Adverse Possession and the Transmissibility of Possessory Rights—The Dark Side of Land Registration?

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Adverse possession; Applications; Proprietorship register; Registered land; Title to land; Transfer of title; Variation

It is trite law that, if unregistered land is adversely possessed for a period of 12 years, the title of the paper owner is automatically barred under the Limitation Act 1980 s.15. Where the land is registered, however, there is no automatic barring of title by adverse possession1—instead, after being in adverse possession for a minimum of ten years,2 the adverse possessor can apply to be registered as the proprietor in place of the registered proprietor of the land.3

Upon receipt of such an application, the Land Registry is obliged to notify various persons interested in the land, including the registered proprietor.4 Those persons then have 65 business days5 within which to object to the registration6 and, in the absence of any objection, the adverse possessor is entitled to be registered as the new proprietor of the land.7 In these circumstances, the registered proprietor is assumed to have abandoned the land. If, on the other hand, there is an objection, the possessor will not be registered as the proprietor unless he falls within one of the three exceptional grounds listed in the Land Registration Act 2002 Sch.6 para.5, where: (1) it would be unconscionable for the registered proprietor to object to the application; (2) the adverse possessor is otherwise entitled to the land; or (3) if the possessor is the owner of adjacent property and has been in adverse possession of the subject land under the mistaken, but reasonable belief, that he is its owner. If none of these grounds apply, the adverse possessor will not be registered as the

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2 Barrister, Senior Lecturer In Law, Aston University.
3 See the Land Registration Act 2002 s.96.
4 The period is 60 years for Crown foreshore.
5 See Land Registration Act 2002 Sch.6 para.1.
6 See Land Registration Act 2002 Sch.6 para.2.
7 Although there is no provision to extend the time limit, there is power to order the rectification of the register for the purpose of correcting a mistake where, e.g. adverse possession is not, in fact made out: Baxter v Mannion [2011] EWHC Civ 136, [2011] 1 W.L.R. 1594; CA.
8 The objection is made by giving counter notice to the registrar requiring him to deal with the application under the Land Registration Act 2002 Sch.6 para.5.
9 If the application relates to the whole of an existing registered title, the Land Registry will register the applicant as proprietor of that title. If, on the other hand, the application relates to part of an existing registered title, then the Land Registry will remove that part from the existing title and register the applicant as proprietor of that part under a new title number.
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proprietor. The only saving is that, if his application for registration is rejected as a result of an objection and none of the three exceptions in para.5, above, apply, he will be entitled to apply once again to be registered provided he remains in adverse possession for a further two years, and this time he will be registered as proprietor whether or not anyone opposes the application.8

Given, however, the very limited grounds under which an adverse possessor may be registered as proprietor in the event of an objection, is he not more likely to avoid the risk of applying for registration altogether if this would alert the registered proprietor of his existence and prompt opposition to the application? With an abandoned piece of land,10 perhaps the risk of an objection would be lower, but where the disputed land forms part of an occupied property,11 the risk would surely be much higher, so much so as to discourage the adverse possessor from ever making an application to register after the requisite ten years of adverse possession.12

Indeed, the incentive to “stay quiet” is made even more attractive given the principle of relativity of title in English property law and the possibility of the transmission of possessory rights between possessors creating, in effect, a “dark market” in possessory rights falling outside the registered land system. Although statistics are only available for the financial years 2008/09, 2009/10 and 2010/11, these show that the number of successful applications for adverse possession of land to the Land Registry in these years (where the land has already been registered and the application is to register the squatter as the new registered proprietor)13 were 1,111, 1,059 and 868, respectively.14 The Law Commission Consultation Paper, “Updating the Land Registration Act 2002” (2016) No.227, provides more recent statistics from the Land Registry.15 These indicate that, in the financial year 2014/15, only 749 applications for adverse possession were made under the new scheme introduced by the 2002 Act. In the period 1 April 2015 to 31 January 2016, the Land Registry received just 598 such applications under that scheme. This suggests a steady drop in the number of such applications brought under the 2002 Act over the last eight years.

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8 The entitlement to be registered is subject to 3 exceptions where: (1) the applicant is a defendant in possession proceedings; (2) there has been judgment for possession given against him in the last 2 years; and (3) he has been evicted pursuant to a judgment for possession: see Land Registration Act 2002 Sch.6 paras 6 and 7.

9 See Land Registration Act 2002 Sch.6 paras 6 and 7.

10 One can also envisage circumstances where it would be unlikely that the notification of the application would reach the registered proprietor—e.g. where the proprietor was a company which had changed its registered office without informing the Land Registry of its new address for service.

