trade Organisation
Chapter 1 – Introduction

1.1 Research Question
This thesis investigates political resistance to neoliberal water resources and water services management strategies in Latin America, and what is the causality between this resistance and types of community. In particular, this research takes into consideration three case studies: Argentina, Brazil and Colombia.

The development of water systems entails an understanding of the social, political, economic and environmental dimensions of a particular society. Specifically, due to its long history of political resistance, the Latin American context is considered appropriate to provide useful examples of a variety of forms of protest, some related to water management, which have been shaped by colonialism, independence movements, dictatorships, and democratic transitions.

The Latin American context offers a useful insight in the panorama of political protest which, in turn, partially shapes collective and individual identities. These identities also derive from the broader discourse of concentration of political power and agrarian capital characterising Latin America, which led to the globally recognised role of rural and indigenous movements. Also, recent debates adduce evidences supporting the argument that structural adjustment, neoliberalism and increasing inequality are among the causes leading to political resistance.

Specifically, resistance to water management strategies in Latin America has been extensive and have assumed a variety of forms.

1.2 Aims and Objectives
The principle aim of this research is to understand the effects of resistance to neoliberal water management strategies in Latin America, and the relation between resistance movements and types of community. Its importance lies in the need to understand the relation between political activism and resistance to water resources and water services management strategies and communities.

In order to provide a theoretical and empirical framework to this analysis, the objectives of this thesis have been identified as follows. Firstly, this research will examine the historical evolution of water management in both developing and developed countries, specifically Europe, the U.S. And Latin America. This will enable the identification of key strategic decisions and patterns in decision making, useful for contextualising the research and for explaining how different water management strategies impact on local communities.
Secondly, it will look at the problems created by neoliberal water policies in Latin America and how communities reacted to it.

Thirdly, this study will look at debates about community, resistance and conflict in order to provide a theoretical framework for the analysis of movements of resistance and their tactics. Fourthly, it will deal with the history of protest in Latin America, particularly by covering the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. In fact, movements of resistance tend to reproduce established tactics and techniques of protest, although they are also inclined to introduce innovative elements such as the use of new media and social networks. Finally, this thesis will analyse the specifics of strategies of resistance to water management strategies in Argentina, Brazil and Colombia in relation to communities.

In the context of neoliberal water management and history of resistance in Latin America, this thesis undertakes three case studies as focus of the analysis, namely Argentina, Brazil and Colombia, in order to examine the consequences of activism in relation to water management strategies and what is the causality between this resistance and different communities in these countries. The reasons why these countries have been selected will be discussed in Chapter 3.

The understanding of the impacts of political resistance to water management strategies on community in Latin America is deeply intertwined with the second aim that informs this research, namely the gap in the literature.

Published materials generally focused on agricultural and industrial uses of water resources, risk management, and issues under the heading of physical resources. Additionally, from historical books to contemporary texts or reports, a significant part of the literature focuses on water scarcity and water management. While substantial research has been undertaken to analyse the links between neoliberal water management strategies and political resistance, there is limited in-depth analysis of the connection between neoliberal water management strategies and types of community and on the direction of causation. As argued by Sjodin (2006), the literature does not examine in-depth the connection between water management approaches and the economic mainstream represented by Washington Consensus and Post-Washington Consensus which, in turn, is driving activism and resistance, and in so doing undervalues the reason why some models have been pushed or taken into account around the world.

The research question raises complementary issues regarding communities and community formation, which will be addressed by delineating theories of communities in Chapter 4. This chapter will also look at complementary issues such as conflict and power structures. Political resistance will be addressed through the historical contextualisation of political activism in Latin American countries in Chapter 5, which will also
deal with complementary issues such as water resources and water services. Together, the analysis of complementary issues of Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 will inform the analysis of Chapter 6 on the causality between political resistance and communities. Other complementary issues connected with the research question are those focusing on multinational corporations, privatisation, and Public-Private Partnerships as the winning model for water management strategies. These issues will be analysed in Chapter 2, as they represent the context for political action and resistance.

1.3 Methodology
This study will analyse the relation between resistance to water management strategies and typologies of community in Latin America which, in turn, is characterised by strong socio-economic inequalities.

There are three methods that are considered most suitable for this research. First, a desk review of the existing literature, centring on three main themes: water management strategies, both at the global level and at the particular level, with particular focus on Latin American countries; theories of community; and political resistance. Secondly, a process of policy analysis of decision-making in public services and, specifically, water resources and services, has been identified as appropriate for this research. In particular, a descriptive analysis of policy will seek to explain water policies and their evolution. Finally, the third method consists in the analysis of causation between resistance to water management strategies and types of community in Argentina, Brazil and Colombia. In fact, the focal point of this thesis is analysing the specifics of the community responses to neoliberal water management strategies, explaining the relation between political resistance and communities and stating whether the communitarianism, communicative community or post-modern community approach are mere ideal-types or if they coexist in real-life communities opposing neoliberal water management strategies.

1.4. Plan of the Dissertation
Chapter 2 will focus on water management strategies at a global level and in Latin American countries respectively, in particular by providing a historical framework regarding water management in the 1900s. It will also compare the development of water services in developing and developed countries, underlining how the former engaged with the colonial period and its legacy, the fundamental role of central governments, and the shift to neoliberal policies. Additionally, Chapter 2 will look at water privatisation, concentrating on the failure of this policy as driven by the Washington Consensus and on the shift towards the Post Washington Consensus paradigm.

Chapter 3 will address methods and techniques considered the most appropriate for this study. The research
for this dissertation involves firstly a desk review of the existing literature. While acknowledging that there is a lot of literature looking at community activism, this research contributes to this rich and ongoing debate in an original way, investigating how different types of communities affect activism and are a determinant of social resistance. Therefore, the study for this thesis entails the analysis of the causality between political resistance and communities, which will be based on the examination of groups and organisations involved in resistance, in particular by investigating their strategies and their effectiveness.

Chapter 4 will examine theories of community and conflict. In particular, it will explore liberal individualism, communitarianism, communicative communities, post-modern communities and the debate on tactical decisions, providing a theoretical background for the analysis of the causality between communities and political resistance contained in Chapter 6.

Chapter 5 will put political resistance to water management strategies within the framework of the history of political activism in Latin America. Therefore, this chapter will analyse political resistance to water management strategies in the three case studies, but it will also discuss the fact that similar issues to the three case studies are found in other countries in Latin America. Also, Chapter 5 will focus on the rise and development of NGOs in Latin America, also taking into account the cases of unionism, social struggles opposing free trade agreements, and resistance by indigenous people.

Drawing from Chapters 4 and 5, Chapter 6 will engage with the analysis of the causal relation between community structures and political resistance. Therefore, it will investigate the organisations or groups involved in the resistance, examining recruitment process, membership, when the group was formed, strategies and political tactics, propaganda and contacts with other organisations, NGOs, and the international community.

Chapter 7 will conclude by summarising the findings of this research. In addition, this chapter will explain the contribution of this research. Although more research is required in order to understand the complexity of the issues included in the research question, in fact, this area of research has received growing attention by scholars in the past. In this context, this thesis gives an original contribution to a rich and ongoing debate by exploring the causal relation between typologies of community structures and political resistance to water management strategies in Argentina, Brazil and Colombia, in particular by analysing three key components, namely socio-political actors and their relations; tactics; and the causality relation between resistance and communities.
Chapter 2 - Water management strategies

2.1 Introduction

One of the underlying arguments in this thesis is that water management strategies and the development of water systems has, and still is, being shaped by the dominant political ideology at both the global and national levels. It is therefore considered pertinent to focus on highlighting this relationship to set the context for further analysis. This chapter will take a historical approach and look at the development of water management systems in Europe (section 2.2) as municipalisation and government-led delivery of public services emerged in the 19th Century. These developments were initially shaped by the political ideology of state-led development. This section will draw on examples from the experiences of different European countries as well as from the municipalisation process in the US.

The chapter will be organised into two main sections, focusing on water management strategies at a global level and in Latin American countries respectively.

Section 2.2 will be organised into four sub-sections. 2.2.1 will give a framework of the history of water management in the 1900s. In particular, it will focus on the rise and decline of local authorities in water management strategies. Additionally, it will deal with municipalisation and public management of water services, which pertain to the political logic of politically elected and accountable decision-makers ideally inclined towards the best interest of local communities. Therefore, this section will be drawing examples from the experiences of different European countries as well as from the municipalisation process in the US. Finally, it will take into account the fundamental role of central government in developing water and sanitation services. 2.2.2. will analyse the different story of developing countries concerning water services. It will engage with the colonial period and its legacy, the importance of central governments in developing the water system in these countries, and with the shift to neoliberal policies promoted by the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) through the use of conditionality. 2.2.3 will look at water privatisation by analysing the Washington Consensus paradigm through the description of the Volcker Shock, the Debt Crisis and the experience of the Asian Tigers1. Furthermore, this section will focus on the failure of privatisation and on the shift towards the Post Washington Consensus paradigm. Finally, 2.2.4 will describe Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) in the water sector as related to the Post Washington Consensus framework. Also, this section will look at the advantages of Public-Public Partnerships (PUPs) in comparison with PPPs.

1Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan are well known for maintaining high growth rates between the early 1960s and 1990s, specializing in areas of competitive advantage.
Section 2.3 will address water management strategies and their impact in Latin America. In particular, after a brief introduction, it will be divided into three sub-sections. The first will describe water management strategies during colonialism and the changes that occurred with independence. Also, it will deal with the import-substitution strategies (ISI) implemented in Latin America in the 1950s. The second sub-section will examine the effects of the Washington and Post-Washington Consensus in Latin America. Finally, the third sub-section will take into account the IFIs strategy that involved pressuring developing countries to adopt water privatisation and the political resistance that responded to this approach. Also, this part will analyse PPPs, which are the cornerstone of the new water management approach as based on the Post-Washington Consensus.

It is pertinent to note that the published materials on water management tend to focus on agricultural and industrial uses of the resource, risk management, physical resources – including physical characteristics, global water balance and so on- water quality, water supply, hydro-power and flood problems. Furthermore, a significant part of the literature (Olmstead, 2010; Griffin, 2006; Biswas, Tortajada and Izquierdo-Alvino, 2009; Harhay, 2011; Postel, 2000; Araral and Wang, 2013) focuses on water scarcity and water management. Although substantial research has been done on the management of water resources and service, Sjodin, (2006) notes there is limited in depth analysis about changes in water management models and how they are ideologically driven. This analysis is expected to contribute to this debate by examining the relationship between neoliberal policies and water management strategies in three Latin American countries, as previously noted.

2.2 Water Management Strategies at the Global Level

2.2.1. Rise and decline of local authorities in water management

The main point of the analysis is represented by the role of local authorities in the development of modern water systems in Europe. In fact, in the late nineteenth century, municipalities took over the management of water and sewerage systems from private companies. In their study on the evolution of water and sanitation services in twenty-nine European cities within the time period 1800-2000, Juuti and Katko (2005) focus on the development of water systems in a wide institutional context covering the political, economic, social, technical and environmental dimensions, aiming to identify long term patterns in decision-making (Juuti and Katko, 2005). The authors provide data and information on a variety of local arrangements on water and sanitation systems in the cities and countries analysed, providing proof that the notion of one best way to provide urban water services, as expressed by the neoliberal ideology, is too simplistic.
Private initiative was the driving force behind the establishment of modern water systems, although the poor quality of private companies’ supply led to a re-evaluation of the organisational means. According to Millward (2000), in the span of time between the 1870s and the 1930s, public investments in public health, local transport, water, electricity and gas were as much as one quarter of all the capital formation in Britain (Juuti and Katko, 2005). Barraque’ (2003) suggests that the type of water resources management and institutional cultures in Europe are based on the Germanic versus Roman legal origins, and also on a centralised versus decentralised tradition, allowing a categorisation of water management of European countries. For example, while Spain, Italy and Portugal have systems built on the Roman law and on a centralised tradition, those of England, the Netherlands and Germany are based on the German law and have a subsidiary (decentralised) tradition. France, instead, is placed outside this categorisation: indeed, the French state is a follower of the Roman law – centralised tradition, even if a certain degree of decentralisation took place: in fact, “the six water basin authorities have become largely subsidiary institutions” (Juuti and Katko, 2005, p.31). Although in France private companies such as the Compagnie Générale des Eaux (later Vivendi and Veolia Water) have survived and expanded since 1853, the extension of the system was carried out by municipalities. In fact, it was reckoned that it was not legally possible to force concession companies to extend the network as required by public policy. Therefore, municipal agencies were instituted as the driving force for investment and operation (Hall and Lobina, 2010). Builder-owner or concession models were the first modern water systems developed in many European countries and North America. However, the inefficiency, costs and corruption characterising private organisations led to municipalities taking over these water and sewerage systems.

The late 19th century emphasis on municipalisation resulted in more effective control, higher employment, and more benefits to the local people in Europe (Hall, 2003). Municipalities “developed financial mechanisms superior to the private sector, including borrowing long-term money from local savers at low rates because of the security of their flow of income from taxes” (Hall and Lobina, 2010, p.3). Furthermore, by the end of the 19th century, in Belgium a number of municipalities decided to “join forces” to set up public companies in order to ensure the production, transport and distribution of water to the population under their supervision: this marked the first appearance of “intercommunal”, or inter-municipal, companies (Despiegelaere et al., 2006).

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2The Roman law conferred a privileged position on the owners of land adjacent to watercourses, and denied the possibility of private ownership of running water, part of the ‘negative community’ of things that could not be owned, together with air, the seas and the wildlife. By contrast, the Germanic law was overwhelmingly concerned with the protection of the individuals and less concerned in protecting the interest of the state.

3A builder-owned model consists in the fact that the company designing and building a plant or a water system automatically becomes its owner.

4A concession is a term applying to a contract where a local authority delegates the delivery of a public service to a legal entity, which can be a private company.
In Eastern Europe a common pattern of nationalisation and integration of the water system can be observed under the influence of the Soviet Union. In Hungary, for example, the development of the network between 1950 and 1970 created an “utility gap”\(^5\) between the water supply and the sewerage system\(^6\). Due to lack of data, it is not possible to establish if the “utility gap” concerned other countries as well. However, difficulties in developing sewerage systems can be observed in other countries as well including, among others, Lithuania. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, water utilities were handed over to municipalities. From data about the capita consumption of water in Vilnius, the capital city, a striking figure emerged regarding the years after 1990: a decline in both total per capita consumption and domestic consumption, a “quite dramatic change” caused by the economic transition to a “more efficient system” (Juuti and Katko, 2005, p.131). The years after 1990 were characterised by privatisations and joint ventures between cities and multinational corporations, due to economic pressure from international donors, especially IFIs.

Even more rapid than in Europe, was the process of municipalisation in the United States throughout the nineteenth century (Hall and Lobina, 2006). In particular, the capacity of municipalities to borrow long-term money from banks at low interest rates was a crucial part of the process (Hall and Lobina, 2006). In his work on the development of water technology in the United States, Melosi (2000) shows that European water technology was soon transferred to the United States and eventually developed. In fact, water works represented the first important public utility and the first municipal service in the US. In general, central governments also played a significant role, although the role of municipalities was undoubtedly dominant. For example, in Canada part of the central tax revenue was distributed in order to support local authority spending on water and other services, while in the USA the central government provided cheap loan finance for local authorities to use for capital investment (Hall and Lobina, 2010). In Europe, until 1974 most water supply and all wastewater services were developed by local governments with increasing support in the form of central government subsidies (Juuti and Katko, 2005). Additionally, in the 1960s and 1970s great efforts were made by many governments to extend the water and sanitation services coverage both in developing and Western countries (Sjodin, 2006).

A pattern of long term decline in the role of local authorities can be witnessed in much of the Western world since the early 1970s. This pattern finds its most significant example in the events which took place in England and Wales in the 1970s. In fact, in 1974 the UK Parliament “decided to transfer the provision responsibility for water and sewerage services in England and Wales from local authorities to regional water authorities” (Juuti and Katko, 2005). In 1974 and, again, 1979, as a consequence of the oil crises the British central

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\(^5\)A discrepancy in the development of public utilities, in this case water and sewerage systems.

\(^6\)As shown by 1995 statistics, in Hungary 98 per cent of the population and 90 per cent of the households were connected to a water supply network: nevertheless, the figure for the connection to the sewerage system remains much lower, and proved that the “utility gap” still existed. In fact, only about 57 per cent of the population and 44 per cent of the households were connected to the sewerage system.
government cut its financing to regional water authorities so that investment at the beginning of 1980s were only one third of those at the beginning of 1970s (Summerton, 1998). Following a neoliberal stance and focusing on the privatisation of public utilities, the Thatcher administration capped the ability of regional water authorities to borrow sufficient funds (Semple, 1993). Bakker (2003) emphasises the uniqueness of the British model: in fact, here the government effectively expropriated the previously municipal water system in the 1970s. Therefore, while the general trend consisted in an “erosion” of local authority, in England and Wales municipal representation was abolished abruptly in 1983, after an initial gradual reduction of municipal representation in the regional water authorities’ boards (Melosi, 2004).

Therefore, the development of modern water systems in Europe has been driven by municipalities taking over the management of water and sewerage from private companies in the late nineteenth century. Also, for example in Belgium, a number of municipalities joined forces creating public agencies in order to ensure proper distribution to the population. By contrast, Eastern Europe has followed a common pattern of nationalisation and integration of the water system under the influence of the Soviet Union. However, after its collapse municipalities have taken over the management of water utilities. Additionally, in the United States the process of municipalisation has been more rapid than in Europe. As a consequence, the role of municipalities has been predominant in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, although central governments also played a significant role, for example in the US. However, in the 1980s, and particularly in the years after 1990, privatisations and joint ventures between cities and multinational corporations have been preponderant in Western countries.

2.2.2 Water Management in Developing Countries

In order to set the context for further analysis, and to determine the causes of political resistance to neoliberal water management strategies, it is considered necessary to focus on the colonial and post-colonial era. In fact, water market issues in developing countries have their roots in the colonial period: while imperial countries were establishing and developing public networks in European cities, water supply in the colonies was a privilege of the colonial elite only. Even when systems were extended the service was unaffordable to the great majority of the local population, because of the charges being based on full cost recovery. This in turn, led to disastrous consequences for public health, with devastating outbreaks of disease in cities under colonial control (for example, in Lagos and Bombay), which was worsened by the socio-economic colonial legacy of unequal societies (Hall and Lobina, 2006).

After independence, in Latin America and Africa the process of building independent states was strongly intertwined with the commitment to public services for all.
However, water services clearly exemplify how international donors and agencies continued to affect development in non-industrialised countries. The pattern witnessed in Africa strongly mirrored patterns of colonialism: post-colonial British and Portuguese operators are almost exclusively present in the former colonies of these countries, while German companies appear to be in countries which were part of the German empire before the First World War, and French operators dominate in former French colonies. Hence, it is hardly surprising that this privatisation process is resented as a reintroduction of colonialism (Hall and Lobina, 2006).

In Latin America and Africa, central governments have played a much greater role in water systems than in Western economies. In fact, these countries had neither strong municipalities nor a strong local middle class, so that the central state ownership of water services is more common than in the Western world. In a number of countries in Latin America and Africa, central governments not only retained the ownership of the capital city’s water services, but they have been the driving force for developing municipal water services in the rest of the country. Nevertheless, since the 1990s, the policies and conditionality of international financial institutions have demanded that municipalities be made responsible for services. These policies were not based on a consideration of the local reality of these countries, nor were they based on experience. Instead, the demand for a policy shift was purely based on ideology (Hall and Lobina, 2006). Issues regarding water management strategies in developing countries will be analysed in depth in the second section of this chapter, which will deal with water management strategies in Latin America.

2.2.3 Neoliberal Policies and the Water Sector

During the 1980s, a new paradigm, the Washington Consensus, emerged. This was a market-centred strategy consistent with the neoclassical school of economics and it was given the decisive impetus by the economic crisis of developing countries, arising from the decreasing world market prices for primary commodities and increasing interest rates on foreign loans. Therefore, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank began demanding policy reforms to the government of developing countries as a condition to access new

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7When the delegates from 44 nations met in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, in 1944, in order to provide a framework for the post-war world economy, they created the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB). These institutions had the objective of reconstructing Europe torn apart by the Second World War together with promoting global trade and putting in place a global economic system. The United States, which was at an advantage economically, utilised its position in order to push towards the Globalisation agenda and to redefine the world economic system as shaped around the US interests. Shortly afterwards, the GATT was created, with the goal of reducing national trade barriers. The final round of the GATT negotiations in 1986-1994, also known as the Uruguay Round, resulted in the creation of a new set of world trade rules to regulate the new global economy and in the creation of the WTO -the World Trade Organisation- as successor of the GATT. The subjects that strongly and successfully lobbied for a free market economy were Transnational Corporations -TNCs. In addition, the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) became the cornerstone of the International Financial Institutions’ policy. SAPs were economic policies that countries have to follow in order to qualify for WB and IMF loans.
loans. Fiscal austerity, privatisation and liberalisation were the three pillars sustaining the Washington Consensus. Also, they were the three concepts on which policy reforms to access new loans from international financial institutions had to be based. This included water management strategies. In particular, privatisation is the process of transferring ownership of a public property, public service or business from the public sector to the private sector by selling shares on the stock market or by selling an entire organisation (or part of it) to a strategic investor, by so paving the way to foreign companies within the OECD nations in profitable sectors such as the extraction of raw commodities. In Latin America, the privatisation process that took place in the 1980s and 1990s resulted in public resources such as water services, the transport system and telecommunication companies being sold to the private sector more rapidly than in almost any part of the world. However, public protests and political resistance throughout the region are a strong indicator of the negative opinion and dissatisfaction of the majority of citizens toward privatisation. In fact, being based on full cost recovery, concessions to the private sector have been proven to be detrimental to the poor, who could not afford to pay for the service.

During the 1990s, international donors began to support concessions and operational contracts in water management, thereby endorsing the interests of multinational corporations on the basis of the Washington Consensus on the one hand, and encouraged to some extent by the water privatisation in England and Wales on the other (Juuti and Katko, 2005). Bilateral donors were promoting models that they have hardly any experience of in their own countries. As a result, the belief in the benefits of private concessions or long-term contracts proved to be erroneous, as acknowledged by a representative of a leading financial institution (2003): “we and others largely overestimated what the private sector could do and would do in difficult markets” (Anon, cited in Juuti and Katko, 2005). Even in countries where there had been no privatisation, increasingly water services have been provided by ‘corporatised' bodies, rather than by municipal departments (Hall and Lobina, 2006). Following the Washington Consensus, in the 1980s and 1990s international financial institutions actively promoted a strategy for creating and extending water systems in developing countries through privatisation (Hall and Lobina, 2006).

Neoliberal policies received a further boost as import-substitution industrialisation (ISI) strategies were discredited in the global south in the 1980s. In fact, previous efforts in development assistance were within the paradigm of the ISI strategy, based on the concept that foreign aid should support the “large-scale modern industries that governments of developing countries nurtured through trade protection, directed credits and subsidies” (Hayami, 2003). The cornerstone of the import substitution industrialisation was the strong

As stated by a World Bank policy paper (1996) “differences among countries notwithstanding, water resources management that follows the principles of comprehensive analysis, opportunity cost pricing, decentralization, stakeholder participation, and environmental protection (...) will yield more coherent policies and investment across sectors, promote conservation, and improve the efficiency of water allocation".
government intervention in the market and in the society as a whole, in the attempt to reduce foreign dependency by replacing foreign imports with domestic production. This included the central governments’ strong effort in developing and maintaining water systems, as mentioned in the previous section. However, ISI-related policies also led developing countries to structural indebtedness by borrowing heavily from Western banks, which in turn heavily lent money to these governments without making sure of their ability to service the debt, as noted by Harvey (2005).

After the Volcker Shock in 1979—named after Paul Volcker, chairman of the Federal Reserve—and the beginning of the debt crisis, international financial institutions based their approach on the perception that the economic crisis was not a temporary phenomenon connected to the collapse of primary commodity markets, but was the result of failing policies implemented by the import substitution industrialisation strategy (Hayami, 2003). Therefore, they connected their approach to the structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) in order to obtain a rigorous implementation of Adam Smith’s ‘invisible hand’ and stabilise the economies of Latin American and African countries. These policy changes toward free market solutions were conditions for receiving new loans from the IMF or the World Bank or for obtaining lower interest rates on existing loans. State-owned resources were to be sold whether they generated a fiscal profit or not, notwithstanding the fact that they maintained a wider social role in providing low-cost utilities and jobs. Specifically, the privatisation of water assets led to a reduced access to water services, a deterioration of the living standards of the poorest strata of the population and environmental hazard. As a consequence, this new status quo and the fact that relevant resources were transferred to foreign companies or national elites has led to political resistance and protests, especially in the global south.

Supporters of neoliberal economics claimed that SAPs made some significant contributions. First, they allowed Latin American countries to escape from the ‘Debt Crisis’ of the 1980s, which was characterised by hyper-inflation and accumulated external debt. However, they rarely mentioned the causes that led to the ‘Debt Crisis’ and the role of Federal Reserve in it. In fact, in 1979 the Volcker Shock led to the increasing of nominal interest rates overnight in order to fight inflation in the US, resulting in a deep recession and compelling developing countries, which already had borrowed heavily because of a poor macroeconomic policy, into the ‘Debt Crisis’. Therefore, the crisis was the result of both bad lending and bad borrowing. Second, SAPs prompted the East Asian economic miracle of the so-called ‘Asian Tigers’, which represented globalisation most robust success story. In fact, although ‘statists’ and ‘neoliberalists’ viewed their success differently, it became an important model to emulate, and in the early 1990s the ‘Asian Tigers’ were held as the most significant evidence of the benefits of the free market. Although not strictly related to water management strategies, it is important to describe the Asian Tigers phenomenon as an indicator of the general economic policy pursued at the global level by international financial institutions which, in turn, impacted on the mind-frame driving privatisation of water assets. The Asian Tigers’ economies were supposed
to grow because of free trade. However, the fact that they still maintained high protectionist policies and a fundamental role for the state was often undervalued. Therefore, the success of the 'Asian Tigers' needs to be ascribed to their mixed economies rather than to free market and free trade. Additionally, in 1997 the 'Asian Tigers' were hit by a devastating financial crisis - due to the high volatility of financial speculation - which started in Thailand after the collapse of a real estate financial market (Harvey, 2005). The crisis rapidly spread, proving that financial crises were endemic and contagious, and Asian currencies dropped one after the other (Harvey, 2005). When the IMF organised emergency loans in order to stabilise the Asian economies, it imposed on them conditionality based on further cuts to government budgets and the Central Bank's re-discount rate raising: such policies had the consequence of intensifying the credit crunch and aggravating the economic recession (Hayami, 2003). Furthermore, as noted by Feldstein (1998) other conditionalities imposed on these countries were also criticised for being undue interventions in domestic affairs and beyond the mandate of the IMF (cited in Hayami, 2003). Therefore, even in the 'successful stories' of Asian economies, structural adjustment policy had the negative effect of exacerbating the economic recession and inequality between the richest and the poorest strata of the population.

In the late 1990s, the supremacy of the Washington Consensus began to be heavily criticised, so the paradigm was replaced by a new one, namely the Post Washington Consensus, which focused on new keywords such as poverty reduction, civil society and education. In fact, as stated in Kessler (2005), due to political opposition and numerous setbacks, support for the private provision of traditional social services, particularly in developing countries, especially in Latin America, gradually decreased. However, this general trend did not apply to water and energy utilities, where the contemporary consensus “suggests that the service should either be run like a business, or become one” (Kessler, 2005, p.3). As a result, by 2005, neither donors nor governments have made water infrastructure spending a high priority (Kessler, 2005). As stated by Carol Brookins, former US Executive Director of the World Bank, during the 1990s “the Bank's infrastructure investment lending declined by 50 percent” and even if there has been “an upward trend in infrastructure spending since 2000, especially in water, years of financial neglect have accumulated” (in Kessler, 2005, p.9). Meanwhile, private sector funding did not ‘fill the gap’, particularly in poorer areas, especially in the water sector of Mexico, for example (Kessler, 2005). Indeed, even institutional supporters of privatised water services recognise limitations of private funding - as admitted by the World Panel on Financing Water Infrastructure, chaired by the former IMF Director Michel Camdessus, in 2004.

As argued by Hayami (2003), and in general by representatives of the Neoliberal approach, the failure of the Washington Consensus as the guiding principle of international development assistance was a direct consequence of an unfaithful and incomplete adherence to it. Yet, they acknowledge SAPs poor performance in promoting growth and reducing poverty in low income economies. Additionally, Stiglitz (2002) pointed out that the SAP reforms of liberalisation, privatisation and deregulation, which included the privatisation of
water assets, not only failed to improve low income economies, but often made them less efficient with an increased incidence of market failure. Indeed, during the 1990s growth in Latin America was only half of what it was during the 1960s and 1970s, when failed import substitution was the dominant strategy.

As a result, the Post Washington Consensus underlines the need for appropriate, country-specific institutions that support economic development. However, as stated by Mahmud⁹ (2011), the dominant role of international financial institutions in providing developing countries with loans in the name of poverty reduction and international development, which, however, came tied with conditions promoting trade liberalisation and public sector privatisation, has not changed in recent times. This includes the privatisation of water services. The strong point of the new paradigm are the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) which were introduced when evidence suggested that SAPs had led many countries to the edge of collapse, though they only “reiterated the free market, privatisation and liberalisation conditions of the SAPs” (Mahmud, 2011, p.27). PRSPs stress the full participation of governments: nevertheless, this is considered by many as a window dressing (Fine, Lapavitsas and Pincus, 2003). For instance, in order to receive new loans, governments need to write a letter specifying that they identified the need of Public-Private Partnerships for water services management and other services. This procedure is only formal, as without the letter no loan has to be issued to a particular country which, as a consequence, risks to be declared insolvent (Data gathered during an internship at the School of Oriental and African Studies, 2009). Like its predecessor, the Post Washington Consensus is seen as built upon a total absence of alternative approaches to the economy and of criticism of its theoretical, empirical and policy positions. The new Consensus has a wider scope and is certainly less dogmatic than the old one. In fact, its purpose is to ground policy advice on analyses appropriate for each context and to build institutions capable of intervening effectively (Stiglitz, 2002).

However, the Post Washington Consensus “replaces an understanding of the economy as relying harmoniously on the market by an understanding of society as a whole based on (informational) market imperfections” (Fine et al., 2003, p.4). In short, the Post Washington Consensus stands upon the concept that the capitalist economy is simply a matter of identifying the various existing informational imperfections and how they are dealt with in specific contexts. Consequently, the idea of development itself is reduced to the alternative approaches for handling informational-based market imperfections, and case-specific economic and social phenomena are interpreted in terms of better or worse use of information, while non-economic or non-market relations are treated as though they were economic (Fine, et al., 2003). As pointed out by Fine et al. (2003), the Post Washington Consensus almost completely neglects the critical literature on the old Consensus, reducing critical voices to supporting elements of the new paradigm: in fact, it disregards the wider critique of the invasive aspect of the old Consensus, which is relevant to both paradigms.

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⁹Ahmaed Swapan Mahmud is the Executive Director of VOICE, a right-based activist organisation in Bangladesh.
Furthermore, the new Consensus “can be understood as strengthening and extending the scope of permissible intervention in recipient countries” (Fine et al., 2003). In fact, as the success of economic interventions is also related to non-economic factors, by stressing the importance of appropriate institutions and of the role of the state, through PRSPs the new Consensus proves its ability in influencing “what the state does and how it should do it” (Fine et al., 2003, p.15). Therefore, PRSPs are widely opposed because they are seen as preventing democratic ownership by applying their strategies as conditional tools over the recipient countries. At the same time, people are kept away from the entire process of project formulation and implementation, for example indigenous people in Mexico (Data gathered through fieldwork, 2011), despite the stress put by the IFIs on new keywords such as participation and empowerment (Mahmud, 2011).

This section discussed the transition from import substitution strategy to the Washington and Post Washington Consensus. This analysis is crucial to this study, as it constitutes the basis for understanding the water management strategies implemented since the 1980s in Latin America. Also, it is essential for describing and examining the contemporary approaches to water management.

2.2.4. Approaches to Water Management

As noted earlier, privatisation is one of the pillars of the neoliberal doctrine. This section will describe Public-Private Partnerships in the water sector as related to the Post Washington Consensus and will compare them to a different approach, namely Public-Public Partnerships, necessary for an understanding of their costs and benefits.

There are three principal approaches to water management. First, Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs), consisting in arrangements such as BOT concessions\(^\text{10}\), leasing, management contracting, or service contracting (Seppala et al., 2001). Second, participative approaches, which mostly emerged in the last ten years. Based on accountability, openness and transparency, they are worth investigating because they provide ways of reinventing the public sector. Third, Public-Public Partnerships, regarding the provision of technologies and the training of personnel and supporting capacity building for water operators in developing countries.

After the failure of water privatisation in the late 1990s-early 2000s, evidenced by the diminished presence of multinational corporations in Latin America and by the wide popular opposition to it, PPPs became the

\(^{10}\text{Build-operate-transfer (BOT) is a form of project financing where the private company receives a concession for financing, designing, constructing and operating a facility -stated in the concession contract- by the public or private sector.}
cornerstone of the new Consensus and of the new water management approach. PPPs involve a private company raising the money for the investment and then recouping the money for the investment by operating the asset over a long period, either charging users (concession) or receiving payments from governments (Hall, 2009). Indeed, the experience of privatisation itself (e.g. in Bolivia and Argentina but also in Western countries like the Netherlands or France) has removed any illusion that privatised services might be more responsible and accountable than the public ones: in fact, in over twenty years, in sub-Saharan, South Asia and East Asia private contracts connected less than 1% of the people who needed to be connected to water services in order to meet the Millennium Development Goals. Also, in the regions with the most significant experience, such as Latin America, privatisation has become largely unpopular. In 2004, privatisation of water has been made illegal in Uruguay and the Netherlands (Hall and Lobina, 2006).

As argued by Seppala et al. (2001), public versus private service is often seen in international debates as a black and white issue: however, in countries with the most comprehensive and the best operating water and sanitation services -for example, Finland- the PPP model has proven successful. Nevertheless, PPPs rarely carry out a comparison between the cost of public investment and government provision of services and the cost of services provided by a PPP. Lacking comparative studies on costs, therefore, it is impossible to argue that the same results are not achievable by the public sector (Hall, 2008).

In setting out a framework for evaluating if PPPs are preferable to public investment and government provision, Hall (2008) compares the cost of capital, the cost of construction, the efficiency of operation, the transaction costs associated with setting up and monitoring a PPP contract, and the uncertainties involved. Looking at studies from the IMF and the OECD among others (see, for example, Estache et al., 2005, which discusses the recent history of infrastructures policy-making in energy, water and transport and analyses the failure of the model centred on large-scale privatisation) the results have shown that first, the private sector has to pay higher interest rates than government; second, PPPs are more expensive as regards construction costs; third, empirical evidence from the application of the large-scale privatisation model, and the comparison with the public sector management, suggests no significant difference in efficiency; fourth, the costs of preparing contracts and tenders and the costs of monitoring and supervising them are higher for PPPs; finally, PPPs are more risky in relation to the uncertainties involved. Furthermore, it is worth bearing in mind that PPPs are paid for by governments, which pay for the cost of the PPP through taxation and then for the cost of running the service and that in almost every country in the world governments can borrow money at lower rates of interest than the private sector (Hall, 2008).

A number of political responses have emerged which provide ways of reinventing the public sector to create better services: Porto Alegre, and many other cities in Brazil, developed participative budgeting systems, “where the annual spending for all services, including water and sanitation, are subject to a completely public
process of debate and decision making” (Hall and Lobina, 2006, p. 34). A number of examples (for instance Faisalabad and Karachi in Pakistan and Andhra Pradesh in India) has shown the significant results achieved by public sector water operators in developing countries. This development of public sector water operators in many countries has often emerged in connection to social movements' resistance to water corporations (e.g. Brazil). Participatory systems have been successful in financing a considerable extension of service coverage at a low cost for customers. Furthermore, these systems can better identify investments of value and can develop consensus around taxation, pricing level necessary to fund the system and distribution of the costs (Hall and Lobina, 2006). These initiatives are based on the interaction between communities, political organisation and various elements of the state. Community involvement and civil society are also two of the pillars of the Post-Washington Consensus and are promoted by international financial institutions. However, they have been emptied of their original meaning: in fact, this idea of participation resulted in the creation of a “civil society” as completely separated by political processes, public institutions and the state, while political processes are fundamental for a significant participation (Hall and Lobina, 2006).

A mechanism for supporting capacity building for water operators in developing countries is represented by Public-Public Partnerships (PUPs). In water services, the experience with PUPs can be classified into two categories. First, international partnerships, the best known of which are the “Baltic Sea Partnerships” developed in the 1990s between established public water authorities. Second, national partnerships, which include initiatives within countries or transnational initiatives.

A great number of examples of PUPs in water and sewerage services all over the world (for example the Japanese partnership between Osaka, Tokyo and Yokohama, the waste-water treatment in China, the internal PUPs in Honduras, Costa Rica and Brazil, and the partnerships between European countries and developing countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America) have shown that PUPs have the great advantage of avoiding the risks of PPPs: transaction costs, contract failure, renegotiation, commercial opportunism, monopoly pricing, currency risk and lack of public legitimacy among others (Hall et al., 2009).

According to a report from the Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF) in December 2008, more and more countries have recently hosted PUPs in water: many of them have been started in the last few years, but the earliest date to the 1980s, with the Yokohama Waterwork Bureau initiating partnerships to help training staff in other Asian countries (Hall et al., 2009). However, this does not mean that far more countries have hosted PUPs than PPPs. PUPs can be initiated by any of the partners and have a considerable potential in creating virtuous cycles: in fact, public sector operators who have benefited from the assistance of a Public-Public Partnership may provide assistance to others in need of capacity building. From the Public-Public

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11 Among others, Stockholm Vatten- and cities of Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia which had left Soviet Union.
Partnerships concept, the UN Secretary General’s Advisory Board on Water and Sanitation (UNSGAB) created the Water Operator Partnerships (WOPs)12 initiative, based on the consideration that there are at least 250,000 public water and sanitation operators worldwide, that many of them achieve significant results in difficult circumstances and that the capacity of these operators should be unleashed in a systematic way in order the meet the Millennium Development Goals (Hall et al., 2009). By definition similar to PUPs, WOPs were soon shaped in order to include the participation of private operators. This represents further advancement of business interests, and erodes the solidarity principle on which PUPs are based. Also, private companies are able to exert much more influence on regional and global initiatives then public sector operators, due to their sophisticated lobbying machinery and their generous lobbying budget.

The difference between PPPs, participative approaches, PUPs and WOPs has been discussed in this section, showing that while PPPs and WOPs represent private interests and are largely opposed by local communities, participative approaches and PUPs are considered positively as they are based on solidarity and involve communities, for example in Latin America.

2.3 Water Management Strategies in Latin America
This section will address water management strategies implemented in Latin America. In particular, 2.3.1 will examine water management strategies during colonialism and the changes that occurred with independence. Also, it will deal with the import substitution industrialisation (ISI) strategy. 2.3.2 will describe the effects of the Washington and Post-Washington Consensus in Latin America. 2.3.3 will address the international financial institutions strategy for pressuring towards water privatisation and the political resistance as originating from it.

Although Latin America is rich in renewable water resources, which account for over 30% of the world water resources, the distribution of these resources is highly uneven: a great part of it can be found in the low populated Amazonia while, by contrast, the majority of the population lives in arid and semi-arid regions (UNEP, 2003). Neoliberalists argued that Latin America has been damaged by state intervention, which caused relative prices distortion and prevented the emergence of a dynamic private sector. However, it is worth noting the a-historical nature of this argument: in fact, state intervention in Latin America was the response to market failure in an unregulated environment. Also, this theory does not explain why some of the poorest Latin American countries, Honduras, as an example, have been among the most open economies in the world (Bulmer-Thomas, 2003).

12WOPs are partnerships aiming at capacity building on a non-for-profit basis, similar to PUPs in definition.
2.3.1. Colonialism, Independence and Import-Substitution Strategy

Colonial Latin America have lasted for about 300 years for most of the region, spanning from the Fifteenth to the Nineteenth Century (Mabry, 2002). As argued in 2.2.2, during the colonial period water supply in the colonies was a privilege of the colonial elite only and, even when systems were extended, the service was unaffordable to the great majority of the local population, because of the charges based on full cost recovery. This, in turn, led to disastrous consequences on public health (Hall and Lobina, 2006). The colonial class system endured in the twentieth century and, according to some views, even in the twenty-first (Mabry, 2002). Bearing in mind that Latin America is one of the most conservative regions in the world, it is no surprise that, as the tax and educational systems have always favoured the elites, innovation was strongly opposed, as it “threatened the social and political order” (Mabry, 2002, p.221). During the colonial period, water legislation involved a system of permits introduced by the colonial powers with the aim of dispossessing indigenous water users who managed their water under community-based arrangements. In fact, this system meant that communities had to buy the right to use water or to own water and land from the colonial powers, compromising their access to natural resources and ancestral territories (van Koppen, 2007).

Most of Latin American countries gained independence from their European rulers in the 1820s with the wave of revolutions led by Simon Bolivar and other leaders (Bulmer-Thomas, 2003). After independence, the physical and social infrastructure of public services for all started to be developed by central governments (Hall and Lobina, 2006). However, the economic and political demands of international agencies and donors continued to strongly influence development, as clearly exemplified by water services (Hall and Lobina, 2006). In fact, Van Koppen (2007) shows that modern water legislation keeps reinforcing the colonial legacy through permit systems, concessions, royalties or leases. During the first half of the twentieth century water supply in Latin America was controlled by private operators; from the 1960s this trend changed to public control until the 1990s, when private operators took over once again, although to a lesser degree (UNEP, 2003). According to estimations by the United Nations Environment Programme, by 2003 the public sector in the region was dealing with 320 million people, while 60 million people were customers of private operators.

Despite the colonial legacy of unequal societies, after independence the process of building independent states was strongly intertwined with the commitment to public services for all. Due to the shortage of manufactured goods during and after the Second World War, and to the collapse of the market for raw materials, Latin American governments developed import-substitution policies (ISI), which attempted to reduce foreign dependency by replacing foreign supplies with local industrial production: Latin American structuralism, which is the ideology sustaining the ISI era, has been theorised by Raul Prebisch, among others, and organised in his work. Indeed, import-substitution strategies were needed in order to diversify the
economic production and reduce the dependency on foreign sources of demand and supply. In fact, in Latin America import substitution gave a more significant contribution to growth than exports; however, the unbalanced expansion of import substitution in consumer goods resulted in an increased dependency on imports (Ahmad, 2011). As stated by Braga (2006), import substitution led to significant changes in Latin America, “with the manufacturing sector expanding its share in GDP between 1950 (19.6 per cent) and 1967 (24.1 per cent)”. During the 1950s and 1960s, industrial growth was the main driver of Latin American economies. However, in the 1970s import substitution was already reaching its limits (Braga, 2006). Indeed, the debt crisis motivated the widespread perception that the ISI strategy was exhausted (Correa, 2002). Although State participation in the economy, which was widely accepted and supported in the 1950s and 1960s, represented the highest growth period in the last century, and improved the general conditions of the population, which continued to have access to the public water system established after the colonial era, it also led to excessive government borrowing, and failed to reverse the inequality in income distribution found in most Latin American countries. This was a heritage of the unequal distribution of land during the colonial period and was reinforced afterwards by industrial and financial concentration in the twentieth century. Braga (2006) noted that foreign capital was often an important partner of the industrialisation process led by import substitution strategies.

Barlow and Clarke (2004) argue that the pattern of unequal access to water mirrors the inequitable distribution of income. Indeed, Latin America’s water resources have been negatively affected by farming practices such as deforestation, clear-cutting, inappropriate irrigation, overdrafting and monoculture, unregulated industrialization and urban poverty. These practices have damaged water sources and, together with unequal access, have left a good part of Latin America “water poor” (Barlow and Clarke, 2004).

Due to the policies driven by Washington and Post Washington Consensus, this situation has been exacerbated by a large inflow of multinational corporations, determined to enter the business of Latin America’s water, as evidenced by their entrance in the water market of Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Argentina, etcetera (Barlow and Clarke, 2004).

Water services exemplify how international donors and agencies continued to affect development in non-industrialised countries. The World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank have often facilitated the entry of private companies into Latin American markets. Holding billions in debt contracted by national governments in the region, International Financial Institutions had the power to impose water privatisation (Barlow and Clarke, 2004). Therefore, it is hardly surprising if the water privatisation process was resented as

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13The re-examination of David Ricardo's comparative advantage and the formulation of the dependency theory is the work of the Argentinian economist Raul Prebisch (1901-1986), author -together with Hans Singer- of the Singer-Prebisch theses.
a reintroduction of colonialism (Hall and Lobina, 2006). In Latin America, central governments have played a much greater role in water systems than in Western economies. For instance, in Argentina, a central government water agency carried out the extension of water systems throughout the country (Hall and Lobina, 2006). Nevertheless, against experience and local history, policies and conditions imposed by international financial institutions have demanded that municipalities no longer be responsible for these services. Therefore, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank conditionality of the early 1990s forced Argentina “into breaking up and privatising its previous national system” (Hall and Lobina, 2006, p.7).

2.3.2 The Impact of Washington and Post-Washington Consensus in Latin America

In 1979 the Volcker Shock led to the increasing of nominal interest rates overnight in order to fight inflation in the US, resulting in a deep recession and compelling developing countries into the ‘debt crisis’ because of the Latin American high levels of borrowing. In response, by the mid-1980s, a new consensus on creating “new rules for the game” emerged in Latin America, in order to revitalize growth and defeat hyperinflation (Cavallo, 2004). However, Cavallo (2004) argued that those reforms could not have been successfully implemented unless Washington provided help to Latin American countries to defeat the debt crisis. This implies that Latin American governments, compelled by the debt, found themselves under pressure to accept IFIs conditionalities. By the mid-1980s, the criticism regarding the ISI strategy that had emerged during the debt crisis became significant and convincing because of the difference in economic performance between East Asia and Latin America during the period 1965-1980. According to a quantitative evaluation carried out by Correa using modified Lora indices\(^{14}\) taking into account policy complementarity (2002), there is no empirical evidence that the reforms undertaken in Latin American countries during the period 1984-1998 have been growth enhancing. By contrast, the evidence shows that trade liberalisation is positively correlated with inequality (Correa, 2002).

The reform process in Latin America has been impressive but uneven between the different sectors: the most relevant changes have been undertaken in financial and trade liberalisation; for example, in 1998 the trade index was larger than 1, meaning that as represented by the index Latin American openness was greater than that of the United States one (Correa, 2002). Replacing the ISI strategy, the Washington Consensus in Latin America was firstly applied to the countries of the Southern Cone -Argentina, Chile, Uruguay (Laffarriere, 2003).

From the mid-1970s, while the ISI paradigm was increasingly considered exhausted, tariff protectionism was

\(^{14}\)In order to quantify the regional reform process in a comprehensive manner, Lora (1997) created five reform indices representing trade liberalisation, tax neutrality, financial liberalisation, privatisation and labour deregulation. The indices have been upgraded and updated in Lora (2001).
gradually abandoned: the exports and the imports began to grow quickly, leading to a bigger fiscal deficit and, correspondingly, to a bigger external debt (Laffarriere, 2003). The financial liberalisation demanded by the new Washington Consensus paradigm caused recurrent financial crises, exit of massive capitals, investments with volatile risk. Furthermore, a strong growth stagnation marked the decade of 1980, period of shortage of capital flows to developing countries which, in turn, was due to the crises of the external debt and the rise of the interest rates in the USA (Laffarriere, 2003). Bearing in mind these factors, among others, Laffarriere concludes his analysis by observing that the performance of Latin America during the application of the neoliberal reforms inspired by the Washington Consensus has been mediocre, while the various countries have had strong deficits in their commercial balances, and the external debt of the region have considerably increased (Laffarriere, 2003).

Ignoring local history and the importance of central governments in providing water services, in the 1980s and 1990s the international financial institutions actively promoted a strategy, based on neoliberal ideology and the presence of private capital, for creating and extending water systems in developing countries through privatisation. It was common belief that multinational corporations would be attracted by a new, large, profitable market, and that the process would be positively seen by local populations. However, from the early 2000s, due to a failure to make adequate profits in developing countries, “the fortunes of international water supply companies have collapsed dramatically” (Hall and Lobina, 2006, p.8). This was because Latin American countries could not support the rates of return required by international water supply companies. Another key factor was the considerable degree of public campaigning against privatisation, a global phenomenon which began with the uprising in Cochabamba (Bolivia), leading to the termination of the private water contract in 2000 (Hall and Lobina, 2006).

2.3.3 IFIs Pressure for Water Privatisation and Political Resistance

As previously noted, privatisation was pushed under neoliberal policies: this extended to the water sector. Seppala et al. (2001) suggest that the international interest in the privatisation of public water and sanitation services has strongly increased since the mid-1990s. The increasing involvement of the private sector was caused by many companies and other organisations with conspicuous financial reserves considering water services as a business investment with guaranteed profit and low risk. On the other hand, their involvement, as mentioned above, was also backed up by international financial institutions, among others, the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Although the “privatisation boom” is clearly one of the most relevant policy changes in the water sector, “analytical discussion and scientific research on the issue” still remains limited (Seppala et al., 2001, p.43). In fact, referencing the extensive literature review covering about fifty scientific articles made by Willner, Seppala et al. argued that “there is no scientific evidence that fully privatised utilities operate more efficiently and effectively than public utilities” (Seppala
et al., p. 45).

However, this model was implemented in Latin America during the 1990s, and it had its first critics just after the Mexican crisis of 1994-95 paving the way to the Post Washington Consensus (Laffarriere, 2003). More specifically, the Washington Consensus has had already important critics from outside the circle of global policy makers but, from the mid-1990s, the critics also come from within. For example, Stiglitz (1998) detailed the nature of the poor outcomes of the economic recipes recommended by IFIs and the US Treasure. Notwithstanding the critiques, as previously explained in 2.2.3, it can be argued that the new Consensus represents the direct descendant of the old Washington Consensus, focusing on different concepts, poverty reduction for example, but maintaining the same political-economic framework (Fine et al., 2003). As a consequence, private sector involvement is still seen as crucial for development: in fact, they are still considered able to manage and operate facilities more efficiently than the public sector. By contrast, the a-historical pressure for this private companies involvement, which finds its expression in public-private partnerships (PPPs), continues to bring together a wide range of people opposed to it.

As previously stated in 2.2.3, the core of the policy and strategies implemented by international financial institutions has not changed, although the focus shifted from ‘rough free market’ to the importance of collaboration between the public and the private sectors -with the creation of PPPs through the Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF), financed by bilateral and multilateral development agencies and international financial institutions (among others, the World Bank). In fact, as stated by Hall and Lobina (2009), although the World Bank admitted in June 2004 that there was some irrational exuberance about the potential benefits of privatisation and that imposing it resulted in a waste of time, the private sector is still considered a key player in the provision of water services and promoting private sector participation in water supply is still seen as the cornerstone of IFIs’ strategy. In 2002, the World Bank adopted a new strategy, the Private Sector Development Strategy, with the aim of advancing privatisation in the so-called “frontier” sectors: health care, education and water (Alexander, 2005). Furthermore, the World Bank’s private sector affiliate, the International Finance Corporation (IFC), which provides loans to private sector projects, while taking equity positions in them, was planning to expand its commitments in water projects, beginning in 2006. Together with the World Bank, the IMF is seen as more actively ensuring “that low-income country governments integrate reforms related to privatisation and trade reforms into their medium-term development strategies, or Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs)” which governments are required to prepare “as a condition for receiving financial assistance” (Alexander, 2005, p.3).

The privatisation experiment failed to deliver the improvements in efficiency and water network extension it was expected to bring. In fact, even what is referred to as the “lost decade of water” in the 1980s, when funding was provided to the public sector, delivered far better results than the privatisation experiment. In
fact, it reduced the overall percentage of people living without safe water supply from 56% in 1980 to 31% in 1990 (Hall and Lobina, 2006). As previously mentioned, due to the fact that developing countries, specifically Latin America, could not support the required rate of return, since 2003 multinational companies have halted and reversed their expansion in those countries.

It is worth underlining that the failure to achieve an adequate return on capital was partly due to the spread of public campaigns and protests against water privatisation. In fact, there are a number of examples of public campaigns against privatisation or, more in general, against the presence of multinational corporations in the Latin American territory. Public resistance has ranged over a wide variety of projects: these will be described in chapter 5, focusing on communities and political resistance.

However, the phenomenon of political resistance and protests against models and strategies imposed by IFIs not only characterised developing countries, where it led to the termination of water concessions from Bolivia (Cochabamba and La Paz) to Gambia, Mali and Chad, for example (Hall and Lobina, 2006). In fact, privatisation faced similar rejections and reversals in developed countries as well: for example, Atlanta (USA) terminated a Suez’ concession on the basis that a public sector operation would have been of better value (Hall and Lobina, 2006). Most cross-country papers on utilities, for example Clarke et al. (2004) and Kirpatrick et al. (2004), find no statistically significant evidence in efficiency scores between public and private providers: therefore, it is no longer possible to assume that the public sector is less efficient than the private sector (Hall and Lobina, 2006).

As previously stated, PPPs have been the cornerstone of IFIs since the 1990s. As argued by Alexander (2005), during the period 1994-2004, investments in PPPs in water and sewerage came to $39 billion in Asia, Africa and Latin America. In 2005, a study on PPPs in infrastructure covering that period was released by the World Bank infrastructure expert Antonio Estache. The study underlined that “poorly structured PPP projects have been pervasive” and “have generated considerable fiscal risks” (Alexander, 2005, p.4). Additionally, the study described problems related to affordability, cherry-picking (private firms keep investing in profitable markets such as urban areas. It is worth underlining that this meant that unprofitable markets such as sub-urban and rural areas were left out of the service obligations. Additionally, other issues addressed in the study regarded fiscal stability, efficiency and collusion (Alexander, 2005). According to Hall and Lobina (2009), the World Bank continues to support private sector involvement in water supply for two main reasons. First, “the Bank’s cognitive process is prey to the vested interests of influential water multinationals and their lobby groups”. Second, Neoliberal ideology continues to underpin the World Bank thinking and actions. Furthermore, it is worth noting that “the World Bank’s position on the role of the private and public sector in water in the last nine years has mirrored the multinationals’ changing strategies in respect of markets in developing countries” (Hall and Lobina, 2009, p.1). Additionally, as stated by a research by Food and Water Watch (2009), the advice
provided by PPIAF includes “pressuring governments to implement the regulatory and legal reforms that private corporations find most conducive to insuring adequate returns to their shareholders”. However, evidence shows that PPIAF “has not proven to be committed to expanding access to clean and affordable piped water for low-income people” but, rather, “its goal is to create new opportunities for private sector involvement (new profit streams for private corporations) in infrastructure development around the world” (Food and Water Watch, 2009, p.14).

According to Alexander (2005), in the mid-2000s the IMF and the World Bank reviewed their conditionality, including their trade conditionality. Although the IMF reports a decline in the number of conditionalities on trade, overall the total number of conditionalities has not declined. Additionally, a report by Tony Killick in 2002 suggested that neither the IMF Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF)\(^\text{15}\) or the Poverty Reduction Support Credit (PRSC)\(^\text{16}\) programmes “have differed markedly in design from their predecessors, although in some PRGFs the extent of structural conditionality has been much reduced” (Killick, 2002, p.4). Therefore, the stress on privatisation, which is a structural conditionality, is still maintained at the core of IMF programmes, even if reduced. As for what concerns the World Bank, although the institution reports that the number of its conditions have declined and that trade conditions are no longer a relevant component, this has to be considered misleading. In fact, the number of conditions rose in low-income countries such as those in sub-Saharan Africa, but they declined in middle-income countries, for example in Morocco and Mexico. A reason for that, however, is that the Bank employed ‘guidelines of engagement’ which actually work as conditions because, if a country does not adhere to the guidelines, its access to financial resources is cut (Alexander, 2005).

Alexander (2005) explained that the term “privatisation” is used to refer to all variants of privatisation, and it is with this meaning that it has to be understood here. The first step consists in decentralising the State’s responsibilities. Thus, the decentralisation process had a negative impact on the drinking water industry by fragmenting it and jeopardising its viability. The second step consists in creating the fiscal space for infrastructure development. Indeed, IMF-led austerity often paved the way to riots and to the collapse of public services, as the example of Latin America clearly shows (Harvey, 2005). The third step is establishing legal frameworks for private water supply. Still, water laws are required to be acceptable to the World Bank as a condition for future financing or debt relief. As an example, in Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador and Peru the World Bank drafted water laws that completely lacked policies protecting smaller users from larger, powerful users. Thus, legal frameworks establish market mechanisms to allocate water rights: international and regional

\(^{15}\)Created in 1999, PRGF is underpinned by comprehensive country owned poverty reduction strategies: basically governments look up PRSPs, which are then taken into consideration by the Executive Boards of the IMF and the World Bank as the basis for concessional lending. Eligibility is based on the IMF assessment of the country’s per capita income.

\(^{16}\)PRSC is the World Bank programme loan availability to countries in support of a PRSP.
financial institutions that promote systems allocating water to ‘high-value users’, such as industry and agrobusiness, put ‘low-value users at a disadvantage. The fourth step consists of ending cross-subsidisation between service sectors. In fact, being the water sector non-profitable in most cases, it requires subsidies from more profitable ones. Therefore, the State must provide costly subsidies for the water sector from the national budget. Indeed, compelling to end cross-subsidisation means that privatisation remains the only option available, if a government wants to meet the IMF and the World Bank budget targets. The fifth step consists of IFIs de facto taking a major role in determining tariffs, by so becoming the tariff regulators. Also, the automatic tariff directions have to be applied independently of the political process and of short and long term phenomena -such as an economic crisis. However, in times of crisis, the poorest strata of the population and the lower-middle class have difficulties in affording water tariffs. Sixth step is the cherry-picking as, as previously explained in this section, water sectors in developing countries are not automatically attractive to investors because of the currency risk, the difficulties in making adequate profits and the unpopularity of water privatisation. Further, the seventh step consists in the establishing of pro-corporate regulators. Public and private water providers are required by human rights law to provide universal service obligations (USOs) -safer and affordable water for all citizens. The fulfilment of USOs is ensured through effective regulatory measures. However, regulatory measures cannot be effective if there is “regulatory capture by powerful transnational corporations or when regulation is weak or non-existent” (Alexander, 2005, p.11). In addition, the eighth step consists on poor transparency to the public. On the contrary, in financial circles the word 'transparency' only refers to the level of information disclosure that governments provide to the private sector. Finally, the last step consists on facilitating privatisation by liberalising financial services and opening the capital account (Alexander, 2005).

2.4 Conclusion

This chapter has analysed the development of modern water systems worldwide and has focused on the Washington and Post Washington Consensus paradigms. In particular, taking over the management of water and sewerage from private companies in the late 19th century, municipalities have been fundamental in Western Europe, Eastern Europe (after the collapse of the Soviet Union) and the United States. However, a long term declining role of local authorities' pattern can be witnessed in much of the Western world since the early 1970s while, in the 1980s and 1990, privatisations and joint ventures between cities and multinational corporations have been preponderant in Western countries.

By contrast, in developing countries, specifically Latin America, due to historical reasons, central governments have played a much greater role in water systems than in Western economies. However, in the 1980s and 1990s the international financial institutions actively promoted a strategy for creating and extending water systems in developing countries through privatisation, following the principles of the Washington Consensus.
However, privatisation of water and PPPs have often been resented and opposed as they were seen as unjust and representing the reintroduction of the colonial rule. Sometimes protests have led to the termination of water private contracts, for example in Cochabamba and El Alto in Bolivia. Also, the widespread unpopularity of water privatisation have led two countries (the Netherlands and Uruguay) to make it illegal. Finally, often behind the backs of mainstream policy-makers, new approaches to water management have been developed: participative approaches and PUPs, which are more flexible and capable of avoiding the risks and failures of privatisation, while being well accepted by local populations.
Chapter 3 – Methodology

3.1 Introduction

The aim of this research is to show how national water strategies, influenced by neoliberal global policies, impacted on local communities in Latin America, particularly in Argentina, Brazil and Colombia, and how communities react to them. By understanding power structures informing water strategies, this study also aims to examine the effects of political resistance to water management strategies. Therefore, the research question raises complementary issues about communities, political resistance, water resources and water services, power structures, multinational corporations, privatisation, PPPs, etcetera. This is a multi-level study that uses several tools of analysis which are discussed below.

To set the context of this chapter, it is important to note that this research is composed of three levels of policy analyses and the analysis of the related power structures. The first level is represented by global water strategies, implemented by international financial institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank. The global level is mirrored by national policies. Hence, the second component of the policy analysis describes national water strategies, adopted in Europe, the United States and in the colonies. All of them are, in turn, the result of global water strategies.

In what it is possible to describe as a waterfall process, global strategies influence national policies. This is exemplified in this study through the analysis of the Argentinian, Brazilian and Colombian realities which, in turn, exert influence on local communities. Communities represent the third level of analysis, the scene for political resistance. The methodological tools are not specific to any one level but used at several levels as considered pertinent.

This is a desk based study using qualitative techniques; this will be described in section 3.2, which will also deal with the issues shaping the literature review. Section 3.3 defines and explains the different analytical tools used to undertake this multi-level research. Conclusions will be addressed in section 3.4.

Issues arising from primary research are those of values and ethics, which are partly a response to criticism of earlier research that ignored local practices or had a covert goal. However, since this is a desk based study, there were no ethical issues arising.

3.2 Qualitative Method: Why it is Appropriate for this Study

This is a desk based study relying on qualitative techniques. While there are some advantages of using
quantitative approaches, the former was considered more appropriate for this study. Quantitative approaches rely on numerical data, large scale surveys (questionnaires) based on measurable indicators and large stratified random samples with a control group and deductive statistical analysis. By contrast, qualitative methods are based on the understanding of complex processes, using desk based research; case studies relying, on informal interviews, with an open-ended formulation of questions and scope, and on inductive causal inferences aiming to find patterns of similarity (Desai and Potter, 2006).

As pointed out by Feyerabend (cited in: Seale, 2004), all methodologies have their limitations. This key issue relates to the differences between qualitative and quantitative methods, although the assumptions underpinning them are not mutually exclusive and they share more common ground in practice than the conventionally held dichotomy would suggest. However, it is important to recognise that qualitative and quantitative methods can rarely be used to address exactly the same research question and that triangulation\(^\text{17}^{1}\) -which has come under considerable criticism- does not produce a definitive account of the truth. In practice, they explain a different slice of reality: hence, they can address different kinds of research questions, which are the different facets of an overall research problem (Seale, 2004). Qualitative methods are fundamental in order to describe complex phenomena and to provide an interpretation of facts and events. Therefore, these methods have much to contribute to community studies and water management research, leading to an understanding of the impacts of political resistance to neoliberal water management strategies on communities in Latin America, with particular focus on Argentina, Brazil and Colombia.

The use of case studies in social research have strategic relevance because it allows generalisation. Nevertheless, in social research any generalisation and any claim of representativeness have to be held as suspect. Although this does not reduce the value of the insights from interpretive research (where both the researcher and the researched influence the research situation by continuously constructing their own roles in a drama that they co-write), the temptation to generalise can lead to the unique case being forgotten (Shipman, 1997). In fact, reality is often a shade of grey rather than black and white.

Additionally, no neutral or value-free position is possible in social research: in fact, at stated by Weber (cited in: Seale, 2004), all research is contaminated to some extent by the values of the researcher. As a result, there is a need for the researcher to honestly acknowledge his/her position and the ideology underpinning the research. In this study, a critical approach to neoliberal policies in water management aims at raising

\(^{17}\)Triangulation (Denzin) is a technique for validating observational data. Triangulation refers to different approaches. First, data triangulation maintains the use of diverse sources of data, resulting in a richer description of phenomena; second, investigator triangulation involves team research -which helps to reduce personal biases; third, theory triangulation suggests that researchers approach data with several hypotheses in mind; finally, methodological triangulation -which is the most widely used approach- involves a 'between-method' approach, generally a combination of ethnographic observation with interviews (Seale, 2004).
awareness of injustice, inequality and deprivation, also looking at the way the world has been organised by those with power.

3.2.1 Issues examined
There are several issues that will be examined. This study will analyze the intersection between the resistance to water corporations and types of community through the lenses of Latin American societies, characterized by the presence of strong social-economic inequality. Two sets of issues will shape the literature review analysis. The first set is based on different water management strategies, together with the rising issues around resistance, collective action and internal power struggle. Water management strategies both at a global level and in Latin America have been discussed in Chapter 2: they are informed by the dichotomous discourse of water as a commodity / water as a community resource (for example, Juuti and Katko, 2005; Bakker, 2003; Hall and Lobina, 2010; Sjodin, 2006). Also, the water as a commodity approach entails a study of the private sector and the role of communities in this framework (for example, Hall and Lobina, 2006). With regard to the management of water as a community resource, this study concentrates on the local government role and on the role of communities: additionally, it focuses on the role and impact of Public-Private Partnerships and Public-Public Partnerships in water management (for example, Seppala et al., 2001; Estache et al., 2005; Hall and Lobina, 2006).

The second set of issues reviewed revolves around two main issues: on the one hand communities and, on the other hand, corporations and governments. Therefore, the first central problematic to be addressed is the participation of communities in water management: in order to do so, a focus on theories of community will be provided (Taylor, 2003; Delanty, 2003). On the other hand, the second topic for discussion will lead to a critical analysis of the free market solution, especially as connected to water resources. The analysis will examine multinational corporations’ and governments’ strategies in the commodification of water resources: main points of the analysis will be the political resistance arising from such strategies and what is the causality between political resistance and types of communities (Hall and Lobina, 2006; Barlow and Clarke, 2004).

3.3 Methods and Techniques
Under the over-arching approach of a desk-based research, several analytical tools are used to undertake this multi-level study. These are:

1. meta-policy and policy process analysis to establish the analytical framework at global and national levels;
2. case studies of three Latin American countries to establish more specific national policies and issues in water management;
3. the analysis of community theories to understand different community structures and to identify the theoretical explanations of different resistance strategies used by communities;
4. the analysis of data on websites of organisations and social groups to understand the different strategies adopted by these communities and social movements.

While these are four distinct tools, they are inter-connected and applicable at all levels of study.

3.3.1 Policy Analysis
There are different types of policy analysis and they are grouped into two major sub-systems: analysis of policy, which describes policies and their evolution, and the type of policy analysis which involves formulating policies and proposals (Nagel, 1999). In this research, it will be employed the first type of analysis of policy, namely the description of policies and their development.

Policy analysis is often used in the study focusing on the public sector. As this research examines water strategies, policy analysis is reckoned as one of the most suitable methods for answering the research question. Also, there are three key approaches to policy analysis, namely the analy-centric, the policy process and the meta-policy approach. While the first revolves around individual problematic and its solutions, the second focuses on the political process and its stakeholders and has a political nature, and the third explains the context-related issues of the policy process, identifying problems as a result of structural factors (Nagel, 1999). The present study focuses on the political processes leading to the decision-making in water policy and on the issues related to the context of the policy process.

Therefore, the policy analysis used in this research entails both the policy process approach and the meta-policy approach. In fact, this study analyses power structures, which include the analysis of water strategies at the global and at the country level; the analysis of the water policy pursued by international financial institutions; a compared policy analysis of the Argentinian, the Brazilian and the Colombian realities; the analysis of what is the causal relation between community typologies and political resistance.

In order to describe which political processes are at the basis of Latin American governments' decisions on water management strategies, it is relevant to provide an analysis of the policy process. In addition, this approach is considered appropriate for exploring the role of communities in the process of decision-making by studying the effects of political resistance to water management strategies and its impact on communities. This study will examine the various approaches to water management as suggested by international financial institutions and international donors to Latin American countries, the political resistance arising from these approaches, and the options emerged in recent years as an alternative to them. Specifically, this research will
underline how policy decisions in water management strategies and, generally, in public services, have been made regardless of previous experiences and context-related analyses (Hall and Lobina, 2009; Alexander, 2005; Killick, 2002).