11 Although squatting in residential buildings is now outlawed under the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 s.144, the offence only relates to a “building” and not its curtilage, so outbuildings, gardens, fields etc. are not caught by the Act. But see also, R (on the application of Read) v Chief Land Registrar [2015] EWHC Civ 17, where the Court of Appeal held that the criminality of trespass does not preclude a claim to adverse possession: see, M. Pawlowski, “Criminal Squatting and Adverse Possession: A Case of Interpretative Logic” (2015) 24 Nott. L.J. 129.

12 The Land Registry itself acknowledges that the 2002 Act “makes it more likely that a registered proprietor will be able to prevent application for adverse possession of their land being completed”: see, Practice Guide 4, “Adverse Possession of Registered Land” updated 26 April 2016, para.1.1.

13 There are no figures where the land concerned is unregistered and the application is to register the squatter as the first registered proprietor. One of the main reasons for this is that it is not unusual for these first registration applications to be made on more than one basis. Such applications, therefore, may not be recorded as being an adverse possession application.

14 See, Hansard, HC Deb, 12. September 2011, c.1032W.

Relativity of title

One of the fundamental principles of English land law is that possession by itself is capable of giving a good title against the rest of the world except someone having a better legal right to possession. Thus, if a squatter’s possession is disturbed by trespass or nuisance, he can sue on the strength of his own possession and does not have to prove his title.

The principle that title to land on the better right to possession is embodied in our common law and, in particular, by the early decision of the Court of Queen’s Bench in *Asher v Whitlock*. In that case, a Thomas Williamson had enclosed a piece of manorial waste and later built a cottage on it. He occupied the land until his death in 1860. By his will, he left the whole property, describing it as “a cottage and garden, in Keysoe Row, in which I now dwell” to his wife for life or until remarriage, remainder to his daughter in fee simple. After his death, the widow remained in possession with her daughter and, a year later, married the defendant. All three then lived at the property until the daughter’s death in February 1863. On her death, the widow and defendant continued to reside on the premises until the widow’s death in May 1863. The daughter’s heir subsequently brought an action seeking to evict the defendant. The court held that he was entitled to recover the whole property. As between these two rival claimants, the land belonged to the heir who could lay claim to the earlier and, therefore, better right to possession.

The notion that title is not absolute but relative has important consequences where a claim to adverse possession is founded on successive adverse possessors who may each be claiming title based on their own occupation of the land. Thus, if a trespasser (T) takes possession of a plot of land belonging to the paper owner (O), then as between O and T, the former can recover the land bringing an action for possession. But also, as between T and the rest of the world (except O and any persons claiming through him), T is the owner for he is in possession of the land and, therefore, has the better right to possession than anyone else who may seek to occupy it. Suppose then another trespasser (T1) takes possession of the land from T. The so-called “first-in-time” principle gives T priority over T1 simply because prior possession gives rise to an older and, therefore, better right. Moreover, T1 cannot argue that the land belongs to O, so as to defeat T’s claim to possession. If, however, T has been dispossessed by T1, the latter may now seek to rely on his own adverse occupation (together with any time that has already run during T’s occupation) in order to defeat O’s title. In such a case, therefore, successive possession generates its own form of common law legal title which is capable of barring an earlier title in time. But to what extent is such possessory title capable of...

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18 See, *Rosenberg v Cook* (1881) 8 Q.B.D. 162 at 165 per Jessel MR: “Now the title of the disseisor is in this country a freehold title, and therefore, although the vendor has a very bad title, and a title liable to be defeated, he had still a title good against all the world, except against those who might be proved to have a better one”.
19 For a modern example of an exclusive licensee suing a squatter successfully in trespass, see *Manchester Airport Ltd v Picken* [2000] Q.B. 20; CA. Trespass to land is seen essentially as “a wrong against possession, not against ownership”: *Simpson v Perrett* (2000) 79 F. & C.R. 398 at 401 per Robert Walker LJ. There is also no doubt that a mere possessor may sue in nuisance: *Hunter v Commer Wharf Ltd* [1997] A.C. 655; H.L. See also generally, Harrow, *LBC v Qvisi* [2003] UKHL 43; [2004] I.A.C. 983; H.L.
20 *Asher v Whitehill* (1865) L.R. 1 Q.B. 1.
22 A useful example is provided by the Land Registry Practice Guide 5, “Adverse Possession of (1) Unregistered and (2) Registered Land where a Right to be Registered Was Acquired Before 13 October 2003” updated 16 September 2015, at paras. 45–46. It is not necessary for the claim to be put forward on the ground that the land was held under a simple subject tenant, B. Rudden, this controversy is not without the potential for the Twenty-fifth Amendment, 1967. For example, B. Rudden, this controversy is not without the potential for the Twenty-fifth Amendment, 1967. For example, B. Rudden, this controversy is not without the potential for the Twenty-fifth Amendment, 1967.
of transmission from one possessor to another? Can the possessor transfer his possessory right on death, or by sale or gift during his lifetime?