However, a knowledge which is predominant in a society it is not necessarily scientific, but -as postulated by the Frankfurt School- it is due to the power that certain groups have to define what is right or wrong, true or false. Research based on critical theory is weighted on its ability to uncover the relations of domination existing in a society and it is based on the struggles and wishes of people, either conscious or unconscious (May, 1997).

This research aims to investigate political resistance in relation to water management in Latin America and what is the causal relation between political resistance and types of community: in order to focus on the principal research question, therefore, it is necessary to understand theories of community and social struggle. These will be the focus of Chapter 4 and 5, respectively.

Additionally, Chapter 6 will be entirely based on first-hand information acquired through the analysis of websites (see Appendix 3.A for details) belonging to Latin American organisations and activists’ communities, which have been monitored every two weeks during the redaction of this thesis.

3.3.2. Choice of Case Studies
This study uses three different case studies in order to investigate the impacts of political resistance to water management strategies on communities in Latin America. The three case studies chosen here are Argentina, Brazil and Colombia. As defined by one of the pioneer in the use of case studies Robert Yin (Yin, 2003), the case study research method is an empirical study examining a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context. There are different definitions of the case study. Its description as an in-depth examination of a single phenomenon, instance, or example, is the most common. However, Gerring proposed to describe the case study as “an intensive study of a single unit18 for the purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) units” (Gerring, 2004, p. 342). This definition, although not discarding the previous definitions of case study, contributes to give a narrower and clearer explanation when methodological confusion arises, while capturing the essential features of other definitions (Gerring, 2004).

The case study method has been considered appropriate for this thesis for different reasons, which will be subsequently addressed in this section. As previously mentioned in this section, the case study method is

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18 A unit is a spatially bounded phenomenon observe at a single point in time or over some delimited period of time (Gerring, 2004).
useful to analyse real life situations, issues and problems. Case studies are beneficial in order to understand a complex issue, focusing on the contextual analysis of a limited number of events and their relationships. They are an appropriate tool in order to answer questions beginning with “How” or “Why” about a contemporary set of events on which the investigator has limited or no control, so that Yin defined them as explanatory case studies (Yin, 2003). Also, they generally involve multiple sources of data and can be used for different purposes. For example, case studies can be used to produce a new theory, to dispute or challenge a theory, to build on a previously existing theory, to explain or describe a certain situation or phenomenon, etcetera.

As a tool of research, case studies are used to add to our previous knowledge of individuals, groups, organisational, social, political and related phenomena (Yin, 2003, p. 1). According to Gerring (2004), case studies are placed in a methodological limbo. In fact, while we owe much of our knowledge of the empirical world to case studies, there is still confusion about the advantages and disadvantages of their use as research method. Case studies are indeed useful for the creation of descriptive inferences ceteris paribus (all other things being equal), although this condition does not always occur. Descriptive inferences are methodologically affine to case studies and fundamental within social sciences, as many of the most famous case studies were descriptive in orientation, one example among others being Malinowski’s study in 1922. Gerring (2004) identifies a number of reasons describing when case studies are generally more useful, which is why case studies have been used in this research. Among these reasons, we can find that one of the most important advantages of the case study is undoubtedly its in-depth analysis of phenomena. Other examples include the observation that the case study is more useful when inferences are descriptive rather than casual; when case comparability has precedence over case representativeness; and when the strategy of research is exploratory.

Case study analysis implies the study of systems -e.g. policies, events, projects- using one or more methods, where data collection is carried on over a continuous period of time. The case studies for this research have been selected using an information-oriented sampling through the study of the impacts of water management strategies in the Latin American area, basing the decision on the fact that these three countries offer a particularly revealing set of circumstances in the application of neoliberal water management strategies, such as the privatisation of water services, and in their impacts on communities.

Specifically, Colombia has been selected because it presents peculiarities in its political and social characteristics, due to the militarisation of the territory and the drug trafficking. Also, Colombia is one of the Latin American countries where indigenous struggles are de-legitimised and criminalised the most -together with Peru and Chile. Socio-economic inequality in Colombia is strictly connected to the civil war, which will be described in section 5.5 and is also racially defined in what activists have described as a ‘geographical
apartheid'. Equally, large-scale economic development and mega-projects in Colombia mostly affect minorities such as indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities. The resistance toward these projects, or neoliberal policies such as the privatisation of natural resources, including water, reflects both the socio-economic inequality issue and the socio-political context of this country. Furthermore, even if protests in Colombia do not often have a positive outcome, the mere existence of different forms of resistance to neoliberal water management strategies is a remarkable success in itself and confirms what will be discussed in Chapter 4 about causes of resistance and relative deprivation.

The choice of Brazil as one of the three case studies examined in this thesis revolves around different issues. In fact, Brazil has international relevance for the implementation of participative models of development at the local level (e.g. in Porto Alegre). Brazil is also portrayed for its public sector water companies, which operate efficiently and democratically, like in Porto Alegre and Sao Paulo. Also, there is the very important issue of the political opposition to mega-projects and the consequent militarisation of the territory. In fact, despite relevant environmental and social costs, such as land deprivation, the development of energy resources represents a critical political issue in Latin America and particularly in Brazil, due to the growing energy demand and the energy crisis of 2001. Political opposition to these mega-projects have had limited effectiveness, mainly because of the larger context on which these projects are set and the lack of incentives to find compromise. Today, policy options under consideration in Brazil are for the most part new versions of projects that have met strong opposition because of their high environmental and social costs, particularly because the possibility of supplying the country’s energy demand through the creation of incentives for the use of renewable energy sources has not been taken into consideration by the government. The evolution of energy development in Brazil, therefore, caused a wide range of political protests creating a policy advocacy network which suggests a dynamic interaction of political actors loosely coalescing around core values, confirming the validity of the framework underlining this study, which will be described in Chapter 4. Also, Brazil represents an example of power asymmetry, which can be generalised to the Latin American context. In fact, the coalition pursuing large-scale energy development projects on the Brazilian government agenda has continued to dominate the policy process.

Finally, Argentina is relevant for its long history of conflicts. There are currently six major ongoing conflicts for water management strategies, which obtained international attention because of the involvement of the Mapuche indigenous people and important organisations such as La Via Campesina. However, Argentina has also been chosen as a case study because of political and economic reasons. In fact, the privatisation and commodification agenda of the IMF and the World Bank could not have found a more willing partner than the Menem administration in Argentina, which created the liaison between the Argentinian political and administrative elites and the Bretton Woods institutions which made of this country the Latin America’s star pupil. However, following the events caused by the privatisation of water in Buenos Aires, which will be
described in 5.3, one lesson was learnt from Argentina. In fact, those events led to a retreat from the unconditional support for water privatisation schemes, and the World Bank itself expressed doubts about the economic rationale for further privatisation and liberalisation of services in Latin America.

The analysis of case studies will imply a theoretical analysis of community theories and its application on the Argentinian, Brazilian and Colombian realities. Also, it will rely on the use of Web-based data and information in order to understand the strategies underpinning the planning and development of resistance to water management strategies. This will be addressed in Chapter 6.

As previously stated in this chapter, the websites of the three countries’ organisations and NGOs dealing with neoliberal water strategies have been monitored every two weeks during this study. Starting with collecting information about recruitment processes, membership, formation, strategies and political tactics, propaganda and contacts, this study will examine the approaches used by organisations and groups participating in the resistance and their effectiveness, drawing from the theories of communities which will be explained in Chapter 4. Additionally, this research will compare the organisations characterising each case study in terms of causal relation between communities and political resistance, and community impact on the broader context of political resistance.

3.4 Conclusion

This chapter establishes the methodological and theoretical framework of the research. Specifically, it describes the methods used in this study, which is composed of three levels of policy analyses and the analysis of the related power structures. The qualitative techniques on which this desk research is based have been described in this section, which also focuses on the issues of the literature review, before explaining the different analytical tools used for this multi-level research, namely meta-policy and policy process analysis, the case study analysis of three Latin American countries, the analysis of community theories and the analysis of data on websites of organisations and social groups.

Furthermore, this section addressed the issue of the choice of case studies in research. After describing what a case study is and why it is used in social research, this section has focused on the choice of the three case studies at the core of this thesis, namely Argentina, Brazil and Colombia, stating the reasons why these countries were chosen among others.

The next chapter will focus on theories of community, fundamental for the case study analysis contained in Chapter 6, and will provide a framework for the analysis which will be encapsulated in Table 4.1 and subsequently analysed in more disaggregated terms.
Chapter 4 – Theories of Community and Conflict

4.1 Introduction
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate political resistance developing towards water resources and water services management and the causal relation between types of community and political resistance in Latin America. Taking a stance toward the interpretation of globalisation as the framework for the expansion of neoliberal policies, this thesis considers increasingly important to acknowledge the position of social groups demanding an alternative that focuses on people rather than markets. Therefore, in order to answer the research question, there is the need to understand how these people comes together forming social movements expressing stances in antithesis to the globalization based on economic competition. In order to do so, it is necessary to look at debates about community, resistance and conflict.

This chapter will be divided into five main sections. Section 4.2 will consider the development of the concept of community and its flexible nature -see Bauman, 2001 and Delanty, 2003. Specifically, section 4.2.1 will describe liberal individualism for its being the most influential way of thinking in the Western world. Section 4.2.2 will explore communitarianism and its focus on traditional institutions. The debate on communicative community, explaining the dimension of community as expressed in protests, will be the focus of section 4.2.3. Subsequently, section 4.2.4 will address post-modern communities, fundamental for the understanding of today's hybrid and fragmented communities. Finally, section 4.2.5 will concentrate on community in the Post Washington Consensus era.

Section 4.3 will examine resistance, focusing on the debate on the role of masses, new social movements and the emotional dimension in mobilisation. Also, other important issues will be taken into consideration, for example those of commitment and disengagement, together with the mobilising structures of social movement networks. This last point is particularly important as it enables to build a framework which will be used for the analysis of the core research question in the subsequent chapters.

Often undervalued in social movements' literature, the debate on tactical decisions will be the focus of section 4.4.

Section 4.5 will examine conflict theory. In particular, 4.5.1 will address the causes leading to conflict, the fundamental role of resources and the changing role of governments and the state, together with issues of inequality and exploitation. Also, section 4.5.2 will focus on contemporary social movements in Latin America and important factors such as marginalisation and social exclusion.
Conclusions will be provided in section 4.6.

4.2 Community

This section focuses on a variety of Western philosophies and traditional stances describing different typologies of community, and it explains how these merged to explain the hybrid and fragmented communities existing today.

Taylor (2003) identifies three general senses in which the term 'community' is used. The first is descriptive and sees community as “a group or network of people who share something in common or interact with each other”; the second is normative and describes community as “a place where solidarity, participation and coherence are found”; finally, the third is instrumental and consists in the description of community both as “an agent acting to maintain or change its circumstances” and as “the location or orientation of services and policy interventions” (Taylor, 2003, p.34).

Communities and groups follow a development in four stages, which will be briefly described as follows: first stage is the formation, in which the group is still a set of individuals: this stage is characterised by talks about the purpose of the group. Second stage is the storming, in which the preliminary consensus on purposes, leadership roles and other boundaries of the group are challenged. Third, the norming phase, in which the group needs to establish norms and practices. Fourth, the performing stage, which marks the full maturity of the group, which is now able to be fully and sensibly productive (Taylor, 1999).

In order to explore the development of the concept of community, it is fundamental to summarise four philosophical views and set of ideas which became prominent in the debate on community, namely liberal individualism, communitarianism, communicative community and post-modern community.

4.2.1 Liberal Individualism

Becoming a distinct political movement during the Age of Enlightenment, liberalism is a political philosophy founded by John Locke, drawing from Thomas Hobbes, and supporting ideas of civil rights, freedom of speech, freedom of religion, free trade and a right to life and property. Liberalism became globally prominent in the 19th century; however, it was formalised as economic thinking by Adam Smith in *Wealth of Nations* in 1776, with the idea of the 'invisible hand' of the free market as a self-regulating mechanism. The individualist aspect of liberalism maintains the primacy of the individual against the pressures of social collectivism, grounding this political philosophy to capitalism and private property. Liberal individualism is the most influential and widespread way of thinking in the Western world. Undoubtedly, it contributed to raise awareness on the
fundamental rights of the individual. For example, women and sexual and ethnic minorities all benefited from the hegemony of this set of ideas. However, liberal individualism remains a controversial view. In fact, the deep relation between liberal individualism and capitalism led to the marketisation and privatisation of public services and resources being imposed in more than one case in the Latin American context by military-or paramilitary-force (Gilbert, 2012).

Additionally, liberal individualism maintains that individual’s freedom and the pursuit of self-interest can be undermined by governments. Therefore, proponents of liberal individualism argued against a communitarian morality and the social contract, demanding the state’s neutrality and the non-intervention of individuals in one another affairs. Liberal individualists argued that there were very few, if any, alternatives to liberalism in modern societies, although they developed universal arguments exclusively funded in the moral line of reasoning and political experience of Western liberal societies (Gilbert, 2012).

4.2.2 Communitarianism
Criticising both the individualism of the market with its deeply negative impact on community life and the dependency produced by the state, the communitarian school have strongly advanced ‘community solutions’. Communitarianism criticised the liberal view of an overly individualistic conception of the self which defined it independently from traditional institutions such as the family or religious traditions. In fact, communitarianism considers the family first and then the community as the place for human fulfilment, the site of moral norms and obligations, of responsibilities and rights (Taylor, 2003).

The concept of community as the foundation of civil society is common in the broad range of positions composing the communitarian discourse. In fact, as communitarianism recognises the possibility of a number of forms of community, it completely rejects individualism and contractualism (Delanty, 2000). Although frequently overlapping, Delanty (2000) identified three different categories of community: liberal communitarianism, conservative communitarianism and civic republicanism.

Liberal communitarianism can been considered as the main challenge to the revival of the classical liberalism\textsuperscript{19}, by trying to recover a lost dimension of utopian community and stressing the importance of the concept of citizens’ participation in the community. In this sense, the political community is intertwined to a prior cultural community, making the self always culturally specific (Delanty, 2000).

Delanty (2000), argued that while liberal individualism has been the response to left-wing liberalism during\textsuperscript{19}

\textsuperscript{19}In particular, the revival of liberalism is expressed by \textit{A Theory of Justice}, originally published in 1971 by John Rawls.
the 1980s, conservative communitarianism has been a reaction to neoliberalism in the 1990s. Moral responsibility and the appeal to community as a belief in social bond and civic values have been central to the conservative communitarianism, which focused on the importance of voluntary organisations, associations and corporations. Therefore, civil society and the ideal of nation are linked and related to issues of schooling, family and policing. Finally, the third category, civic republicanism, has emphasised civic bonds, stressing the importance of participation in a pronounced political form, creating a participatory democracy. However, there are different civic republican positions, mostly concerned with a pre-political level of non-political benefits as emerging from associational participation (Delanty, 2000).

The 'communitarian community' discourse has been largely criticised for its oversimplification of complex ideas, its romanticism and its avoidance of the intrinsic tensions which characterise community life. While communities were considered as the only possibility of resistance against the corporate capitalism, they maintain a dark side which has been often undervalued. First, community is defined as ‘Us against Them’, antagonising innovation, talent, creativity, diversity and experimentation. The extent of tribal and religious warfare -Hutu and Tutsi, Hindu and Muslim, Jew and Arab, Catholic and Protestant, clearly exemplifies this assumption. Second, the type of close community implied in the community discourse is simply not the way most of us live now: indeed, most of us belong to many communities, different networks that shape different relationships. Third, and final point, there are limits to what can be expected by communities, mainly because most community members are not that interested in linking up with what happens beyond their boundaries (Taylor, 2003).

4.2.3 Communicative Community

Delanty (2003) argued that the growing literature on new social movements provides a different perspective on community than in communitarian thought. Rather than a concept detrimental to community, individualism is increasingly seen by social movement research as the basis of a good quantity of communal activity. In fact, strong individualism can be seen as sustaining many kinds of collective action, as individualised expression and personal self-fulfilment can be highly compatible with collective participation (Delanty, 2003).

As shown by the example of Green politics, based on the culture of individualism and personal autonomy and expressed in a sense of public responsibility, people from different backgrounds can come together in communal activism united by solidarity and a common commitment. Many of the new social movements are based on collective identity, which has become central to their politics. In fact, “many movements owe their influence to their ability to create powerful collective identities” (Delanty, 2003, p.123).
Therefore, the community discourse and the concept of individualism per se are not mutually exclusive. In fact, individualism is likely to sustain many kinds of collective action, as proved by the example of Green politics.

For the purpose of this study, it is worth underlining the dimension of community as expressed in protests, namely, the communicative model described by Delanty (2003). The concept of communities as 'communities of dissent', or 'communities of resistance' is distinctive of the construction of a communicative project that is formed in the dynamics of social action. In this view community emerges from the mobilisation of people around a collective goal.

Communication as a form of social action is the cornerstone of Habermas' work (1981), even though the German sociologist and philosopher distrusted the very idea of community. His critique aimed at communitarianism and, more generally, to nationalism and mirrored that of the French sociologist Alain Touraine. Specifically, “for Habermas, communitarians such as, for instance, Charles Taylor or Hannah Arendt reduce the social to a moral totality rather than see it as a communicative structured process that is always in tension with the existing society” (Delanty, 2003, p.115). In addition, according to Touraine's opinion, community and nationalism are very close, in the sense that the community discourse tends to oversimplify complex ideas, reducing reality to “Us against Them”, antagonising diversity. This view does not mean that Touraine opposes community in the sense of collective goals or the common good. Rather, he argues that community has been debased by nationalism and that, today, society is divided between a struggle of community versus market and individualism: indeed, a world dominated by community attempts to find only integration, homogeneity and consensus, rejecting democratic debate (Delanty, 2003). Therefore, both Touraine and Habermas are “looking for an alternative conception of political community that does not reduce community to an underlying unity but builds upon diversity and communicative possibilities” (Delanty, 2003, pp.117-118). It is this alternative conception of community, which builds upon diversity, creativity and inclusion, rather than on contrast and exclusion, that should constitute the basis for collective action and political resistance to corporate policies.

4.2.4 Post-modern Community

This section will take into consideration the post-modernist community, important for its features of hybridization and fragmentation characterizing communities today, and leading for example to the creation of displaced communities and communities of interest. Social movements’ research suggests that community is something constructed. Rather than an already existing set of values, crucial for social integration and the identity of the individual, community is constructed through processes of mobilisation. Hence, what differentiates post-modern communities is the fact that the community is sustained by action rather than by
culture. Moreover, community can be shaped by conflict: the post-modern community is a ‘fractured community’, emerging with the creation of heterogeneous societies (Delanty, 2003).

Delanty (2003) argued that the concept of community in sociology and community studies has been challenged by developments brought by “post-modernism, globalisation, the Internet and 'third-way' style politics” in many different ways (Delanty, 2003, p.1).

In particular, post-modernism focused on deconstruction, leading to the notion that human societies and behaviours need to be read like a text and interpreted. Therefore, the self is multiple and always under construction. This idea of multiple selves that are in tension can lead to self-affirmation which, in turn, is the basis for the 'ideal self' of consumer culture (Hollinger, 1994).

Rejecting totalitarianism and the idea of society as a totality, post-modernism emphasised heterogeneity, plurality and tension, making the concept of community itself an ideal with no content. In fact, a community based on consensus and unity would represent an example of totalitarianism as it would ignore differences: by contrast, community and agreement need to be based upon difference and fragmentation. Therefore, post-modernism can be seen as supportive of the post-industrial, late capitalist world order, aggravating it by accepting the fragmentation of post-industrial society which, in turn, leads to the glorification of flexibility for multinational corporations. However, post-modernists’ emphasis on cultural hierarchy and liberation of desire can be considered as foundation for resistance. Additionally, post-modernists underlined that new forms of political resistance and new social movements call for a transformation of the categories of analysis in order to examine the developments of society, as historical discontinuities are considered more important than continuities (Hollinger, 1994).

4.2.5 Community in the Post Washington Consensus

Today, the concept of “community” is present in the vocabulary of the Post Washington Consensus. However, the concept assumed two different meanings, the community of the elites and the community of the weak and deprived, which bear little resemblance with each other. In Bauman's view (Bauman, 2001) the strongest sense of community is likely to be found in those groups whose existence has been threatened and who build a strong sense of identity, resistance, and empowerment out of their deprivation. Bauman shares with Habermas and Touraine a profound scepticism of community. In fact, he argues that people miss community because they miss security: however, in this view community and freedom do not fit so easily together. Therefore, with no debate or dissent, a true community lacks of criticism and internal opposition (Delanty, 2003).
Delanty (2003) argued that today’s globalized society destroyed communities, for example through liberalization, the privatization of public assets and mega hydroelectric projects flooding traditional territories belonging to indigenous communities. On the other hand, Post Washington Consensus policy set communities and civil society as two of the pillars of the new neoliberal agenda in order to balance the effects of the previous policy of the Washington Consensus, but also for obtaining the locals’ approval, as exemplified by the mechanism of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers.

Communities have been based on class, politics, ethnicity or religion, with a possible emphasis on citizenship, civil society, collective identity or ideology. In short, community has a flexible nature and cannot be ascribed to a particular group or place. Delanty (2003) described four broad positions emerging from debates on community: first, community as highly spatialized and as needing the mainstream society for help; second, community as a search for belonging; third, community as a space for political consciousness and collective action; fourth, the less clear-cut position recently emerged around globalisation, transnational movements and new media (Delanty, 2003).

4.3 Resistance

Different perspectives have contributed to the debate on issues related to resistance. These are discussed in this section.

In 1975, Gould (cited in: Staiger et al., 2010) argued that crowd and masses have been looked at in particular ways in every period of history. Specifically, they have been considered with deep concern for their destructive potential, mental inferiority and irrationality by the literature of the 19th century. For example, Le Bon, one of the first theorists of contentious politics and emotions, argued that in the crowd individuals’ personalities are led by a collective mind towards an identical direction (1895). In his analysis, emotions are transmitted to one another like contagious microbes, turning individuals into barbarians only acting by instinct and against their ‘obvious interest’. Influencing the study of group behaviour through the middle of the 20th century, Le Bon’s famous work stresses the irrationality of the crowd which, in his view, is inclined towards extremism and anarchism. Interfering with reason, emotions are seen in a negative light, leading to psychological distraught and disruptive group behaviour. In brief, these studies pathologised people engaging in protest, considered as alienated from society, frustrated, psychologically unstable, narcissistic, wild and dangerous. Therefore, rather than an expression of political grievance and rational analysis, protest was considered as an aberration, caused by the protesters’ psychic trauma of not leading fulfilling lives (Gould, 1975, cited in: Staiger et al., 2010).

During the 1970s, this collective behaviour literature begun to be criticised, leading to the emergence of a
new field of study, namely the social movement studies. However, the consideration of protests and protesters as irrationally-driven, childish and self-defeating, is still widely accepted today, for example by corporate media and politicians aiming to maintain the status quo (Gould, 1975, cited in: Staiger et al., 2010).

Questioning the rationality of protest, in The Logic of Collective Action (1965), Mancur Olson asked when and why people would protest if they were carefully weighting the costs and benefits of their choices, that is to say if they were rational and self-interested human beings (cited in: Goodwin and Jasper, 2009). Around the same time, also the explicitly political dimension of social movements was discovered by a number of scholars, who were analysing political movements such as the labour or the civil rights ones, finding that they were making demands directly to the state which, therefore, was involved not only as a target, but also as the “adjudicator of grievances” (Goodwin and Jasper, 2009, p.6).

Most of the “new” social movements started to emerge in the 1960s. They include student movements, the New Left, and later environmental, feminist and anti-nuclear movements, and preferred egalitarian groups that encouraged everyone to participate in decision making (Goodwin and Jasper, 2009). Today, many movements, for example the environmental and human rights ones, increasingly organise across national boundaries, as it makes sense in an increasingly integrated world.

Influenced by the socio-political climate of the mid-1960s and 1970s, many scholars recognised the rationality of protests and protesters, even if implicitly. Still dominant today, these rational-actor models contrast with a view of protesters as irrational, psychologically disturbed and impulsive. Nevertheless, emotions were expelled by the social movement studies, as the new generation of social movements’ scholars shared with the older one the assumption that emotions were irrational. Therefore, protesters were denied their emotions in order to demonstrate their rationality (Staiger et al., 2010).

In the late 1990s, however, the emotional dimension of mobilisation assumed a new relevance: without depriving protesters of rationality, in fact, emotions were now considered a fundamental and omnipresent feature of social life (Staiger et al., 2010).

Therefore, more and more aspects of social movements have begun to be studied, for example movements having a global reach such as the environmental movement or the one protesting against globalisation, while the emotions surrounding them have also been rediscovered (Goodwin and Jasper, 2009).

Today, almost all scholars admit that cultural meanings are a relevant dimension of social movements, so that it is fundamental to explore how protesters view the world and what is the type of rhetoric they use. Gaps in the literature remain, however. First, little work has been done in understanding from a cultural point of view
the state bureaucrats, politicians and police officers’ view and persuasion attempts. Second, the emotions of protesters -namely, their feelings about the world, themselves and each other. Nevertheless, the cultural approach has helped in giving a different analysis for different movements: not all movements are seen as structurally similar. Moreover, perceptions, rhetoric, symbols, and emotions matter probably even more than the underlying reality (Goodwin and Jasper, 2009).

For example, Goodwin and Jasper (2009) argue that the poor are not always the most rebellious people in societies and that people do not always protest during the worst of times. The key concept is ‘relative deprivation’: people judge the fairness of their situation relatively to the expectations that they have come to hold about themselves or their societies. And, in fact, evidence to date suggests that the globalized economic order is contributing to considerable deprivation, paving the way to socio-political protests.

Kurzman (cited in: Goodwin and Jasper, 2009) argues that protest is no longer seen as a compensation for some lack, but as part of an effort to give cognitive meaning to the world, to create an individual and a collective identity, to define and pursue collective interests and to reinforce affective connections with other people.

The issue of commitment -why people remain active in a movement or why they drop out- has been studied less than the recruitment issue, although it has not been neglected altogether (Goodwin and Jasper, 2009). For example, Kanter (cited in: Goodwin and Jasper, 2009) catalogued a number of commitment mechanisms and emphasised that commitment to a cause or group is simultaneously cognitive, affective, and moral. Furthermore, the study by Hirsch (cited in: Goodwin and Jasper, 2009) highlighted the important impact of group processes on movements recruitment and commitment and the development of solidarity based on a sense of collective power and polarization.

Disengagement is a further element to be taken into consideration in the study on social movements. Indeed, it can take different forms, and does not always imply to take action or to voice dissent. But what leads to disengagement? As stated by Goodwin and Jasper (2009), the answer seems to consist in a combination of insufficient gratification and lack of commitment. Of course, this raises the questions of what causes insufficient gratification and of why commitment declines. As explained by Klandermas (quoted in: Goodwin and Jasper, p.131):

“Action mobilization implies social polarization, for it rearranges an individual’s social environment into proponents and opponents of the movement. Most individuals live in a fairly homogeneous social environment and will find themselves unambiguously in one camp or the other, but some may discover that groups, organizations, or parties with which they identify are suddenly in their enemy’s camp or that groups
and people with whom they feel little affinity have become allies. If they don’t like the social identity implied by these new arrangements, they may choose to detach themselves from the movement”.

In groups that are building a sense of community, the internal homogeneity binds members to one another more fully (Luker, cited in: Goodwin and Jasper, 2009). Therefore, potential deviants try to suppress their differences in order to belong. The deep inclusivity of social movements accentuates homogeneity. In fact, social movements identify themselves exclusively in terms of their ideology. Subconsciously, all members know that they are part of the movement as long as they believe what other members believe. In a study comparing two communities resisting urban renewal—one a tightly knit Italian community, the other a more loosely organised aggregation—Mark Granovetter (1973) concluded that the loose aggregation succeeded probably due to the fact that members of less exclusive aggregations could use their many weak contacts with different organisations and individuals outside the aggregation itself so to further the aggregation’s interests. Hence, it is important to understand that social movements have to balance the conflicting claims of purity and pragmatism in order to survive and succeed (Luker, cited in: Goodwin and Jasper, 2009).

There has been a relevant debate over the effects of formal organisations on social movements. Some scholars argued that social movements with more bureaucratic organisations were more successful. However, the study of a number of poor people’s movements by Fox Piven and Cloward in 1979 (cited in: Goodwin and Jasper, 2009) found that the most powerful tool of the oppressed is their ability to disrupt things, which conflicts with the purposes of a more bureaucratic organisation. Nevertheless, additional studies on the subject are needed.

This section entails a description of different perspectives that have contributed to the debate on issues related to resistance. Specifically, it started with some consideration on how crowd and masses have been looked at by the collective behaviour literature of the 19th century. The irrationality of the crowd has been overtaken by the rationality of protest as applied to the new social movements emerged in the 1960s. However, emotions were expelled by the social movements’ studies and assumed a new relevance just in the late 1990s. In fact, rationality and emotions need to be considered together in the explanation of protest. Another key concept explained in this section is relative deprivation as cause of protest: this can be seen as relevant in the analysis of resistance to water management strategies in Argentina, Brazil and Colombia and relates to the work of David Harvey, which will be described in section 4.5. Additionally, commitment and disengagement are further elements to be considered in the analysis: building a sense of community is essential for the success of protest. Even though internal homogeneity binds members more fully, a number of studies (e.g. Granovetter, 1973; Smith, 1997) has shown that loose aggregations are more effective in protest. Therefore, the typology of mobilising structures, which will be the focus of the following section and which will be described in Table 4.1 will be used to examine the core research question in the subsequent
4.3.1 Typology of Mobilising Structures.

Drawing from the work of McCarthy (1996), Smith (cited in: Goodwin and Jasper, 2009), provided a table which describe the mobilising structures that characterise transnational social movement networks. This will be applied to this study to analyse social groups and networks involved in the political resistance to neoliberal water management strategies in Latin America.

Table 4.1 (Typology of Mobilising Structures).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Non-Movement</th>
<th>Movement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Informal</strong></td>
<td>Friendship networks, Professional networks, Expatriate networks, Individuals in intergovernmental bureaucracies or national delegations</td>
<td>Activist networks, Affinity groups, Refugee/exile networks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Formal</strong></td>
<td>Churches, Unions, Professional associations, Regional cooperative associations, Service organisations, Intergovernmental and state bureaucracies, National delegations, Foundations</td>
<td>TSMOs (Transnational Social Movement Organisations), Unions, SMOs (Social Movement Organisations), local and national, Protest committees of other NGOs, Transnational NGO coalitions, Movement research institutes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Smith, 1997.*

Smith's table looks both at formal and informal typologies, intersecting them with 'movement' and 'non movement' structures. As for the structures taken into consideration in Table 4.1, 'non movement' structures are non-organised networks, while 'movement' structures refer to organised advocacy groups. It is also worth noting that the concept of network becomes increasingly important to qualify the mobilizing structures at the basis of social movements.

Describing the mobilizing structures characterising transnational social movement networks, Table 4.1 is significant because it explains that strong movements are in fact those at the intersection of 'non movement' structures with the informal typology, for their ability to connect different people, ideas and resources -by so, confirming the results of the study by Granovetter (1973), previously mentioned in this section.

Loose aggregations have, in fact, the power to challenge the legitimacy of dominant institutions. By promoting social change through diverse objectives, members of the non-movement/informal cluster impact
on organisations devoted to more democratic and sustainable global policy due to their loose contacts. In turn, these organisations help in unifying the different causes promoted by loose groups. Nevertheless, it can be noted a constant tension between social movements (which are, by definition, fluid, adaptable, and decentralised) and formal organisations (stable, predictable, and with a certain degree of centralisation).

Social movements are often made up of formal organizations, which are focused on specific objectives. However, movements' structures are becoming more and more decentralised and informal, due to the prominence assumed by loose aggregations.

As previously stated in this section, Table 4.1 describes the mobilizing structures characterising transnational social movement networks to investigate who participates in social movements (Smith, cited in: Goodwin and Jasper, 2009). Together with the analysis above, therefore, Smith’s work explores one of the key components at the basis of the analysis in Chapter 6, namely relevant actors and their relations, allowing to build a framework which shows and explains the different forms of communities existing today.

The non-movement/informal category, comprehending friendship and professional networks, expatriate network and individuals in intergovernmental bureaucracies or national delegations, shows which movements can mobilize influence. National social groups are likely to include such networks or individuals: because of their routine, in fact, they have the opportunity to have contacts on a regular basis and to channel transnational mobilisation. Also, the importance of these networks augmented due to simpleness and quality of modern travels and communication.

The non-movement/formal dimension is formed by groups such as unions, churches, professional associations etc. (see Table 4.1), although unions are, in contexts of greater confrontation with governments and corporations, considered as part of the 'movement' type, rather than the 'non movement'. In the transnational context, these actors can be represented by large organisations focusing, for example, on humanitarian or development projects, while covering the role of protectors against governments' repression. This happened in many countries in Latin America during the dictatorships and authoritarian governments in the 1970s and 1980s. Although, officially, the Catholic Church was condemning communism, and many priests and the high levels were indeed involved with the dictatorships and were later found guilty of complicity, people like Mons. Romero in El Salvador, together with many other priests and nuns throughout Latin America, paid the price of their support with expulsions, torture and death.

The movement/informal category includes activists networks and affinity networks (characterised by shared norms and expectations), which represent the most important and dynamic category for global change. These were the actors who focused on direct action protests against international financial institutions, for example
in the new peasant-led struggles in Mexico (EZLN), Brazil (MST) and Bolivia (Cocaleros), or in the resistance to the North America Free Trade Agreements. Diverse factors such as transportation and information technology have contributed to these network assuming a bigger role in the transnational panorama, rather than in the national one. The participation of these actors in networking processes and communication-based politics contributes to the relevance of these fluid and informal networks. Today, transnational movements seem to have shifted towards an increasingly mass-based political action (Goodwin and Jasper, 2009).