**Transmission of possessory title by will or on intestacy**

Apart from highlighting the principle that possession is good against all but the true owner, the decision in *Asher*, above, demonstrates that a possessory title is capable of transmission on death either by will or on an intestacy. In the words of Cockburn CJ:

“There can be no doubt that a man has a right to devise that estate, which the law gives him against all the world but the true owner. Here the widow was a prior devisee, but *durante viduitate* [during widowhood] only, and as soon as the testator died, the estate became vested in the widow; and immediately on the widow’s marriage the daughter had a right to possession; the defendant however anticipates her, and with the widow takes possession. But just as he had no right to interfere with the testator, so he had no right against the daughter, and had she lived she could have brought ejectment; although she dies without asserting her right, the same right belongs to her heir.”

It is interesting to note that, in this case, there were two stages of devolution. First, the possessory right passed to the widow under the testator’s will and, secondly, it passed to the daughter’s heir upon an intestacy. Because adverse possession, as we have seen, gives all the rights and powers of ownership, the possessor acquires, to all intents and purposes, a legal estate in fee simple absolute in possession subject only to the true owner’s paramount right to recover the land until such time as his title is extinguished by limitation. The logical upshot of this is to recognise the existence of two estates—one held by the paper owner and

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2015, at para.3.4: “If a second squatter dispossesses the first, the second acquires the benefit of any time that had already run against the owner. However, the first squatter will retain the right to recover possession from the second, until the full limitation period has run from the date when they were dispossessed. See if B dispossesses A (the owner) in 1982 and is then dispossessed by C in 1994, A loses the right to recover possession from C in 1998, but B could still bring possession proceedings against C until 2006.”

31 *Asher v Whitley* (1865) 1 R. 1 Q.B. 1 at 6. See also, the judgment of Mellor J, at 6-7: “Here the first possessor is connected in title with the plaintiff; for there can be no doubt that the testator’s interest was devisable”. The decision was applied, in preference to the earlier case of *Dowson v the Duke of Dorset* [1764] 3 R. 945, by the Privy Council in *Perry v Jolliffe* [1907] A.C. 73; PC. See also, *Caldicott v Alexander* (1900) 16 T.L.R. 394.

32 There has been some controversy over whether the adverse possessor’s fee simple arising from possession is legal or equitable; see, E. Cooke, “Adverse Possession—Problems of Title in Registered Land” (1994) 1 S. 1, 4-5. It has been argued that the possessor’s estate is legal because the Law of Property Act 1925 s.7 states that “a fee simple subject to a legal or equitable right of entry or re-entry if for the purposes of this Act a fee simple absolute”. It is also subject to a risk of extinction by an adverse possessor. But both the respective estates of the squatter and paper owner are absolute because they may endure in perpetuity. The notion, therefore, that “there can only be one legal fee simple at any given time rests on a fallacy: it confuses the weakness of a person’s title with the potential duration of that person’s estate in land" see, Law Commission/ HM Land Registry, “Land Registration for the Twenty-First Century: A Consultative Document” (1998) Law Com No 254, para. 10.23.


34 On this reasoning, the superior title of the lord of the manor in *Asher v Whitley* (1865) 1 R. 1 Q.B. 1, who was not a party to the litigation, was presumably not barred.

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the other by the squatter—each qualified by reference to the other and, therefore, not in conflict.25

There is also judicial recognition in both the English and Commonwealth cases that the squatter’s possessory title is capable of giving rise to property rights under statute. In *Perry v Clissold*,26 for example, the Privy Council held that an adverse possessor was entitled to compensation when the land became subject to compulsory purchase. Significantly, his possessory right was characterised as an “estate or interest” in the land within the meaning of the *Lands for Public Purposes Acquisition Act 1880*. In the course of his judgment, Lord MacNaughten stated27:

“It cannot be disputed that a person in possession of land in the assumed character of owner and exercising peaceably the ordinary rights of ownership has a perfectly good title against all the world but the rightful owner.”

In the Australian case of *Wheeler v Baldwin*,28 the respondent sought to lodge a caveat in relation to certain lands on the basis that she was “an owner in fee simple” relying on her (and her predecessor in title’s) adverse possession for over 20 years. In order to lodge the caveat, she had to show that she had an estate or interest in the land within the meaning of the Real Property Act 1900 of New South Wales. The High Court of Australia, relying on the above-cited extract from Lord MacNaughten’s judgment in *Perry*, held that a person in possession of land claiming inconsistently with the title of the owner of the first estate in possession had a sufficient interest to lodge a caveat under the 1900 Act. In reaching this conclusion, Dixon J acknowledged that an adverse possessory right in land is akin to an estate in fee simple capable of inheritance by heirs.29

There are also other Commonwealth cases expressing the same principle. In *Allen v Roughley*,30 for example, Dixon CJ observed that “there can be no doubt that a person who is in possession of land without a good documentary title has, whilst he continues in possession, a devisable interest in the property”.31 Similarly, Taylor J stated that “the inchoate interest [resulting from possession of the land] … was an interest which might have been assigned or, as actually occurred, devised by the testator”.32

Transmission of possessory title by sale or gift

Apart from devolution by will or intestacy, it is apparent that an adverse possessory right in land can be sold or gifted.33 In *Mount Carmel Investments Ltd v Peter Thurlow Ltd*,34 a Mr Renwick gained entry and began to use a garage for the storage

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26 *Perry v Clissold* [1907] A.C. 73, PC.
27 *Perry v Clissold* [1907] A.C. 73, PC at 79.
28 *Wheeler v Baldwin* (1934) 52 C.L.R. 609; High Court of Australia.
29 Reliance was placed primarily on the statements of Joshua Williams in his lectures on the “Seisin of the Freehold” (1878) 7, and Maithred’s essay on “The Mystery of Seisin” Collected Papers (1911) Vol.1, 370.
30 *Allen v Roughley* (1955) 94 C.L.R. 98; High Court of Australia.
31 *Allen v Roughley* (1955) 94 C.L.R. 98; High Court of Australia at 130-131.
32 *Allen v Roughley* (1955) 94 C.L.R. 98; High Court of Australia at 145.
34 *Mount Carmel Investments Ltd v Peter Thurlow Ltd* [1988] 1 W.L.R. 1078; CA.

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35 *Mount C.*
36 It should be an earlier.
37 *Budden*
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of vintage motor cars. He later caused to be registered at the Land Registry a
purported lease of the property and an assignment of the lease to a company called
Keithshire Properties Ltd. The registered proprietor of the garage had never granted
any such lease. Subsequently, Mr Renwick, purporting to act on behalf of this
company (of which he was director), permitted the first defendant (Peter Thurlow
Ltd) to go into exclusive occupation. The second defendant and another director
of the first defendant went into actual occupation. The forgery of the lease (and
assignment) eventually came to light and the entries relating to these transactions
were struck off the register. In the course of his judgment, Nicholls LJ stated:

"If squatter A is dispossessed by squatter B, squatter A can recover possession
from squatter B and he has 12 years to do so, time running from his
dispossession. But squatter A may permit squatter B to take over the land in
circumstances which, on ordinary principles of law, would preclude A from
subsequently ousting B. For example, if A sells or gives his interest in the
property, insecure as it may be, to B."

In the instant case, it was apparent that Mr Renwick had abandoned any rights
to possession of the property when the police became involved over the forged
documents and he fled the country. Accordingly, despite the defendant’s occupation
being initially consensual as assignee of the lease, Mr Renwick’s subsequent
actions debarred him from recovering the property. This, of course, accords with
the principle that a transfer of rights (by sale or gift) prevents any subsequent claim
to possession by the transferee against the transferee—in effect, the latter now
acquires good title against the former who no longer has any entitlement to the
land. Moreover, although the paper owner’s title is not affected directly, the
transferee may now count his predecessor’s period of possession towards the period
which must elapse before he becomes entitled to a full possessory title. In order
to do this, however, the transferee needs immediately to follow the transferee into
possession and occupy for the remainder of the limitation period.

In *Buckinghamshire CC v Moran*, a plot of land owned by the council had
been occupied for some four years (since 1967) by a Mr and Mrs Wall, who owned
a neighbouring house, for their own purposes. The house was then conveyed to
the defendant by a conveyance which was expressed to include not only the land
comprised in the paper title but also “all such rights estate title and interests as the
vendors may have in or over” the plot of land. Because the defendant was aware
of the possibility that the Mr and Mrs Wall had acquired, or were in the course of
acquiring, a possessory title to the plot, he arranged for the making of a statutory
declaration by the vendors setting out their use and occupation of the plot since
1967. Although the defendant was able to establish that the council had been
dispossessed of the plot for more than 12 years before it instituted proceedings for
possession by relying on his own exclusive physical control of the plot since 1973,
the case illustrates the possibility of a sale of possessory rights taking place
informally between successive possessors under the auspices of a formal transfer