The movement/formal dimension, finally, is composed by TSMOs together with nationally or locally-based social movement organisations, which create those organisations which, in turn, help in the coordination of actions or campaigns on particular issues. The establishment of think tanks and research institutes that promote the objectives of particular social movements are fundamental in order to gather substantial information and scientific evidence that supports their point of view.

Strong movements have the ability to reach people in the space of their everyday lives, in the more informal and non-movement spaces of people's families and communities. Furthermore, episodes of contention such as the “Battle of Seattle” and UN global conferences have been crucial for creating new relationships between activists from different countries who would otherwise never meet, and for allowing activists to conceptualise their issues in broader terms. Also, such episodes created spaces for the formation of new transnational alliances (Smith, cited in: Goodwin and Jasper, 2009). However, many of the new coalitions tend to organise around short-term goals, rather than on a long-term commitment.

4.4 Tactics

Deriving from Latin tactica and the Greek taktike’, tactics indicate a set of manoeuvres engaged in order to achieve a goal. Also, tactics represent the military science dealing with securing objectives set by strategy. Strategy, in turn, defines a plan of actions which intends to achieve a specific goal and it derives from the Greek strategia (Clavell, 2013). So, the formulation of a strategy includes a tactical plan.

Often undervalued in social movements’ literature is the debate on tactical decisions which, in turn, also represent the second key component of the analysis of Chapter 6—the first key component being actors and their relations, previously described in 4.3, which addressed the typology of mobilising structures. The undervaluing of this debate can be ascribed to two main reasons: first, social movements often have difficulties in simply surviving. Second, choices made in the heat of conflict are hard to explain in a rigorous way (Goodwin and Jasper, 2009). Indeed, strategies are tailored according to the availability of resources, opportunities, and daily life. Tactical principles are not unlike those of war theorists: try to take your opponents by surprise; try to give them the impression that you are more powerful than you are; try to use
tactics that your own followers are familiar with. It is fundamental to keep emotions, pressure and polarisation on. Of course, the study of tactics and strategies of social movements is an area in which additional research is needed (Alinsky, cited in: Goodwin and Jasper, 2009).

Although the use of “extra-institutional” means by social movements is vital, protest can also take place within institutions, which is the role taken on by the actors part of the movement / formal, category mentioned in the previous section (Table 4.1). However, all the four clusters described in Table 4.1 use this tactic. In fact, many movements make demands directly on powerful institutions such as the state, the mass media, or multinational corporations. Usually, the most important of these institutions is the state, its actions being sometimes the focus of the grievance. Fundamental is the access to mass media, although even for causes from “important” countries of the global North media access and, therefore, global attention, remains uneven (Goodwin and Jasper, 2009).

Particularly in the global South, movements increase their chances of success if they gain support from Western NGOs, belonging to the movement/formal category in Table 4.1 which has been analysed above in this section. NGOs have multiplied and became more visible in the 1990s, because much of international aid was channelled through them, although they have often been ineffective as they have often been incapable of maintaining a critical stance or promote an alternative project of development. However, NGOs have an important role in the delivery of social services (Foweraker, 2001). Checking these facts against Table 4.1, it emerges that the variety of organisations present in Latin America during the 1990s belonged to both structures -movement and non-movement- intersecting the formal typology, which can explain why these forms of collective action were not entirely successful and were capable of influencing social policy just sporadically.

In trying to get support from Western NGOs, social movements need to be prepared to conform to the expectations and the needs of Western potential backers. This is well exemplified by Subcomandante Marcos’ Zapatista revolution in Mexico and Guatemala's Marxist insurgency in the 1980s. Both of them, in fact, benefited abroad from the indigenous identity that became the trademark of the movements themselves. However, this can lead to pressures to conform to the needs of international NGOs, subverting and undermining the original goals of local movements. Corporations are another important institution at the centre of the controversy with social movements. Corporations are increasingly powerful and global in scale. Therefore, it could be suggested that movements focused their attention on corporations, rather than on countries (Goodwin and Jasper, 2009).

The use of participation in social movements as a mean to influence government’s and corporations’ policies and the idea that social movements can actually contribute to improve governance and development
outcomes has been at the centre of mainstream development policy debates, especially in the last two decades (Gaventa and Barrett, 2010). However, the impact of participation has been difficult to assess. In their meta-case study analysis, Gaventa and Barrett (2010) explored the observable effects of citizens' participation and create a typology of four democratic and developmental outcomes -namely, the construction of citizenship; the strengthening of practices of participation; the strengthening of responsive and accountable states; and the development of inclusive and cohesive societies.

What is relevant for the purposes of this dissertation is the analysis of the practices of participation. Many positive outcomes can be found as a consequence of citizens' participation. Drawing from the framework described in 4.3.1, this is ascribable to the non-movement / informal dimension mentioned in Table 4.1. For example, participatory budgeting in Brazil, although somehow mixed on measures of empowerment, was strongly correlated with a reduction in extreme poverty (Gaventa and Barrett, 2010). Nevertheless, findings can also differ, or seem to contradict, depending on the type of impact under study: differences in conclusion, even based on studies on the same countries, are found to be the result of the privileged perspective, different methodologies, of “how the meaningfulness of changes is determined”, and “how the contextual and multi-directional nature of change is dealt with” (Gaventa and Barrett, 2010, p.16).

Gaventa and Barrett (2010) categorised four broad areas -previously listed in this section- in which participation can lead to a change in state-society relations, either with a positive (some 75 per cent) or a negative direction. Their findings suggest that participation can make positive differences even in the least democratic settings. Positive outcomes of citizens’ engagement are represented by an increased capacity for collective action, the development of new forms of participation and the deepening of networks and solidarity. For example, in Brazil new modalities of participatory governance have contributed to gradually improve access to healthcare and quality health services. Additionally, in Argentina, engagement in participatory budgeting processes, focusing on the provision of water and housing, by local residents led to the identification of priorities for action on urban services, many of which were incorporated into a development plan (Gaventa and Barrett, 2010).

Indeed, the strategies used by social groups to reach these outcomes vary according to the political context. Of course, figures leading to this assumption are to be interpreted very carefully, as there are dangers in broad generalisation. Also, other factors could affect the outcomes of citizens' participation, including “the quality of representation and mediation involved, the nature of the issue, and the style of mobilisation used” (Gaventa and Barrett, 2010, p.56). Bearing in mind the importance of taking into account negative outcomes (25 per cent of the sample) is essential. However, this synthesis of a large sample of qualitative research,

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20 This categorisation is based on Gaventa and Barrett’s coding and analysis of almost 830 examples of outcomes from citizens’ participation in a sample of 100 cases all over the world (2010).
which facilitates a degree of generalisation that could not be achieved by the analysis of a single case study, underlines that, in contrast with previous arguments, citizens' participation can indeed contribute to developmental or state-building outcomes. This represents the third key factor of the analysis which will be developed in Chapter 6, namely the impacts on community. In fact, this study suggests that participation is itself “a way of strengthening a sense of citizenship, and the knowledge and sense of awareness necessary to achieve it” (Gaventa and Barrett, 2010, p.56). Undoubtedly, more aware citizenship can, in turn, contribute to the inclusion of previously marginalised groups and can increase social cohesion across groups (Gaventa and Barrett, 2010).

By contrast, the assumption linking positive outcomes to the level of democratisation of a given country do not hold true. In fact, a very strong presence of associations -key actors in each of the outcomes studied by Gaventa and Barrett (2010) is to be noted particularly in the least democratic countries. Also, data support the view that an often violent state reaction to increased citizen voice can be found in all political settings. Amongst other examples, violent attacks and atrocities by police, often infringing civil and political rights, occurred as the result of labour mobilisation in Bangladesh, environmental mobilisation in India and public-service protests in South Africa. Indeed, further research is needed in order to better understand the conditions under which citizens' participation makes a positive difference (Gaventa and Barrett, 2010).

Taylor (2003), argues that “the power of collective citizen action has been felt by authoritarian governments from the communist regimes in Eastern Europe at the end of the 1980s, through the Philippines and South Africa to East Timor” (Taylor, 2003, p.12). Furthermore, environmental activism has achieved a number of important victories across different fronts, while there are thousands of examples of local communities taking initiatives to improve their own circumstances at a local level, even if these initiative found little space and visibility in the global media.

In 1996 Abbott (cited in: Taylor, 2003) suggested that there are four possible outcomes for community struggles, which indicate four different sets of impacts on communities. In his analysis, two of the options are negative and see community-based movements as collapsing or being undermined by government. A third option is that the state can leave some space for limited organisation and mobilisation around projects implementation, while the fourth option takes into consideration the fact that a shift in the state can create the opportunity for confrontational approaches to evolve into a new community-state dialectic. This validates the argument of the study by Gaventa and Barrett (2010) which has been previously explained in this section, and paves the way to the analysis of the impact on communities which will be developed in Chapter 6.

A consistent part of the studies on social resistance focuses on non-violent resistance. The history of the 20th
The 20th century is characterised by plenty of examples, clearly demonstrating that violent resistance against unfair power systems, dictators, or external occupations is likely to lead to further violence—for instance, decolonisation wars in Africa and Asia (Dudouet, 2011). However, the 20th century also saw many powerful non-violent struggles, for example, Gandhi’s non-violent movement in India and Martin Luther King Junior’s civil rights campaign in the US. Non-violence has been a powerful tool in the hands of marginalised communities (Dudouet, 2011). An understudied issue however, relates to the context and conditions in which non-violent resistance is able to contribute to successful and sustainable conflict transformation processes.

However, non-violent campaigns are not always successful, and non-violent struggles have been brutally crushed by occupiers and regimes: the major examples remain Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the events of Tienanmen Square in China in 1989. Other non-violent struggles have only been partially successful—for instance, the Palestinian first intifada-and could not achieve major socio-political change. Additionally, often armed and non-violent resistance have been complementary—for example, in Chile or South Africa. Dudouet (2011) argues that, in order to be successful, non-violent movements have to be home-grown and developed over the course of several years, while the role of outside assistance and support can only be marginal and secondary. Nevertheless, when conflicts involve highly polarised communal groups, peace does not automatically follow the achievement of relative power balance, and negotiations and process-oriented conflict resolution remain necessary (Dudouet, 2011). This will be part of the analysis of Chapter 5, which will examine successful and unsuccessful movements in Argentina, Brazil, and Colombia following a context-based approach.

In 1994, Ackerman and Kruegler (cited in: Edmonds, 2006) demonstrated that non-violence can be a powerful and often successful strategy and identified the correct non-violent strategy in order to make protesters operate pro-actively rather than reactively. They concluded that civic organisations, continuity, and a variety of sanctions imposed by non-violent resisters all contributed in achieving a successful outcome, while ambivalence about the use of violence, inability to shift to a less violent procedure, the failure to specify the goals of resistance and the imposition of martial law by governments led to negative outcomes of protests. Furthermore, it emerged from their study that there was never a self-evident progression from resistance to victory or defeat in any of the campaigns. However, Ackerman and Kruegler barely mentioned the influence of religious beliefs or institutions in the resistance process (Edmonds, 2006).

Tactics and strategies relevant to this work are both extra-institutional and those happening within institutions, and they can be used together in a dual strategy to obtain positive outcomes. However, not all social groups have the opportunity to be represented within institutions or to access mass media, which makes it difficult to obtain positive results, at least on the large scale. From the disaggregated analysis of Table 4.1, it emerges that means of protest used by different social groups in the countries under examination.
depend on the mobilising structures of those social movements. Different studies (e.g. Ackerman and Kruegler, 1994) demonstrate that the success of protest and resistance depends on context and conditions of protest, rather than on a magic and predictive formula. As discussed in section 4.3, it is proven that success has its roots on the type of community mobilised.

4.5 Conflict Theory

In order to examine political resistance to water management strategies and what is the causal relation between political resistance and types of community in Latin America, it is necessary to draw from conflict theory.

As Tidwell pointed out (2004), the definition of conflict can fall into two groups: first, conflict as subjective, focusing on the individual; second, conflict as objective and external, which emphasises its social and behavioural aspects. Indeed, each conflict is unique in a number of ways. Additionally, conflict types can be collocated on a continuum spanning from simple argumentation to total warfare.

Tidwell (2004) categorises conflict theories as follows. First, based on the work of Georg Simmel (1971), conflict could be largely functional by serving a social function: Simmel, one of the most influential authors on conflict theory, defined conflict as what is designed to resolve divergent dualism, by so being a way of achieving some kind of unity, even if this unity may occur through the annihilation of one of the conflicting parties. Second, situational, where conflict finds expression under unusual situations. Third, interactive: in this last case, the methods and mechanisms underpinning conflict are the object of investigation (Tidwell, 2004). The various issues underlined in this typology are cross-cutting and are found in the case studies analysed in this thesis. Therefore, the next section will address the causes leading to conflict, discussing the three basic theory types identified by Tidwell (2004): inherency, contingency and interaction. Also, the following section will focus on the essential role of resources and the changing role of the government and the state, together with the issues of inequality and exploitation. All these matters relate to the debate on political resistance to neoliberal water management strategies addressed in this study.

4.5.1 Causes of Conflict

According to Taylor (1999), conflict occurs when two or more parties believe that what each wants is not compatible with what the other wants: in short, conflict arises when differences -which, in turn, are based on the identity of a group or a community- are not satisfactorily addressed.

Today, complex conflicts are mainly caused by two major, interrelated factors: a) the role of resources (in
particular, natural resources’ extraction and trade) which includes the use of water resources, and b) the changing nature of government and the state. The potential destructive role of natural resources and illicit economic activity in sparking or sustaining conflicts have been underlined by the ‘greed versus grievance’ debate. According to the greed faction, the initiation or the continuation of war and violence is the result of the struggle for the control of natural resources and trade networks. Also, the recession of the state describes a situation in which governments have only marginal control over many parts of the society, but exert predatory control over resources. This view describes the situation existing in Latin America and Africa, for example. In fact, many ‘new’ and ongoing conflicts take place in states where power relations are characterised by a small, dominant elite sustained by informal power and resource networks, presiding over a large, poor and marginalised majority, for example in Mexico or Colombia (Desai and Potter, 2006).

With regard to the sources of conflict, Tidwell (2004), identifies three basic theory types: first, inherency, which stresses the inevitability of the conflict; representative of this strand of theories are Hobbes (1651), Lorenz (1966), Ardrey (1970), deWaal (2000); second, contingency, represented by Webb (1888), Rousseau (1762), Marx (1867) and Keynes (1926), addressing the external factors leading to the conflict which, as a result, is fully preventable; third, interaction, dealing with the fact that conflict depends on both inherent and contingent factors, the two of which cannot be separated or further reduced. Since the mid-nineteenth century there have been a variety of theorists concerned with conflicts, of whom maybe Karl Marx is the most noteworthy. However, some other contributions have to be taken into consideration. Among others, Lewin and his Field theory (1940s), which attempted to integrate explanations of individual behaviour within a social context, arguing that the tension level or the social atmosphere in the group will determine if a particular event will turn into a conflict (Tidwell, 2004).

Although there are other important theories or approaches (such as the Game theory, for example), the Elite theory of Pareto and Mosca is considered fundamental: repudiating class analysis, which, in turn, is the cornerstone of the works of Weber and Marx, Elite theory substitutes the concept of class relationship with the opposition between elite and masses, proposing the idea of cyclical replacement of elites in perpetuo: as noted by Dahrendorf in 1959, in fact, it can be stated that the basic social conflicts are no longer between capital and labour (Giddens and Held, 1982).

This view is also developed by David Harvey. In 1976, Harvey argued that community action and community consciousness may emerge as a powerful force that generates competition between communities for scarce public investments and the like. By examining three situations situated on a continuum of possibilities, namely competitive individualism, community action and class struggle, Harvey maintains that it is not possible to automatically assume labour to be at any particular point of this continuum: rather, the key concept to consider is the dispossession created by the neoliberal system. In his view, class distinction is created and re-
created through the mechanism of accumulation by dispossession, which does not negate the possibility of situations of 'fully class-conscious proletariat' struggling against all forms of exploitation (Giddens and Held, 1982).

Therefore, inequality, expropriation and exploitation are confirmed by Harvey as the key elements that lead today's social movements. This view constitutes the roots of the theory behind this study, which considers neoliberal policies as detrimental for local communities as it does cause increasing social injustice and inequality. Also, according to Zeitlin (1974), a new economic elite is now in control of the new forms of productive property: the non-owning corporate management which displaced its capitalist predecessor (Giddens and Held, 1982). In fact, this theory reflects the roots of indigenous political resistance to water management strategies decided and implemented by local elites, governments and corporations in Latin America, as it will be described in Chapter 5.

4.5.2 Contemporary Social Movements

As contemporary social movement theorists would put it, the oppressed draw on a repertoire of actions established by those who have been oppressed before them. Therefore, elements of those repertoires are expected to be found in new social movements and in political resistance, including those against multinational corporations or those supporting a more equal management of public resources. Every form of society, in fact, has been based on the antagonism of oppressing and oppressed classes. Indeed, as Weber pointed out, classes are not communities; additionally, according to Melucci, new social movements focus on personal identity, on the time and space of life (Ruggiero and Montagna, 2008).

The struggles we witness today in Latin America, especially with regard to natural resources, are carried out by communities focusing on personal and community identity, tradition and culture. In fact, the market approach to land and agriculture, advocated by international financial institutions, led to the development of new peasant-led struggles. In Mexico, the context of debt and neoliberal adjustment created one of the largest mass movements in a long history of peasant protests, the EZLN, rooted in the struggle of indigenous communities for land and rights. In addition, new peasant-led movements committed to the same struggle are the MST (the Brazilian movement of rural landless workers), the CONAIE in Ecuador, the Cocaleros in Bolivia and the Federacion Nacional Campesina in Paraguay, while in other Latin American countries peasant movements have been the forefront of the struggle against neoliberal policies on the management of natural resources. Drawing from Smiths' work categorised in Table 4.1, it is possible to describe these groups as cutting across two dimensions: they are affinity networks, therefore belonging to the movement / informal dimension; however, they also (and, perhaps, mostly) intersect the non-movement / formal category, formed by traditional institutions, such as churches and national delegations, among others. These groups, therefore,
are communitarian communities in the sense that they have a peasant/indigenous core, which sees the community as the place for human fulfilment, as explained in section 4.2. However, it would be restrictive to define these groups in those terms: rather, their characteristics of communities of dissent, their ability in using mass media and their capacity of mobilisation around a collective goal make them representative of the communicative community discourse (4.2.3).

Marginalisation and exclusion are two fundamental features that have to be taken into consideration for an understanding of community and social groups' resistance. Following Parson's steps, Smelser (cited in: Ruggiero and Montagna, 2008) proposed a typology of norm-oriented and value-oriented movements: the roots of the emergence of collective action are to be found in spontaneous or planned responses to structural strains in society which, in turn, may stem from established cleavages which amount to social differentiation inevitably producing identity and, at times, resentment. Today's religious, but also ethnic, national and tribal divisions in regions such as Latin America and Africa are examples of such cleavages, based on unequal allocation of wealth, prestige and power.

Although some recent empirical works have shown little or no support for expected relations between objective or subjective deprivation and the outbreak of movement phenomena and willingness to participate in collective action, the unequal allocation of wealth, prestige and power identified by Smelser (2008) can indeed feed a feeling of injustice and deprivation: this, in turn, could become the element driving opposition and political resistance. For example, in Latin America, inequality of wealth and power led to indigenous people's deprivation of ancestral land and resources in order to allow the construction of mega hydroelectric dams which, in turn, caused consistent collective action and socio-political turmoil. This will be the focus of the analysis in Chapter 5.

However, Olson's argument needs to be taken into account: in his view, action is only potential, because group rationality choose to 'free ride', enjoying the benefits of collective action while abstaining from directly participating. Although Olson has been critiqued for its supposed excessive reliance on the 'rational actor' approach and on a cost-benefits analysis, it maintains its importance for its dealing with the forgotten groups, those who would have all reasons to mobilise but fail to do so due to lack of resources (Ruggiero and Montagna, 2008). Indeed, this lack of resources and mobilisation of the 'forgotten groups' is a fundamental element that can partly explain the failure of a number of socio-political struggles.

As previously explained in this section, it has been argued that deprivation and grievance are a secondary component in the generation of social movements. Therefore, external variables such as the political and institutional environment and its degree of openness have been considered as an explanation, in the political process, of the facilitation or discouragement of the rise of social movements, demonstrating a close relationship between political institutions and collective action (Ruggiero and Montagna, 2008).
However, new social movement theory seem to be a Western creation and, therefore, to apply to Western contexts, while developing countries, specifically Latin America, deal with totally different conditions: yet, resistance and collective action in these countries are widespread and social theorists interpreting them are both well aware and critical of the approaches adopted by their counterparts in the developed world (Ruggiero and Montagna, 2008).

In Latin America, in fact, forms of collective action are performed by squatters, ecologists, feminists; black and indigenous groups, workers, cooperatives and peasants. Social movements in Latin America must be seen as economic, political, and cultural struggles. However, it is worth noting that while the challenges of new social movements, due to their anti-authoritarianism and political creativity, are fully recognised and appreciated in Latin America, their ability to produce social change is questioned (Escobar and Alvarez, cited in: Ruggiero and Montagna, 2008).

Additionally, according to Della Porta and Tarrow (cited in: Ruggiero and Montagna, 2008), it is important to address the transnationalisation of social movements which, in turn, is the result of three different processes - namely, diffusion, domestication and externalisation. In particular, domestication is the action on domestic theory of conflicts originating externally. In fact, protests analysis clearly shows how protests often address national governments decisions that originated or were implemented on a supra-national level which, in turn, includes transnational corporations as they are backed up by international institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank, the WTO etcetera.

4.6 Conclusion

Looking at debates on community, resistance and conflict has been necessary in order to answer the research question which, in turn, raises issues about political resistance towards water management strategies concerning water resources and services. In fact, this section described the development of the concept of community, explaining how Western philosophies and traditional ideas merged in the hybrid communities existing today, formed by individuals belonging to different typologies of networks (Table 4.1). Also, the debate on conflict and resistance shows how socio-political conflicts today are the result of the interrelation between the role of resources and the changing nature of government and the state.

This section described different perspectives that have contributed to the debate on issues related to resistance, e.g. how crowds and masses were looked at by behavioural literature from the 19th century onwards and the fact that both rationality and emotions need to be taken into account in the explanation of protests. This section entailed another key concept for this thesis, namely relative deprivation, deriving from
the neoliberal system, as cause of protest, which relates to the work of David Harvey, described in section 4.5. Also, this section considers the issue of participation in protest, finding that many positive outcomes can be associated with citizens’ participation which, in turn, can be referred to the non-movement / informal dimension highlighted in Table 4.1, although the strategies used to reach these outcomes vary according to the context.

Drawn from Smiths’ work (cited in: Goodwin and Jasper, 2009), described in Table 4.1 and analysed in this chapter, the framework emerging to examine the core research question in the subsequent chapters defines the different forms of communities existing today, channelled in four dimensions, namely non-movement / informal; non-movement / formal; movement / informal; movement / formal (section 4.3), arguing that success in protest and resistance has its roots in the type of community mobilised and it depends on the context and conditions of protest.

The combination of traditional ideas with modern concepts, mentioned above, explains the existence of different networks forming in different contexts, which define today’s existing hybrid societies. The context-based approach provides a different analysis for different movements or social groups which are not, in fact, structurally similar. Also, it defines the difference in tactical decisions, as shown in section 4.4. The framework resulting from Table 4.1 explains how loosely organised aggregations, which strictly speaking belong to the non-movement / informal dimension, even though this aspect can be seen with more flexibility as a starting point of successful movements, represent strong and successful groups. This is due to the fact that less exclusive aggregations are likely to use their many weak contacts with a number of different organisations and individuals which are in fact outside the aggregation itself. This ability to connect different people, ideas and resources, impact on all the dimensions analysed in section 4.3, making loose contacts the key to achieve significant success and to build stronger networks. In fact, the groups in the non-movement / informal category can exert influence on different actors through their loose contacts, with the possibility of creating a waterfall effect that can touch the groups belonging to the other dimensions of Table 4.1.

As previously stated in this chapter, this research takes a stance toward the interpretation of globalisation as the fabric of neoliberal policies: this, in turn, leads to acknowledge the relevance of the position and the formation of social groups demanding an alternative and expressing stances in antithesis to the globalization based on economic competition. This also relates to Chapter 2 which, after focusing on the development of water systems and on the Washington and Post-Washington Consensus paradigms, explained how new, participatory approaches to water management have been developed.

Taking into account the concepts and theoretical approaches examined in this chapter, the position emerging is one that observes the controversies implicit in the sets of ideas mentioned in section 4.2, notwithstanding
the variety of contributions they made.

In particular, the view behind liberal individualism led to the commodification and privatisation of public services and resources, which was imposed by international financial institutions, causing inequality, exploitation, marginalisation and deprivation which, in turn, are the key elements behind socio-political resistance, as explained in section 4.5. Indeed, also communitarianism, in all its dimensions, can -and has been- criticised for its oversimplification of reality, defining it as a stiff dichotomy and opposing diversity and creativity. By contrast, communicative communities represent a *trait d'union* between individualism and collective action, proving that the concepts of community and individualism are not mutually exclusive in a framework that stresses diversity, creativity and inclusion, while post-modern communities describe communities as they are today, with their key features of hybridization and fragmentation.

By highlighting these characteristics, the analysis leads to a position considering communicative communities and post-modern communities as the ones that can best represent strong, successful movements for this study, because of their ability to create and maintain loose contacts and to be structured as loose aggregations belonging to the non-movement / informal category. Particularly, this is fundamental in realities where a small, dominant elite has the control of natural resources' extraction and trade, marginalising the poor majority of the population, as described in section 4.5.

After concentrating on water management approaches and the Washington and Post Washington Consensus paradigms in Chapter 2, focusing on theories of community and conflict has been necessary in order to put the foundation for the analysis on the causal relation between types of community and political resistance, which will be addressed in Chapter 6. In fact, it will draw from the discussion on political resistance, which will be the focus of Chapter 5, and it will use the theories from this chapter to investigate how and in what cases resistance is effective. The analysis of Chapter 6 will look at different typologies of community, for example local communities, activist communities and global communities, and will explain whether communitarianism, the communicative community model or the post-modern community model are to be considered mere ideal-types or if they coexist in real-life communities. Also, the analysis of Chapter 6 will establish the direction of causation between political resistance and types of community in the three case studies.
Chapter 5 – Political Resistance to Water Management in Argentina, Brazil and Colombia

5.1. Introduction

This chapter will be looking in details at the three case studies chosen for this thesis, namely Argentina, Brazil and Colombia, in order to provide a context for the analysis of relations of causality between political resistance and types of community. Chapter 6 will examine the tactical strategies of the groups involved in political resistance and will establish the direction of causation between political resistance and types of community. The following chapter debates the country-level, or the second level of analysis, which has been described in Chapter 3, specifically in 3.3.

Political resistance to water management strategies in Latin America, particularly in Argentina, Brazil and Colombia, has its roots in the discourse on identity as forged in protests, which has to be connected to the examination of specific features of economies and societies. Therefore, it is important to bear in mind its contextual elements, such as the analysis of the European-oriented elite, the Catholic Church, structural adjustments and a highly differentiated popular culture. These elements have been discussed in Chapter 2. Indeed, racial issues -in particular, the idea of indigenous people as symbol of backwardness and the process of 'whitening' - and gender issues help shaping protests and identities (Radcliffe and Westwood, 1993).

Research for this section has been based on newspapers such as Le Monde (2012), Socialist Action (2012), and the Financial Times (2012). Also, different academic sources have been used. Among the books and articles researched there are: Biekart (2005), Dangl (2010), Galeano (1973 and 1997), Moyo and Yeros (2005), and Yen-Pin (2012). Additionally, this section utilised web sites such as the CDCA (2012), Al Jazeera (2012), and the BBC (2012). Furthermore, a consistent academic work informs the analysis on Latin American protests. Among others, important studies on political and indigenous protests in Latin America have been carried out by Alvarez, Dagino and Escobar (1998), Tarrow (1998), Petras and Veltmeyer (2005), Eckstein (2001).

The contextual analysis of the three case studies will provide a background for the analysis of the next chapter.

Section 5.2 will discuss the historical commonalities of the three case studies. In particular, it will describe how the political resistance developed during the authoritarian / military rule shaped the basis of modern social movement.
Section 5.3 (Argentina), 5.4 (Brazil) and 5.5 (Colombia) will focus on an in-depth analysis of the three case studies chosen for this thesis, following a country-specific approach. Also, other countries will be briefly described in 5.7. Primary research for the case studies has been done on web sites such as the CDCA in Italy. This constitutes the bone structure of these sections, which have been enriched with other sources, such as academic papers and newspapers’ articles. The CDCA (Centro di Documentazione Conflitti Ambientali – Documentation Centre on Environmental Conflicts) was founded in 2007 by the Italian association ‘A Sud’ (‘To South’) which today is an independent NGO providing information about the cause and consequences of environmental conflicts resulting from the exploitation of natural resources in developing countries, with a particular focus on local communities and their rights. Additionally, materials from the CDCA were selected as the basis of this analysis due to the personal experience acquired by the author while working for the NGO as an intern in 2007-2008, contributing in the creation of the web site of the NGO and its content.

These three case studies will be brought together in 5.6 for a comparative analysis using the analytical framework developed in Chapter 4 and summarised in Table 4.1. Similar issues to the three case studies can be found in other countries in Latin America. These are discussed in section 5.7. However, these countries will be discussed briefly.

Section 5.8 will describe movements of resistance present today in Latin America and what kind of social phenomena led to an increasing importance of new social movements.

Conclusions will be provided in section 5.9.

5.2. Historical Commonalities.

In the three case studies, the basis of modern social movements is represented by the resistance that arose during the authoritarian / military rule. In fact, this presents historical commonalities that concern the three case studies under examination. Social movements in Latin America were firstly shaped by the experience of authoritarian and military rule. Isabel Allende (Foreword, in: Galeano, 1973) argued that, during the Cold War, the series of coup d’etat which, primarily in the 1970s, precipitated Latin America into terror has been a strategy decided in Washington and imposed upon Latin American countries by neoliberal political and economic forces. As the military dictatorships were supported by the US and by the market forces in order to avoid leftists experiments in what Henry Kissinger called ‘the US backyard’, it is worth remembering the
horrors that came with them: masses of exiles, refugees and 'disappeared' people; large-scale repression; torture; concentration camps; censorship; imprisonments without trial; summary executions (Allende, Foreword, in: Galeano, 1973). Additionally, Durrani (1999)\textsuperscript{21} argues that the control over mass media by few transnational corporations made it possible either to hide reality altogether or to transform it in such a way that, among other things, atrocities committed against people during the dictatorship never became acknowledgeable.

Resistance against the military / authoritarian rule in Latin America has been extensive and rooted in multi-class and cross-ethnic participation, leading to the rise of new social movements and actors. In the 1990s, these movements multiplied and changed during the democratic transitions: for example, NGOs have proliferated and have become more visible, even if they have often been ineffective, while other grassroots organisations found it difficult to survive. In turn, this led to these organisations often being incapable of maintaining a critical stance or to promote an alternative development project. Furthermore, the role of unions in Latin America had evolved as a form of resistance against neoliberalism and the establishment of flexible markets. Unionism has been strongly repressed by dictatorships through torture, kidnaps and killings. Today, a high degree of unionisation remains in the public sector, in some cases creating new alliances outside the aggregation \textit{per se}. This led, in turn, to the formation of loose aggregations, which are those situated at the intersection of the informal with the 'non- movement' structure, as previously explained in section 4.3.1, specifically in Table 4.1. These aggregations can be considered as the key to the transformation of unions and the foundation of a new identity that builds up on inclusion and creativity.

Indeed, no cycle of protests or peak of mobilisation can be comparable with those witnessed at dawn of the democratic transition (Foweraker, 2001). This peak of mobilisation focusing on political parties and Presidents has been characterised by an ability to connect different people, ideas and resources. In other words, these were loose aggregations of different people who could use their many weak contacts with a number of diverse organisations and individuals in order to achieve their final goal.

This section has discussed the historical commonalities present in the three case studies, with a particular focus on the political resistance that arose during the authoritarian rule. As today’s events and situations are shaped by events and situations of the past, the discussion on how political movements of the past developed and what triggered them has been considered relevant to the analysis of today’s political

\textsuperscript{21}Durrani’s argument is partially based on the analysis of the documentary film by Patricio Guzman \textit{The Battle of Chile: the Fight of an Unarmed People}, recording the events occurring in the country from 1972 onwards, which was banned in Chile, and was still banned at the time of his writing, in 1999. The documentary played a fundamental role in restoring history to the Chilean people, demonstrating that the brutal regime of General Pinochet, responsible for the murder of President Salvador Allende, had been backed by the US military and financial establishment.
resistance to water management strategies in Argentina, Brazil and Colombia. In particular, political movements from the past are to be seen as the roots of the new movements which, in turn, is considered important with regard to the strategies that are being implemented and the lessons that have been learnt from previous political movements.

Section 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5 will focus on an in-depth analysis of the three case studies chosen for this thesis, following a country-specific approach. Specifically, 5.3 will concentrate on Argentina, 5.4 on Brazil and 5.5 on Colombia. Additionally, the following sections will use the theoretical framework of analysis set up in Chapter 4.

5.3. Argentina

This section will examine the resistance to water management in Argentina, describing a number of projects and policies that have encountered resistance in this country. After describing these projects and policies, this section will relate to the analytical framework discussed in Chapter 4 and summarised in Table 4.1. With regard to Table 4.1, it is worth bearing in mind that the categories describing the political resistance to water strategies are not mutually exclusive. In fact, all of them are present in Argentina, as it will emerge from the table’s breakdown. Although this could be considered as an indicator of them being analytically weak, in reality it contributes in offering a broader context for the analysis of Chapter 6. However, it is also important to discern the predominant features of the organisations involved, in order to understand which cluster of the table can explain the country under observation. In Argentina, movements’ structures have become more and more decentralised and informal, making the informal / movement cluster –which, in turn, creates loose aggregations- the principal category of analysis for the Argentinian case study. Nevertheless, it is important to notice that, in order to obtain successful loose aggregations capable of challenging dominant institutions or policies, all the clusters need to be present and influence each other. This will be addressed later in this section.