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36 *Mountheard Investments Ltd v Peter Thurlow Ltd* [1988] 1 W.L.R. 1078; CA at 1086.
37 It should be noted, however, that whilst the possessor who makes the claim can rely on the adverse possession
of an earlier possessor, he can also be defeated by the knowledge of a prior possessor if the latter did not have a
"reasonable belief" that the land belonged to him: see, Land Registration Act 2002 Sch.6 para.3(4)(c).
37 *Buckinghamshire CC v Moran* [1990] Ch. 623; CA.
of property. Indeed, a chain of possessory title was the basis for a successful claim to adverse possession in *Trelor v Nute*, where the defendant was able to rely on his father’s earlier use of the disputed land which had also been conveyed to him by his father by way of gift to make up the 12-year statutory period of limitation.

**Mere possessory successors**

It is apparent that periods of adverse possession may be added together to make up a full possessory title. This is possible in relation to both registered and unregistered land. Thus, Land Registration Act 2002 Sch.6 para.11(2)(a) states:

“A person is also to be regarded ... as having been in adverse possession of an estate in land—

(a) Where he is the successor in title to an estate in land, during any period of adverse possession by a predecessor in title to that estate”

The wording clearly recognises that a possessory right is transmissible from one adverse possessor to another. In the same way, a possessory title of 12 years can be built up in unregistered land. This was recognised under the common law in *Wills v Earl of Howe*, where Kay LJ stated that “a continuous adverse possession for the statutory period, though by a succession of persons not claiming under one another, does, in my opinion, bar the true owner”. Indeed, a modern illustration of this principle can be found in *Ellis v Lambeth LBC*, where the claimant went to live in the house in 1985 when it was already occupied by a number of other squatters. In due course, they left and various other people moved in with the claimant controlling who would be allowed to do so. From 1995, however, the property was occupied by the claimant and one other person only. The register, at first instance, held that one or more of the earlier squatters (who had enjoyed possession of the property) had allowed the claimant to join them and that their possessory rights could, therefore, be transmitted to him. On this basis, the claimant was able to successfully show a continuous adverse possession of the property so as to defeat the local authority’s claim to possession. Although this aspect of the case was not argued on appeal, the judgment of Wilson J (with whom Swinton Thomas LJ agreed) accepts to appear the principle that, so long as the period of adverse possession is continuous, the adverse possession of successive trespassers may be lumped together to defeat the paper title to the property.}

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38 *Trelor v Nute* [1976] 1 W.L.R. 1295; CA.
39 *Wills v Earl of Howe* [1993] 2 Ch. 545. The case was applied in the Australian case of *Soder v Clarke* (1994).
40 S.B. (NSW) 289 at 288 High Court of New South Wales.
41 *Wills v Earl of Howe* [1993] 2 Ch. 545 at 553.
42 But if the first adverse possessor ceases occupation and abandon possession back to the paper owner, time runs only from when a second adverse possessor takes possession: see Limitation Act 1980 Sch. 1 para. 8(1): “where ... any such right of action is treated as accruing on a certain date and no person is in adverse possession on that date, the right of action shall not be treated as accruing unless and until adverse possession is taken of the land”.
43 In other words, time stops running if a squatter abandons the land before the limitation period has expired. If a second squatter later takes possession, time starts to run from that date against the paper owner. See also, s.13(6), Sch.1 para.8(2) to the 1980 Act, which makes clear that, after abandonment of possession by the squatter, the paper owner is in the same position as if he had never been deprived of possession.
44 *Ellis v Lambeth LBC* [2000] 32 H.L.R. 396; CA.
46 This has also been recognised by the Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland in *Brown v Foulds* [2003] NICA 53 para.41 per Higgins J: “A person in possession without title, but before the statutory period has elapsed, has a transmissible interest in the land (good against all the world except the paper owner). If he leaves the land and is followed by another claimant without title, the period when the paper owner is without possessive, due to the first claimant’s possessory may be added together to make up a full possessory title. This is possible in relation to both registered and unregistered land. Thus, Land Registration Act 2002 Sch.6 para.11(2)(a) states:

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A similar claim to adverse possession arose in *Lambeth LBC v Bigdon,* where the subject property, Oval Mansions, comprised 60 flats in a total of eight blocks. From 1983 onwards, various squatters began to occupy the blocks of flats. It was not, however, until 1997 that the local authority brought an action claiming possession which was defended on the ground that the defendants had acquired title to each block through a form of joint adverse possession relying on their own and their predecessors’ occupation. The Court of Appeal, however, rejected the claim holding that there was no exercise of effective joint or communal control over the individual flats and no joint adverse possession of the common parts such as the hallways and staircases. Moreover, there was no evidence of joint occupation of other common parts of the blocks, such as the outer walls, foundations and the roof, which would have been relevant to the acquisition of a freehold title to a block of flats by adverse possession. Although some doubt was cast by Simon Brown LJ on the correctness of the recorder’s decision in the earlier case of *Ellis,* above, the case again acknowledges the possibility of some form of notional transmission of possessory rights from one trespasser to another which does not require any formality complying with the Law of Property Act 1925 s.52(1). Indeed, s.55(6) of the 1925 Act seems to make this clear by stating that nothing in s.53 (conveyances to be by deed) and s.54 (creation of interests in land by parol) shall “affect the right to acquire an interest in land by virtue of taking possession”.

Does a transfer of a possessory title trigger first registration?

Although the Land Registry will not register a squatter’s title to unregistered land unless there is evidence of adverse possession for at least 12 years, a transfer of possessory rights (whether by gift or sale) to a successor in title will (it seems) trigger an application for first registration. In this connection, the Land Registry Practice Guide 5: “Adverse Possession of (1) Unregistered and (2) Registered land where a Right to be Registered was acquired before 13 October 2003” states that, if the successor does not apply for first registration within two months of the transfer of the possessory estate, the title to this estate will revert to the transferor, who will then hold it on a bare trust for the successor. The effect of this is that the successor will have a beneficial interest in this freehold possessory estate and, therefore, is able to lodge a caution against first registration against anyone else claiming to the benefit of the second claimant. The merger of the two (or more) periods of possession may defeat the paper owner.” The Australian case law is to the same effect: see e.g. *Mckay v Coonawarra Property Ltd* [1974] 2 N.S.W.L.R. 464 at 466–477, where the Court of Appeal of New South Wales held that, as long as there was no break in possession by successive trespassers, the cumulative time during which they adversely possessed the land could extinguish the paper title to the benefit of the last trespasser. See also, *Public Trustee v Bedford* (1986) 4 B.P.R. 97 at 255 Supreme Court of New South Wales: “There can ... be a series of trespassers on the land and, so long as there is no abandonment by any of them, the time during which each of those trespassers is in adverse possession will be added to the time of his successors so that, if there is no break in the possession, the total time of a series of trespassers will run against the owner of the land”.

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2. *Lambeth LBC v Bigdon* (2001) 33 H.L.R. (3); CA at [57].
3. 1 See, Land Registry Practice Guide 5: “Adverse Possession of (1) Unregistered and (2) Registered land where a Right to be Registered was acquired before 13 October 2003” s.8 “Protection Prior to Registration of the Squatter”.
4. See, Land Registry Act 1925 s.75(2), for periods of limitation completed before 13 October 2003.
5. Updated 6 September 2015.
6. 1 See, Land Registry Practice Guide 5: “Adverse Possession of (1) Unregistered and (2) Registered land where a Right to be Registered was acquired before 13 October 2003” s.8 “Protection Prior to Registration of the Squatter”.
7. Presumably also, an adverse possessor can validly declare an express trust of his possessory title thereby creating an equitable interest carved out of his own common law possessory title. Such equitable interest would also then enable the beneficial owner to lodge a caution against first registration.

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claiming title to the land. Here again, however, there may be good reason why the squatter would not wish to apply for first registration as this would have the potential of alerting the registered proprietor of the existence of the squatter and prompt a claim to recover possession of the land. Indeed, this has been recognised most recently in the Law Commission's Consultation Paper, “Updating the Land Registration Act 2002” No.227, (2016), where it is stated that “there may be little incentive for an adverse possessor to register a ... title [because] [d]oing so may draw attention to his or her claim to the land and, therefore, prompt the registered proprietor to commence proceedings to bring the adverse possession to an end”.

In the case of registered land, the possibility of registering a transfer of a possessory estate as between successive squatters does not arise. If a first possessor had, say five years' adverse possession and then transferred such rights as he had in the land to a second possessor, the latter could not, at that point, apply for registration, as a minimum of ten years possession, as we have seen, is required under the Land Registration Act 2002.