Among other cases of local communities strongly opposing different projects and corporations, a relevant example is represented by the privatisation of water in Tucuman, where in 1995 the French multinational Vivendi obtained a 30-years concession for the supply of water services. The concession of the water service in Tucuman was part of the project of privatisation of the water service in Buenos Aires and Santa Fé: after the concession of the service to Vivendi, an increase of water tariffs was observed. Also, the quality of the water supplied worsened and no investment was made in order to improve the water system and infrastructure. In 1997 the Tucuman province had rescinded the contract with Vivendi, leading to the beginning of the legal dispute between Vivendi and the Tucuman province. Vivendi filed a US$ 300 million compensation suit with the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). In 2008 the fourth Board of Arbitration constituted at the ICSID declared the invalidity of the concession (CDCA, 2011).
In the Buenos Aires Province, the concession for two of the three regions of the province awarded in 1999 to Azurix has been reported for the poor quality of the service, the failure to honour contractual commitments and for financial problems (Hall and Lobina, 2002). The concession to the company was terminated in 2002, when the operations were taken over by an interim public sector company set up by the provincial government of Buenos Aires and the water trade unions.

As pointed out by Hall and Lobina in a study on water privatisation in Latin America presented at the Public Services International Americas' Water Conference in San José (Costa Rica) in 2002, water concessions in Argentina were based on protecting the multinational corporations, so that prices were indexed, for example, to the US dollar. However, this was no longer sustainable after the collapse of the Argentinian currency in the late 1990s-early 2000s. In 2002, the law n°25,561 abolished the parity between the Argentine peso and the US dollar while, at the same time, it aimed to revise the contractual and regulatory framework applying to the privatised utilities and to renegotiate the contracts with the private companies (Hall and Lobina, 2002). Then, the cornerstone of water privatisation in the country, Aguas Argentina -led by Suez- started a lobbying campaign in order to protect its shareholders' interests. The outcome of the struggle between the Argentinian people and the foreign investors, namely, Suez' unilateral suspension of a number of obligations of Aguas Argentina, is to be considered as crucial. In fact, water privatisation in developing countries may turn into a less desirable business if private companies cannot avoid taking at least part of the risk deriving from the crisis (Ibidem).

The privatisation and commodification agenda of the IMF and the World Bank could not have found a more willing partner than the Menem administration in Argentina, which created the liaison between the Argentinian political and administrative elites and the Bretton Woods institutions which made of Argentina Latin America’s star pupil.

However, following the events caused by the privatisation of water in Buenos Aires, previously mentioned in this section, one lesson can be learnt from this country. In fact, those events led to a retreat from the unconditional support for water privatisation schemes, and the World Bank itself expressed doubts about the economic rationale for further privatisation and liberalisation services in Latin America.
Table 4.1 (Typology of Mobilising Structures).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Non-Movement</th>
<th>Movement</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Informal</strong></td>
<td>Friendship networks</td>
<td>-Activist networks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Professional networks</td>
<td>-Affinity groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Expatriate networks</td>
<td>-Refugee/exile networks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Individuals in intergovernmental bureaucracies or national delegations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Activist networks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Affinity groups</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Refugee/exile networks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Formal</strong></td>
<td>Churches</td>
<td>-TSMOs (Transnational Social Movement Organisations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unions</td>
<td>-Unions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Professional associations</td>
<td>-SMOs (Social Movement Organisations), local and national</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Regional cooperative associations</td>
<td>-Protest committees of other NGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Service organisations</td>
<td>-Transnational NGO coalitions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Intergovernmental and state bureaucracies</td>
<td>-Movement research institutes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National delegations</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Foundations</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Reproduced from Chapter 4.

Following the analytical framework delineated in Table 4.1, political resistance to water management strategies in Argentina has seen a diverse set of actors engaging in political campaigns. All the categories described in Table 4.1 can be found in this case. In fact, the informal / ‘non-movement’ category has been represented by friendship and professional networks; the informal / ‘movement’ category by activist networks; the formal / ‘non-movement’ by the strong presence of the water trade unions; and the formal / ‘movement’ category by SMOs and protest committees of other NGOs. This has been detailed in Appendix 5.A. As mentioned in Chapter 4, strong movements have the ability to reach people in the space of their everyday lives, in the more informal and non-movement spaces of people's families and communities. This is what happened in the Argentinian case. Different actors belonging to different categories have formed loose aggregations which, in fact, have the power to challenge the legitimacy of dominant institutions, systems or policies. This has implied that movements’ structures had become more and more decentralised and informal, leading to the informal / movement cluster of Table 4.1 being the predominant category in this case study. However, the network of resistance that formed in Argentina comprised a variety of actors collaborating to find a different approach to water management, including local governments, like those in Tucuman and in the Buenos Aires province.

5.4. Brazil

In Brazil, resistance built around a number of big projects related to water management strategies, leading to discern two clusters as predominant in this case study. These are the informal / non movement and the formal / movement. Given the strong presence of trade unions in the resistance to water management strategies, belonging to the formal / movement cluster, together with the strong presence of elements
belonging to the informal / non-movement category, it can be argued that the best fit to describe the country can be found at the intersection of these two clusters. The projects which have led to political resistance in Brazil are discussed here.

Integration of the San Francisco River.
The Integration of the San Francisco River project entails the deviation of the river waters towards the rivers of the arid north-east. Former President Lula da Silva, who actively promoted the project, considered it as crucial for the populations of that arid part of Brazil. The movement opposing the project is composed by a variety of subjects such as scientists and environmentalists, whose independent studies have shown that the water of the San Francisco would not be sufficient to nourish the basin of north-east rivers, while just the 0.28% of the north-eastern population would actually benefit from the project (CDCA, 2011). In addition, the resistance movement is formed by indigenous populations, charities, Afro-Brazilian communities and NGOs. All these subjects have repeatedly pointed out that the water deviation will benefit the big landowners and their industries only, causing social and environmental imbalances. Many corporations are investing in the project. For example, Odebrecht Sa, Petrobras, Itochu, Toyota, and Queiros Galvao.

Initiative for the Integration of the Regional Infrastructure of South America.
A second example of local resistance in Brazil concerns one of the projects of the Iniciativa para la Integracion de la Infraestructura Regional Sudamericana -Initiative for the Integration of the Regional Infrastructure of South America- which was approved by the government in 2000. Important criticism has developed around the project, especially considering that it can lead to the destruction of the Amazon rainforest. However the development plan has been implemented during the following years.

Among the projects concerning Brazil, there was the plan to build two dams on the Rio Madera, the biggest tributary of the Amazon River. The dams were planned to be built in two cities, Jirau and Santo Antonio: the populations of these cities strongly opposed the project, creating the campaign “Viva o Madera Vivo” (Viva the Alive Madera). Independent environmental impact studies clearly documented the environmental and social negative consequences of the project: among others, the flooding of large areas of territory by the river, increasing water levels, evacuation of local populations and loss of subsistence agriculture, alteration of aquatic fauna (CDCA, 2011). Even though the project has been approved, in this case local communities managed to create some room for local and environmentally sustainable initiatives focusing on the Rio Madera.

Water Privatisation in Tangará’ da Serra
A relevant case, at least for its political and ethic consequences, is that of water privatisation in Tangará da
Serra, in the state of Mato Grosso. In July 2001, the city councillor Daniel Lopes is murdered as he leaves the City Hall after a vote on the privatisation of water, which was approved. Police investigations immediately related Lopes' murder to his own opposition to the privatisation. In addition, a major corruption scandal emerged, which led to the imprisonment of fourteen people in 2002 -eight of whom were city councillors. During their detention, the arrested city councillors confessed having been bribed for approving the privatisation of water, in the form of a 30-years concession (Hall and Lobina, 2002).

According to Hall and Lobina (2002), political parties, trades unions and other political actors in Brazil are involved in an influencing and strong campaign against water privatisation. In fact, in 1999, this movement successfully stopped the planned privatisation of water in Rio de Janeiro. Furthermore, Brazil has many relevant examples of public sector water companies which operate effectively and democratically. In Porto Alegre the water company is fully and efficiently owned by the city council, while in Sao Paulo the state water company -which is the largest Latin American water company- operates efficiently and managed to survive the Brazilian currency crisis in 1998-1999.

Additionally, with regard to the Post Washington Consensus-driven Public-Private Partnerships strategy, and consequently to the private participation to the UN Water Operators Partnerships (WOPs), based upon the Public-Public Partnerships successful concept, the case of the partial privatisation of the Parana state water company Sanepar clearly suggests how PPPs are not partnerships of equals (Hall and Lobina, 2002). In fact, in 2001 the president of the Comissao Especial de Investigacao -the parliamentary Special Commission of Investigation- revealed that Sanepar's statute was modified in September 1998, three months after the acquisition of its shares, with the aim of allowing the Vivendi-led consortium Domino Holding to control the state water company (Ibidem). The Parana state maintained the ownership of 60% of the Sanepar's shares, while the private partner was holding a 39.71% stake. Nevertheless, Domino Holding exerted 59.3% of total voting power within the Board of Directors. By contrast, the state government had the 40.7%.

Consequently, around 87% of the total employees of Sanepar worked under the directors appointed by Domino Holding which, by so, were in all effect controlling the company (Hall and Lobina, 2002). As previously mentioned, this shows how PPPs are not partnerships of equals and that, even if the state maintains ownership of the majority of the company shares, it is the private partner that holds the actual power and control over Sanepar.

Despite relevant environmental and social costs, the development of energy resources represents a critical political issue in Latin America and particularly in Brazil, due to the growing energy demand and the energy crisis of 2001. Opposition to these mega-projects have had limited effectiveness, mainly because of the larger context of these projects and the lack of incentives to find compromise. The government, in fact, has refused to dialogue with the opposition and, on the other hand, in many instances, especially when
indigenous communities are involved in the resistance, the opposition has shown lack of trust in the government and its promises.

Policy options under consideration in Brazil are for the most part new versions of old projects, like the Integration of the San Francisco River, that have met strong opposition because of their high environmental and social costs particularly because the possibility of supplying the country’s energy demand through creating incentives for the use of renewable energy sources has not been taken into consideration by the government.

The literature on policy advocacy coalitions (Schlager, 1995) suggests that changes in policy often happen because of the dynamic interaction of political actors loosely coalescing around core values or interests, forming a policy advocacy network. The evolution of energy development in Brazil fits with this approach, which confirms the results of the analytical framework developed in Chapter 4 and detailed in Table 4.1.

In Brazil, the coalition pursuing large-scale energy development projects on the government agenda has continued to dominate the policy process: one of the reasons for this is power asymmetry which, as previously mentioned in this thesis, is characteristic of Brazil’s – and Latin America’s – politics.

As previously mentioned in this section, several actors have been involved in the political resistance toward water management strategies in this country. In both the cases of the integration of the San Francisco River and the dams on the Rio Madera, the actors involved mainly belong to the informal / ‘non-movement’ and the informal / ‘movement’ clusters.

On the other hand, in the cases of the privatisation of water in Tangara’ da Serra, Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo and Porto Alegre, political actors were also involved in the resistance, with different consequences, as mentioned above. These political actors can be assigned to both the informal / ‘non-movement’ and the formal / ‘movement’ clusters, as they include individuals in intergovernmental bureaucracies or national delegations and unions. In general terms, all the clusters are represented in the Brazilian scenario of political resistance to water management strategies and their success, or partial success, is determined by the variety of subjects and clusters involved in the creation of loose aggregations. Where some actors have been missing, such as in the case of the Integration of the San Francisco River, actively promoted by the central government, chances of success have, in fact, been scarce. However, as previously noted in this section, the intersection between the formal / movement and the informal / non-movement category can be seen as the one that can better represent the country’s scenario as related to political protest in the water sector.
5.5. Colombia

Political resistance in Colombia developed around a number of issues. The analysis of these issues, together with the analysis of the Colombian socio-political reality, leads to the consideration that the country can be described as intersecting two clusters of Table 4.1, namely the informal / non-movement and the informal / movement. Therefore, it can be suggested that the intersection of these two typologies of mobilising structures is to be seen as the more capable of describing this case study. This will be addressed later in this section, following an account of the issues that created political resistance in the water sector in the country. Also, as suggested by the analysis, it is important to take into account the fact that, in this case, the opposition has not been able to present a united front, able to challenge dominant institutions or policies.

First, organisations of workers, environmentalists and human rights organisations demonstrating against the Chiquita Brands International Inc. -the former United Fruit Company- for the devastating environmental, social and health effects deriving from the massive use of pesticides, for the territorial militarisation and, finally, for the repressive practices performed by armed paramilitary groups financed by the multinational itself. Labor and environmental organisations such as the Rainforest Alliance and Peuples Solidaires have promoted protest actions and initiative opposing Chiquita’s intense agricultural model and have also accused the multinational corporation of funding right-wing paramilitary groups like the Autodefensa Unida de Colombia (AUC) to suppress any form of protest inside the plantations. This was admitted by the company in 2004 (CDCA, 2011). Workers in Chiquita’s plantations have organised strikes since 1928. These strikes have often been repressed in blood. In recent years, trade unions and human rights groups have filed several lawsuit against Chiquita for human and trade unions rights violations and for water and soil pollution, consequence of Chiquita’s intense agricultural model. The charges are currently being investigated (CDCA, 2011).

Second, within the US-funded Plan Colombia, which started in 2000 but is strictly related to the joint Colombian-US governments’ war on drugs of the 1980s, the country had resorted to a massive use of multinational Monsanto’s Round-Up Ultra22 in order to destroy cocaine fields in Colombia through the fumigation of highly toxic chemicals by plane. In only three years, 4,680,000 litres of RoundUp Ultra had been sprayed by the US contractor company DynCorp International over a surface of 200,000 hectares (CDCA, 2011). However, this strategy did not curb the cocaine flowing towards US cities, with price, purity and availability of cocaine remaining stable in the US while, as noted by Peace Reporter (CDCA, 2011), it did

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22The Round-Up Ultra, produced by the US multinational Monsanto, is a chemical compound of POEA, herbicide Glyphosate and Cosmo-Flux 411F, which have the effects of damaging the central nervous system, destroying blood cells and of having heavy side effects on liver, eyes and skin. In 1999, the Organic Consumers Association and others argued that Round-Up Ultra led to the first stages of/or directly caused cancer. Round-Up Ultra indistinctly affects people, animals, water resources and fields, and can remain in the soil for years, affecting the groundwater.
not create economic alternatives for the Colombian peasants living in misery and, in fact, it did worsen their living standards. Local communities, farmers and indigenous people living in the Putumayo and other regions affected by the spraying of the herbicide have denounced and demonstrated against the danger of the fumigations on human health, water, soil and cultivations. Also, the fumigation at the border between Colombia and Ecuador led to the government of President R. Correa (Ecuador) resorting to the International Court of Justice in The Hague. Recognising the toxic effects of RoundUp Ultra on human health and crops, the Tribunal ordered the suspension of aerial fumigation in 2007, although this did not stop the fumigation. Additionally, the Colombian government begun another harmful practice, namely the manual eradication of coca crops, a practice leading to the phenomenon of deforestation (CDCA, 2011).

Third, damaging the lives of indigenous populations and the cultivations, is the Urrà dam on the Sinu River, which had heavy ecological and social impacts, by opening for massive communities’ displacement, erosion of the river’s banks, salinization of fields located near the river delta, the desiccation of hectares of vegetation, extinction of local farming and fishing traditions and depletion of water resources. In 1992, the government had approved the construction of the dam arguing that it would have brought tangible advantages in terms of energy production. By contrast, according to the populations affected by those negative effects and opposing the project, the dam only produces 3% of the total Colombian energy production. Furthermore, the project entailed consequences on human right, because of the paramilitary groups isolating, suppressing and killing the villages’ representatives: several Embera’s representatives were assassinated. Organisations such as the ASPROCIG and indigenous communities such as the Embera and Katio organised several protest rallies. In 1996, they occupied the Swedish embassy, Sweden being one of the countries part of the Urrа’ company consortium; in 1998, they occupied the Spanish embassy to protest against the wave of violence aimed at suppressing the voice of indigenous people; in 1999, Embera and Katio communities camped for four months in the Ministry of Environment’s gardens in Bogota’, in an attempt to force the government to schedule an effective consultation meeting. Although agreements were signed between the parts, they were never fulfilled. The violence against protesters continued and, in 2007, the government announced the construction of a new dam on the Sinu’ river, the Urrа’ II, five times larger than the Urrа’ I and requiring the flooding of 53,000 hectares of land (CDCA, 2011).

Among the cases studied by the CDCA in Rome, the last one is undoubtedly the most relevant to the present study. It concerns the issue of privatisation of water and energy services on the Colombian Atlantic coast and in the Cauca Valley. Local populations have accused the Spanish multinational Union Fenosa of the violation of the collective rights of local communities to access basic services such as water and energy. In fact, the company indiscriminately increased water and energy prices in the area. Being responsible for the billing, payment collection and suspension of services, Union Fenosa also made an advanced payment mandatory. This resulted in clashes between local and marginalised communities on one side and the
government and the corporation on the other side, resulting in many casualties (CDCA, 2011). Negative impacts have been - among others - the worsening of the already serious life condition of poor and often isolated local communities, due to the multinational’ inefficiency and unaffordable prices; the pollution of the river; worsening conditions of workers and their unions; murders and threats toward unionists and their families; and the corruption of the local and national government. Nevertheless, grassroots movements, activists, women organisations and trade unions - among others, the CUT, ODG and SINTRALECOL - organised many initiatives, including the “Campaign for the Protection of Water and Energy”, the refusal to pay any price increases and a massive strike in Cartagena. Not only their protests did not meet a positive outcome but, ironically, Union Fenosa was awarded the Conetica Award for Social Responsibility in 2008 (CDCA, 2011).

A relevant example for this thesis is represented by the public-private joint venture set up in 1995 in Cartagena de Indias, where Aguas de Barcelona was the only bidder in an international tender for 45.91% stake (Hall and Lobina, 2002). The privatisation project was made priority at the expense of other important issues - for instance, the contract did not address the needs of the poor, the existing workforce was made redundant and forced to reapply for their former jobs, the police and the army occupied the worksites in order to defeat union opposition. Additionally, there has been no transparency in the tender and in the award of the concession and, having the municipality no effective professional capacity in water and sanitation, it was actually at the mercy of the private company in negotiations (Ibidem). The poor living outside the legally defined municipality became invisible to the contractor, causing a gross underestimation of the target population, so that in 1999 the company claimed that over 90% of the population was connected. By contrast, the same year a report by the World Bank stated that one third of the population, particularly in poor areas, lacked the connection to clean drinking water and basic sanitation services (Hall and Lobina, 2002). In 1995 the newly elected mayor of Cartagena was seriously confronted by the population on the way the PPP with Aguas de Barcelona was set up. The mayor wanted to terminate the contract and re-municipalise the water service, but he had to step back when the World Bank made it clear that it would make funding conditional to privatisation. The striking figures of the Cartagena PPP are, first, the Aguas de Barcelona being allowed to extract massive revenues from its Cartagena operations (Aguas de Barcelona was, in fact, remunerated through the dividends paid to shareholders and through the management fees); second, the municipality retained responsibility for the payment of pensions to the staff (this heavy financial burden reducing the availability of social funding for health and education); and, third, the Cartagena PPP undermined local democratic control over water services (Hall and Lobina, 2002).

Socio-economic inequality in Colombia is strictly connected to the civil war, and it is also racially defined in what activists have described as a ‘geographical apartheid’. Equally, large-scale economic development and mega-projects in Colombia mostly affect minorities, such as indigenous communities and Afro-Colombian
communities (CDCA, 2011). The resistance by these minorities toward these projects, or projects that cause land deprivation and privatisation of natural resources, including water, reflects both the socio-economic inequality issue and the socio-political context of this country. Furthermore, even if protests in Colombia do not often have a positive outcome, the mere existence of different forms of resistance to neoliberal water management strategies, such as the privatisation of water, is a remarkable success in itself and confirms what is theorised in Chapter 4 about causes of resistance and relative deprivation.

In Colombia, the actors involved in the political resistance to water management strategies, or to corporations endangering water resources, mainly belong to the informal / ‘non-movement’ and the informal / ‘movement’ clusters. Therefore, the predominant features of the political resistance in Colombia are to be found at the intersection of these two clusters. However, as previously noted in this section, the opposition has not unified in loose aggregations capable of challenging dominant institutions or policies. This is due to the particular climate of corruption, to the militarisation of the territory and to the presence of paramilitary groups, which undermines local democratic control over water resources and services by creating and reinforcing an environment of fear and inequality.

5.6. Comparative Analysis

This section will use the analytical framework defined in the previous chapter of this thesis and encapsulated in Table 4.1 in order to examine the policies and projects described in the previous section. In particular, it will analyse projects and policies of Argentina, Brazil and Colombia, those being the three case studies focus of this thesis.

As previously stated, in general terms loose organisations are the most successful, probably because members of less exclusive aggregations use their many weak contacts with different organisations and individuals, furthering the interests of these aggregation. This is confirmed by both Smith’s table, quoted in Table 4.1 of this dissertation, and the study by Granovetter (1973). As discussed in section 4.3.1, in fact, by promoting social change through diverse objectives, members of the non-movement/informal cluster impact on more formal organisations devoted to more democratic and sustainable global policy due to their loose contacts. In turn, these organisations help in unifying the different causes promoted by loose groups. This is mirrored by the contextual analysis of Argentina, Brazil and Colombia.

As seen in section 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5 a number of different projects and policies have been developing in the three countries which are the focus of this thesis. These countries have been chosen as case studies because of different reasons, which have been pointed out in Chapter 3.

In Brazil, Argentina and Colombia, opposition and protests can be seen as emblematic of the power and
potential of loose networks, although this opposition had mixed results. The integration of the San Francisco River in Brazil, for example, has witnessed an opposition formed by different subjects such as scientists, environmentalists, indigenous communities, NGOs, and so on, and so did other projects in the three countries, for instance the privatisation of water in Tucuman and in the Buenos Aires Province in Argentina. However, not all of them have corresponded to clear successes: in Brazil, the indifference shown by the government (both the one led by Lula da Silva and the one led by Dilma Rousseff) to the people involved in the protests led to an exasperated situation and to a lack of positive results.

By contrast, in Argentina, resistance to the two projects mentioned above led to both concessions being terminated. The peculiar situation of Colombia is reflected on the resistance to water management strategies in the country. In fact, unions, environmentalists and human rights organisations, among others, cover the role of protecting the population against state repression, territorial militarization and paramilitary groups. Indeed, as explained in section 5.3, the resistance to the water privatisation of Cartagena failed due to the intervention of the World Bank. However, the widespread intervention of the military also made it difficult to achieve notable successes.

Indeed, the cases of Brazil and Colombia indicate that the capacity of loose organisations of balancing conflicting stances of purity and pragmatism for succeeding, and their potential deriving from the intersection of the non-movement structure with the informal typology, leading to the ability to connect different people, ideas and resources, does not translate into a certain positive outcome. Nevertheless, it is possible to enumerate at least one clear success of loose aggregations in Brazil, namely the one conducted by trade unions and other political actors toward the water privatisation in Rio de Janeiro.

Following the analytical framework delineated in Table 4.1, political resistance to water management strategies in the three case studies has seen a diverse set of actors engaging in political campaigns. Different actors belonging to different categories have formed loose aggregations which, in fact, have the power to challenge the legitimacy of dominant institutions, systems or policies. This has implied that movements' structures had become more and more decentralised and informal. The network of resistance that formed in Argentina comprised a variety of actors collaborating in finding a different approach to water management, including local governments, like those in Tucuman and in the Buenos Aires province. However, the analysis has shown that the predominant features of the socio-political actors involved in the political resistance to neoliberal water management strategies in this country are to be found in the informal / movement cluster of Table 4.1, as the movements’ structures have become increasingly decentralised and informal. Also in Brazil, all the clusters are represented in the scenario of political resistance to water management strategies and their success, or partial success, is determined by the variety of subjects and clusters involved in the creation of loose aggregations. Nevertheless, the
examination of the context related to political resistance in the water resources’ field indicated that the predominant features that constitute the best way to describe the country are at the intersection between the informal / non-movement and the formal / movement clusters. However, as previously discussed, where some actors have been missing, such as in the case of the Integration of the San Francisco River, chances of success have, in fact, been scarce. Finally, in Colombia, the best way to describe the political resistance to neoliberal water management strategies as related to Table 4.1 is at the intersection of the informal / non-movement cluster with the informal / movement typology. Furthermore, as previously noted in 5.5, the opposition has not unified in loose aggregations capable of challenging dominant institutions or policies. This is due to the particular climate of corruption, to the militarisation of the territory and to the presence of paramilitary groups, which undermines local democratic control over water resources and services by creating and reinforcing an environment of fear and inequality.

5.7. Other Countries
Similar issues to the three case studies can be found in other countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. These are briefly discussed in this section.

A number of campaigns have characterised Bolivia: from the movements lodging a complaint and a refund request to the Transredes Sa, held responsible for the accident occurred to the Valle Hermoso-Sica Sica-Arica pipeline, which polluted the coast and affected 127 local communities, to the local populations demonstrating against the mining plans in Oruro and Potosi, to the most famous case of the “water war” in Cochabamba, to the strong popular opposition to the water privatisation in El Alto and La Paz.

In 1999 the Bechtel corporation (USA), together with Abengoa Sa. (Spain) and Edison (Italy) took over the management of the water service in Cochabamba, the third city of Bolivia. Water prices increased of 300%, while the company imposed to buy permissions to access the resource and even put into place a licensing system for harvesting the rainfall. After a year, 55% of the population still lacked access to water. In 2000, hundreds of thousand people marched against the government, compelling it to revoke the legislation on the privatisation of water. In the end, the contract with Bechtel have been cancelled and the water service have been re-made public (CDCA, 2011).

Additionally, in January 2005 a strong popular mobilisation in La Paz and El Alto forced the state to rescind the contract for the concession of the water service to the French multinational Suez - Lyonnaise des Eaux. The corporation have left over 200.000 people without water connection and most of the population in the impossibility to pay the fee for the connection, which was set at $435 -eights times the average salary in Bolivia. In 2007, President Evo Morales made the contract termination' official, putting a public company in charge of the service. It is worth noting that, a month from the public mobilisation in 2005, the creation of a
public-private company between Suez, national investors and the municipality of El Alto was proposed for the management of the service: the proposal was immediately rejected by the local population’s movement, which continued to ask strongly to Suez to leave the country (CDCA, 2011).

Also in Ecuador the local resistance have been organised against different situations: from the massive environmental damages due to the operations of Chevron-Texaco, to the destruction of the local eco-system in the areas of Muisne and Esmeraldas, to the evacuation of the area surrounding the Baba dam, in Los Rios, to the indigenous populations opposing the petroleum extraction in the Pastaza province, to the resistance against the fumigation according to the Plan Colombia -as mentioned above- to the privatisation of the water service in Guayaquil (CDCA, 2011).

Concerning the privatisation of the water service in Guayaquil, the most densely populated city in Ecuador, local populations denounced the Water International Group – Bechtel for the supply of undrinkable water, together with the irregularity of the service and the increasing price. Furthermore, due to the supply of infected water, an additional decline in the already precarious hygienic conditions of the population occurred, together with the appearance and diffusion of several illnesses (Ibidem).

There is a lack of data on political forms of resistance to water management strategies in Venezuela, Honduras, Panama and Peru. Nevertheless, different forms of mobilisation against multinational corporations have been present in these areas, particularly in regard to mining projects (Peru; Venezuela), pipelines (Panama), tourist complexes (Honduras). These projects have entailed the use, pollution and depletion of water resources, together with other relevant issues, and have been fiercely opposed by local communities, NGOs and indigenous populations. For example, in June 2002, in Paraguay the opposition to the privatisation of water scored a massive victory: privatisation plans were indefinitely suspended, and the water company remained state-owned. After fifteen days of trade unions’ mobilization, the Parliament voted by 32 to 7 to suspend indefinitely the privatisation process of the state-owned water company Corposana, which had been driven by fiscal motives and IMF conditionality. Therefore, Paraguay succeeded in preventing privatisation from taking place, in this regard joining Panama, Brazil (Rio de Janeiro) and Honduras (Tegucigalpa). In Uruguay also a continuing campaign against privatisation -led by the trade union- have prevented the privatisation of the main water company. Indeed, the negative experience of the small private water concession awarded to a subsidiary of Aguas de Barcelona was still very much alive -the water supplied was malodorous and undrinkable and was found it was contaminated with faecal coliform bacteria (Hall and Lobina, 2002). In 2004, a referendum promoted by the National Commission for the Defence of Water and Life, which included the trade union representing workers in the publicly owned water and sewerage company Obras Sanitarias del Estado -OSE- and several civil society organisations marked water privatisation as illegal (Hall and Lobina, 2004). By contrast, in Trinidad the state water
authority took back the management of the water system after the contract with Severn Trent was cancelled, following the example of Cochabamba (Hall and Lobina, 2002).

Despite lack of data regarding Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Nicaragua, and Puerto Rico, particularly Cuba, the Dominican Republic and Jamaica, relevant pockets of resistance can be found in Costa Rica, where in 2002 a 25-year BOT (Build, Operate and Transfer) contract have been planned to upgrade the sewerage system in the capital San José. The project has been strongly opposed by the trade union Sipaa (Sindicato de Profesionales de Acueductos y Alcantarillados) as a form of 'creepy privatisation' (Hall and Lobina, 2002).

In Nicaragua water privatisation has been first introduced in the cities of Matagalpa and Jinotega, where the new private water companies were owned by former high level bureaucrats in the national water utility. Following pressures from the IMF, in 2001 a 30% increase of the water tariffs was introduced at the national level. As a consequence, trade unions, consumers' associations, human rights and women's groups united peacefully demonstrated and took legal action (Hall and Lobina, 2002).

In Puerto Rico, the Puerto Rico Aqueducts and Sewers Authority has been managed by Vivendi for seven years, after it was awarded a management contract in 1995. Several reports of the Puerto Rico Office of the Comptroller analysing Vivendi's performance indicated deficiencies in management, operation and maintenance of the infrastructure and major problems regarding quality, efficiency and an increasing deficit. In 2002 Vivendi was dismissed and, even if the option of returning the management to the public authorities was taken into consideration, a renewable 10-years contract for operation and management of the water supply and the sanitation infrastructure was awarded to Suez-Ondeo, under the pledge of the multinational to rescue the Puerto Rico Aqueducts and Sewers Authority's budget (Hall and Lobina, 2002).

5.8. Resistance Today

Over the last two decades, Latin American countries have witnessed two simultaneous phenomena. Firstly, the increasing importance of new social movements –from the piqueteros in Argentina to the indigenous-based cocaleros in Bolivia and the Zapatistas in Mexico. Secondly, the election of a number of left and centre-left governments. For example, Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, ex-Tupamaro Jose' Mujica in Uruguay and Evo Morales in Bolivia are the expression of these struggles and of a more widespread anti-neoliberal sentiment, although most of the centre-left governments are still following neoliberal agendas -among others, Dilma Roussef in Brazil. However, it has to be noted that, even in these cases, a big change occurred in policy making: Dilma Roussef's predecessor, former President and leader of the Workers Party (PT) Luiz Inacio da Silva (Lula), indeed changed the face of Brazil.
The market-led approach to land and agriculture, which comprises water resources and assets, has been advocated by international financial institutions, and led to the development of a number of new peasant-led struggles which were triggered by increasing inequality and human rights violations (Hristov, 2009). This is exemplified by the struggle of the EZLN in Mexico and the FARC-EP in Colombia. For instance, in Mexico, the context of debt and neoliberal adjustment policies such as the SAPs and the PRSPs, described in Chapter 2, created one of the largest mass movements in a long history of peasant protests. This movement, the EZLN, Ejercito Zapatista de Liberacion Nacional, found its roots in the struggle of indigenous communities for land and rights. In addition, new peasant-led movements committed to the same struggle are the MST (the Brazilian movement of rural landless workers), the CONAIE (the confederation of indigenous nationalities of Ecuador), the Cocaleros in Bolivia23 and the Federacion Nacional Campesina in Paraguay, while in other Latin American countries peasant movements have been at the forefront for the struggle against neoliberal policies on the management of natural resources, including water resources. It is worth noting that in the 1990s these movements had started to build strategic alliances with urban civil society organisations in order to gain public support (Moyo and Yeros, 2005).

The dichotomy centre-periphery has never ceased to exist in Latin America. Additionally, the bulk of the burden of structural adjustment fell on the periphery, resulting among other consequences, in a new division of labour in the agricultural sector which, in turn, affected peasants and indigenous people, who represent the cornerstone of the new social movements in the global South in general and in Latin America in particular (Appendix 5.A).

Resistance to neoliberal water management strategies such as privatisation of water resources and services, based on the conflict between privatisation and equity, has also been more widespread than commonly acknowledged. For example, in Mexico mass media have often failed to describe and analyse resistance against water management strategies such as water privatisation and the implementation of hydro projects such as mega dams. Indeed, the lack of economic resources is one of the reasons leading mass media to neglect water issues in favour of other important issues characterising the country – narco-trafficking representing the most important and, indeed, covered by media.

Water privatisation schemes catalysed a wide range of resistance all over the world and specifically in the area studied in this thesis, although strong campaigns has not been always successful, for example in the case of Chile. Nevertheless, successful campaigns have almost always been channelled through existing

23It has to be noted that Bolivia has the highest density of militant social movements than any other country in Latin America, including Indian and peasant movements. Additionally, the suppression of coca cultivations, which included the displacement of small farmers, was a US-mandated programme in favour of large-scale agro-business plantations (Petras, 2009).
democratic institutions -generally, court actions- both in Western and developing countries. Additionally, water privatisation policies have represented significant electoral issues, sometimes affecting the outcome of elections, for example in Panama and Argentina (Hall and Lobina, 2010).

Latin America has been the centre of many important social struggles against Free Trade Agreements, especially the NAFTA, and multinational corporations. In Argentina, a well-known episode of resistance by communities in Buenos Aires has taken place against the privatisation of water supply and sewerage system by the Enron subsidiary Azurix. Also, Bolivia witnessed the now famous resistance in Cochabamba against a Bechtel subsidiary that took over the public water supply system, as it has been described in this section.