Other alienation rights

Apart from the transmission of a possessory title by sale or gift, or on death, there is the possibility that the adverse possessor may grant a form of possessory leasehold estate over the land. In this connection, although the adverse possessor has, as we have seen, the equivalent of a fee simple estate in possession, this cannot, it is submitted, clothe him with the necessary power to create a legal lease binding against the whole world. The principle of relativity of title dictates that the possessor is capable of giving a good title against the rest of the world but not someone having a better legal right to possession. This means that any grant of a tenancy over the land by the possessor will confer exclusive possession (and give rights against all who wrongfully interfere with possession) but will not bind the superior paper owner. To this extent, the tenancy will have somewhat similar characteristics

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51 The application to lodge a caution is made on the basis that the applicant is entitled to an interest affecting a freehold estate as opposed to bring the owner of such an estate: see, Land Registration Act 2002 s.15(1)(b). The freehold estate involved is the possessory estate which is the subject of the transfer by the earlier squatter.
53 The Law Commission has recently proposed that an adverse possessor of land should not be able to apply for registration with possessory title until either title has been extinguished under the Limitation Act 1980 (unregistered land) or except through the procedure in the Land Registration Act 2002 Sch.6 (registered land): Law Commission Consultation Paper, “Updating the Land Registration Act 2002” No.227 (2016) paras 17.63-17.71.
54 Any adverse possessor of registered land who is already a beneficiary under a trust within s.7(1)(d) of the 1925 Act has the right to be registered as proprietor: see, Land Registration Act 2002 Sch.12 para.18(1). This qualifies as a proprietary right and so is capable of being an overriding interest. It is unclear, however, whether there must be actual occupation for the right to be classified as an overriding interest: see, Thomson v Foy [2009] EWHC 1076 (Ch). Where the possessor has not yet accrued 10 years' adverse possession, it seems that a successor in title to the registered proprietor will take subject to the period of adverse possession which the possessor has already accrued. According to Bufton v Roper, Registered Conveyancing, Leicester, July 2014, para.33.023, “this would follow from the wording of the general principle under Schedule 6, para.1, which defines the necessary period of adverse possession and provides that the squatter may apply once `he has been in adverse possession of the estate for the period of ten years ending on the date of the application’.” According to the authors, “it should therefore make no difference that there has been a change of proprietor of the estate in the meantime”.
55 It would be surprising, however, if a mere trespasser (who did not have the necessary degree of physical possession and intention to possess), could grant a possessory lease. E.g. T enters onto X's field and grants T a weekly tenancy of the land—a valid possessory leasehold estate will not arise in these circumstances as T does not have possession in the sense of a legal fee simple estate.
Adverse Possession and the Transmissibility of Possessory Rights

The limited grounds under which the possessor may be registered following objection

As mentioned earlier, if an objection to the possessor's application for registration is received in time, he will not be registered unless the case falls within one of the three exceptional grounds listed in para. 5, Sch. 6 to the 2002 Act. This accords with one of the underlying objectives of the 2002 Act, namely, that the basis of title should be the register and that "the title that registration confers should be capable of being overridden by adverse possession only where it is essential to ensure the marketability of land or to prevent unfairness".5

The first ground6 is that it would be unconscionable because of an equity of estoppel for the registered proprietor to seek to dispossess the applicant and the circumstances are such that the applicant ought to be registered as the proprietor. The obvious difficulty here is that a possessor who occupies land under...

5 See, Brutor v London & Quadrant Housing Trust [2000] 1 A.C. 406; HL. The same may be true of an easement, that if expressly granted by the adverse possessor, it would not bind the paper owner. However, presumably, an easement by prescription would be acquired against the paper owner regardless whether he was in possession or not. It is necessary to show acquiescence of the quasi-servient owner, which requires "a power to stop the acts or use in respect of them" (see, Dulsow v Angas & Co [1881] App. Ct. 740), but the paper owner has that power unless and until the adverse possessor gains an indefeasible title.


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circumstances giving rise to a proprietary estoppel is unlikely to be in adverse possession. If the registered proprietor encourages the possessor to occupy the land, then presumably this would suggest that the possessor is occupying with the former's consent. It would seem, therefore, that this ground may be confined to cases where the paper owner has stood by while the possessor mistakenly builds on the disputed land, or in which there is an informal purchase and sale and the purchaser goes into possession without taking any steps to perfect his title.\(^{60}\) Quite apart from the very limited circumstances under which this ground is likely to operate, it is important to bear in mind that the Land Registry retains a discretion whether or not to register the applicant as proprietor even if a proprietary estoppel is made out. This important discretion, reserved in practice now for the First-tier Tribunal (in place of the Adjudicator), may result in the satisfaction of the applicant's estoppel equity by some means other than his registration as proprietor of the disputed land such as an award of monetary compensation.\(^{64}\)

The second ground\(^{65}\) is that the applicant is for some other reason entitled to be registered as the proprietor of the land. Although expressed in broad terms, the ground appears to be limited to cases where, for example, the possessor is entitled to the land as a beneficiary under a will or on intestacy of the previous registered proprietor, or where a purchaser has gone into possession after paying the purchase price but without a formal transfer of the title.\(^{66}\) According to the Land Registry, this second ground is rarely successfully used in practice.\(^{67}\)