Today the globalisation of agriculture, direct consequence of the trade liberalisation, acts as a catalyst for a number of social movements around the world. In fact, the organisation of production was transferred to the agribusiness, marginalising peasants and drastically deteriorating their living standards, paving the way to rebellion and social unrest (Moyo and Yeros, 2005). The globalisation of agriculture is represented by intensive agriculture, which wipes out small scale farming by replacing it with unsustainable industrialised food systems (Beatty, 2008). The globalisation of agriculture also touches the water resources’ problematic, as they are needed for intense irrigation and luxury commodities –such as shrimps- for international markets. In the current global economy food has become a target of neoliberal policies and the world’s food supply has been placed by international financial institutions in the hands of multinational corporations, leading to the displacement of rural and indigenous peoples in order to gain access to land, increased poverty, starvation and the degradation of our ecosystems, as previously discussed in this chapter and in Chapter 2.

As a result, citizens around the world have united in resistance through social movements. Among these movements, ranging from international movements to regional movements, in Latin America there are, for example, La Via Campesina (“The Peasant Way”) and the Brazilian Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra (“Rural Landless Workers Movement”) (Beatty, 2008). The aim of La Via Campesina is to create an alternative model of agriculture through agrarian reform, food sovereignty, biodiversity, sustainable agriculture and human rights. By contrast, the Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra -the largest social movement in Latin America- has the goal of carrying out a land reform by occupying unused land, forcing the Brazilian government to redistribute millions of acres of agricultural lands to landless families. These and other movements present both in the global North, for example in the USA and Europe, and in the global South, for example in Latin America, see the current mainstream food and water system, derived from trade liberalisation and globalisation of agriculture, as an hazard to communities, health and environment (Beatty, 2008).
Taking into consideration the various realities of Latin America, and especially those of the three case studies, protests by indigenous people need to be mentioned. According to ALAI – America Latina en Movimiento (2007), the social struggles of indigenous people have been criminalised since the times of colonialism, as it has been discussed in Chapter 2. Talking about indigenous people in Colombia – but the same concepts are to be applied to indigenous people in other countries as well – Father Antonio Bonanomi, the ambassador of the organising process of the indigenous people of the north of the Cauca, argued that indigenous people are living through a very difficult time, as their love for their land is trying to make it difficult for multinational corporations to take control over water, forests and natural resources in general (ALAI, 2007). In fact, the indigenous cultures are inherently against capitalism and neoliberalism, and this is why indigenous people are considered “the enemy”: therefore, repression and displacement take place. Among other countries, in Colombia, Peru and Chile confrontations between indigenous people and the state (and their resistance against massive economic interests) are de-legitimised and criminalised the most. Indeed, this resistance is often considered as terrorism – and not only in the case of coca cultivations (ALAI, 2007).

It is fundamental to bear in mind that in several Latin American states the penal code has been modified so that common practices in social protest, such as road blockades and demonstrations which, in turn, are often the result of months of years of attempts to be heard through dialogue, can be qualified as criminal offences such as illicit association, public intimidation, sabotage, incitement to violence, kidnapping and terrorism. Also, the concept of ‘illicit association’ has been widened and laws have been passed for increasing the scope of police and military intervention or reduce accountability in case of abuses (CISDE, 2011). An assessment on political resistance and social movements in Latin America today need to pass through the lenses of this context, also taking into consideration the ‘cui prodest?’ issue.

5.9. Conclusion

Loose bodies of resistance have emerged opposing water management strategies in Argentina, Brazil and Colombia. However, the analysis has shown that these networks have been powerful and successful only when all the actors and the groups summarised in Table 4.1 are involved. In fact, while informal movements may have potential to develop into something stronger, none of them have significantly changed their scale. This means that generally they remained small and with little or no influence to change the outcomes of the policies they are resisting. The instances where these movements have been successful have been those movements which were large, better organised, armed and well-funded, such as the FARC-EP in Colombia. This movement’s struggle, however, is not directly related to neoliberal water management strategies. The second instance has been where those organisations combined with formal movements or institutions, such

\[24\] In Latin: ‘who takes advantage?’ / ‘whose interest is this following?’.
as in the case of water privatisation in Brazil.

Political resistance have been developing through a variety of forms in Latin America. In order to answer the research question and the further issues raised by it, it has been necessary to study the different structures of political action existing today. Therefore, the analysis of Chapter 5 has provided a framework for the investigation on causal relation and the direction of causation existing between political resistance to water management strategies and types of community in Latin America, which will be the focus of Chapter 6.

As noted in section 5.6, in Brazil, Argentina and Colombia political resistance to neoliberal water management strategies can be seen as emblematic of the power and potential of loose networks, although this opposition had uneven outcomes. In some cases, such as the Integration of the San Francisco River in Brazil, for example, opposition to neoliberal water strategies and policies have been formed by different actors such as scientists, environmentalists, indigenous communities, NGOs, and so on, and so did other projects in the three countries analysed in this thesis, for instance the privatisation of water in Tucuman and in the Buenos Aires Province in Argentina. Indeed, not all instances of resistance have witnessed clear successes. In Brazil, the indifference shown by the government (both the one led by Lula da Silva and the one led by Dilma Rousseff) to the people involved in the protests toward large-scale development projects led to an exasperated situation and to a lack of positive results. By contrast, in Argentina, resistance to the two projects previously mentioned in this section led to both concessions being terminated and to the country becoming a lesson to be learnt for the supporters of neoliberal water policies. In Colombia, the peculiar socio-political situation of the country is mirrored in the resistance to water management strategies. In fact, unions, environmentalists and human rights organisations, among others, have been covering the role of protecting the population against state repression, territorial militarization and paramilitary groups. As explained in section 5.3, notable examples of resistance's failure are due, on the one hand, to the direct intervention of IFIs and, on the other hand, to the widespread intervention of the military.

The cases of Brazil and Colombia indicate that the capacity of loose organisations of balancing conflicting stances of purity and pragmatism for succeeding, and their potential deriving from the intersection of the non-movement structure with the informal typology, leading to the ability to connect different people, ideas and resources, does not translate into a certain positive outcome. Nevertheless, as mentioned in 5.4, it is possible to enumerate at least one clear success of loose aggregations in Brazil, namely the one conducted by trade unions and other political actors toward the water privatisation in Rio de Janeiro.

Smith’s table, quoted in Table 4.1 of this dissertation and the study by Granovetter (1973), both support the analytical framework developed in section 4.3.1 and the contextual analysis, or second level of analysis,
developed in this chapter. In fact, in the three case studies under examination, members of the non-movement/informal cluster impacted on formal organisations devoted to more democratic and sustainable global policy due to their loose contacts. In turn, these organisations helped in unifying the different causes promoted by loose groups.

All the three case studies analysed in this section present all actors constituting the four groups detailed in Table 4.1. However, the three case studies show that they do not really come together. Also, as previously seen in this chapter, the predominant features characterising the three countries taken into consideration are very different, and they can be summarised by placing these countries in different clusters of Table 4.1 or, as in the case of Brazil and Colombia, between two clusters. This has been discussed in 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5, and will be visually illustrated in Table 5.1. Therefore, political resistance to water management strategies in Argentina, Brazil and Colombia has seen a diverse set of actors engaging in political campaigns and protests. These actors have formed loose aggregations which, in fact, have the power to challenge the legitimacy of dominant institutions, systems or policies, but they are highly fragmented. The potential of loose aggregations implied that movements’ structures have become more and more decentralised and informal. There are similarities between the three cases. Argentina and Brazil, for example are similar in regard to the variety of actors forming the network of resistance and collaborating in finding a different approach to water management. These actors have included individuals who were part of local bureaucracies and local governments. Success, or partial success in the scenario of political resistance to water management strategies can therefore be seen as determined by the variety of subjects and clusters involved in the creation of loose aggregations. As argued in 5.6, where some actors have been missing, such as in the case of the Integration of the San Francisco River, chances of success have, in fact, been scarce. Brazil and Colombia, on the other hand, present some similarities with regard to the militarisation of the territory and widespread corruption which, in turn, led to cases of violence being perpetrated against poor strata of the population and indigenous people. However, the contextual framework of corruption, territorial militarisation and paramilitary groups in Colombia, discussed in section 5.5, led to the fact that loose aggregations representing the opposition to water management strategies did not unite to challenge dominant institutions or policies. This is due to the particular climate of corruption, to the militarisation of the territory and to the presence of paramilitary groups, which undermines local democratic control over water resources and services by creating and reinforcing an environment of fear and inequality. This confirms how the context of political resistance, discussed in Chapter 4, heavily influences its outcomes. Chapter 6 will discuss the tactical strategies of these informal movements and the causal relation between resistance to water management strategies and types of community in Argentina, Brazil and Colombia.

Table 5.1 Locating the Case Studies in the Typology Of Mobilising Structures.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Non-Movement</th>
<th>Movement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Informal</strong></td>
<td>Activist networks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Friendship networks</td>
<td>• Affinity Groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Professional networks</td>
<td>• Refugee/exile networks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Expatriate networks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Individual in intergovernmental bureaucracies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>or national delegation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Formal</strong></td>
<td>Transnational Social Movement Organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Churches</td>
<td>(TSMOs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Unions</td>
<td>• Unions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Professional associations</td>
<td>• Social Movement Organisations (SMOs) local</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Regional cooperative associations</td>
<td>and national</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Service organisations</td>
<td>• Protest committees of other NGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Intergovernmental and state bureaucracies</td>
<td>• Transnational NGO coalitions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• National delegations</td>
<td>• Movement research Institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Foundations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Argentina

Colombia

Brazil
Chapter 6 – Political Resistance Strategies and Types of Community

6.1. Introduction

As argued in Chapter 5, in Argentina, Brazil and Colombia members of the non-movement/informal cluster of Table 4.1 connected to formal organisations devoted to more democratic and sustainable global policy due to their loose contacts. In turn, these organisations helped in unifying the different causes promoted by loose groups. In the scenario of political resistance to water management strategies in the three case studies, success, or partial success, is to be seen as determined by the variety of subjects and clusters involved in the creation of loose aggregations, together with the context of political resistance. These case studies have been discussed in the general context of the rising of neoliberalism in Latin American countries in the 1980s and 1990s. As explained in Chapter 2, international financial institutions actively promoted a strategy for creating and extending water systems in developing countries through privatisation, following the neoliberal policies advocated by the Washington Consensus and, after its failure, of the Post Washington Consensus. This led to local communities often resenting and opposing privatisation of water and PPPs, as they were seen as unjust and a representation of the reintroduction of the colonial rule. Political resistance to water management strategies in Argentina, Brazil and Colombia had different outcomes, as mentioned above.

Focal point of this thesis is analysing what is the causal relation between political resistance to water management strategies and types of community in Argentina, Brazil and Colombia, establishing a direction of causation. Therefore, this chapter will draw on the discussion of resistance in Chapter 5 and will use the theories from Chapter 4 in order to shed light on two aspects. The first aspect relates to the analysis of how activist communities, local communities, national communities and global communities in the Latin American countries taken into consideration relate to political resistance to water management policies. The second aspect relates to the relationship between the ideal-types of community, explaining whether communitarianism, communicative community or post-modern community are just mere ideal-types or if they coexist in real-life communities.

The research for this chapter has been grounded on original sources, such as the websites of the organisations involved in the resistance to water management strategies. Also, a consistent part of the information has been collected in its original languages (Spanish and Portuguese) and it required to be translated into English in order to proceed with the analysis.

In addition, much information has been found on the website of the CDCA, Centro di Documentazione Conflitti Ambientali – Documentation Centre on Environmental Conflicts, founded in 2007 by the Italian association 'A Sud' - 'To South'. Today, CDCA is an autonomous NGO providing information about the causes
and consequences of environmental conflicts resulting from the exploitation of natural resources in Latin America, Africa and Asia, with a particular focus on local communities' rights.

Each case study mentioned above will be treated in a different section which, in turn, will be divided into three subsections. Every case study will deal with the description of the organisations or groups involved in the resistance, examining recruitment processes, membership, when the group was formed, strategies and political tactics, propaganda and contacts with other organisations, NGOs, and the international community. Then, it will address the approaches used by organisations and groups participating in the resistance, particularly by analysing benefits and disadvantages of these approaches and their effectiveness, drawing from Chapter 4, specifically section 4.4: Tactics. Also, it will discuss how water management strategies impacted on communities and how communities reacted to it. The final section will analyse the group in terms of types of community, referring to the ideal-types of community examined in Chapter 4, and compare the organisations characterising each case study in terms of causal relation and causal directionality between political resistance to water management strategies and types of community.

Conclusions will be provided in section 6.5.

6.2. Argentina

As argued in Chapter 2, in the 1980s and 1990s the international financial institutions actively promoted a strategy for creating and extending water systems in Latin American countries through privatisation. This caused political turmoil and social unrest in many cases. Complex conflicts today are mainly the result of two major, interrelated factors: first, the role of resources (in particular, natural resources' extraction and trade) which includes the use of water resources; and, second, the changing nature of government and the state. This has been addressed in Chapter 4, particularly in section 4.5.

As mentioned in Chapter 5, resistance to water management strategies in Argentina is mainly connected to six conflicts where local communities strongly opposed a number of different projects and corporations. These conflicts consist of: 1) political resistance towards the contamination of the Alumbrera mines, in the western province of Catamarca; 2) the soy monoculture due to the US company Monsanto’s policy and strategy in the country; 3) the Argentinian side of the Pascua Lama mine, challenging the Barrick Gold Corporation; 4) the conflict between local communities of Mapuche indigenous people and the Italian company Benetton; 5) the environmental hazards deriving from the cellulose industry on the Uruguay River; and 6) the implementation of the Yacyreta' Dam on the Parana' River. The following section will describe the organisations involved in the political resistance in Argentina.
6.2.1. Organisations involved

Different organisations and groups are involved in these six conflicts related to water management strategies in Argentina, ranging from international organisations such as FIAN International and Via Campesina to indigenous-based groups and associations of citizens.

In the case of the Alumbrera mines, international movements such as La Via Campesina and FIAN International coexist with local organisations. FIAN International is a human rights NGO widely present in the resistance related to water issues in Argentina, consisting of national sections and individual members based in over fifty countries around the world. Exposing violations of people's right to food, FIAN also deals with other issues such as indigenous people's rights, natural resources, land 'grabbing', agrofuels, climate change, peasants' rights, income/social security and has consultative status at the UN (FIAN website, 2013). FIAN acts upon requests of people affected and uses several means of propaganda, such as annual reports, website, newsletter and access to social networks such as Facebook, Flickr and Twitter, and a channel on Youtube.

Another international movement widely present in the Argentinian case is La Via Campesina, born in 1993. La Via Campesina brings together millions of peasants, small and medium-size farmers, landless people, women farmers, indigenous people, migrants and agricultural workers with the aim of protecting small-scale sustainable agriculture as opposed to corporate driven agriculture and transnational companies. Founded by a group of farmers' representatives from Asia, Africa, Europe and the Americas, today, La Via Campesina includes over 150 local and national organizations in 70 countries, representing about 200 million farmers. Therefore, the organisation has been recognised by many institutions, such as the FAO, and governments as main actor in the food and agricultural debates (La Via Campesina website, 2013). Based on a strong sense of solidarity between small and medium-scale agricultural producers both in developed and developing countries, the organisation aims to enable the realisation of food sovereignty, prioritizing local food production and consumption, together with the end of the neoliberal process of globalized agriculture, based upon cheap imports. La Via Campesina is a grassroots mass movement whose members are farmers organizations at the local and national level, decentralised between nine regions. The International Coordinating Committee is in charge of the coordination between regions, and is formed by a man and a woman representing each region, elected by the member organisations in the respective region. Members of the movement in Latin America are, for example, the MST (Movimento dos Trabalhadores sem Terra) and the MAB (Movimento de Atingidos por Barragens) in Brazil, and the CNA (Coordinador Nacional Agrario) in Colombia. The movement is funded by the contributions of its members, by private donations and by the financial support of some NGOs, foundations and local and national authorities (La Via Campesina website, 2013). In addition, the movements uses different channels for propaganda, such as social networks (mainly Facebook and Twitter), a newsletter, and an archive of photos and videos.
Local organisations involved in the political resistance in the case of the Alumbrera mines are: the Catamarca Autoconvocados, a citizens' assembly opposing the mine project and expressing dissent through a blog in both Spanish and English; the Vecinos por la Vida, a citizens' collective whose strategy is expressed through social networks, a blog and a channel on Youtube, together with the repeated blockage of vehicle access to the mine; the Alianza de los Pueblos del Oeste de la Provincia de Catamarca -Alliance of the People from the Western Province of Catamarca- organised in settlements which have either sprung from successful family projects that have paved the way to eco-friendly communities, or from groups of friends with a common view of environment-related issues. Also, a form of non-violent resistance towards the mining project have been carried out by students and professors of the Cuyo National University, in the Mendoza province, who in 2009 refused the funds offered by the Alumbrera company (CDCA, 2013).

Deeply involved in the resistance towards US multinational Monsanto and the soy monoculture is the Citizens Forum for Justice and Human Rights (Foro Ciudadano de Partecipacion por la Justicia y los Derechos Humanos – FOCO), a NGO with consultative status at the United Nations Economic and Social Council – ECOSOC. This organisation has been active since 1996 due to the initiative of a group of citizens and social organisations with the objective of promoting and protecting human rights, especially in developing countries. In addition, after a few years of activity, FOCO's members created the Institute for Participation and Development (INPADE) for the legal representation of the organisation itself and for the formalisation of the relationship with national and international institutions and organisations supporting its activities. In order to publicise its actions of monitoring and supervision of multinational corporations, democracy promotion, and support to human rights as the central aspect of national and international politics, FOCO uses social network such as Twitter and Facebook and a newsletter.

Among other organisations, such as the RENACE – Red Nacional de Accion Ecologista (National Network of Ecological Action), the resistance towards Monsanto and soy monoculture enumerates the presence of the GRR -Grupo de Reflexion Rural (Group of Rural Consideration), created in the mid-1990s as a space of multidisciplinary dialogue and debate on the various impacts of global capitalism (GRR website, 2013).

In the Pascua Lama mine case, FUNAM Argentina represents a relevant organisation taking part in the resistance process. Active since 1992, FUNAM (Environment Defence Foundation) has a consultative status at the ECOSOC and works at the local, national and international level in order to promote sustainable development, to investigate and publish actions and projects detrimental for health and environment, to denounce environmental degradation and corruption, and to organise and carry out public campaigns in defence of the environment and quality of life.

By contrast, in the conflict between Italian company Benetton and Mapuche indigenous people, Mapuche indigenous groups and associations demonstrated to be the most effective ethnic group in organising and
developing its own strategies of resistance. In addition, this tendency cannot only be found in Argentina, but it is clearly observable in Chile, where the majority of Mapuche people live. Mapuche indigenous people created a number of organisations in order to claim economic, political and social rights: in this case, the Organizacion Mapuches Tehuelches “11 de Octubre” (Mapuche Tehuelches “11 of October” Organisation) is the major organisation involved in the resistance, by creating bonds and alliances with a variety of social actors such as national institutions, NGOs, social movements and with the population in general. Nevertheless, it has been noted a new presence of Mapuche groups which are independent from major groups like the “11 de Octubre” and other similar groups: these new groups are mainly formed by young people who are developing their own tactics and strategies, also forming alliances and strong ties with other Mapuche groups in Chile (CDCA, 2013).

Other movements involved in protests and political resistance to water management strategies are, among others, the Union de Trabajadores Agrícolas Representación Estatal (the National Union of Rural Workers), the Grupo de Madres Ituzaingo' Anexo (Group of Mothers Ituzaingo' Anexo), the Cordoba Coordination for the Defense of Water and Life and the Union the Asembleas Ciudadanas (Union of Citizens Assemblies) in the case of the Monsanto’s soy monoculture. Furthermore, in the Pascua Lama case and the resistance towards the Barrick Gold mining corporation on the Argentinian side, there is a variety of organisations contributing to the protest in different ways. The Latin American Observatory on Environmental Conflicts (OLCA), for example, follows and supports communities in conflict, while the Fundacion Ciudadanos Independientes (Foundation of Independent Citizens), the Anti-Pascua Lama Citizens Movement and the Argentine-Chilean Citizen and Institution No Pascua Lama and Valadero Mines are formed by communities and citizens directly protesting against the mining project and its impact, using social networks and newsletters as propaganda for their actions and findings. In addition, in the case of the cellulose industry on the Uruguay River and the Yacyreta’ Dam on the Parana’ River, citizens' assemblies such as the Citizens' Environmentalist Assembly of Gualeguaychu’ and the Guarani’ indigenous people respectively have been the dominant groups involved in the resistance, together with the International Tribunal of Indigenous People in the case of the Yacyreta’ Dam (CDCA, 2013).

This section has enumerated and described the organisations and communities involved in the political resistance to water management strategies in Argentina. This contributes to the in-depth examination of one of the three key components this study is based on, namely the analysis of the actors involved and their relations which, in turn, has been explored in section 4.3.1, allowing to build a framework which shows and explains the different forms of communities existing today. This is summarised in Table 4.1. Also, it will help explaining if, and how, ideal-types of communities such as communitarianism, communicative community and post-modern community can be found in real-life communities. This will be addressed in section 6.5.
6.2.2 Strategies

As mentioned in Chapter 4, strategies are tailored according to the availability of resources, opportunities, and daily life. While a strategy defines a plan of actions which intends to achieve a specific goal, tactics represent the military science dealing with securing objectives set by strategy. So, the formulation of a strategy includes a tactical plan.

A variety of tactical strategies have been employed by the organisations involved in the political resistance towards water management policies in Argentina. Firstly, the strategy of FIAN international confirms the assumption that it is vital to keep the pressure on by making demands directly to powerful institutions such as the state, the mass media, or multinational corporations. Through the analysis and documentation of concrete cases of violation of the right to food, FIAN's strategy consists in exerting public pressure in order to hold governments accountable for violations using international campaigns, advocacy and recourse to law. Also, FIAN is integrated in a wide network of social movements, NGOs and governmental bodies which, in turn, are all complementary to its strategy of raising awareness on the right to food.

By contrast, it is necessary to underline that international movements such as La Via Campesina use “extra-institutional” tactical means, such as road blockages and land occupation, in addition to the demands through institutional channels. At the broad level, this movement and its members are organised in a community with post-modern elements. In fact, this community is constructed through a process of mobilisation, where the community is based upon difference and fragmentation (Delanty, 2003), as argued in Chapter 4. However, at the particular level, communities formed through the participation to the organisations members of la Via Campesina have also characteristics which are typical of communitarian communities, such as the emphasis on traditional institutions (family and religious beliefs, for example).

Being a grassroots mass movement whose members are farmers’ organizations at the local and national level, the methods of protest of La Via Campesina differ according to the context. In the Alumbrera mine case, its strategy has been focusing on carrying out an international enquiry mission, together with FIAN international and the Global Campaign for Land Reform. Other movements in Argentina have chosen a more direct and antagonist approach, starting with the FOCO. Openly opposing the policies of water management promoted by the Washington Consensus, the organisation has been at the centre of the wide social movement that has been a protagonist of the resistance towards privatisation, fiscal adjustment and indiscriminate openness of the economy. Also, it participated with other social groups and organisations of the Latin American region, such as the MST -Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem Terra- at the first international Social Forum in Porto Alegre (Brazil) in 2001. Also the GRR strategy is generally based upon a strong participation to international conferences and meetings, and to marches (GRR website, 2013).
Broadly, local groups and communities have developed a two-ways strategy of resistance. On the one hand they appeal to institutions, for example by signing petitions and filing lawsuits: this led to notable successes. Indeed, in 2008 the vice-president of Alumbrera went on trial before the Tucuman Federal Court of Appeal personally charged according to article 55 of national law 24,051 on dangerous and toxic waste: this, in turn, represented the first case of pollution caused by mining activities that went on trial (CDCA, 2013). On the other hand, organisations such as the citizens' collective Vecinos por la Vida and others used road blocks and protest rallies. Additionally, Mapuche indigenous people and associations developed their own strategies of resistance, by creating alliances with a variety of social actors such as national institutions, NGOs, social movements and with the population in general and by bonding with other Mapuche groups in Chile (CDCA, 2013).

In the Benetton-Mapuche case, Mapuche indigenous groups launched a press campaign in 2004, reporting the repeated violation of indigenous rights caused by Benetton’s commercial activities in the Argentinian Patagonia. The case gained international attention when the Italian press published a letter by the Argentinian Peace Nobel Prize25 winner Adolfo Perez Esquivel, who explained the reasons why Mapuche communities must be protected from the Benetton’s expropriation (CDCA, 2013). Also, in the attempt to bringing attention to the situation, a number of Mapuche people took part in the roadblock on the Benetton estate at the end of 2004. This, in turn, led to their arrest. Although Benetton repeatedly offered acres of land to the indigenous communities, which were a minimum part of the land previously possessed by the same communities and corresponded to the most unproductive part of it, Mapuche groups turned down the offer, considered offensive and illegal. In 2006, a delegation of Mapuche people demonstrated against Benetton in Rome, Italy and, in 2007, indigenous communities of Mapuche started the peaceful occupation of the lands in Argentina, claiming that Benetton illegally acquired them (CDCA, 2013).

Understanding the impacts of neoliberal water management strategies on communities and how communities reacted to them relates to conflict theory, which has been explored in Chapter 4. According to Harvey (Giddens and Held, 1982), inequality, exploitation and expropriation are the three key concepts representing the roots of the reasons of conflict. So, for example, the Alumbrera mine case represents a typical instance of what Harvey called “relative deprivation”, as the merging of the mining company and the provincial Government interests led to the political exclusion of citizens from the decision making process. Relative deprivation, in turn, is the element that leads to protests and political turmoil. Marginalisation and exclusion are two fundamental features of relative deprivation. They need to be taken into account to understand contemporary social movements in this field of study, as their resistance arises from the unequal allocation of wealth and power and the perception that their issues are not going to be heard, as argued in

25Esquivel won the Peace Nobel Prize in 1980.
Chapter 4. Also, in this case the company attempted political, social and media bribery in order to legitimise the extraction activity. This, together with the lack of an independent judiciary power during the conflict, led the citizens to distrust political institutions, paving the way to a democracy crisis (CDCA, 2013).

Issues of marginalisation and exclusion are mirrored in the strategies and tactics pursued by the variety of organisations involved in the political resistance to water management strategies in Argentina. In fact, while international organisations such as the FIAN based their approach on the dialogue with traditional institutions which, in turn, recognised and legitimised them, local organisations and groups of citizens used militant tactics aiming at circumnavigating the centres of power. In the Benetton-Mapuche case, for instance, it has to be underlined that the Italian company's activity led to the daily evacuation of Mapuche groups from their traditional land. This increased the isolation of communities and decreased opportunities of communication between them. Also, it increased discrimination and the deterioration of labour conditions, augmenting the mistrust toward the local Government, accused by Mapuche communities of being unable to protect the communities' rights (CDCA, 2013).

The same dynamics witnessed in the Benetton-Mapuche case were repeated in the case of the construction of the Yacireta' Dam. In fact, during the dam construction, resident communities and indigenous Mbya-Guarani' communities were forced to abandon the area. However, while the Mapuche people have been able to present a united front toward the Italian corporation, reinforcing the bonds between communities, building new allies in other countries and developing strategies that were often successful, the Mbya-Guarani' communities have faced a different destiny. In fact, their displacement to urban centres, together with the consequent neglecting of their traditional language, led to a complete division between members of the Mbya-Guarani' groups\textsuperscript{26}. Even though there was no lack of opposition to the project, the dam was built and filled for the first time in 1994, causing the evacuation of 20,000 more local residents (CDCA, 2013).

This section addressed the approaches used by organisations and groups participating in the resistance, drawing from Chapter 4, specifically section 4.4: Tactics, referring to the ideal-types of community, namely communitarianism, communicative community and post-modern community, examined in Chapter 4. The existence of these ideal-types in real-life communities will be addressed in the next section. Also, this section discussed how water management strategies impacted on communities and how communities reacted to it, arguing that marginalisation and social exclusion, which are features of what Harvey (Giddens and Held, 1982) referred to as ‘relative deprivation’, are the elements leading to political protest and, particularly, militant strategies. These, in turn, mostly characterise local organisations and groups of citizens.

\textsuperscript{26}According to World Bank estimates, 10,400 families were relocated in 1987 (CDCA, 2013).
6.2.3 Relation between Political Resistance and Types of Community

As stated in 6.2.2, in Argentina the participation to diverse social movements which, in turn, took part to the first international Social Forum in Porto Alegre, can be interpreted as the construction, at the broader level, of community with post-modern characteristics which emphasise heterogeneity, plurality and tension. Also, this community is formed through mobilisation, being characterised by its being supported by action rather than by culture. Instead, at the particular level, the analysis of specific conflicts and resistance movements of this research led to the consideration that the variety of groups and communities involved can either exemplify communicative communities or communitarian models, although these two models often overlap. Communitarian models are a prerogative of indigenous groups and communities, such as the Mapuche, deeply rooted in traditional institutions, beliefs and the protection of ancestral territories. On the other hand, communicative communities, also known as ‘communities of dissent’, are characterised by the construction of a communicative project with the aim of mobilising people around a collective goal: this is the case, for example, of citizens' collectives like Vecinos por la Vida.

The analysis of the Argentinian case led to a few consideration. First, resistance to water management strategies in this country has developed as a consequence of the rising of neoliberalism in the 1980s and 1990s, described in Chapter 2. This has led to the establishment of a number of movements, ranging from international, more formal organisations such as FIAN International, which belongs to the movement / formal category of Table 4.1, to indigenous or peasant-based organisations or communities, belonging to the non-movement / informal dimension. In general, all the categories of Table 4.1 are seen as part of the resistance. Second, the strategies used by these movements vary according to the context, opportunities and availability of resources. While international, formal movements such as FIAN International focuses on exerting public pressure, raising awareness and dialoguing with the government, local groups and communities, together with international, informal movements such as La Via Campesina focus on a two-way strategy, appealing to institution on one hand and using activist strategies such as road blockages on the other. So, it can be argued that, in Argentina, community is a determinant of social resistance. Third, even though the characteristics of ideal-types of communities, identified in Chapter 4, can be seen as existing and, actually, coexisting in real life, they are much more fluid and less schematic than the categorization seems to suggest. So, elements pertaining to the ideal-types, as they were categorised in Chapter 4, can be found, but a rigid schematisation of the Argentinian society into ideal-types is not confirmed. Elements of a post-modern community can be identified at the broader level, resulting in the existence of an “umbrella” community of resistance to a particular policy or project. This community is formed by diverse social movements at the particular level. Also, the study of specific conflicts and movements leads to the identification of characteristics belonging to communicative communities and communitarian models, which are often overlapping, at the particular level.
6.3 Brazil

Resistance towards water management strategies in Brazil revolves around two main cases: 1) the Jirau and Santo Antonio dams on the Madeira River; and 2) the deviation of the Sao Francisco River. The next section will discuss the movements of resistance opposing water management strategies in this two cases.

6.3.1 Organisations involved

Part of the hydro-power project in the Amazon basin, the construction and implementation of the dams on the Madeira River started in 2008 and entails the systematic violation of individual and collective human rights of indigenous communities who have been living in these territories for centuries. Therefore, movements and communities opposing the construction of dams on the Madeira River are all local-based. The most important of these organisations is the Viva O Rio Madeira Vivo movement (Viva the Madeira River Alive), that reported the absence of dialogue with Eletrobras (the Brazilian governmental company for electricity) and other powerful contractors. Indigenous peoples and organisations have been frequently ignored by the government. Also, invitations from civil society organisations and academic institutions to participate in public debates have been declined. Moreover, Eletrobras and the other contractors for the dam have rejected studies and recommendations from experts and academics (Viva O Rio Madeira Vivo website, 2013).

In the case of the deviation of the Sao Francisco River, a project that has been discussed for over a century, although its construction began in 2005, there are many organisations contributing to the protest, both local and national, but also international organisations such as La Via Campesina. The project of the transposition of the water course of the river, led by the Brazilian government, includes the privatisation of the waters that are being diverted, channelling them into the supply of large scale agribusiness and heavy industries, by so benefiting large landowners and multinational companies. Only 4% of the water will be available for the population of the semi-arid region that the canals are going to cross (APOINME website, 2013).

Among the major organisations involved in the resistance to the Sao Francisco River project, the CPT - Comissao Pastoral da Terra (Earth Pastoral Commission) addresses issues of unfair land distribution and violence in the countryside in Brazil since 1975, with the aim of connecting, advising and supporting landless workers and peasants. CPT’s activities have included a unique database of land-inspired human rights violations in Brazil, popular education and mobilisation. In particular, the CPT have been involved in the organisation of collective actions of resistance for the use and preservation of water resources and in the fight against the construction of dams. CPT’s website also includes a description of conflicts related to water resources, dividing them into: reduction or prevention of access to water resources, destruction of cultural-
historical assets, threat of expropriation, lack of resettlement projects, non-compliance with legal procedures, water preservation (from overfishing, destruction of riparian forests, use of pesticides and other pollutants), privatisation of water and charges for water use. Additionally, it is worth taking into account a series of studies provided by the CPT website besides the description of the various typologies of conflicts, which relates to violence against individual workers during demonstrations of rural social movements. These studies provide information on different types of violence such as murder, attempted murder and death threats. Also, they give an important contribution in recording deaths resulting from the conflict (abortions, failure to rescue, et cetera), together with torture, beatings, injuries, arrests. In addition, these studies provide data on kidnappings, threats of arrest, false imprisonment, intimidations (CPT website, 2013).

Another organisation active in the resistance towards the Sao Francisco River project is the CIMI – Conselho Indigenista Missionario (Missionary Council for Indigenous People), created in 1972 and intertwined with the work of the Catholic Church – in fact, the CIMI is part of the CNBB, National Conference of Brazilian Bishops. The CIMI publicises its activities through its website, social networks and a journal ('Porantim').

In the debate on the organisations involved with indigenous people in Brazil it is necessary to mention the FUNAI - National Indian Foundation, the Brazilian government body that establishes and implements policies related to indigenous people in the country. Created in 1967, FUNAI is the organisation responsible for mapping and protecting lands traditionally inhabited by indigenous communities, and prevents invasions of indigenous territories by outsiders. Among other activities, in 1987 FUNAI established the General Coordination Unit of Uncontacted Indians (CGII), the only department in the world dedicated to the protection of indigenous people who have little or no contact with the national society and with other tribes. Today, in fact, contact is only sought if indigenous communities are believed to be under serious threat. It needs to be underlined that FUNAI was created in 1967 after the Figureido Report, commissioned by the Ministry of Interior, exposed the true extent of criminal actions perpetrated against the indigenous population of Brazil. The Figureido Report, in fact, revealed a catalogue of atrocities -from mass murder, to torture and slavery and from sexual abuses to land thefts- that held responsible the predecessor of the FUNAI, the Indian Protection Service (SPI), created in 1910. As a consequence, therefore, the SPI was replaced by FUNAI after the publication of the Figureido Report. Using a range of means of propaganda (monthly e-news, Facebook, Twitter, Tumbir, Youtube, a blog, films, video clips and publications), FUNAI has contributed in reaching some important success. For example, after a massive campaign set up by indigenous people and Survival International, in June 2012 a biofuels company set up by Shell in Brazil discarded controversial plans to source sugar cane from land stolen from the indigenous Guarani’ tribe, one of the most persecuted and impoverished of Latin America (FUNAI website, 2013).

The Accelerated Growth Plan and the Ten-year Energy Plan, supported by Dilma Roussef before she became
the first female President of Brazil, is an ambitious development plan aiming to change the face of the country by building 134 dams by 2020 in the Amazon alone. Among the movements opposing the project, the MAB – Movimento dos Atingidos por Barragens (Movement of People Affected by Dams), composed by circa 20,000 families who have ancestors who chose to settle the lands affected by the project. Since 2004, the MAB has obtained many victories in the struggle against the construction of dams, which is opposed not in principle but because issues such as environment, water and indigenous rights are not taken in consideration by the project. The MAB has been linking the network to movements of dams-affected people in other countries, managing to stop many dams from being built. In the cases where it was not able to stop the construction of dams, the MAB has ensured compensation, land resettlement and community development support. Today, MAB main objective, together with other mass organisations, is to stop the construction project of the third largest dam in the world, the Belo Monte, along the Sao Francisco River (MAB website, 2013).

In addition, an indigenous-based movement strongly opposing the Sao Francisco River project, is the APOINME – Articulacao dos Povos e Organizacoes Indigenas de Nordeste, Minas Gerais e Espirito Santo (Articulation of Indigenous People and Organisations of North-East, Minas Gerais and Espirito Santo), composed by 33 indigenous peoples and using social networks as means of propaganda (APOINME website, 2013).

Other movements participating in the resistance to neoliberal management strategies are, among others, the Brazilian National Forum for Agrarian Reform and Justice in the Countryside; the Bahia Engineering Union; the Luiz Freire Cultural Centre; the Council for the Defence of Human Rights -CDDPH; the Fishermen Pastoral Council; NECTAS -Nucleo de Estudio em Povos e Comunidade Tradicionais e Acoes Sociambientais (Centre for the Study on People and Traditional Communities and Socio-environmental Actions), active since 2004 and studying the Sao Francisco River project and its impacts; AATR – Associacao de Advogados de Trabalhadores Rurais (Association of Solicitors for the Rural Workers); the Permanent Forum for the Defense of the San Francisco; indigenous associations and organisations of Pernambuco, Bahia, Paraiba and Alagoa (CDCA, 2013).

Additionally, two movements are aiming to the recuperation and the revitalisation of river: the Manuelzao Project and the Popular Articulation for the Revitalisation of the Sao Francisco River. The Manuelzao Project’s objective consists in recuperating the Das Velhas River, which runs through the metropolitan area of Belo Horizonte (capital of the State of Minas Gerais) and, therefore, is polluted by the city's urban and industrial waste-water before flowing into the Sao Francisco. On the other hand, the Popular Articulation for the Revitalisation of the Sao Francisco River, active since 2004, participated in the construction of more than 850 barraginhas, small circular dams located near highways and other roads where the water from river flooding, together with heavy rain, flows. Due to the movement's work, sediment has been prevented from being washed into the river blocking it (Manuelzao Project website, 2013).
6.3.2 Strategies

As stated in 6.3.1, protest towards water management strategies in Brazil took a variety of forms. In particular, in the Sao Francisco River case, the CPT and the MAB, together with other organisations, have been protagonist of collective actions aiming at the use and preservation of water resources. As previously mentioned in 6.3.1, since 2004 the MAB has been building connections to movements of dams-affected people in other countries, managing to stop many dams from being built. Indigenous people, social movements and NGOs organised the first meeting for organising the opposition to the project in 2005, which gained additional attention due to the hunger strike in protest at the Brazilian government plan begun by the Bishop of Barra (Bahia). In 2007 protesters occupied the headquarters of two of the companies involved in the project, organised a number of protest rallies in Bahia and Brasilia and filed a civil lawsuit before the Supreme federal Court which, in turn, suspended the authorization for project works. Also, a National Caravan in Defence of the Sao Francisco River and Plateau, visiting 11 Brazilian cities, was organised, together with other public protests involving a relevant number of local residents and indigenous associations, which were also spurred by the lack of response of the Lula's government. Indeed, protest has been made difficult due to the territory militarisation. Therefore, a number of movements, the CIMI, APOINME and CPT among others, launched the Opera Campaign in Europe in 2010, making public human rights violations from the military and the government. Protests rallies and block roads have also been repeatedly used by local residents and indigenous people. In 2011, enraged at the inflexibility and indifference of the Roussef government, the Counsel for Indigenous Brazilian Peoples broke off any attempt of negotiations with the government (CDCA, 2013).

Additionally, the Manuelzao Project and the Popular Articulation for the Revitalisation of the Sao Francisco River both focused on a non-violent strategy aiming at recuperating the River, the latter specifically by participating in the construction of more than 850 barraginhas, preventing the sediment which, in turn, is one of the consequences of the project and consists in urban and hospital waste, from blocking the river.

Although the protest in both cases of political resistance towards water management strategies in Brazil have been extensive and numerically relevant, indigenous peoples and organisations have been frequently ignored by the government. Indigenous communities and local residents, cooperating with organisations and NGOs at a local, national and international level, built a strong and active communicative community of people from different backgrounds united by a common commitment (Chapter 4, paragraph 4.2.3). A top-bottom approach to safeguard the basic needs of indigenous groups living along the Sao Francisco River and the Rio Madeira have been carried out in 2011 by the Roussef presidency, by envisaging the construction of 800,000 water tanks. However, this approach has been considered poor and imposing by indigenous communities,
who regarded as impossible any further negotiation with the government. Today, indigenous communities and local residents continue to pursue their strategy of opposition through road blocks and demonstrations, which has been highly effective especially in delaying the works for the new Belo Monte Dam.
6.3.3 Relation between Political Resistance and Types of Community

As previously acknowledged in 6.3.2, Brazil has witnessed a numerically relevant and extensive resistance towards water management strategies. Nevertheless, resistance in Brazil has often been ignored by the government, especially since Dilma Roussef became President in 2010, in particular when the protest aimed of criticising and fighting the governmental hydroelectric plans. Additionally, it can be noted that the pattern characterising community models in Argentina does not repeat itself in the Brazilian case. In fact, while considered as a combination of various movements, resistance in Brazil can be categorised as a community with post-modern traits at the broader level, it has also distinctive communicative characteristics. So, communities are seen as challenged by globalisation and 'third way' style politics which, in turn, describe the synthesis of right wing and left wing politics by conciliating the right wing economic view with left wing social policies (Delanty, 2003). However, when looking at the particular level, communities can be seen under different approaches. In fact, the strategies and work of organisations such as MAB and APOINME, described in 6.3.1 and 6.3.2, supported indigenous communities, defining them as belonging to the communitarian tradition. In the case of FUNAI, the governmental institution created for the support and preservation of indigenous communities, this communitarianism often assumes the features of conservative communitarianism -see Chapter 4, paragraph 4.2.2. Furthermore, smaller, local-based movements such as the Manuelzao Project and the Popular Articulation for the Revitalisation of the Sao Francisco River, both focusing on a non-violent strategy, constitute an example of communicative community, where communal activity is increasingly seen intertwined with a strong individualism, leading to many kinds of collective actions.

There are a few elements qualifying the Brazilian case. First, the strong relationship between the Catholic Church and popular protests, as explained in Chapter 5, section 5.3.2, which is exemplified by the importance in the country of organisations such as the CPT and the CIMI. Second, as seen in the Argentinian case, resistance to water management strategies strongly developed with the rising of neoliberal policies, including water privatisation, in the 1980s and 1990s which, in turn, led to the involvement of different organisations and communities, ranging throughout the entire spectrum of possibilities summarised in Table 4.1. Third, as seen in Chapter 4, strategies depend on context, opportunities and resources. The militarisation of the Brazilian territory, together with widespread corruption and the lack of dialogue with the government and with the contractors involved in the projects, explained in Chapter 5, led to the development of activist modalities of resistance, ranging from road blocks, land occupation and demonstrations to non-violent strategies such as the one used by the Manuelzao Project. Also, a number of organisations successfully pursued strategies aiming at raising awareness of the events, the corruption and the deaths and tortures of indigenous people and activists. Due to contextual reasons, therefore, the two-folded strategy of dialogue and activism characterising the Argentinian case has not been pursued in Brazil. So, influenced by context, opportunities and availability of resources, communities are a determinant of political resistance. As in the
Argentinian case, therefore, the causal connection between political resistance to water management strategies and types of community seems to be suggested as a direction of causality going from the types of community to the resistance. Fourth, in this case the ideal-types of community are seen as coexisting in real-life communities, and they are generally more neatly marked at the particular level. In fact, as argued in 6.3.2, at the broader level indigenous communities and local residents, cooperating with organisations and NGOs at a local, national and international level, built a strong and active community with post-modern traits, as explained in Chapter 4, but also with distinctive communicative features, where people from different backgrounds are united by a common commitment.

6.4. Colombia

There are four conflicts revolving around water issues in Colombia: 1) the aerial fumigation with glyphosate in the Putumayo; 2) the construction of the Urra' dam on the Sinu' River; 3) the resistance to the Chiquita Corporation and the funding to irregular armed groups; 4) the privatisation of water and energy carried out by Union Fenosa. The following subsection will describe the groups and movements involved in the resistance towards water management strategies. It is important to note that two out of four conflicts in Colombia witness the active participation of indigenous communities. A complete description of the conflicts has been carried out in Chapter 5.

6.4.1 Organisations involved

As mentioned in the previous section, there are two cases in Colombia where indigenous communities are actively involved in the political resistance towards water policies (CDCA, 2013). Those are the first two cases enumerated in section 6.4. In the case of the aerial fumigation with glyphosate in the Putumayo, a number of indigenous communities and organisations opposed the fumigation of the coca plantations in Colombia which, in turn, also affected indigenous and local communities in Ecuador. The ONIC – Organizacion Nacional Indigena de Colombia (National Indigenous Organisation of Colombia), as an example, was founded at the first National Indigenous Congress in 1982 and comprises approximately 800,000 people, representing 2% of the Colombian population. In 2010, ONIC launched an international campaign aiming at exposing the massive violations of indigenous rights in the country, which are the result of the armed conflict (see Chapter 5, paragraph 5.3.5), the lack of social policies for indigenous people, and the imposition of a destructive developmental model in indigenous territories. The campaign's objective is the protection of at least 18 tribes considered at risk of extinction (ONIC website, 2013). Another indigenous organisation working on the issue of indigenous and peasants rights in the case of the aerial fumigation with glyphosate is the CONAIE - Confederacion de Nacionalidades Indigenas de Ecuador (Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador), formed in 1986. CONAIE is the largest indigenous organisation of Ecuador, pursuing social change.
on behalf of the region’s significant native population using a wide range of tactics which include direct action. In fact, CONAIE is well known for the organisation of popular uprisings which, in turn, often include the blockage of commercial arteries and the takeover of governmental buildings. Rejecting neoliberal policies and the Plan Colombia, CONAIE has also been a primary force behind the coup d’etat that deposed Ecuadorian President Gutierrez in 2005 - Gutierrez had in fact maintained the status quo on economic issues, supporting neoliberal policies even though he was supposed to reverse them. Additionally, he has been protagonist of controversial moves that have been perceived by analysts as dictatorial acts, and was accused of corruption (CONAIE website, 2013).

There are other movements participating in the aerial fumigation case. Born in 1986, Accion Ecologica is based on the principle of non-violence and supports actions leading to dialogue and to opening a space of debate with the aim of collaborating with public and private national and international institutions for the defence and protection of the environment. Additionally, this case enumerates the presence and activity of the Permanent Peoples Tribunal, the international independent tribunal founded in Italy in 1979 at the initiative of Senator Lelio Basso, with the aim of examining and providing judgements for cases of human rights abuse. Also, the Defensoria del Pueblo of Colombia (the Colombian Ombudsman's Office) has been involved in the case (CDCA, 2013).

The second case that sees a deep involvement of indigenous people and communities is that of the Urra' dam on the Sinu' River. The organisations participating in the resistance in this case are: the ONIC (described above in this paragraph), the ASPROCIG – Asociacion de Productores para el Desarrollo Comunitario de la Cienaga Grande del bajo Sinu' (Association of Producers for the Communitarian Development of the low Sinu' River basin area), and the indigenous Embera-Katio, living on the river banks (CDCA, 2013).

The ASPROCIG is a collective of fishermen, farm workers and Zenu indigenous people from the lower basin of the Sinu' River, promoting human rights and repair of environmental damage to its territory resulting from human rights violations, through community organising and training and local, national and international advocacy. Created in 1994, the organisation is integrated directly by 32 affiliated groups, for a total of 672 families whose living standards have been heavily deteriorated by the construction of the Urra' dam. Tool of propaganda in this case is the association's own radio, used for actions' organisation in the low Sinu' river basin area (ASPROCIG website, 2013).

The indigenous Embera Katio people live in the southern part of the state of Cordoba and in Uraba, in the north-western part of the state of Antioquia. The Embera Katio people indigenous people are being directly and heavily affected by the Urra' Hydroelectric Project, which has led to the destruction of the fishing areas -
constituting their primary source of food. Furthermore, the Embera Katio people have lost the river route connecting them to their markets; also, part of their territory will be flooded (CDCA, 2013).

In 1996, the Colombian government and the indigenous people reached an agreement on compensation by the company -the Urra' SA- to the indigenous people, which included the participation in the income generated by the sale of electricity. However, after only a month, the company, following a request from the Ministry of Mines and Energy, refused to abide by the agreement. Instead, it decided for a strategy aiming at fostering divisions within the Embera Katio community (CDCA, 2013). In 1998 the indigenous communities of the Sinu' and Verde Rivers filed a lawsuit in order to protect their rights. As a consequence, the Constitutional Court ordered a temporary halt to the filling of the dam. However, it is important to note that in 1997 the ONIC solicitor Ana Cecilia Betancur began to receive threats and to be followed. Additionally, after the indigenous communities filed the lawsuit in 1998 the offices of the organisation came under harassment by vehicles and motorcycles without license plates or using stolen plates, as confirmed by police authorities (ONIC website, 2013).

Also, in 1998 the most important Embera Katio leader, Alonso Domingo Jarupia was murdered by a paramilitary group known as the "Self-Defense Units of Cordoba and Uraba" (Autodefensas de Cordoba y Uraba). At the time, the paramilitaries had a list of five other indigenous people they were going to kill. Afterwards, three ONIC consultants, including Ana Cecilia Betancur, received anonymous death threats against them, their families, and co-workers. The paramilitaries "officially" informed the ONIC that they had sentenced to death the anthropologist consultant of the Embera Katio, Efrain Jaramillo. The other consultant, Hector Mondragon, was forced to leave the country with his family. Similar threats have been received in other cases involving investigations against paramilitary groups. In many cases, the threats have impeded the investigation, and potential witnesses have expressed fear of collaborating (ONIC website, 2013).

In the case related to the Chiquita Corporation (former United Fruit Corporation) and the funding to irregular armed groups, the major movements involved are the Rainforest Alliance, the Fundacion Ambio de Costa Rica (Ambio Foundation of Costa Rica) and the Tsuli-Tsuli Audubon group (CDCA, 2013). Born in 1986, the Rainforest Alliance is a US-based environmental NGO working to preserve biodiversity. Using tools such as Twitter, Facebook, a newsletter and a blog, the organisation supports the assumption that, in order to ensure the preservation of forests, it is necessary to make it profitable for businesses and communities to do so. Businesses that meet certain environmental and social standards are then connected to the global marketplace, where the demand for sustainability is on the rise, through instruments of certification and verification of transparency, independence and accountability. Other activities of Rainforest Alliance include training, technical assistance, product sourcing, which in turn help in the development of policies and procedures ensuring transparency, integrity and accountability (Rainforest Alliance website, 2013).
Two other movements are involved in this case. First, the Fundacion Ambio, which is a member of the Cooperation South-South project. Ambio is one of the largest environmental organisations in Costa Rica, and was created in 1989 with the aim of promoting changes in the mainstream development model by supporting sustainable development in environmental and national policies (Fundacion Ambio website, 2013). Second, the Tsuli-Tsuli, an independent part of the Audubon Society, with its “Adopt a bird” program - Tsuli-Tsuli means, in fact, “many parrots” in the language of the Cabecar Indians. The group strategy develops through an environmental education program with a special emphasis on protecting birds, particularly parrots, symbols of the tropical wilderness (Audubon Society website, 2013).

Finally, the case of the privatisation of water and energy carried out by Union Fenosa sees the involvement of the Permanent Peoples Tribunal (described above in this subsection), the CUT – Central Unitaria de Trabajadores de Colombia (Central Union of Colombian Workers), the Spanish Observatory of the Debt in Globalisation (ODG), and the SINTRAEELECOL – Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Energia de Colombia (Colombian Union of Energy Workers) (CDCA, 2013).

The CUT is the most important, in numerical terms, central union in Colombia today. SINTRAEELECOL, founded in 1974, is part of the CUT. Created in 1986, CUT opposes the traditional unionism in Colombia. In fact, in order to find a solution for the many issues characterising the country, its members support an alternative type of unionism with a vocation for power. The CUT uses social networks as means of propaganda, in particular Facebook and Twitter (CUT website, 2013).

Another important network involved in this case is the ODG, which is a centre for research into North-South relationships and the generation of debt informing the current process of globalisation, born in 2000 by the initiative of the Citizens’ Network for the Abolition of External Debt. Composed by a heterogeneous network of people collaborating in its different areas of activity, the Observatory uses a multidisciplinary approach for the study of the mechanisms associated with the financial debt owed by the countries in the ‘periphery’ to the countries belonging to the ‘centre’, particularly to Spain and the European Union. Furthermore, the ODG takes into account the other forms of foreign debt that the countries in the ‘centre’ owe to the countries in the ‘periphery’, namely ecological debt, historical debt and social debt. In addition, the ODG analyses the transnational processes and mechanisms generating negative impacts on the global south. Through the web, the ODG published news and documentation, collecting and analysing the most important political events and debates on debt, by vigilantly monitoring Spanish governmental and corporate policies in the process of globalisation. Also, the Observatory has a fundamental role in the coordination and encouragement of strategic activities such as the real time monitoring of political decisions related to debt (especially those taken by Spanish government, Spanish transnational corporations and merchant banking, Spanish political
parties, the IMF and World Bank and the administrations of the countries in the 'periphery'); applied research into the impacts of those policies in the global South; training course; publication of articles, reports and books to raise the awareness on the subject; connecting universities to the emerging critical social movements and NGOs. In 2004, the Observatory on debt in Globalisation Network was also created, aiming at facilitating the task of training and as an instrument of public pressure (ODG website, 2013).

6.4.2 Strategies

Strategies of resistance towards water management strategies in Colombia can be grouped in two main sets. The first set consists of the organisation of international campaigns, like the one launched by ONIC in 2010 with the scope of raising awareness on the massive violations of indigenous rights in the country. The first set also comprises: the promotion of human rights and repair of environmental damage, like in the case of ASPROCEG; community organising and training; local, national and international advocacy; the analysis of the transnational processes negatively impacting on the global south. On the other hand, the second set of strategies is well epitomised by the CONAIE and other indigenous-based organisations. In fact, as mentioned in 6.4.1, CONAIE is well known for the organisation of popular uprisings, road blockages and the takeover of governmental buildings. Indeed, during the 1990s, CONAIE repeatedly mobilised thousands of indigenous people (Shuar, Achuar, Siona, Secoya, Cofan, Huaorani, Zaparo, Chachi, Tsachila, Awa', Epera, Manta, Wancavilca and Quichua) shutting down Quito (Ecuador’s capital) and opening to direct negotiations with the government. The organisation of public demonstrations by CONAIE often came as a response to IMF policies. As an example, in 1994 a massive mobilisation was the direct result of both the neoliberal Agrarian Reform Law, which implied the privatisation of the water system, and a World Bank loan granted in order to obtain the privatisation of the oil sector in Ecuador. In this case, because of the vehemence of the protest, land reform and water privatisation basically disappeared from the government’s agenda and, although the oil privatisation passed, indigenous communities gained some protection. It is possible to draw parallels between the work of CONAIE in Ecuador and Colombia, which are often interlinked with regard to resistance due to boundary lines and marginal lands issues.

It has been possible to establish that CONAIE’s strategies of direct confrontation have achieved much: however, they have also been characterised by a lack of connection with mainstream politics which, in some view, represents the key for the protection of indigenous communities. Also, the impact of resistance differentiated Colombia from Ecuador. Indeed, the numerous protests regarding the fumigation of coca fields in both countries led to the suspension of aerial fumigations in 2005. However, the following year the Colombian government unilaterally decided to restart them, by so indicating a different approach in taking protest into consideration. In fact, while the Colombian government decided to ignore humanitarian, social and territorial consequences intertwined with the Plan Colombia, the Ecuadorian government of Rafael
Correa backed a lawsuit against the Colombian government at the International Criminal Court at The Hague (CDCA, 2013).

A first social consequence of the situation in Colombia is that many peasants and even indigenous groups have been forced to grow coca crops for cocaine production by armed groups as this is often considered the only viable economic option for rural communities (see Chapter 5, paragraph 5.3.5). This, in turn, led to a change in several aspects of rural communities’ culture, paving the way to its being less united and more fragmented, due to the militarisation of the territory and the proliferation of armed groups. In addition, illegal armed groups, especially right-wing paramilitary groups such as the Autodefensa Unida de Colombia – AUC, have been financed and armed by multinational corporations such as Chiquita Brands. Furthermore, the violation of collective rights of local communities to basic resources and services, exemplified by the case of water privatisation by Union Fenosa, also led to the worsening of the living conditions of local residents and to the further marginalisation of indigenous communities. Nevertheless, in 2004, grassroots movements, farmers, citizens groups, fishermen, students, trade unions, human rights activists and women’s organisations started the Campaign for the Protection of Water and Energy, which included the organisation of strikes and other protest initiatives such as the refusal to pay price increases and asked for the return of public services under state control. The campaign did not result in positive outcomes for the protesters: this is also ascribable to the country’s high levels of corruption and to the fact that affected communities were demanded payments under threat of retaliation by the Army (CDCA, 2013). Finally, the construction of the Urra’ Dam confirms the trend describing the increasing marginalisation of communities and the increasing difficulties in presenting a united front of protest, due to the displacement and subsequent homelessness of a great number of local and indigenous families and groups, which followed a ‘Divide and Conquer’ logic framework. Also, the militarisation of the territory in reaction to the indigenous Embera-Katio strategy of governmental buildings and embassies occupation, led to the assassination of several indigenous leaders, accused of collaborating with the FARC – EP guerrillas.

6.4.3. Relation between Political Resistance and Types of Community

The situation in Colombia today is extremely controversial. High levels of corruption connecting the centres of power in the country to multinational corporations need to be added up to the proliferation of armed groups, the militarisation of the territory and the internationally known issue of narco-trafficking. In this environment, on the one hand groups and organisations elaborated strategies aiming at raising awareness on human rights violations, injustice and political resistance, which have undoubtedly been effective in developing a national and international consciousness on these issues. On the other hand, indigenous organisations and groups have developed strategies of direct confrontation, like in the case of the CONAIE. This, in some cases, has contributed to the creation of what it is possible to define as activist communicative
communities. However, the situation in Colombia itself, together with the fact that, as explained in 6.4.2, the Colombian government has chosen to deal with the humanitarian, social and territorial consequences intertwined with the Plan Colombia using an iron fist, led to a more fragmented rural communities' culture. In addition, the living conditions of local residents affected by water management strategies worsened, while indigenous communities have been further marginalised. This pattern clearly shows that, in Colombia, the building of a community capable of challenging governmental policies and corporations at the broader level is more and more arduous, due to the difficulties in presenting a united front of protest. This, in turn, is a direct consequence of the displacement and subsequent homelessness of a great number of local and indigenous families and groups, as argued in 6.4.2.

The Colombian case is characterised by distinctive features, which refer to its context. In fact, the militarisation of the territory, the proliferation of armed groups and right-wing paramilitary groups, which have admittedly been used by companies like the Chiquita Corporation in order to curb protests and silence trade unions, together with the “divide et impera” tactical strategy used by the government, led to the development of strategies of direct confrontation, like those used by the CONAIE. The organisations and communities involved in the political resistance to water management strategies also employ approaches aiming at raising awareness of the injustice and violence characterising the Colombian system. Additionally, all the typologies of networks described in Table 4.1 are present in this case. However, the lack of connection with the mainstream politics led to an absence of positive outcomes of political resistance in Colombia. Another important feature is the formation of what it is possible to define as activist communicative communities due to the activities promoted by the CONAIE. This represents a reverse trend compared to the cases examined so far, indicating that social resistance to water management strategies is, in this instance, a determinant of community. Yet, this is a minority trend. In fact, generally, the Colombian case seems to confirm the results of the Argentinian and the Brazilian case. Finally, resistance to water management strategies developed in Colombia with the rising of neoliberal policies such as the privatisation of water resources. In fact, as noted in 6.4.2, organisations such as the CONAIE mobilised thousands of indigenous people belonging to different communities in response to policies supported by the IMF and the World Bank.

6.5 Conclusion

This chapter focused on the analysis of the causal relation between resistance to water management strategies and types of community in Latin America. By taking into consideration the discussion on political resistance in Chapter 5 and the theories on communities of Chapter 4, this chapter discussed how communities in the Latin American countries taken into consideration relate to political resistance to water management policies. Three Latin American countries, namely Argentina, Brazil and Colombia, are used as case studies in order to explain the relationship between the ideal-types of community and to establish
whether communitarianism, communicative community or post-modern community are merely ideal-types or if they coexist in real-life communities. The analysis of this chapter is based on three key components: actors and their relations; tactics; and the relation between types of community and political resistance.

Starting with the description of the organisations and communities involved in the political resistance to water management strategies in Argentina, Brazil and Colombia, this chapter contributed to the in-depth examination of the first key component this study is based on, namely the analysis of the actors involved and their relations which, in turn, has been explored in section 4.3.1, allowing to build a framework which explains the different forms of communities existing today. This has been summarised in Table 4.1.

Also, this chapter addressed the second key component of the analysis, exploring the strategic approaches used by organisations and communities participating in the resistance, drawing from Chapter 4. Discussing how water management strategies impacted on communities and how communities reacted to it, it has been necessary in order to connect political resistance to the conflict theory as explored in Chapter 4, arguing that marginalisation and social exclusion, features of ‘relative deprivation’, are the elements leading to political protest and, particularly, militant strategies. These, in turn, mostly characterise local organisations and groups of citizens. In fact, in the three countries under examination, political resistance to water management strategies developed in the context of the increased relative deprivation due to the rising of neoliberalism in the 1980s and 1990s, as discussed in Chapter 2.

This context has led to the establishment of a number of movements, ranging from international, more formal organisations such as FIAN International, which belongs to the movement / formal category of Table 4.1, to indigenous or peasant-based organisations or communities, belonging to the non-movement / informal dimension. In general, all the categories of Table 4.1 are seen as part of the resistance. Broadly, the analysis of this chapter led to the argument that, on the one hand, international organisations such as FIAN International in Argentina based their approach on the dialogue with traditional institutions and corporations, also organising international campaigns in order to raise awareness at a national and international level on a variety of issues. On the other hand, local organisations, indigenous-based organisations and groups of citizens used militant tactics aiming at circumnavigating the centres of power. In fact, the strategies used by movements and communities vary according to the context, opportunities and availability of resources, as argued in Chapter 4. As seen in this chapter, being the ones most marginalised and excluded from the decision-making process, local communities and networks do not trust institutions. In fact, they acknowledge that the issues they raise are not heard by those institutions which, in turn, often neglect to open a line of dialogue with them. This leads to these groups pursuing more activist strategies. In short, the lack of dialogue and willingness to compromise often leads to exasperating the situation.
As previously argued, in Argentina, the participation to a range of social movements which took part to the first international Social Forum in Porto Alegre, can be understood as the construction, at the broader level, of an “umbrella” community with post-modern elements of heterogeneity, plurality and tension, and formed by different movements. At the particular level, the investigation of specific conflicts and movements of resistance suggests that the variety of groups and communities involved can either present elements of communicative communities or communitarian models, although these two models can often be seen as overlapping. Communitarian elements characterise indigenous groups and communities, which are deeply connected to traditional institutions, beliefs and the protection of ancestral territories. Communicative communities, also known as ‘communities of dissent’, imply the construction of a communicative project with the aim of mobilising people around a collective goal: this is the case, for example, of citizens’ collectives like Vecinos por la Vida. In Argentina, international, formal movements such as FIAN International focus on exerting public pressure, raising awareness and dialoguing with the government, while local groups and communities, together with international, informal movements such as La Via Campesina focus on a two-way strategy, appealing to institution on one hand and using activist strategies such as road blockages on the other. What emerges in the Argentinian case, therefore, is that community is a determinant of social resistance and of the strategies employed. The analysis of the Brazilian and the Colombian cases led to the acknowledgement of a pattern with regard to the relation between types of community and resistance to water management policies, which is the third key component of this study.

In Brazil, the militarisation of the territory, together with the widespread corruption and the lack of dialogue with the government and the contractors involved in the projects, explained in Chapter 5, led to the development of activist modalities of resistance, ranging from road blocks, land occupation and demonstrations to non-violent strategies such as the one used by the Manuelzao Project. Also, as it has been seen in the Argentinian case, a number of organisations successfully pursued strategies aiming at raising awareness about the issues faced by indigenous people and activists, although these issues are much different in Brazil and involve corruption, tortures and deaths. Due to contextual reasons, the two-folded strategy of dialogue and activism characterising the Argentinian case has not been pursued in Brazil. So, influenced by context, opportunities and availability of resources, communities are a determinant of political resistance. As in the Argentinian case, therefore, the causal connection between political resistance to water management strategies and types of community seems to be suggested as a direction of causality going from the types of community to the resistance. In the Brazilian case, ideal-types of community are generally more neatly distinguished at the particular level than in the Argentinian case. Also, at the broader level indigenous communities and local residents, cooperating with organisations and NGOs at a local, national and international level, built a strong community with post-modern traits, but also with distinctive communicative features, where people from different backgrounds are united by a common commitment, as addressed in Chapter 4.
In Colombia, the militarisation of the territory, the proliferation of armed groups and right-wing paramilitary groups and the “divide et impera” strategy used by the government, led to the development of strategies of direct confrontation, like those used by the CONAIE. Also, some organisations use approaches aiming at raising awareness of the injustice and violence characterising the Colombian system. The establishment of these methods can also be seen in the Brazilian case. This is due to the context of the militarisation of the territory, which is absent in the Argentinian case. However, as often seen in the case of Brazil, Colombian organisations and communities completely lack a connection with the mainstream politics, which in this case led to an absence of positive outcomes of the political resistance to water management strategies. As discussed in 6.4.3, a significant finding in the Colombian case has been the formation of what it is possible to define as activist communicative communities due to the political resistance’s activities promoted by the CONAIE. This represents a reverse trend compared to the cases of Argentina and Brazil, suggesting that social resistance to water management strategies is, in this instance, a determinant of community. However, this is a minority trend. In fact, generally, the Colombian case seems to confirm the results of the Argentinian and the Brazilian case as referred to the direction of causation between political resistance and types of community. Different types of community pursue different tactical strategies, and this is due to the perceived “relative deprivation”, as argued by Harvey (Giddens and Held, 1982).

The objective of this chapter was to combine the discussion provided in Chapter 2, Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 in order to shed light on two fundamental aspects, namely the relationship between the ideal-types of community and the direction of causation between political resistance and types of community.

As for the first aspect, evidence indicates that the characteristics of the three ideal-types of communities, identified in Chapter 4, can be seen as coexisting in real-life communities in Argentina, Brazil and Colombia. However, they are much more fluid and less schematic than the categorization seems to suggest. This leads to the consideration that, although local communities can be seen as representing communitarian or communicative features, and communities at the broader level, for example regional or national, seem to maintain traits of post-modern and communicative models, a schematisation of the three society analysed through these categories is not established. So, while traits of the three ideal-types of communities are found in the three contexts analysed, these do not offer a neatly defined categorisation of real-life communities. Although categorising offers interesting ideas on communities and what are the principles guiding them, real-life communities are found to be more complex in their structure, and a categorisation of them would result in an over-simplification of real-life situations.

With regard to the second aspect, the analysis suggests that communities, influenced by context, opportunities and availability of resources, are a determinant of political resistance. In fact, the types of
community, explicated in 4.3 and in Table 4.1, and the context of marginalisation and exclusion constitute the elements determining what strategies are adopted. Therefore, bigger and international networks such as FIAN International are oriented towards raising awareness and, in general, towards a political resistance within institutions, other organisations such as the MST focus on a more direct and confrontational approach. This is because of contextual reasons. Where dialogue is not seen as a viable choice, or where citizens feel abandoned and marginalised by the government, a confrontational approach is often seen not only as the last resort, but as the only option available in order to be heard.