The third ground\(^{68}\) is that (1) the land to which the application relates is adjacent to land belonging to the applicant; (2) the exact line of the boundary between the two has not been determined; (3) for at least ten years of the period of adverse possession ending on the date of the application, the applicant (or any predecessor in title) reasonably believed that the land to which the application relates belonged to him; and (4) the estate to which the application relates was registered more than one year prior to the date of the application. Significantly, the ground is intended to apply only to genuine cases in which the boundary between two pieces of land is not fixed under the Land Registration Rules 2003\(^{69}\) and the boundary line has been in its present position for at least the last ten years. The ground will not, therefore, apply where the applicant has moved the boundary deliberately (hoping to acquire more land from a neighbour) because the applicant must show that he "reasonably believed" that the land in question belonged to him or her. Moreover, it is clear that the burden of proof as to reasonable belief falls on the applicant and, although he may at all times honestly believed that the disputed land belonged to him, this is not enough to satisfy the condition—the test is whether the applicant was reasonable in holding the belief that he did in all the circumstances. That, in turn, may involve the question as to whether the applicant should have made

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\(^{64}\) See, Land Registration Act 2002 s.110(4).

\(^{65}\) See, Land Registration Act 2002 Sch.6 para.54).

\(^{66}\) These examples are derived from the joint Law Commission/HM Land Registry Report, "Land Registration for the Twenty-First Century: A Conveyancing Revolution" (2001) Law Com.No.271 paras 14.36-14.52. See also Bridges.\(^{67}\)


enquiries of his solicitors (or elsewhere) as to whether the disputed land was, in fact, comprised within his paper title.\footnote{Sec. IAM Group plc v Chowdhry [2012] EWCA Civ 505; CA at [27] per Etherton LJ. In Zarb v Parry [2011] EWCA Civ 1396; CA, on the other hand, the applicant was able to satisfy the requirement of reasonable belief even though the paper owner had challenged the assertion of ownership of the disputed land during the last couple of years of possession.}

The point to make here is that, even in cases where ten years of adverse possession has accrued, the success of the application to be registered as proprietor will depend on whether the squatter is able to bring his situation within one of the three limited grounds listed in para.5 of Sch.6.\footnote{Interestingly, the Law Commission has sought views as to whether the first two grounds in para.5 of Sch.6 should be removed: see, Law Commission Consultation Paper, “Updating the Land Registration Act 2002” No.227 (2016) para 17.25-17.35. It is, of course, only the third ground in which the claim to the land succeeds through adverse possession.} The overall impression is that, in the majority of cases, this will be a difficult obstacle to overcome discouraging the bringing of many applications of this kind.

The writers’ study

The temptation to “stay quiet” and not make an application to be registered as proprietor is borne out by the writers’ recent study based on a questionnaire sent out to 200 conveyancing solicitors (specialising in real estate) throughout England and Wales in December 2016/January 2017.

The writers’ findings were compiled from replies to the questionnaire (comprising 16 separate questions) with the sample being selected randomly from senior practitioners (taken from the Law Society website) grouped evenly amongst five different regions, namely, London, the South East, the South West, the Midlands, the North and Wales. The sample frame was given three weeks within which to return a response. The questionnaire itself was structured so as to allow for a choice of answers to a particular question (so as to avoid leading a response) or, alternatively, to provide an opportunity for more detailed comment to deliberately open-ended questions. A response rate of 30 per cent (representing 60 substantive replies) was achieved from the solicitors contacted.\footnote{A good geographical spread of responses was received, albeit a number were returned anonymously, including London, Canterbury, Watford, St Albans, Cheltenham, Southchurch, Colchester, Bradford, Bath, Bury St Edmunds, Cardiff, Kent, Manchester, Buckinghamshire, Guildford and Lincolnshire. The majority of replies were received from partners or senior associates.}

Not surprisingly, perhaps, as many as 67 per cent of solicitors who responded indicated that they had advised clients who had been in adverse possession of land not to apply for registration because of the risk of alerting the registered proprietor to the adverse possession and prompting opposition to the application. A variety of reasons were put forward: (1) that possession was not long enough to qualify (17 per cent); (2) there was a lack of factual possession (33 per cent); (3) there was no intention to dispossess (13 per cent); (4) possession was with the owner’s consent or licence (7 per cent); and (5) the application was likely to be rejected because the three exceptional grounds listed in Sch.6 para.5 to the 2002 Act were unlikely to be met (30 per cent). The last figure is particularly interesting as it shows that a significant number of potential applications are not pursued because of the difficulty envisaged in complying with the 2002 Act requirements. Typical responses included: “it would alert the owner of the paper title who might object”; “the client was not able to possess against the Crown so he decided to stay quiet”;