As seen in the cases of Argentina and Brazil, this is the direction of causation between political resistance and types and community: different types of community are the determinant of political resistance to water management strategies. A minority trend can be found in the case of CONAIE in Colombia, where activist communicative communities are formed due to the activities of political resistance promoted by this organisation. However, as previously stated in this section, in general the Colombian case seems to confirm the results of the Argentinian and the Brazilian case as referred to the direction of causation between political resistance and types of community.

Chapter 7 will discuss the findings of this research, making explicit the contribution of this thesis.
Chapter 7 – Findings and Conclusions

7.1 Aim, Objectives and Methods Justification

This research aimed at understanding the effects of resistance to neoliberal water management strategies in Latin America, and the relations between resistance movements and types of community. Five main objectives have been identified. First, this research examined the historical evolution of water management in both developing and developed countries, specifically Europe, the U.S. And Latin America. Second, it looked at the issues created by neoliberal water policies in Latin America and how communities reacted to it. Third, this study looked at debates about community, resistance and conflict in order to provide a theoretical framework for the analysis of movements of resistance and their tactics. Fourth, it dealt with the history of political resistance to water management strategies in Latin America. Finally, this thesis analysed the specifics of strategies of resistance to water management strategies in Argentina, Brazil and Colombia in relation to communities.

The rationale of this study resides in the need to contribute to the rich and ongoing debate on neoliberal policies, natural resources, inequality and communities. Specifically, it resides in the need to comprehend the relation between political activism and resistance to water resources and water services management strategies and communities.

This is a desk based research relying on qualitative techniques and on the use of case studies. Under the overarching approach of a desk-based research, several analytical tools are used to undertake this multi-level study. First, a meta-policy and policy process analysis has been undertaken in order to establish the analytical framework at global and national levels; second, Argentina, Brazil and Colombia has been selected as case studies in order to establish more specific national policies and issues in water management; third, the analysis of community theories has led to the understanding of different community structures and to the identification of the theoretical explanations of different resistance strategies used by communities; fourth, the analysis of data on websites of organisations and social groups involved in the political resistance, which has been useful to understand the different strategies adopted by these communities and social movements.

This thesis analysed political resistance strategies and types of community in relation to water management policies and strategies in Latin America. In order to answer the research question, this dissertation has focused on a number of issues such as water management strategies in Latin America and at a global level, theories of community, political resistance, power structures and multinational corporations.
7.2 Findings

This research findings can be ascribed to the global, national and local levels, as explained in Chapter 3.

Firstly, at the global level, the study of water management strategies presented in this research identified key strategic choices and patterns for the development of modern water systems. Specifically, the analysis has shown that, in Western economies, municipalities have been central for urban water systems until the drive towards privatisation, and they were able to adapt to the pressure to privatise brought by the influence of Washington and Post-Washington Consensus in the 1980s and 1990s. On the other hand, in developing countries, and in Latin America in particular, central governments have been the cornerstone of the development of urban water systems after colonialism. When privatisation models were introduced, they were repeatedly opposed by local communities and social movements, with different outcomes in relation to the achievements attained. Therefore, political resistance to water management strategies has been a consequence of, and a reaction to, the rising of neoliberalism. The difference between these two patterns of development of modern water market systems highlights an important dissimilarity of the formal structures in place, and means that, as local history and the legacies of colonialism were not taken into account, neoliberal policies in the water sector created general discontent in the poor majority of the population. They were seen as a return to the colonial times and privileges for a small colonial elite. As a consequence of significant accumulated debts—which, in turn, often had been accumulated thanks to the lack of proper supervision from the very same institutions that were lending them those sums- and of the Volcker Shock, developing countries were forced to accept neoliberalism and privatisation. In fact, these were the conditionalities they had to consent to in order to have their debts restructured and to receive additional loans.

Secondly, the examination of debates on community, resistance and conflict have shown that, at the national level, strong social movements are those built on diversity, creativity and inclusion. Not eliminating the possibilities of individualism, they are based on a loose aggregation, in which success is determined by the use of many weak contacts with a number of different organisations and individuals. Because of their loose contacts, members of the non-movement/informal cluster in the three countries analysed joined up with formal organisations devoted to more democratic and sustainable global policy. In turn, these organisations helped in unifying the different causes promoted by loose groups. In the scenario of political resistance to water management strategies in Argentina, Brazil and Colombia, success, or partial success, is to be seen as determined by the variety of subjects and clusters involved in the creation of loose aggregations, together with the context of political resistance. Therefore, the interrelation of these two factors is the key for the success of the tactical strategies adopted by different groups. Also, movements of resistance tend to reproduce established tactics and techniques of protest, although they are also inclined to introduce
innovative elements such as the use of new media and social networks.

Marginalisation and exclusion have been found to be the determinants of strategies of resistance to water management strategies in the three countries studied. The key concept is “relative deprivation”, inherited from colonialism, which leads to the political exclusion of citizens from the decision making process. Therefore, this is the element that paves the way to protests and political turmoil. Marginalisation and exclusion are two fundamental features of relative deprivation, and they need to be considered in order to understand contemporary social movements in this field of study, as their resistance arises from the unequal allocation of wealth and power and the perception that their issues are not going to be heard. As a consequence of the lack of dialogue with political and economic institutions, social groups and communities are led to distrust those institutions, so that they feel that the only option available for them resides in antagonistic and confrontational strategies of political resistance.

Thirdly, the study of the development of the water service sector and the investigation of debates on community paved the way to the contextual analysis of political resistance to water management strategies in Argentina, Brazil and Colombia. The case studies have, in fact, been discussed in the global context of the rise of neoliberalism in the 1980s and 1990s. Neoliberal policies such as privatisation and liberalisation strongly affected peasants and indigenous people in Latin America through the new division of labour between the global centre and the global periphery. In the water sector, this paved the way to rebellion and social unrest, and to the creation and development of new social movements characterised by the strong presence of peasants and indigenous people. As shown by the examples of resistance to water management strategies in Latin America delineated in this study, the repression of popular forces does not only concern the dictatorship period. Rather, it is a feature still characterising Latin American societies. Specifically, this has been seen in the cases of Brazil and Colombia.

Furthermore, the analysis of the political resistance to water management strategies in the three countries under consideration in relation with Table 4.1, illustrate how the typologies of the mobilising structures of political resistance are not mutually exclusive. However, it is important to distinguish the most relevant features of the three case studies. This has been addressed, showing which clusters can best explain these countries. The fact that none of the case studies fall into a single category in Table 5.1, highlights similarities – at least to some extent- in the community building and the community involvement in the political resistance to neo-liberal water management strategies in the three countries analysed. This has been visually summarised in Table 5.1, delineating the informal / movement cluster as the principal category in Argentina; the intersection between the informal / non-movement and the formal movement as the major feature of Brazil, and the intersection between the informal / non-movement and the informal / movement as the
leading category describing the Colombian case. This suggests that the common denominators of the three cases are fluidity and informality. These represent the foundations for all of them. The informal element of the mobilising structures is present in Argentina, Brazil and Colombia. On the other hand, the movement/non-movement category ranges in a spectrum: the ‘movement’ feature represents the most relevant of the Argentinian case, the ‘non-movement’ epitomizes the Brazilian case, while the Colombian case can be collocated in between the two clusters. In all the three countries under investigation, loose bodies of resistance incarnate the power and potential of communities towards neo-liberal water management strategies, albeit with uneven results that are due to the particular socio-political reality of each country. For example, in the case of Colombia, loose aggregations have not been capable of challenging dominant institutions or policies. This is a consequence of the particular socio-political reality of this country, characterised by a climate of corruption, militarisation of the territory and presence of paramilitary groups.

Fourth, the analysis of the relation between types of communities and political resistance to water management strategies suggest that, at the local level, the characteristics of the three ideal-types of communities, namely communitarianism, communicative communities and post-modern communities, can be seen as coexisting in real-life communities in Argentina, Brazil and Colombia. However, these traits are much more fluid and less schematic than the categorization seems to suggest. So, although local communities can be seen as presenting communitarian or communicative features, and communities at the broader level, for example regional or national, seem to maintain characteristics of post-modern and communicative models, a schematisation of the three society analysed through these categories is not established. Traits of the three ideal-types of communities are found in the three contexts analysed. However, these do not offer a neatly defined categorisation of real-life communities and, although categorising offers interesting ideas on communities and what are the principles guiding them, real-life communities are found to be more complex in their structure, and a categorisation of them would result in an over-simplification of real-life situations.

7.3 Conclusions and Contribution of the Research

Based on the findings, the original contribution of this thesis resides in the analysis of the specifics of the causal relation between types of community and political resistance, specifically in the determination of a direction of causation between the two.

As local authorities in Western countries were already managing the urban water systems, they were able to respond to the pressures of neo-liberal policies more positively. By contrast, the colonial heritage and the absence of strong local governments meant the entry of private forms of provision of services, to the detriment of the services for the poor.
daily life. Therefore, a variety of strategies are employed in political resistance. The colonial impact led to the lack of municipalities and effective local governments in developing countries, which still were highly committed to provide utilities for all in the post-colonial era. This commitment enormously improved water systems in the developing countries and, for the first time, not only the European and local elites could take advantage of public services. However, the limited economic resources of these countries, and the spiralling debt in which they precipitated in the 1980s, paved the way for international financial institutions to intertwine debt relief to a number of conditionalities which followed the neo-liberal agenda. Privatisation of water services was one of them. Therefore, without taking into consideration local history and the colonial heritage, indebted developing countries were pressured in shifting their systems of provision from the state to local authorities, something that, due to colonialism, they lacked experience of. This led to private - Western - companies taking over the water services in these countries in order to provide the service in a more efficient way. However, this was seen by local communities as a strong example of neo-colonialism, that would have reverted the hard-conquered rights of water services for all to newly established privileges, unaffordable to many. In fact, the private companies immediately proceeded to increase the prices, while not improving the extension and quality of the water systems. Community mobilisation has been a consequence of these policies in developing countries and, specifically in Argentina, Brazil and Colombia. This suggests that a historical approach allows a fuller appreciation of a country’s characteristics and problematics, leading to shared solutions and to efficiency being grounded in greater cooperation.

The three case studies under consideration have shown that the theoretical trends of communitarianism, communicative community and post-modern approaches are, as previously stated, more intertwined and less schematic than a fixed categorization could suggest. In fact, the two categorisations –the ideal-types on the one hand, and the four clusters of Table 4.1 on the other- suggest that these are false (or, at least, not entirely true) distinctions of communities, and that caution should be used when talking of categories. The categories developed by Smith (Table 4.1) have been used in this study. The analysis, however, reveals that this classification fails to acknowledge fluidity as a fundamental feature of real life situations. In fact, none of the three countries studied fits exclusively in any one cluster. Therefore, it can be argued that real-life communities of resistance in Argentina, Brazil and Colombia are fluid and based on informal, loose aggregations, which is the key for the democratisation of society. Paradoxically, although their strategies can be highly confrontational, these groups are based on decreasing violence in the long run and on the diffusion of pluralism and tolerance.

The Argentinian, the Brazilian and the Colombian cases diverge in a number of ways. As previously explained in this study, decisions on strategies of resistance are made according to a range of factors, namely availability of resources, opportunities and to neo-liberal water management strategies. Small movements are more rooted in the local and historical context, while larger and better funded organisations can engage at higher
levels for political impacts. Different types of community and the context of marginalisation and exclusion, inherited from colonialism, constitute the elements determining what strategies are adopted. Therefore, while bigger and international networks such as FIAN International are oriented towards raising awareness and, in general, towards a political resistance within institutions, other organisations such as the MST focus on a more direct and confrontational approach. This is because of contextual reasons. Where dialogue is not seen as a viable choice, or where citizens feel abandoned and marginalised by the government, a confrontational approach is often seen not only as the last resort, but as the only option available in order to be heard.

The analysis of the Argentinian, Brazilian and Colombian cases led to the acknowledgement of a pattern with regard to the relation between types of community and resistance to neo-liberal water management policies. Communities, influenced by context, opportunities and availability of resources, are a determinant of political resistance. In the cases of Argentina, Brazil and Colombia, this is the direction of causation between political resistance and types and community. A minority trend can be found in the case of CONAIE in Colombia, where activist communicative communities are formed due to the activities of political resistance promoted by this organisation. However, as previously stated in this section, in general the Colombian case seems to confirm the results of the Argentinian and the Brazilian case as referred to the direction of causation between political resistance and types of community.

Finally, the findings do not entail that small organisations are only partially successful or not at all. As argued beforehand, much depends on the socio-political context in which the protest takes place. This is proven, for instance, by the Colombian case, where the extensive presence and intervention of the military and of paramilitary groups contributes in the maintenance of a status quo of fear and inequality. Loose bodies of resistance, even small, can have great power and potential. However, they have undoubtedly achieved uneven results in the three case studies. The case of Colombia exemplifies why loose organisations can be ineffective, or only partially effective. De facto, a climate of corruption and militarisation creates an environment of fear where loose aggregations are unable to unify in a cohesive, integrated front able to challenge the country’s institutions and policies. Only when a united front of combined loose aggregations, in which all the actors of the clusters of the mobilising structures (Table 4.1) are active, the organisation can be effective in challenging the status quo and the network of power, leading to a change in policies.

7.4 Limitations

There are a number of limitations to this research that need to be acknowledged.

Firstly, the subject of the investigation constitutes an area of research that has received attention by scholars
in the past. Research on water resources, community studies, movements of resistance, and neoliberal policies has, in fact, been extensive and has been useful as the starting point for this study. However, this thesis contributes as original analysis to a rich and ongoing debate, due to the in-depth analysis of the theoretical framework of theories of communities and movements’ mobilising structures and its application to the reality of three case studies. Also, an innovative element of this study can be found in the employment and analysis of original sources, for example the websites of the organisations and groups involved, which are presented in Appendix 3.A.

Secondly, due to the extensiveness of political resistance to neoliberal water management strategies in Latin America, it has been necessary to select three countries as case studies. So, the dimension of the phenomenon in Latin America required a focus on Argentina, Brazil and Colombia. While additional research is required in order to analyse strategies of political resistance in other countries, and the direction of causation between resistance and types of community, the case study method allows generalisation. In fact, common elements emerge from the application of the theoretical framework to the Argentinian, Brazilian and Colombian realities. These are the fluidity of societies and the informality as trait d’union in the mobilising structures of social movements. This shows that there needs to be caution when talking about categories: they are useful as a research tool, but they can also force delimitations when there aren’t any and oversimplify reality.

Also, it has been useful to analyse real life situations, issues and problems, and it has been beneficial in order to understand a complex issue, focusing on the contextual analysis of a limited number of events and their relationships. The reasons why Argentina, Brazil and Colombia have been chosen as case studies have been clarified in the methodological section.

Thirdly, the absence of fieldwork is considered an important limitation, as this would have helped in understanding the issues arising from the research question and would have provided additional information and originality to the thesis. This would have added important elements to the analysis, especially allowing to establish advantages and disadvantages of both big and small groups in terms of political impacts and the paradox of the use of confrontational –sometime violent- tactics by loose aggregations which, as argued in this study, are the cornerstone of democratisation and pluralism. Also, fieldwork would have contributed with interesting insights to the development of innovative water policies that take the historical, social and political context into consideration. As shown by the analysis, in fact, Argentina, Brazil and Colombia were countries where local authorities could not –for the simple fact that colonialism led to municipalities and effective local authorities never being properly developed- adapt to the pressures of neo-liberal policies. These are countries where time has been lost by not taking into consideration historical peculiarities. Therefore, more research is required in order to understand and interpret the complexity of these issues.
Therefore, this research has a number of limitations. Nevertheless, this study has revealed a number of significant findings that contribute to an understanding of the issues intersecting water management, political resistance and typologies of community.
Appendix 3.A. List of the web-sites analysed

Accion Ecologica  www.accionecologica.org
APOINME (Articulacao dos Povos e Organizacoes Indigenas de Nordeste, Minas Gerais e Espirito Santo) www.apoinme.blogspot.com
ASPROCIG (Asociacion de Productores para el Desarrollo Comunitario de la Cienaga Grande del bajo Sinu') www.asprocig.org
CIMI (Conselho Indigenista Missionario)  www.cimi.org.br
CNA (Coordinador Nacional Agrario)  www.cna-colombia.blogspot.org
CONAIE (Confederacion de Nacionalidades Indigenas de Ecuador)  www.conaie.nativeweb.org
CPT (Comissao Pastoral da Terra)  www cptnacional.org.br
CUT (Central Unitaria de Trabajadores de Colombia)  www.cut.org.co
Defensoria del Pueblo of Colombia  www.defensoria.org.co
FIAN International  www.fian.org
FOCO (Foro Ciudadano de Partecipacion por la Justicia y los Derechos Humanos)  www.foco.org.ar
FUNAI (Fundacao Nacional do Indio)  www.funai.gov.br
FUNAM (Fundacion para la Defensa del Ambiente)  www.funam.org.ar
Fundacion Ambio de Costa Rica  www.fundacionambio.org
GRR (Grupo de Reflexion Rural)  www.grr.org.ar
La Via Campesina  www.viacampesina.org
MAB (Movimento de Atingidos por Barragens)  www.mabnacional.org.br
Manuelzao Project  www.manuelzao.ufmg.br
MST (Movimento dos Trabalhadores sem Terra)  www.mst.org.br
ODG (Observatorio de la Deuda en Globalizacion)  www.2015ymas.org
ONIC (Organizacion Nacional Indigena de Colombia)  www.onic.org.co
Organizacion Mapuches Tehuelches “11 de Octubre”  www.mapuexpress.net
Rainforest Alliance  www.rainforest-alliance.org
RENACE (Red Nacional de Accion Ecologista)  www.renace.net
SINTRAELECOL (Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Energia de Colombia)  www.sintraelecol.org
Tsuli-Tsuli Audubon  www.audubon.org
Viva O Rio Madeira Vivo  www.riomaderavivo.org
## Appendix 5.A

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Type of Conflict</th>
<th>Social movements involved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brazil (Protected Area in Pataxó indigenous territory).</td>
<td>Environmental/Indigenous rights: the Pataxó indigenous community fights to defend its territorial land rights.</td>
<td>-CIMI - Brazil</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-Indigenous People Pataxó</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-World Movement for Tropical Forests</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-Brazilian Anthropological Society</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brazil (Santarém, State of Pará).</td>
<td>Environmental: soy monoculture introduced by the multinational Cargill Agrícola is opposed by peasants and indigenous communities.</td>
<td>-Greenpeace</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-Indigenous Community of Santarém</td>
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<td>-MST</td>
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<td>-PSA</td>
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<td>-Green Federation Party (Italy)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brazil (State of Espirito Santo)</td>
<td>Environmental/water: Tupinikim and Guarani indigenous peoples fight to protect their territories being seized by the company Aracruz Cellulose SA that is expanding its eucalyptus plantations in order to produce more cellulose.</td>
<td>-Alert Network against the Green Desert</td>
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<td>-MST</td>
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<td>-MMC</td>
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<td>-Friends of the Earth</td>
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<td>-World Rainforest Movement</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-Urgewald (German NGO)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>-Robin Wood (German NGO)</td>
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<td>-CIMI</td>
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<td>-Via campesina Movement</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>CONAIE (Ecuador)-ECUARUNAR (Ecuador)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>-Acción Ecológica -FUNDECOL</td>
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<td>-FUNAI</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brazil (Raposa Serra do Sol).</td>
<td>Recognition of indigenous lands.</td>
<td>-Makuxi Indigenous People</td>
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<td>-Wapichana Indigenous People</td>
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<td>-Tuarepang Indigenous People</td>
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<td>-Ingariko Indigenous People</td>
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<td>-Patamana Indigenous People</td>
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<td>-Indigenous Council of Roraima</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brazil/ Venezuela</td>
<td>Gold Mining in indigenous Yanomami territory (border between Brazil and Venezuela).</td>
<td>-Amnesty International</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-CIMI (Brazil)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Chiquita Brand International Inc. and its supporting and funding paramilitary groups in order to brutally suppress any form of protest inside the plantations. Also, Chiquita is held responsible for: poor working conditions, underpayments, forcing long shifts on workers, and environmental protection.</td>
<td>-Rainforest Alliance (USA)</td>
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<td>-Fundación Ambio de Costa Rica</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>-Tsuli Tsuli/Adubon</td>
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<td>-Earth Right Internacional</td>
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<td>-Peuples Solidaires</td>
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</table>
and health impacts resulting from the use of highly polluting agricultural practices.

Colombia

Environmental / water: construction of the Sinú River dam by the Urrá Company.
-ONIC
-ASPROCIG
-Indigenous Eberma Katio
-Mišmi Internacional de observadores independientes
-Movimento mundial por los bosques tropicales
-CENSAT
-Networks of groups fighting dams

Colombia (Putumayo)

Water: aerial fumigation with Monsanto’s glyphosate of the Putumayo territory.
-Permanent People Tribunal
-ONIC
-Indigenous and peasant communities of the Putumayo
-Acción Ecologica (Ecuador)
-Defensoría del Pueblo
-CONAIE (Ecuador).

Colombia (Cauca)

Environmental: the native community of Alsace, Agua Blanca, Esperanza and the indigenous reservation of Paula, demand the recovery of their lands and respect for their rights.
-Permanent Peoples Tribunal
-CENSAT
-Native Communities and Peasants of Alto Naya
-SINALTRAINAL
-FSC (Germany)

Colombia (Choco’)

The establishment of oil palm monoculture has led to serious environmental problems and has been strongly opposed by afro and indigenous communities living in the area.
-Permanent Peoples Tribunal
-ONIC
-Afro-descendant and indigenous communities of the Caracara River Basin
-CAVIDA
-World Movement for Tropical Forests
-Inter-ecclesiastical Commission of Justice and Peace
-SINALTRAINAL
-Conondo Resguardo Tami Community
-Community of Paimadó, Villaconti and El Cantón de San Pablo
-OREWA
-COCOMACIA
-Observatory on Multinationals in Latin America
-Human Rights Everywhere
-Quibdó Diocese

Colombia

El Cerrejón Mine: contamination of land and underground aquifers
-Indigenous Wayúu communities

Colombia (Cesar)

La Loma mine: negative impacts on
-Local communities of La Jagua and
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Region</th>
<th>Issues</th>
<th>Groups</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colombia (indigenous Motilón Barí</td>
<td>Oil extraction in indigenous territory</td>
<td>-ONIC</td>
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<td>territory)</td>
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<td>-ASOBARI</td>
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<td>-ASCAMAT</td>
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<td>-CISCA</td>
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<td></td>
<td>-World Rainforest Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>Colombia (indigenous U’wa territory)</td>
<td>Extraction of oil, gas and condensates in the Samoré Block, part of the indigenous U’wa ancestral territory.</td>
<td>-U’wa indigenous people</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ecuador (Amazon)</td>
<td>Environmental damage in the northeast region of the Amazon Forest caused by the Chevron-Texaco oil company.</td>
<td>-Acción Ecológica</td>
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<td>-Amazon Watch (USA)</td>
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<td>-Amnesty International</td>
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<td>-Residents Community of the Curvarado and Jiguamiando rivers basins</td>
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<td>-Oxfam América</td>
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<td>-UNICEF</td>
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<td>-RAN (USA)</td>
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<td>-EDF (USA)</td>
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<td>-Amazon Defence Coalition</td>
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<td>-Assembly of people affected by the Texaco case</td>
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<td>Ecuador (Esmeraldas)</td>
<td>Local residents and environmental organisations oppose the project of eucalyptus monoculture because of its socio-environmental impacts.</td>
<td>-Acción Ecológica</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>-Committee of representatives for the Canton’s residents</td>
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<td>-Committee of representatives for environmental organisations</td>
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<td>-Community of Muisne - Esmeraldas residents</td>
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<td>-Community of Matambal - Esmeraldas residents</td>
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<td>-Community of Quito - Esmeraldas residents</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-Community of Tortuga - Esmeraldas residents</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ecuador (Cotacachi region)</td>
<td>Local communities oppose the Canadian Ascendant Copper Corporation plan to exploit the region for mining activities.</td>
<td>-DECOIN</td>
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<td>-AACRI</td>
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<td>-Mining Watch Canada</td>
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<td>-Friends of the Earth Canada</td>
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<td>-CEDHU</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>International campaign against the OCP, Pipeline for Heavy Crude Oil.</td>
<td>-A Sud (Italy)</td>
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<td>-Acción Ecológica (Ecuador)</td>
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<td>-CONAIE (Ecuador)</td>
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<td>-Greenpeace</td>
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<td>-Acción por la Vida (Ecuador)</td>
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<td>-Community of Lago Agrio (Ecuador)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ecuador (Amazon)</td>
<td>Indigenous communities strongly oppose the oil extraction project affecting 200,000 hectares of Ecuadorian Amazon known as Block 23.</td>
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<td>Ecuador (Yasuní World Biosphere Reserve National Park)</td>
<td>Protests have drawn the international community’s attention to the oil extraction in Yasuni Park.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ecuador (Guayaquil)</td>
<td>Privatization of water</td>
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<td>Ecuador (Muisne)</td>
<td>The mangrove ecosystem and the entire local economy has been devastated by the growth of large scale shrimp farming.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ecuador (Los Rios)</td>
<td>Both local communities and</td>
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<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Issue Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>Environmental organisations oppose the displacement and resettlement of local residents due to the construction of the Baba Dam.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>Mining activities of the open-pit mine Alumbrera are strongly opposed by local residents because they negatively affect society, health and the environment.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Argentina (La Rioja)</td>
<td>Environmentalists and local citizens strongly oppose the 2005 Famatina-Barrick Gold project initiated by Barrick Gold and Yamiri S.A.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Argentina (Patagonia)</td>
<td>Environmental damages caused by the use of cyanide mining technology in Patagonia’s El Desquite mine.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>The spread of Monsanto’s transgenic RoundUp Ready soy caused several serious impacts on the population and environment.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Argentina / Chile</td>
<td>Strong opposition from environmentalists and local citizens to the Chilean-Argentine Pascua Lama mining project initiated by the Barrick Gold company.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Argentina (Tucuman)</td>
<td>Privatization of water</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Country (Region)</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>-----------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Argentina (Patagonia)</td>
<td>The Mapuche got organized to fight against the Italian multinational Benetton and won back their native territories.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Argentina / Uruguay</td>
<td>The decision of the Uruguayan Government to build two pulp mills on the Uruguay River was strongly opposed by Argentine communities and institutions, and led to a diplomatic crisis between the two countries.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina / Paraguay</td>
<td>Indigenous communities, with the support of environmental and human rights organisations oppose the construction of the Yacyretá Dam along the Paraná river, on the border between Argentina and Paraguay.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>The project of Celulosa Arauco S.A. (CELCO) for the construction of a wood-processing factory to produce pulp and paper brought immediate protests from local residents and environmental organisations opposed to the deforestation and contamination caused by the factory, as well as the displacement of local residents.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chile (Patagonia)</td>
<td>Construction of hydroelectric power plants along the Baker and Pascua rivers.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>The hydroelectric power station project along the Biobío river basin envisaged the displacement of six indigenous Mapuche-Pehuencches.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chile (Araucania)</td>
<td>At the beginning of the 1990s, many landfill sites were established, with negative impacts on the environment and health of the indigenous Mapuche community.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>Education/inequality: during what have been called the ‘Chilean winter’, students across Chile have fought to recover the right to education. In the wake of the student protests, because of the great public support the protest had gained, the government has increased scholarships, lowered interest rates on student loans from 6 per cent to 2 per cent and offered subsidies to young workers on low wages.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>In 2002, after pressure from civil society the moratorium on oil exploration comes into effect.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>Affected by militarisation and forced displacement, indigenous residents opposed the Chixoy dam project in order to protect their rights and stop their lands from being flooded.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guatemala (San Marcos)</td>
<td>Due to the Marlin mining project, serious environmental impacts affect local residents of the San Marcos region, mainly populated by indigenous Maya people.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Honduras (Tela Bay, Atlantida region)</td>
<td>Local communities living in natural protected area oppose a tourist mega-project.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Mexico (San Salvador Atenco)</td>
<td>A strong movement called the</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Groups</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mexico (El Salto and Juanacatlán, Jalisco)</td>
<td>Contamination of water/ recurring violations to health and safety rights/ serious environmental degradation</td>
<td>MAPDER, CEDMA, Un Salto de Vida, Un Salto a la Cultura, Familias Unidas por la Vida, IMDE, Foundation of Lerma-Chapala-Santiago-Pacífico, Juanacatlán en Acción, Sociedad Amigos del Lago de Chapala, IDEA, Vecinos de la Comunidad de Juanacatlán, Comite pro-Defensa de Arcediano, Amigos de la Barranca, Ciudadanos por el Medio Ambiente, Red Ciudadana, VIDA, Ecologist Group El Roble</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico (Guerrero)</td>
<td>The project of building a dam along the Papagayo River, known as La Parota dam, is immediately opposed by local communities as it would completely flood their territory.</td>
<td>CECOP, CDHMT, OCSS, Environmental Association Guerreros Verdes, A.C. (Argentina), MAPDER, CEDMA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico (Chiapas)</td>
<td>PRODESIS (the Integrated and Sustainable Social Development Project) envisaged measures to help indigenous people living in Chiapas State to move out of poverty. Local residents opposed the project, claiming that behind the authorities stated goals was a hidden agenda of controlling the abundant economic resources - such as water, biodiversity and hydrocarbons- as well as the political and military command of Chiapas.</td>
<td>EZLN, CIFCA, Organisation in Defense of Indigenous and Peasant Rights (OPPDIC), Maderas del pueblo NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico (Oaxaca)</td>
<td>The construction of wind power plants sees the strong opposition of the indigenous community</td>
<td>Solidarity Group La Venta, The Isthmus Peoples’ Front in Defence of Land and Territory</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The “Broad Front against Minera San Xavier” (FAO) and other organizations strongly oppose mining exploitation in their region, and denounce the irreversible damage produced by extraction operations and frequent explosions.

Indigenous communities fight against the project of a road and housing infrastructure in the indigenous Naso people ancestral territories.

The Panamanian pipeline, owned by the US company Petroterminal, causes an ecological disaster in 2007, resulting in the launch of the Committee of the Chiriquí Grande Communities Damaged by Oil.

The expansion of soy cultivation in Brazil, close to Paraguay, caused the displacement of communities and compromised the biodiversity of the area as a result of GMO seed use.

Collective resistance: every Thursday in Asunción, the capital, activists gather to protest the right-wing government of Federico Franco, which came to power in a June 22nd parliamentary coup against left-leaning president Fernando Lugo.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Location</th>
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<tr>
<td>Peru (Moquegua)</td>
<td>Resident farmers denounced the harmful effects of the mining project in the Asana river valley and opposed the sale of their lands to the Quellaveco Company. -CONACAMI -Argentine-Chilean Citizen and Institution NO to Pascua Lama and Valadero Mines -Association Civil Labor -FOEI -(Netherlands) -Global Green Grant (USA)</td>
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<td>Peru</td>
<td>The deforestation caused by the CFA/Amazonian Forest Consortium in the territory of the indigenous Asháninka, provoked serious social and environmental impacts and created an open conflict with the community. -World Movement for Tropical Forests -CIAMB -OIRA -AIDESEP -Forest People Programme (UK).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Peru (Amazon)</td>
<td>The project for the extraction, transportation and distribution of natural gas produced serious negative environmental and social impacts on the Urubamba valley. -AIDESEP -CECONAMA -COMARU -FECONAYY -CEDIA -APRODEH -Management Committee of Lower Urubamba -La Esperanza Shintorini Camisea Association -Centro Ganadero Agropecuario Bendezú -International NGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>Strong social opposition by thousands of farmers, local communities, Mayors, provincial administrators and environmental organisations oppose the exploitation of copper and molybdenum from the Río Blanco mine. -CONACAMI -FDSFN -Farming Communities of Segunda and Cajas -Provincial Federation of peasant vigilantes of Huancabamba -Front for the Defence of Life and Environment of Huancabamba -CEPICAFE -Professors Association of Huancabamba -Municipality of Huacabamba -Municipality of Sóndor</td>
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<tr>
<td>Peru (Cajamarca)</td>
<td>The Yanacocha mine was responsible for increased environmental pollution and worsening living conditions for local residents who demanded the mine be closed. -Rural Communities of Cajamarca -OMAL (Spain) -No Mine Movement -Green Network Cajamarca -Gruñides NGO -Ecovida NGO -OLCA -Observatory on socio-environmental conflicts</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
| Uruguay | The decision by the Uruguayan Government to build two pulp mills on the Uruguay River was strongly *

*Cfr. above (Argentina / Uruguay).*
opposed by Argentine communities and institutions, and led to a diplomatic crisis between the two countries.

Venezuela (Perijá Mountains) The indigenous of the Wayúu community oppose the sale of their traditional territory by the Venezuelan Government to national and International coal mining companies.

Bolivia (Oruro) Local communities protest against plans by the Inty Raymi Company, owner of the Kori Kollo mines.

Bolivia (Potosí) The exploitation of mineral resources causes conflicts that involve several actors: the Government, social movements, workers and unions.

Bolivia The opposition of Bolivian citizens to the privatisation of natural gas led to the fall of the President Sanchez de Lozada Government and the opening of discussions on the nationalisation of hydrocarbon resources.

Bolivia (Valle Hermosa) In January 2000 one of the pipes of the oil pipeline broke, pouring 29,780 barrels of crude oil into the Desaguadero River, polluting a fragile ecosystem of the central Bolivian plateau and affecting 127 communities.

Manta-Manaos Multi-modal Corridor (Regional project) The creation of a route along a chain of highways, waterways and airports, allowing the movement of goods and people.
of goods from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean as an alternative to the Panama Canal is a project for the transformation of the territory into a platform for exporting raw materials from Latin America to the US and Asia, in accordance with multinational corporation interests. International and South American environmental organisations, as well as indigenous and peasant communities strongly oppose the project.

Occupied Wall Street-inspired protest movements have spread throughout the whole Latin American region, demonstrating their discontent with the global economic system.

Appendix S.A

Source: CDCA (2012).

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